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At present, a surprisingly wide variety of commentators and observers seem to
agree that Europeans are failing to tackle urgent policy challenges. As a result,
so the argument does, Europeans are falling further and further behind in an
increasingly competitive global race. Part of the reason, these commentators
believe, is the very nature of policy challenges that face European politicians,
policy-makers and citizens. Today’s policy problems are messy: underlying
causes are rarely known in full, the impacts are complex, and repercussions are
likely to spill over into other policy domains or jurisdictions. For this reason,
polities across the European continent feature divisive and protracted policy
conflicts about how to solve messy policy problems.
This thesis, then, sets out to understand the nature of this policy conflict
about messy policy problems in contemporary policy-making contexts. Con-
ventionally, the social sciences explain policy conflict in terms of a clash of
self-interested policy actors. Interest-based approaches, however, tell only part
of the story. In particular, they entirely omit the impact of ideas, knowledge and
world-views on conflicts about messy policy problems. Since, however, “ideas
matter” in policy-making, understanding of policy conflict requires analysing
the way policy actors clash over ideas and knowledge. This, then, gives rise
to the three general research questions of the thesis: is there a way to analyse
policy conflict in terms of ideas, knowledge and world-views; what insights into
conflict in contemporary European policy domains does such an ideas-based
approach offer; and what can the analysis of ideas-driven policy conflict tell
us about governance in European policy domains? The thesis addresses these
questions in two parts.
Part I of the thesis develops the conceptual framework for policy-oriented
discourse analysis designed to analyse conflict about messy policy problems.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 provide both the general conceptual backdrop as well as
introduce central concepts and tools used in the discourse-analytical framework.
Chapter 2 introduces the idea of the “differentiated polity” by discussing (pre-
dominantly British) literature on policy networks and policy communities. The
differentiated polity — that is the realisation that contemporary policy-making
takes place in functionally segregated and specialised institutional network —
provides the institutional setting for the discourse-analytical framework. In
turn, Chapter 3 maintained that what goes on between policy actors in pol-
icy networks and policy communities is fundamentally argumentative and con-
flictual. By critically reviewing the so-called “Argumentative Turn in Policy
Analysis and Planning”, the chapter contributes a range of instruments, con-
cepts and tools that aim to analyse the impact of divergent ideas, knowledge
and world-views on contemporary policy processes. In Chapter 4, the the-
sis discusses five different theories that explain policy processes in terms of
the interaction between ideas and institutions: the “Politology of Knowledge”
[Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993], the “Multiple Streams Analysis” [Kingdon, 1984,
Kingdon, 1995], “Epistemic Communities” [Adler and Haas, 1992], “Advocacy
Framework Coalition” [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993b], and “cultural the-
ory”. This chapter discusses and compares the strengths and weaknesses of each
theory thereby identifying the key concepts and tools deployed in the discourse-
analytical conceptual framework.
Chapter 5 develops the conceptual framework for policy-oriented discourse
analysis by building in the synergies between different frameworks and theories
discussed in Part I of the thesis. The aim here is to capitalise on the mu-
tual strengths of each approach while avoiding the specific weaknesses. The
conceptual framework explains policy conflict over messy issues in terms of fun-
damentally incompatible “perceptual lenses” or policy-frames. Policy actors
— networks of individuals that coalesce around a particular policy frame and
policy project — use these lenses or frames to make sense of complex and uncer-
tain policy problems. These policy frames, however, are fundamentally biased
because they emerge from and legitimate incompatible forms of social organisa-
tion. Yet, since frames are irreducible, all knowledge about messy policy issues
is inherently relative and partial. The discourse-analytical framework uses the
“policy stories” method to reconstruct and compare arguments based on frames
in terms of coherent narratives. In this way, the chapter designs a discourse-
analytical framework capable of systematic analysing the scope, structure, and
impact of policy conflict about messy policy problems.
Part II of the thesis applies the discourse-analytical framework to three dis-
tinct policy domains: European transport policy, environmental security and
pension reform. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 each feature a similar structure. In each
chapter, the analysis uses the policy stories method to gauge the scope of pol-
icy conflict by comparing and juxtaposing contending policy stories about the
particular issue. Moreover, in each chapter the analysis also explores the struc-
ture of policy conflict: here, each chapter scrutinises and compares the areas of
agreement and disagreement between each policy story. Last, the chapters also
examine the potential impacts of contending policy arguments. This involves
scrutinising the contending policy arguments for blind-spots and weaknesses.
Given that of policy arguments emerge from frames based in fundamentally
incompatible forms of social organisation, the chapters find that ideas-driven
policy conflict about complex, uncertain and transversal policy problems is en-
demic and intractable. Thus, the case studies suggest that a wide scope of policy
conflict increases the likelihood of policy debate deteriorating into a “dialogue of
the deaf”. The inherent selectivity of policy frames, in turn, implies that a nar-
row scope of policy conflict leaves policy processes vulnerable to unanticipated
consequences and policy failure. Chapter 9 applies the conceptual framework to
explore the impact of frame-based policy conflict on recent continental European
pension reform experiences. Counter to much of the social scientific literature,
the chapter shows how widening the scope of policy conflict in European pen-
sion reform debates brought about structural changes in continental European
pension systems.
The conclusion reviews the argument, evidence and findings of the previous
chapters. The frame-based discourse analysis of Part II suggests that inevitable
and intractable policy conflict is a valuable, if volatile, resource for dealing with
messy policy problems. On the one hand, a wide scope of conflict maximises
the pool of potential policy solutions available to policy actors while minimis-
ing unanticipated consequences. On the other hand, a responsive policy debate
ensures that contending policy actors profit from the critical potential of policy
conflict without descending into a dialogue of the deaf. Based on the application
of the discourse-analytical framework to three different policy domains, the con-
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clusion outlines an agenda for future research. This research will revolve around
two main ideas. First, future research will explore the implication of a frame-
based analysis of policy conflict for pluralist democracy in Europe. The analysis
in the empirical chapters of Part II suggests a positive relationship between pol-
icy conflict, policy change and pluralist democracy. A future research agenda
will investigate how the discourse-analytical framework can be deployed to re-
furbish pluralist theory and practice for contemporary policy processes. Second,
the future research agenda will also look at how the discourse-analytical frame-
work may be applied to overcoming or mitigating intractable policy conflict
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In terms of public policy-making, Europeans have got off to an inauspicious start
into the 21st century. Creaking welfare states, outdated tax systems, and overly
protective labour laws are threatening to stifle economic growth and employ-
ment. Environmental problems such as global climate change or transboundary
air pollution are likely to leave coming generations with an unsalvageable mess.
Inefficient research and development infrastructures mean that Europeans will
continue to lag behind the USA and Asia in the development of future technolo-
gies. Thorny issues concerning immigration into Europe have fuelled unsavoury
behaviour in both host and immigrant populations. In addition to this (far from
exhaustive) list of unresolved policy issues, localisation and rapid socio-cultural
changes have transformed beyond recognition the contexts for dealing with any
policy issue, including old favourites such as unemployment, crime or social pol-
icy. If Europeans are to continue enjoying the quality of life they have become
accustomed to, many commentators from politics, policy-making, the media and
academia warn, policy-makers need to act immediately and decisively to solve
the pressing policy challenges of our time.
But, as even the most cursory survey of any policy issue in Europe will
confirm, this is easier said than done. Fundamental economic, political and
socio-cultural changes in Europe have not only remodelled the backdrop for
policy-making, they have also changed the very nature of policy challenges Eu-
ropean politicians, policy-makers and citizens face today. As the Cabinet Office
in the UK points out, the
“. . . world for which policy-makers have to develop policies is be-
coming increasingly complex, uncertain and unpredictable. The
electorate is better informed, has rising expectation and is making
growing demands for services tailored to their individual needs. Key
policy issues, such as social exclusion and reducing crime, overlap
and have proved resistant to previous attempts to tackle them, yet
the world is increasingly inter-connected and inter-dependent. Issues
switch quickly from the domestic to the international arena and an
increasingly wide diversity of interests needs to be co-coordinated
and harnessed. Governments across the world need to be able to
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respond quickly to events to provide the support that people need
to adapt to change and that businesses need to prosper. In paral-
lel with these external pressures, the Government is asking policy
makers to focus on solutions that work across existing organisa-
tional boundaries and on bringing about change in the real world.
Policy makers must adapt to this new, fast-moving, challenging
environment if public policy is to remain credible and effective”
[Strategic Policy-MakingTeam, 1999].
Contemporary policy problems, then, are messy.
The uncertain, complex and transversal nature of contemporary policy prob-
lems give rise to divisive and persistent policy conflict about how to solve them.
Not only are these conflicts protracted and increasingly bitter, they have also
proved remarkably resistant to resolution
[Rein and Schön, 1993, Rein and Schön, 1994]. This, in turn, has created it-
erative and circular policy processes yielding incremental policy outputs far
removed from the ideal of rational policy-making [Hogwood and Gunn, 1984,
de Leon, 1999]. The widely perceived inability of European policy-makers to
master these problems, as the Cabinet Office suggests with characteristically
British reserve, is raising uncomfortable questions about the legitimacy of democ-
racy in Europe
[Bergheim et al., 2003, Commission, 2001]. Repeated disappointments and the
perceived inability to deal with urgent policy problems have led European cit-
izens to disengage with politics and pluralist democracy [OECD PUMA, 2001,
Caddy, 2001, Commission, 2001]. Decreasing voter turnout and the worrying
success of (mostly right-wing) extremist parties at elections across Europe are
outcomes of what the European Commission perceives to be a central policy
paradox:
“On the one hand, Europeans want them [policy-makers] to find
solutions to the major problems confronting our societies. On the
other hand, people increasingly distrust institutions and politics or
are simply not interested in them” [Commission, 2001, p.3].
If governments in Europe are to remain “credible and effective” with Euro-
pean voters, then, they will have to understand and deal with intractable and
persistent policy conflict.
1.1 Conflict as a Clash of Interest
One way of understanding policy conflict is to model it in terms of self-interested
competition between rational policy actors. On this view, conflict about messy
policy issues stubbornly resists resolution, thinkers such as George Tsebelis,
Kent Weaver, Paul Pierson and many others contend, due to institutional char-
acteristics of European polities. Pluralist democracies provide organised inter-
ests with power over the policy process disproportionate to either their size
or actual socio-economic influence [Tsebelis, 2002, Bonoli, 2000, Pierson, 1996,
Pierson, 2001, Bergheim et al., 2003]. Strategically placed at critical junctures
in the decision-making process (so-called “veto-points”), these policy actors
(so-called “veto-players”) can derail or threaten to derail any policy initia-
tive perceived to jeopardise their interests. Political institutions that offer
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veto-players many opportunities to contest government policy, George Tse-
belis argues, make a departure from the policy status quo is highly unlikely.
What little policy change does take place is typically accompanied by vocifer-
ous squabbling and haggling as governments buy off obstructive veto-players
[Leibfried and Obinger, 2001, Bonoli, 2000].
The implications of this argument are to restore policy-making capability to
governments by diminishing the influence of veto-players. Indeed, much (but
by no means all) of what goes under the catch-phrase of “modern government”
reflects this line of argumentation [OECD PUMA, 2001, Caddy, 2001]. In prac-
tise, this has meant reducing the scope of policy conflict at both the institutional
and ideational level.
At the structural level, policy actors across Europe are currently debating
how best to streamline and simplify political institutions at regional, national
and European level (Österreichkonvent, Konvent für Deutschland, European
Convention). Here, advocates suggest to first separate the appropriate policy-
making competences at different levels of governance and, second, to pare down
substantive policy input across different levels of governance to the merely ad-
visory (the subsidiarity principle) [Strohmeier, 2003]. Moreover, advocates also
urge policy-makers to shake-up ossified power relations within levels of gover-
nance. Policy proposals include changes to electoral systems [Strohmeier, 2003],
reform of socio-economic decision-making [Bergheim et al., 2003] and
re-alignments in the horizontal separation of power towards the executive
[Herzog, 2004]. In either case, the expressed aim is to reduce the influence
of veto-players by curtailing their ability to generate policy conflict.
At the ideational level, policy actors (particularly in the UK and at European
level) plan to contain policy conflict with sophisticated knowledge management
systems. By basing policy on objective evidence about “what works”, policy ac-
tors hope to create “a common policy focus, [thereby] encouraging participation
and mutual understanding. . . ” among policy actors
[Strategic Policy-Making Team, 1999, emphasis added]. On this view, values are
not only detrimental to understanding and participation, policy positions based
on values are “. . . likely to fail because they may not be grounded in the eco-
nomic, institutional and social reality of the problem”[The Urban Institute, 2003,
emphasis added, p.2]. By definition, arguments that challenge the prevalent per-
ception of ’what works’ can be safely ignored based as they must be on values
rather than evidence. In this way, knowledge management systems designed to
bring about “Evidence-Based Policy-Making” help control the policy agenda by
narrowing the scope of permitted problems and solutions in the debate.
1.2 Conflict as a Clash of Ideas
While contemporary politics in Europe undoubtedly is a conflict about who gets
what, when and how [Lasswell, 1936], that is not all it is. Another and possibly
more fruitful way of coming to terms with protracted and intractable policy
conflict is to think of it as the encounter of incommensurable ideas, ideologies
and world-views.
On this view, ideas matter. Here, argue thinkers such as Deborah Stone,
Frank Fischer, John Dryzek or Giandomenico Majone, ideas are far more than
the public face of cynically self-interested politicking. Rather, ideas, ideologies
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and world-views instill in policy actors the passion and drive for political en-
gagement and confrontation. Shared values help policy actors forge coalitions
and associations, help them identify shared causes as well as target common
enemies. In this sense, as the policy scientists Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-
Smith argue, ideas and values not only motivate, they also are the “glue” en-
abling political communities to cohere and persevere in the face of adversity
[Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993b]. Thus, boiling political conflict down to
disputes about “distributional equilibria” [Bonoli, 2000] ignores what Deborah
Stone calls “the essence of policy-making in political communities: the struggle
over ideas” [Stone, 1988, Stone, 1997, see also Chapter 3].
However, placing ideas rather than self-interest at the heart of an explana-
tory strategy is more than a matter of intellectual taste or fancy. At a more fun-
damental level, ideas, ideologies and world-views matter because policy actors
rely on them to make sense of complex, uncertain and transversal policy issues
[Schwarz and Thompson, 1990, Rayner, 1991, Adler and Haas, 1992]. Uncer-
tainty means that facts and evidence do not speak for themselves
[Thompson, 1997]. On the contrary, to be of any practical use to policy-makers,
data and evidence require interpretation and judgement
[Vickers, 1965, Fischer and Forester, 1993, Strategic Policy-Making Team, 1999].
By highlighting some aspects while backgrounding others, ideas and world-
views help policy actors identify salience and relevance of data for policy-
making. The criteria for fore- and backgrounding, however, are “trans-scientific”
[Weinberg, 1972]: they are beyond validation by rational, objective or scientific
means. For this reason, interpretation of messy policy issues relies on the values
that underlie particular world-views [Rayner, 1991].
Since understanding messy policy problems requires the mobilisation of ideas
and values, explaining policy conflict in terms of competing rational self-interests
alone no longer seems a viable option. Successful policy-making in terms of a
self-interested bargaining paradigm assumes a common base for finding and ne-
gotiating mutually beneficial trade-offs [Lindblom, 1958, Wildavsky, 1987]. The
basic problem with complex, uncertain and transversal policy challenges is that
the base has become the object of negotiation and dispute. Policy conflict re-
volving around messy policy issues is about the basic nature of the issue and
what this could mean for policy making rather than the distribution of the
associated costs and benefits.
This raises three sets of questions:
Is there a way of systematically analysing policy conflict that takes account
of the role of ideas in European policy processes? In other words, can we
devise a conceptual framework that
• explains how ideas generate intractable and persistent policy conflict?
• allows us to explore the characteristics of policy conflict in European
policy domains?
• provides a way of identifying and understanding the role of policy
conflict in processes of institutional and policy change?
What insights into conflict in contemporary European policy domains does
such an ideas-based approach offer?
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• How do messy policy problems get framed and how does that lead to
policy conflict?
• What is the nature of policy conflict in these domains?
• How do framings affect potential solutions for messy policy problems?
What can the analysis of ideas-driven policy conflict tell us about governance
in European policy domains?
• How does ideas-based policy conflict impinge on policy change in
Europe?
• What are the implications of an ideas-based analysis for the struc-
tures and processes of policy-making in European policy domains?
These are precisely the questions this thesis will address.
1.3 Aims and Research Tasks
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore how the simple but powerful insight
that “ideas matter” affects the understanding and analysis of conflict about
complex, uncertain and transversal policy problems. Pursuing this overall aim
implies addressing three constituent objectives, each generating a specific set of
research tasks.
First, the thesis will examine the theoretical implications of the insight that
“ideas matter” for policy analysis. The necessary concepts and tools for integrat-
ing ideas into the analysis of policy conflict are scattered across many different
approaches in the social sciences. The thesis aims to identify the relevant con-
cepts in the policy sciences and integrate them into a conceptual framework for
analysing policy conflict about messy policy problems. By using a plurality of
different approaches, the framework aims to exploit complementarities of the
relevant contemporary theories of policy-making. In this way, the conceptual
framework can build on the strengths while avoiding the weaknesses of exist-
ing approaches (as best as is possible). In terms of research tasks, the thesis
will first explore and assess the strengths, weaknesses and complementarities of
selected theories of policy-making. Then the thesis will integrate the relevant
concepts and tools into an analytical framework for understanding how ideas
give rise to conflict about messy policy problems.
Second, the thesis aims to show how such a conceptual framework offers
insights into policy conflict in European policy domains. By applying the
framework to policy debates in three European policy domains, the thesis aims
to demonstrate that a conceptual strategy incorporating ideas, knowledge and
world-views significantly contributes to our understanding of contemporary policy-
making. In this sense, the thesis aims to show that an ideational explanation
can augment and complement more conventional accounts of conflict based on
rational self-interest. The research tasks that emerge from this aim relate to
the application of the conceptual framework for policy-oriented discourse analy-
sis. After operationalising the conceptual framework for empirical analysis, the
thesis will apply the framework to policy domains in Europe. In applying the
conceptual framework, the analysis will identify, explore and compare compet-
ing narratives that policy actors devise to make sense of messy policy issues. In
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this way, the thesis aims to gauge the conflicts that surround complex, uncertain
and transversal policy challenges.
Last, yet closely related, the thesis will elicit the wider implication of an
ideas-based analysis for the governance of European policy domains. On the
one hand, this involves exploring the relationship between ideas-based conflict
and policy change in European policy domains. On the other hand, the analysis
will also take investigate the structural and procedural ramifications for sub-
political policy-making. These will then lead to an outline of an agenda for
future research into contemporary policy-making, conflict and democracy at
both a theoretical-conceptual and practical-empirical level.
The thesis will pursue the objectives and research tasks in two parts. In
Part I of the thesis, Chapters 2, 3,4, and 5 critically review a selection of dif-
ferent approaches and theories in contemporary policy sciences. The goal here
is to assemble a conceptual framework for analysing and comparing competing
discourses in contemporary policy making. In Part II of the thesis (Chapters 6,
7, 8 and 9) will apply this framework to three different policy issues: European
transport policy, environmental security and pension reform. In the concluding
chapter, the thesis will summarise and compare the findings and discuss their
wider implications for pluralist democracy in Europe. This exposition will be
of a forward-looking character in that it plots the direction in which the thesis
points both conceptual-theoretical and empirical-practical future research.
The rest of this introduction outlines the basic argument of the thesis by
providing an overview of the chapters.
1.4 Ideas, Discourses and Policy-Making: The
Conceptual Framework for Analysing Con-
flict about Messy Policy Problems
The observation that “ideas matter” in policy process is almost a truism. A far
more controversial and, therefore, more interesting question to ask about ideas
in policymaking is: how and in what ways do ideas matter in contemporary
policy processes?
Ideas matter, this thesis suggests, because institutions matter [Putnam, 1993,
Pierson, 1996, March and Olsen, 1989, Pierson, 2001]. On this view, institu-
tions and ideas are inextricably intertwined
[Douglas, 1970, Douglas, 1987, Douglas, 1992, Douglas, 1996]. Institution give
rise to systematic shared sets of ideas and knowledge that help its members
impose meaning on a potentially anarchic set of events [Rayner, 1991]. Here,
knowledge and meaning are public resources that individuals draw on in social
interaction and co-operation [Geertz, 1973]. Thus, ideas enable and coordinate
collective action (such as, for example, policy-making). Collective action, in
turn, produces and reproduces institutions: by drawing on knowledge to create
meaning, ideas and knowledge prescribes social practise which in turn repro-
duces patterns of transaction typical to particular institutions. On this view,
conflict over the definition, understanding and solution of messy policy prob-
lems flares when members of different institutions bring their perceptual lenses
to bear on complex, uncertain and transversal policy problems. Thus, the in-
terrelationship between ideas and institutions in policy-making provides the
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theoretical and methodological focus for this thesis.
In Part I, the thesis will investigate how institutions and ideas impinge of
policy-making by adopting a methodologically pluralist approach. Attempting
to explain contemporary policy processes within only one theory, Wayne Par-
sons argues, inevitably overtaxes the explanatory capabilities of the particular
approach [Parsons, 1995]. That is why Parsons believes public policy analysis
“. . . to be essentially a bootstrapping activity. No one theory or
model is adequate to explain the complexity of the policy activity
of the modern state. The analyst must accept the pluralistic na-
ture of the enquiry, both in terms of the interdisciplinary quality
of investigation and the need for a hermeneutic tolerance of diver-
sity. The analysis of public policy therefore involves an appreciation
of the network of ideas, concepts and words which form the world
of explanation within which policy-making and analysis take place”
[Parsons, 1995, p.73].
Understanding the relationships and processes through which institutions
and ideas impinge on policy-making, then, implies using a number of different
theoretical and methodological tools. Such a pluralist approach allows the ana-
lyst to explore the same phenomena from different theoretical vantage points and
through different “perceptual lenses” [Allison, 1971]. This process of conceptual
triangulation provides a balanced and more complete picture of the particular
aspect of policy-making under scrutiny by forcing the analyst to engage in a
critical process of reflection.
For this reason, the chapters of Part I introduce and critically discuss a range
of different contemporary approaches to explaining policy-making. The under-
lying aim of this section is twofold. First, the chapters provide the conceptual
background for the theoretical and empirical analysis of this thesis. Second, the
analysis in Part I also trawls through a selection of relevant theories, frame-
works and approaches in search of concepts that can help structure the analysis
of conflict about messy policy challenges.
Chapter 2 outlines some of the conceptual tools for analysing the insti-
tutional and organisational structures of policy-making in Europe. This ap-
proach invites the analyst to focus attention on the structures and processes
that make-up the subpolitics of contemporary policy-making. The policy sci-
ences use theories of policy networks and policy communities to map structures
of subpolitical policy-making. The basic premise of policy network approaches
is that contemporary democracies are so-called “differentiated polities”. Here,
the growing remit of the state coupled with the increasing technical sophisti-
cation of policy issues have meant that policy-making takes place in discrete,
issue-oriented and highly specialised organisational networks. These networks
consist of organisations from the public, the private and the tertiary sectors.
Concentrating mainly on European thinkers, Chapter 2 introduces and re-
views the two contending schools on policy networks and policy communi-
ties. One approach, associated with the work of the British political scien-
tist R.A.W. Rhodes, understands policy networks as sectoral configurations
in which organisations relate to each other in terms of resource dependencies
[Rhodes, 1990, Rhodes, 1997]. Here, the network metaphor describes the in-
stitutional location or venues of policy-making. The second school of thought,
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associated with the American political scientist Hugh Heclo or the British re-
searcher Jeremy Richardson, prefers to think about policy communities as so-
cial units consisting of individual policy-makers [Heclo, 1978, Richardson, 1982].
This approach, in turn, understands policy communities more in terms of pol-
icy actors rather than policy venues. Both approaches come to different con-
clusions about the democratic and governance implications of the differenti-
ated polity. Policy networks, Rhodes argues, represent a threat to popular
sovereignty and democratic accountability because representative democracies
are poorly equipped for controlling policy networks. Richardson, in turn, ar-
gues that policy communities, far from being a threat to democracy, are a fresh
articulation of pluralism and pluralist policy-making. However, both strands
of literature thematise access to policy networks and policy communities as a
key determinant of contemporary policy-making. Chapter 2 closes by critically
examining the key weaknesses in the policy network and policy community lit-
erature. Unnecessary terminological confusion aside, policy network and policy
community concepts overemphasises organisational continuity to the detriment
of understanding institutional change. Moreover, theories of policy networks
and policy communities have little to say about the role of ideas and ideologies
in the differentiated policy-making.
While Chapter 2 concentrates on the institutions of policy-making, Chap-
ter 3 looks at the role of ideas, ideology and knowledge in the policy pro-
cess. In this chapter, the thesis reviews a collection of theories and frame-
works that, taken together, account for the so-called “Argumentative Turn
in Policy Analysis and Planning” [Stone, 1988, Majone, 1989, Dryzek, 1990,
Fischer and Forester, 1993, Stone, 1997]. More a multi-disciplinary assortment
of different social scientific approaches than a coherent theory, the Argumen-
tative Turn urges us to reconsider the relationship between ideas and policy-
making. Rather than conceiving policy-making as rational problem-solving, we
should think of policy-making as an argumentative process. This basic insight
has a number of ramifications for both policy-making and policy analysis.
First, it suggests we abandon the belief that applying scientific methods to
objective policy problems invariably leads to better, meaning more rational,
decision-making. Such a belief, the core of what Deborah Stone calls the “ra-
tionality project”, emerges from a number of questionable assumptions about
the relationship between knowledge and reality, the underlying model of soci-
ety, as well as the perception of the individual within this society [Stone, 1997,
Stone, 1988].
Second, the argumentative nature of policy-making suggests that policy-
analysis and politics are about crafting and deploying plausible arguments. Far
from separating the objective from the subjective, effective policy analysis uses
a battery of rhetorical skills to weave values and facts into an argumentative
fabric. Using these arguments, policy actors define problems, apportion blame,
identify solutions and ascribe responsibilities. Thus, argue proponents of the
Argumentative Turn, we can think of politics as the conflict over the naming and
labelling of issues. These conflicts, originating in fundamentally incompatible
ways of viewing the world or “frames”, are not amenable to resolution by rational
methods. On the one hand, this implies that no system of knowledge — be it
science, religion, common sense, or intuition — provides the analyst with a
privileged epistemological vantage point. On the other hand, it also implies
that policy analysts not only take part in political processes but, by naming
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and labelling policy issues, can significantly shape policy outcomes.
Third, this view of the policy process implies a methodological reorientation
of policy analysis. If politics consists of the struggle between political communi-
ties over the naming and labelling of contested issues, then policy analysis needs
to concentrate both on the way policy actors define these issues and how the
conflict over contested definitions plays out in the public sphere. The former
suggests that policy analysis should concentrate on so-called frame analysis or
discourse analysis [Rein and Schön, 1993, Rein and Schön, 1994, Dryzek, 1990,
Dryzek, 1993]. This involves analysing the narratives contending actors from
competing political communities construct to lay a claim on policy issues. The
second aspect suggests a reorientation of policy analysis itself. Since policy-
making is fundamentally an argumentative process, policy analysis should sup-
port and enhance this process. Therefore, the thinkers of the Argumentative
Turn focus on the mode and characteristics of argumentation in policy-making.
Instead of providing knowledge about substantive issues, policy analysts should
focus their discursive analyses on maintaining the democratic integrity of the
deliberative and argumentative policy process. In other words, contend the
proponents of the Argumentative Turn, policy analysts are well situated and
sufficiently qualified to become the guardians of deliberative and argumentative
democracy.
Yet, the Argumentative Turn also has decisive weaknesses. In particular,
the more radical approaches envisage a pivotal and democratically spurious role
for argumentative policy analysts. Using their specialist skills, policy analysts
should graduate from being mere technicians to being the moral guardians of
democracy. However, without adequate democratic safeguards, about which
the Argumentative Turn is silent, this new role of policy analysis is as open
to abuse as is the conventional role of analysis and planning. What is more,
while the Argumentative Turn acknowledges the relationship between ideas and
institutions, it has lamentably little to say about how social structures affect
frames or policy narratives.
Chapter 4 reviews four conceptual frameworks that explain policy-making
in terms of both institutions and ideas. In each section, the chapter briefly
reviews the assumptions of the approach, outlines how the key concepts ex-
plain policy-making and provides a short evaluation of the framework. Chap-
ter 4 opens with a discussion of Frank Nullmeier and Friedbert Rüb’s con-
cept of “knowledge markets” [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993]. The model by the
two German political scientists uncovers the institutional and ideational mecha-
nisms with which policy actors limit access to policy-making. Second, Multiple
Streams Analysis [Kingdon, 1984, Zahariadis, 1999], based on the Garbage Can
model of organisational behaviour [Cohen et al., 1972], shows how the complex
and chaotic interaction of ideas, policy problems and events determines policy
agendas. Third, the notion of “epistemic communities” [Adler and Haas, 1992]
provides a set of terms for analysing and describing the role of knowledge-
based experts in international policy processes. The concept of epistemic com-
munities illustrates how groups of experts use their specialist knowledge to
shape policy agendas at international level. Fourth, Chapter 4 looks at Paul
Sabatier’s and Hank Jenkins-Smith rather comprehensive and sophisticated Ad-
vocacy Coalition Framework [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993a]. The Advo-
cacy Coalition Framework explains how policy beliefs and competing policy com-
munities, called advocacy coalitions, determine long-term policy change. Last,
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Chapter 4 discusses cultural theory [Douglas, 1970, Douglas, 1987, Douglas, 1992,
Douglas, 1996, Thompson et al., 1990, Thompson et al., 1999], a theory that
systematically relates world-views to institutional structure. Essentially, cul-
tural theory stipulates that social systems at any level of analysis consist of
four competing social solidarities: hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and
fatalism. Each of these solidarities boasts a distinctive pattern of transactions
(social relations), a legitimating cosmology (cultural bias) and a characteristic
set of social practises (behavioural patterns). The inherently antagonistic rela-
tionship between the different social solidarities keeps social systems in constant
flux as each social solidarity defines itself in contradistinction to the others.
Although the approaches all bear a family resemblance, they also diverge in
significant and important ways. Both Nullmeier and Rüb’s Knowledge Politics
and Kingdon’s MS approach subordinate individual and institutional agency
under socio-political contexts: they are, in short, context-driven. In both these
approaches, limiting policy conflict is detrimental to the policy process. Con-
versely, Peter Haas’ epistemic communities as well as Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith’s Advocacy Coalition Framework explain policy as the outcome of com-
peting aggregate policy actors. These approaches draw the causal lines from
agency to socio-institutional contexts and are therefore actor-driven. Here, con-
flict is something policy actors need to control, harness, and, if necessary, remove
from the public sphere.
Chapter 5 concludes the theoretical discussion of the thesis. After having
laid the foundations in the previous chapters, Chapter 5 integrates a range of
relevant ideas and tools into a ‘bootstrapped’ conceptual framework for policy-
oriented discourse analysis. This framework explains the generation and persis-
tence of policy conflict in terms of the interplay of institutional and ideational
structures in policy domains.
By assembling the key concepts and ideas identified in previous chapters,
the thesis constructs a conceptual framework capable of
• mapping the institutional and ideational landscapes of conflict about messy
policy problems in the differentiated polity;
• analysing the role of policy conflict in institutional and policy change
within policy domains.
Turning first to the mapping of policy conflict, the basic idea behind the con-
ceptual framework is to locate the mechanisms and insights of the Argumentative
Turn within the types of institutional venues depicted by policy network ap-
proaches. In other words, the conceptual framework provides tools for analysing
the argumentative struggle over naming and labelling within the institutional
context of policy networks and policy communities.
The fundamental assumption underlying the discourse-analytical framework
is that policy-making takes place in functionally differentiated networks of indi-
vidual and organisational policy actors: in short, contemporary policy-making
takes place in the “differentiated polity”. Each policy domain focuses on a
specific messy policy problem or a complex of messy policy problems. The
bootstrapped discourse-analytical framework calls this locus of policy conflict
about messy policy problems the contested terrain. This terrain is both an insti-
tutional and ideational space. On the one hand, the contested terrain features
all the networks of institutional and individual policy actors relevant to the
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specific messy policy issue. Here, the term “relevance” means any institution
or individual publicly expressing an interest in any aspect of policy-making on
the particular problem. On the other hand, the contested terrain is also the
place that contains all policy arguments pertaining to the complex, uncertain
and transversal policy problem. In short, the contested terrain is the “policy
universe” of all actors and arguments relevant for policy-making about a partic-
ular issue [Wilks and Wright, 1987] as well as the locus of engagement between
actors and arguments.
Who operates in the contested terrain? The principal policy actors in
the bootstrapped conceptual framework are groups of individuals that coa-
lesce around a particular policy project to form stable patterns of transac-
tions. Since these groups focus on a particular common policy agenda, networks
can span the organisational boundaries of formal institutions. Following Paul
Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, we will call these groups advocacy coalitions
[Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993b, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999].
The policy project and policy agenda pursued by these collective policy ac-
tors is determined by shared beliefs, norms, and practises — or policy frames
— that provide members of the advocacy coalition with the cognitive and nor-
mative resources for making sense of messy policy problems.1 These shared
beliefs, norms and practises promote group cohesiveness by acting as cognitive
and perceptual lenses through which events in the policy domain are refracted
and interpreted.
On this view, policy frames justify specific patterns of transactions and be-
haviour between members of advocacy coalitions. Using Mary Douglas’
grid/group analysis and cultural theory [Thompson et al., 1990] gives us four
basic but irreducible patterns of transactions that could constitute the social
relations of advocacy coalitions. In terms of cultural theory, advocacy coalitions
can organise and coordinate their interaction in terms of one of the following
basic forms of social organisation:
• Hierarchy: here, advocacy coalitions organise their activity in terms of
nested, bounded groups with clear lines of control leading to the centre.
• Individualism: individualist advocacy coalitions consist of ego-focused net-
works in which each member is free to negotiate relations with any other
member.
• Egalitarianism: egalitarian advocacy coalitions operate in terms of bounded
groups and are characterised by the lack of internal stratification or formal
differentiation.
• Isolation: isolation is characterised by the absence of social coordination
and co-operation. Thus, while any contested terrain is likely to feature
isolated individuals, this group of policy actors does not actively advocate
a policy project.
cultural theory provides a way of classifying and comparing different advocacy
coalitions that operate in the contested terrain. Each type of advocacy coali-
tion will feature a distinctive policy frame that justifies and reproduces the
1The more holistic concept of “policy frame” was preferred to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s
more stratified idea of “policy-belief systems”. Chapter 5 goes into more depth on this issue.
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preferred form of social organisation. Since these policy frames are grounded in
fundamentally incompatible forms of social organisation, the beliefs, norms and
practises that constitute the policy frame are similarly incommensurable.
What do policy actors do? Within this bootstrapped conceptual frame-
work for policy-oriented discourse analysis, advocacy coalitions aim to enshrine
their basic values in policy. These values are part of the policy frames that
help individual policy actors make sense of messy policy problems. Here, the
term “policy” encompasses a wide range of outputs, including statutes, policy
measures, policy programmes, court rulings, organisational reform, personnel
changes and so on. Since “ideas matter”, policy processes in the contested ter-
rain are fundamentally argumentative. This means that incorporating values
into policy involves vying for legitimacy and credibility in the contested terrain.
By pitting policy arguments against those of rival advocacy coalitions, policy
actors aim to persuade, convince, cajole, bribe, browbeat, pressurise, silence or
subjugate other policy actors into accepting the superiority of their particular
policy argument. This, then, is the policy debate about the naming and labelling
of messy policy problems.
Since policy actors formulate policy arguments on the basis of fundamen-
tally incommensurable policy frames, policy debate in this approach is inher-
ently conflictual and intractable [Rein and Schön, 1993, Rein and Schön, 1994].
Frame-based policy conflict is highly resistant to resolution by recourse to facts.
As cognitive and perceptual lenses [Allison, 1971], policy frames determine what
is to count as a fact and how this fact is to be used to validate or invalidate an
argument. Not only, then, do the policy projects and policy agendas of contend-
ing advocacy coalitions differ, the very basis for perception and construction of
these agendas is incompatible.
Using cultural theory, the Advocacy Coalition Framework and insights from
the Argumentative Turn means that we can identify four basic types of policy
arguments. These basic policy arguments are blueprints or templates for con-
structing specific arguments in an ongoing policy debate. These blueprints im-
bue policy actors with a specific “thought-style” [Douglas, 1987, Douglas, 1992].2
Applying the different thought-styles, policy actors assemble and launch con-
tending policy arguments in the policy debate. These policy arguments define
the messy policy issue, identify lines of causality and apportion blame, develop
and propose policy solutions as well as outlining reform pathways.
The method for reconstructing and comparing contending policy arguments
in a policy debate is called the policy stories approach. Here, the conceptual
framework analyses and rearranges policy arguments into a coherent narrative.
This narrative outlines a setting (the basic assumptions), identifies villains (the
policy problem) as well as heroes (the policy solution).
Thus, integrating the Advocacy Coalition Framework and cultural theory
against the wider backdrop of the Argumentative Turn and policy network ap-
proaches enables the analyst to gauge the scope and structure of policy conflict
over messy policy problems. By identifying contending advocacy coalitions and
their policy stories in terms of the cultural theory typology, the conceptual
framework allows the analyst to gauge and explore the scope of policy conflict.
Further, by juxtaposing these policy stories within a comparative framework,
2Mary Douglas, following Ludwig Fleck, uses this term to explain the effects of cultural
bias on argumentation.
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the analysis can examine the structure of policy conflict: that is, the analy-
sis maps the areas of agreement and disagreement among contending advocacy
coalitions.
The second type of analysis concerns the role of policy conflict in institu-
tional and policy change. This part of the conceptual framework is basically
exploratory in nature. The objective here is to generate hypotheses and theories
rather than test the framework in any rigorous sense.
How can we recognise change? On this view, institutional change refers to
the structural transformation of individual or organisational networks that con-
stitute the policy domain. Policy change, in turn, depicts the revision on under-
lying ideas or theories that inform policy outputs
[Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993b]. The cultural theory-inspired typology of
advocacy coalitions and their policy frames provides a way of calibrating this
change. Shifts in the composition or relation between contending advocacy
coalitions indicate institutional change. Adjustments to the underlying frame
or policy story that informing policy outputs, in turn, points towards policy
change.
In order to trace movement into and out of the contested terrain, the spatial
model needs to be augmented with two further layers of nested policy space. The
public sphere describes the encompassing policy space that contains all policy
domains in a particular polity. The contested terrain (as we have seen) contains
all relevant actors and arguments pertaining to a messy policy issue. Last, the
policy subsystem describes the core institutional and individual networks: actors
in these policy spaces define issues, set agendas, formulate policy and make deci-
sions. While the boundary between public sphere and contested terrain is fluid
and open,3 the boundary between the contested terrain and policy subsystems
is subject to change.
Inherent antagonism between advocacy coalitions means that policy actors
strive to assert epistemic sovereignty over a policy domain. In order to imple-
ment their preferred policy solutions, they aim to minimise (endemic) interfer-
ence and criticism by contending advocacy coalitions.4 This autonomy implies
excluding rival policy actors from policy-making. In terms of the bootstrapped
conceptual framework, this means that the organisational and ideational com-
position of policy subsystems can vary as advocacy coalitions establish their
epistemic sovereignty over an issue. The cultural theory-inspired typology of
advocacy coalitions provides three schematic types of policy subsystems:
• Inclusive Policy Subsystems that feature all three types of advocacy
coalitions engaged in policy debate. In this case, the policy subsystems is
congruent with the contested terrain.
• Partially Inclusive Policy Subsystems feature a bi-polar subset of the
contending set of advocacy coalitions in the contested terrain.
• Exclusive Policy Subsystems are dominated by a single advocacy coali-
tion.
3Albeit by definition.
4This ties institutional change to policy change and vice versa. Any change in the com-
position or relation of advocacy coalitions in the contested terrain and in policy subsystems
implies a change in policy outputs.
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We can think of institutional and policy change in terms of the contraction
and expansion of policy subsystems.
What makes policy subsystems contract and expand? In this discourse-
analytical framework, two countervailing forces give rise to a cyclical evolu-
tionary developmental trajectory in contested terrains. On the one hand, the
inherent antagonism between advocacy coalitions (based on incommensurable
policy frames rooted in fundamentally divergent forms of social organisation)
generates conflictual and intractable policy debate. In inclusive policy subsys-
tems, this debate is at risk of degenerating into a “dialogue of the deaf” leading
to policy impasse and deadlock [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993b].5 Actors
in policy subsystems then become receptive to proposals that suggest narrowing
the scope of policy conflict. At this point, external events may precipitate a pro-
cess of institutionalization in which a subset of advocacy coalitions establishes
epistemic sovereignty over the policy subsystem. On the other hand, the inher-
ently selective nature of policy frames means that policy actors are vulnerable
to conceptual blindness. Epistemic sovereignty, then, implies the institution-
alization of “unanticipated consequences”: since rival advocacy coalitions are
excluded from policy-making, so is their critical potential for scrutinising pol-
icy solutions. This may lead to policy failure as unanticipated consequences of
policy (caused by conceptual blindness) undermine the legitimacy and efficacy
of policy solutions. At the same time, excluded advocacy coalitions in the con-
tested terrain thematise policy failure and mobilise in the public sphere (both
ideationally in terms of new ideas and organisationally in terms of new allies).
This process, then, leaves policy subsystems receptive to the expansion of policy
subsystems. Again, external events may nudge or jolt policy processes onto a
trajectory of deinstitutionalisation and reform.
The Scope and Structure of Policy Conflict in the Global Climate
Change Debate
How does such an analysis work in practise? By way of a brief illustration,
the following section explores the scope and structure of policy conflict for the
global climate change debate.
An analysis of the global climate change policy debate in the mid-1990s re-
vealed three contending policy stories about global climate change
[Thompson et al., 1998, Thompson and Ney, 2000]. Each policy story provided
a setting (the basic assumptions), villains (the policy problem), and the heroes
(policy solutions). Depending on the socio-institutional contexts of the partic-
ular policy actor, each story emphasised different aspects of the climate change
issue.
The first policy story — an egalitarian tale of Profligacy — singles out the
consumption and production habits of the industrialised North as the funda-
mental cause of global climate change. The setting of this story is a world
in which human wellbeing is intricately connected to the wellbeing of planet
Earth, a highly fragile and vulnerable thing in need protection. The villains of
the egalitarian tale are the inequitable structures of global capitalism that have
driven human societies to the brink of ecological disaster. The profit motive and
5German commentators have called this state of affairs a Reformstau — a congestion of
necessary reforms to revitalise stagnant policy domains in Germany and Europe.
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obsession with economic growth have instilled in us artificial wants (high calo-
rie foods, fast cars, bottled water) fundamentally alien to our genuine nature.
What is more, the entire system is based on an inequitable global distribution of
income and burdens: while the rich North wallows in excessive wants, the poor
South is in dire want. Inequities, then, have generated unsustainable patterns of
consumption and production. The general solution to the global climate change
problem — that is, the heroes of the tale — is to put an immediate stop to
these destructive tendencies. This means, among other things, adopting the
strict precautionary principle for any activity and drastically reducing carbon
dioxide emissions (mostly in the North). However, since global climate change
is merely a symptom of the corruption of the global capital system, curbing
global climate change will have to be part of a wider project of socio-cultural
renewal.
The second policy story, told by individualist advocacy coalitions, pins the
degradation of the world’s atmosphere on distorted resource price structures.
The setting of the Prices story is a world of markets and economic growth. In
fact, economic growth is the basic motor that drives sustainable development:
since climate change mitigation is likely to be costly, the global economic sys-
tem must produce and release the required resources. This, in turn, means
that markets must be allowed to function without governments impeding their
self-regulatory mechanisms. However, these policy actors contend, this has not
been the case. The villains of the Prices Story are misguided economic policies
that have led to distortions in resource prices: the inevitable consequence is the
relative overconsumption of natural resources that has led to the massive degra-
dation of the environment. The heroes of this story, recounted by institutions
such as the World Bank, are policies to break down the barriers inhibiting mar-
ket mechanisms: these include global trade liberalisation as well as instruments
such as carbon taxes or emissions permits.
The third policy story identifies uncontrolled population growth as the sin-
gle most important cause of global warming. The setting of the hierarchical
Population Story is a world in which humans are the custodians of the natural
world. Our innate superiority over other species also gives us a moral obliga-
tion to manage our resources wisely. While economic growth is an inevitable
part of any climate mitigation strategy, unbridled market forces are likely to
wreak havoc on the social and natural order. Thus, policies for sustainable de-
velopment that do not abandon civilisation (as the Profligacy Story proposes),
call for the careful and judicious management of socio-economic activity. The
villain of this story is uncontrolled population growth in the developing world.
More mouths to feed and needs to satisfy translates directly into increased car-
bon dioxide emissions in particular and resource degradation in general. The
heroes of this tale are policies and organisations that arrest rapid population
growth through measures ranging from family planning campaigns to female
education. Unlike the Profligacy Story, the onus for action is on the countries
of the developing world.
The three policy stories about global climate change give rise to a number
of areas of agreement and disagreement between the individual advocacy coali-
tions. The scope of agreement decreases with increasing specificity of issues,
principles and policy measures in question. All three advocacy coalitions can
agree (in public) that global climate change constitutes a challenge that requires
some form of response. However, agreement beyond this general proposition dis-
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aggregates into pair-wise alliances. Here, areas of agreement encompass some
agreement on fundamental principles, mutual rejections, and agreement on gen-
eral policy measures. At a more concrete level, however, agreement collapses
into an intractable controversy as each advocacy coalition brings its own inter-
pretation to bear on general principles or policy measures.
Advocates of both the Profligacy and Prices Story agree on the superiority
of decentralised responses to global climate change. Advocates of both policy
stories champion small scale and flexible renewable energy sources, local adapta-
tion and mitigation, as well as the relocation of autonomy and choice to the most
appropriate level. Similarly, members of both advocacy coalitions are sceptical
of policy responses that centralise and concentrate the responsibility for global
climate change policy. The overly bureaucratic treaties of the FCCC as well as
unwieldy mechanisms such as the Joint Implementation Mechanism, members
of both advocacy coalitions agree, will do little to curb carbon dioxide emis-
sions. Moreover, both advocacy coalitions reject massive investment in large,
centralised technologies such as nuclear fusion. Therefore, proponents of the
Profligacy and Prices Story both support policy that encourages and promotes
development of renewable forms of energy provision.
Proponents of the Population and Prices stories, in turn, understand the
significance and necessity of economic growth and the capitalist system of pro-
duction. As we have seen, both advocacy coalitions are in no doubt that curbing
global climate change will require resources that only continuing and increased
economic growth can deliver. For this reason, members from both advocacy
coalitions reject policy proposals that aim to sacrifice economic growth for strin-
gent environmental standards: both proponents of the Prices and Population
stories are critical applying the strong version of the precautionary principle.
Consequently, both advocacy coalitions support policies and measures that can
lead to a “greening” of the world economy.
Members of the hierarchical (Population Story) and egalitarian (Profligacy
Story) both agree in principle that curbing global climate change is also a matter
of taking social responsibility. This includes the international reallocation of re-
sources from rich to poor as well as community-driven environmental protection.
Policy actors from these advocacy coalitions pour scorn on policies and mea-
sures that absolve the community of any responsibility for global climate change
mitigation: voluntary codes and targets by industry, both contend, are not only
ineffective but also morally corrosive. For this reason, proponents from both
advocacy coalitions favour environmental standards that impose restrictions on
unfettered emission of carbon dioxide.
However, this agreement dissolves into intractable disagreement as each ad-
vocacy coalition brings incompatible frames to bear on the principles and policy
measures. While advocates of the Profligacy and Prices stories are united in
their opposition to centralised policy responses to global climate change, they
disagree on the purpose of decentralised solutions. Egalitarian advocacy coali-
tions see renewable energy technologies as a way to decouple energy production
and consumption from the capitalist mode of production. Individualist coali-
tions, in turn, see renewable energy sources and flexible technologies as a means
of boosting and strengthening economic growth. Similarly, the advocates of the
Prices and Population stories may agree on the need for economic growth. They,
however, disagree on how to bring this growth about: whereas hierarchical ac-
tors favour steering of economic growth in an environmentally sound direction,
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individualists argue for setting up real incentives for individuals and firms to
“go green”. Last, while the proponents of the Population and Profligacy stories
see global climate change mitigation as a moral issue, they bitterly disagree on
what type of morality is involved. The egalitarian actors see restoring social re-
sponsibility as a act of total socio-cultural renewal in which existing inequities
are levelled. Conversely, the hierarchical advocacy coalition understands social
responsibility as a stratified system of burden-sharing and problem-solving.
1.5 Part II: Applying the Framework to Policy
Domains
Part II of the thesis applies the conceptual discourse-analytical framework devel-
oped in Part I to three different policy domains: transport policy, environmental
and security pension reform. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 use the framework to analyse
the scope and structure of frame-based conflict in each policy domain. Chapter
9, in turn, brings the dynamic analysis of institutional change to bear on recent
pension reform experiences in continental Europe. This chapter examines the
role of policy conflict in recent continental European pension reforms.
The following provides a brief overview of each chapter. In order to illustrate
the application of the conceptual framework to real policy issues, this section
applies the framework to the issue of global climate change.
Gauging the Scope and Structure of Policy Conflict
The first three chapters of Part II use the conceptual framework centred on
the cultural theory-inspired typology of advocacy coalitions and policy frames
to assess the scope and structure of policy conflict in three different contested
terrains.
Chapter 6 maps the contested terrain of transport policy-making in Eu-
rope. The chapter unravels contending policy stories about transport policy
by identifying different perceptions of “accessibility”. Both at a semantic and
normative level, the chapter shows that accessibility means different things to
different people. For some, accessibility is an attribute of transport systems.
Others see accessibility as an inequitably distributed good within a transport
system. Some perceive accessibility as the pre-requisite of mobility while others
understand accessibility as an outcome of mobility; still others use the terms
accessibility and mobility interchangeably. The reason why policy actors define
accessibility differently, the chapter argues, is neither ignorance or self-serving
cynicism. Rather, accessibility is a concept with inherent normative implications
for transport policy-making. Policy actors define the concept of accessibility in
terms of their cultural biases and embed this definition in their particular policy
narratives.
Chapter 6 then identifies and describes three contending policy stories in
transport policy-making: the classical transport planning approach (the hierar-
chical story), the market approach (the individualistic story), and the ecological
approach (the egalitarian story). Each narrative is based on a specific set of as-
sumptions and identifies a villain of transport policy-making in Europe that
conflicts with those provided by the other two, and each champions a different
hero to solve the messy policy problem. On the basis of this discussion, the
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chapter outlines the triangular contested terrain defined by these narratives.
After outlining the scope of policy conflict, the chapter scrutinises the structure
of policy contention in the European transport domain by comparing areas of
agreement and disagreement. Last, the analysis turns to the potential impacts
of policy conflict by comparing the potential effects of conceptual blindspots in-
herent in policy frames. The chapter draws three conclusion from this analysis.
First, the chapter shows that triangular contested terrains give rise to endemic
and intractable policy conflict. Second, contending policy stories set up tenuous
and fragile areas of agreement between advocacy coalitions limited to general
policy principles and measures. Last, the analysis of the potential impacts of
conceptual blindness suggests that policy-makers need to promote a lively and
pluralist debate but prevent this debate from deteriorating into a “dialogue of
the deaf”.
Chapter 7 brings the bootstrapped framework for discourse analysis to
bear on the idea of environmental security. This overview of the environmental
security debate aims at critically evaluating approaches that suggest merging en-
vironmental issues with traditional geo-political security concerns. The chapter
identifies three different approaches or streams of thinking in the environmen-
tal security debate. One stream narrowly focuses on the socio-economic and
demographic mechanisms that link environmental degradation to violent con-
flict and socio-political security. The second stream looks at how conventional
concepts of security are predicated on a more biological and ecological notion
of eco-system security. Finally, the chapter looks at lines of argumentation
that advocate encompassing all aspects of human well-being in an inclusive idea
of human security. However, despite identifying three different approaches or
streams, closer analysis of the underlying assumptions uncovers the theoretical
and conceptual proximity of the frameworks. In essence, all three approaches
perceive population growth in the developed world to be the decisive cause of
environmental insecurity. Thus, rather than generating a triangular argumen-
tative constellation, the different policy stories are situated along a continuum.
At one end of the continuum, the concept of environmental security is developed
with reasonable analytical rigour at the expense of a powerful normative mes-
sage: here we find Thomas Homer-Dixon’s notion of “environmental scarcity”.
At the other end of the continuum, approaches use the idea of environmental
security to champion a strong normative vision at the cost of analytical rigour:
this is where approaches advocating “human security” are situated. Somewhere
in between, the analysis locates approaches proposing “ecological security”.
The analysis of the structure of policy conflict uncovers a large potential
for consensus on the normative ambitions of all three approaches. Basically, all
frameworks reviewed in Chapter 7 aim to push the environmental policy issue up
the agenda, redefine the notions of security and, more importantly, the nation-
state, as well as remodel global governance structures. Unlike the transport
debate, conflict is not inherently intractable. Rather, it is limited to issues of
strategy: i.e. where to place policy demands along the continuum. The potential
consensus between the contenders, however, comes at a price: all three streams
are unable to integrate or even perceive the ability for individual and local
adaptation to environmental stress. Thus, policy based on these paradigms of
environment security would be vulnerable to the “unanticipated consequences”
resulting from individual innovation or the destruction of local socio-cultural
coping mechanisms.
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Chapter 8, analyses policy stories about pension reform at the international
level. Chapter 8 both introduces the basic issues in the pension reform debate
and outlines the ideational space in which this debate takes place at international
level. The first part of Chapter 8 provides a brief overview of the main issues
and concepts of pension reform. It covers what it is that pensions do (long-term
savings, redistribution and insurance), what type of pension systems exist, and
what types of risks are associated with different types of pension systems. This
chapter then outlines the main demographic challenges facing pension systems.
The second part of Chapter 8 discusses pension reform policy stories of three
international organisations: the World Bank, the International Labour Office
(ILO) and the European Commission. Although all three discourses describe
the impacts of ageing on social protection systems, each of the stories starts
from differing assumptions, produces a contradictory prognosis on the pension
problem (the villains), and prescribes a different policy solution (the heroes).
The World Bank – telling an individualist story of Crisis — is worried about the
effects on economic growth of ageing and inherent design flaws in public pen-
sion systems. In order to increase rates of return on pension contributions, they
suggest privatising parts of public pension provision. The ILO — advocates of
the hierarchical narrative about Stability — argues that most workers are not
covered by old age social security and, for the few that are, these systems suf-
fer from poor management. Rather than retrenching tried-and-tested pension
arrangements, the ILO urges policy-makers to expand and deepen systems in
order to ensure that retirement income is secure. Last, the European Commis-
sion takes a more holistic and egalitarian approach in telling the Social Justice
Story. The real problems here are socio-institutional practises and attitudes
that exclude older workers thereby accelerating the decline in the labour sup-
ply. An effective reform in pension systems therefore necessitates a broad-based
project of socio-cultural renewal. The discussion of the scope of policy conflict
is followed by an analysis of the structure of dispute. Here, the chapter looks at
the areas of overlap and contention that emerge from the triangular contested
terrain. Like Chapter 6, this chapter closes with an investigation into the po-
tential impacts of policy conflict by scrutinising the implications of conceptual
blindness for pension systems.
The conclusions for Chapter 8 point to three distinct issues. First, like the
transport policy debate, the triangular contested terrain implies that conflict in
social security reform is likely to be intractable and inevitable. Second, although
the pension reform debate provides more and deeper pair-wise overlap between
advocacy coalitions than seems to be the case for transport policy, agreement
potentially remains brittle. Last, policy-makers in pension reform debates also
need to balance plurality with a constructive argumentative climate.
Assessing the Role of Conflict in Institutional and Policy
Change
Chapter 9 applies the exploratory framework for explaining the role of pol-
icy conflict in institutional and policy change to pension reform in continental
Europe. In particular, the chapter examines at the contention that pluralist
polities prevent structural pension reform because they promote principled pol-
icy conflict. Drawing not only on the material from chapter 8 but also including
evidence from continental European countries (e.g. Austria, Germany, France,
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Italy, Poland), the chapter shows how structural pension reforms in continen-
tal Europe were predicated on opening up formerly exclusive pension policy
subsystems to new policy actors. By tracing the evolution of pension policy
subsystems, the chapter argues that pension reform experiences have amounted
to a partial pluralisation of social policy-making in Europe. On the one hand,
new policy actors and their ideas have introduced competition into a once stag-
nant and predictable policy domain. On the other hand, the process is far from
complete since many other policy actors — most notably ’egalitarians’ advo-
cating basic income and active ageing — are still widely excluded from policy-
making. What is more, pension reform still takes place at arm’s length from
public scrutiny. The main beneficiaries of structural and ideational changes so
far have been central governments. In a very real sense, governments have man-
aged to liberate themselves from the interorganisational ties and responsibilities
that locked pension reforms into institutional pathways in the past.
1.6 Conclusions: The Implications for Pluralist
Democracy in Europe
The conclusion will summarise the argument and findings of the previous chap-
ters and explore their implications for future research. In the first part of the
conclusion, the chapter revisits the research questions (outlined above) and re-
flects on how the thesis has addressed the research tasks. The second part of the
conclusion examines the implications of the thesis’ findings for future research.
In particular, this section will outline a research agenda for using a frame-based
conceptual architecture to understand and assess pluralist democracy in the dif-
ferentiated polity. This requires extending and adapting the discourse-analytical
framework — particularly the normative implications of cultural theory — to











Describing and analysing political structures is the bread and butter of political
sciences. Historically, much of political science has been concerned with studying
the structures of formal political institutions such as, typically, parliaments,
the executive or the judiciary. In the past, political scientists have focused
on issues such as the structure and composition of parliaments, the role of
political parties in the legislative process, the relationship between executive
and legislative institutions or the impact of the judiciary on policy-making.
Political science is the study of political power and for a long time political
scientists thought that analysing the formal structures of power would provide
the key to understanding politics.
The emergence of the policy sciences, however, marked a change in political
science. The advent of the policy sciences as a specific area of study coincided
with the rapid expansion of state responsibilities. Roughly, this process of state
expansion started in the 1940s, gathered momentum in the immediate post-war
era, and came into full bloom in most industrialised polities in the 1960s. As
the state got involved in more and more aspects of social life, the number of
institutions and policy actors implicated in decision-making grew considerably.
As a result, formal political institutions lost their monopoly on policy-making.
In mass democracies, the pioneers of policy analysis argued, politics no longer
takes place in the corridors of power alone. Rather, in order to understand
politics, the policy sciences insist, we need to look at political processes in
places other than formal political institutions. These places include the public
administration, public service delivery, the private sector or civil society as a
whole. In a political space less regulated than formal political institutions,
the policy sciences increasingly focused on the actual behaviour of institutional
and individual policy actors in far more general policy-making processes. As a
result, the study of formal structures of power waned in importance relative to
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the analysis of decision-making processes and policy actor behaviour.
In the past two decades or so, the study of formal institutions has made a
phenomenal come-back. In large parts a reaction to the stifling dominance of
Rational Choice Theory in social science, researchers from many social science
disciplines (including economics) are showing a renewed interest in the struc-
tures of formal institutions. Sociologists [DiMaggio and Powell, 1991], political
scientists [Skocpol, 1995, Putnam, 1993, Pierson and Weaver, 1993], economists
[Williamson, 1975], and even environmental scientists [Ostrom, 1991] are once
again analysing the impacts of formal institutions and institution-building on
diverse types of social processes. Their conclusions all point in the same di-
rection: institutions matter. Institutions furnish policy actors with resources
and provide a location for political processes. Institutional norms and prac-
tises regulate political behaviour. Development within any polity takes place in
the context of institutional development. It stands to reason, argue these New
Institutionalists, that the structure of institutions is a key aspect of politics.
If institutions matter but political science’s traditional focus on formal in-
stitutions is too narrow, how can we study political structures in mass democ-
racies? The policy network and policy community approach offers a way to
integrate the more behavioural insights of the policy sciences into an broad in-
stitutional analysis. In a very real sense, these frameworks take seriously the
insight that social relations and patterns of transactions significantly structure
policy-making and political behaviour. The network metaphor, as vivid an
image to contemporary social researchers as the machine was to previous gen-
erations of social scientists, allows us to recognise structures in policy processes
without confining analysis to formal political institutions. Like institutional po-
litical science, network approaches assume that politics and policy-making takes
place in political structures. Like the policy sciences, network theories do not
confine these processes to the legislative, executive or judiciary. Arguably, this
conceptual flexibility has made policy network and policy community theories
“. . . the dominant ‘model’ for analysing the policy process in Western Europe
. . . ” [Richardson, 1996, p.4].
The following chapter, then, will present and discuss the major (European)
theories of policy networks and policy communities. Section 2 will present the
assumptions about policy-making in mass democracies that underpin policy net-
work models. Section 3 briefly lays out the contending theoretical strands in
the policy network field. In Section 4 we will look at what policy networks
mean for the distribution and control of of political power. While penultimate
section reviews some of the weaknesses of existing network theories, the conclu-
sion outlines the general ideas and concrete concepts relevant to a conceptual
framework for policy-oriented discourse analysis.
2.1 The “Differentiated Polity”
The starting point of policy network models or, if you will, the thing that policy
network approaches try to explain is the “differentiated polity”. Policy-making
in the differentiated polity, R.A.W. Rhodes suggests, “. . . is characterised by
functional and institutional specialisation and the fragmentation of policies and
politics” [Rhodes, 1997, p.7].
This somewhat condensed definition refers to several broad observations
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about contemporary policy-making. The first observation concerns the rapid
and continuing expansion of state responsibilities since about 1945. At present,
advanced industrial states are implicated, in one way or another, in a widening
spectrum of social activities ranging from economic life to arts or even sports.
New demands on policy-making, so the argument goes, give rise to public insti-
tutions that deal with them. As a result, the state changes from being a mono-
lithic entity to a collection of distinct institutions each geared towards handling
a limited number of policy issues. In short, the state becomes institutionally
fragmented into specialised areas of competence [Jordan and Richardson, 1987,
Rhodes, 1997].
The second observation, in many respects a corollary to the process of insti-
tutional fragmentation and thematic specialisation, points to the growing role of
technical knowledge and expertise in policy-making
[Atkinson and Coleman, 1992]. Effective policy-formulation and implementa-
tion requires reliable knowledge about the issue area in question. This spe-
cialised knowledge, proponents of policy network models argue, resides with the
different policy actors within an issue area. States need to tap this source of spe-
cialised technical expertise either by recruiting experts from the issue area or by
inviting interest groups into the policy-making process. Policy-making, then,
becomes a process of exchange, transaction and bargaining between different
institutions and policy actors.
Third, policy-making in the differentiated polity features a plurality of policy
actors. Not only do states need to acquire technical knowledge, they also have
to (at least in democratic polities) take into account the differing interests and
political demands that coalesce around a policy issue [Parsons, 1995].
All this, the policy network approach argues, means that no single policy
domain resembles another. Each issue area features a specific constellation of
formal and informal ties between institutions, social groups, and individual pol-
icy actors. What is more, each policy domain develops a specific “policy style”
[Richardson, 1982] or a set of norms and practises that regulate interaction.
Institutional fragmentation, thematic specialisation as well as the develop-
ment of discrete webs of organisational and individual relationships also implies
the fragmentation of policy objectives. The interests of the state within one
policy community, argue proponents of policy network approaches, may very
well conflict with governmental goals in another policy network [Rhodes, 1990,
Smith, 1993]. Moreover, Martin Smith argues that state interests and policy
goals are formulated in civil society not the other way around [Smith, 1993]. In
the differentiated polity, policy no longer is the sole responsibility of the state:
rather, policy emerges from the social transactions within policy networks and
policy communities. Significantly, the policy network approach abandons the
idea that state and civil society are separate entities [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993,
p.294].
The upshot of the argument is that the study of formal institutions only
tells part of the story of how policy actually emerges in the differentiated polity
[Parsons, 1995]. For this reason, proponents of policy network approaches, such
as Martin Smith, pour scorn on conventional theories of state and civil society:
“They are reductionist, deterministic and underestimate the importance of the
state” [Smith, 1993, p.48]. Rather than looking for answers in the interaction of
formal institutions, policy network advocates suggest that we “. . . focus on the
pattern of formal and informal contacts and relationships which shape policy
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agendas and decision-making . . . ” [Parsons, 1995, p.185]. Yet, given fragmen-
tation and specialisation of policy-making, what is needed, argue Atkinson and
Coleman, is “a concept that travels across policy domains and political systems
yet retains some measure of distinctiveness” [Atkinson and Coleman, 1992, p.
156]. This “magic bullet”, to use Atkinson and Coleman’s term, is the idea of
policy networks and policy communities.
2.2 Policy Networks, Policy Communities and
Policy Universes
The policy network metaphor, then, has a lot of intuitive appeal. It stands to
reason that the structure of personal contacts between policy-makers, the insti-
tutional ties between state organisations and social groups, as well as technical
expertise have some impact on policy-making. This, however, leaves open two
central questions: in what ways do policy networks affect policy-making and
how are we to go about studying policy networks and communities?
Unfortunately, as with many social sciences, there is little consensus among
scholars of policy communities. “The literature on policy networks”, R.A.W.
Rhodes and David Marsh observe, “has varied disciplinary origins, proliferat-
ing terminology, mutually exclusive definitions and, especially, varying levels of
analysis” [Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, p.19]. To complicate matters further, the
different policy network approaches defy systematic classification.1
In general terms, then, there are two ways of thinking about policy networks.
Some analysts, most notably R.A.W. Rhodes in the UK, understand policy
networks in terms of formal and informal ties between organisations in the policy
process. Others, such as Jeremy Richardson and Grant Jordan, concentrate on
the relations between individual policy-makers within and across organisations
[Richardson and Jordan, 1979, Jordan and Richardson, 1987].
Policy Networks: The “Rhodes Model”
The so-called Rhodes model is one of the two British schools concerned with pol-
icy networks. Originally designed to explain relations between central and local
government in the UK, the approach is an attempt to apply European intergov-
ernmental relations theory (IGR) to British policy-making
[Rhodes, 1990, Rhodes, 1997]. Since the IGR literature focuses on “. . . activities
or interactions occurring between governmental units of all types and levels. . . ”
[Anderson, 1960], the Rhodes-model understands “. . . structural relationships
between political institutions as the crucial element in a policy network”
[Rhodes, 1997, p.36].
Initially, Rhodes depicted the relationship between central and local gov-
ernment in the UK as a game based on “power-dependence”. Organisations,
he argues, depend on each other for resources in order to pursue their goals.
These include, among others, political, legal, knowledge-based, personnel and,
of course, financial resources. By exchanging resources, organisations in the
policy process become dependent upon each other: decision-making in one or-
ganisation constrains decisions elsewhere. Rhodes’ initial formulation pointed
1Although Rhodes [Rhodes, 1990, Marsh and Rhodes, 1992] identifies an American and a
British strand of policy network literature, in practise the distinction is not very sharp.
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to the existence of dominant coalitions within each web of organisational ties.
These coalitions, he argued, can retain some policy-making discretion by ma-
nipulating the process of exchange according to “rules of the game”. Moreover,
the “appreciative system” of the dominant coalition “influences which relation-
ships are seen as a problem and which resources will be sought” [Rhodes, 1997,
p.36]. How much discretion a dominant coalition will secure depends, in turn, on
policy goals, the relative distribution of resources among institutions, the struc-
ture of exchange, and the prevailing rules of the game [Rhodes, 1997, p.37].
In this political game structured by resource dependencies, organisations de-
ploy resources “. . . to maximise influence over outcomes, while trying to avoid
becoming dependent on other ‘players’ ” [Rhodes, 1997, p. 37].
However, this model failed to untangle the relations between central and local
government at the level of group-government interaction
[Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, p.11–12] [Rhodes, 1990, p.303]. The problem here
was applying insights from corporatist theory to two separate levels of analysis.
Whereas corporatism, Rhodes argues, explains state structures at the macro-
level reasonably well, it “. . . provides a rigid metaphor of government-interest
group relations” [Rhodes, 1990, p.303]. At this level of analysis, which Rhodes
calls the meso-level, corporatist models fail to capture the different ways in
which interest groups can and do relate to government organisations. What
was needed, then, was a concept that reflected interorganisational resource-
dependencies but that also could accommodate varying constellations of inter-
est group-government interactions within different policy areas. This meso-level
concept, Rhodes maintains, is the idea of a policy network.
In the Rhodes model, “policy network” is the generic term to cover all forms
of interaction between government organisations and interest groups at the
so-called meso-level. Networks come into being, Smith argues, when an ex-
change of information between social groups and the government institutions
leads to “. . . a recognition that a group has an interest in a certain policy area”
[Smith, 1993, p.56]. Following Benson, Rhodes defines a policy network as
“. . . a cluster or complex of organisations connected to each other by
resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or com-
plexes by breaks in the structure of resource dependency” [Benson, 1982,
quoted in [Marsh and Rhodes, 1992], p.13].
These networks, Rhodes contends, emerge at the aggregated sectoral level; for
example, an analyst will find networks of structurally interdependent organisa-
tions in social policy as a whole rather than in the area of pension policy-making.
Depending on the constellation of structural features, policy networks in the
Rhodes model differ in character, function and style. Martin Smith identifies
the following structural features:
1. Constellation of interests: these may vary according to service, function,
territory and client groups.
2. Membership: this refers to the types of organisations in the policy network;
3. Vertical independence: the extent to which a policy network is indepen-
dent of hierarchical structures.
4. Horizontal independence: the contact policy networks have with other
policy networks.
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5. Distribution of resources [Smith, 1993, p.58] [Rhodes, 1997, p.43].
These structural features determine the degree to which organisations are
integrated within a policy network. Based on differences in integration, then,
Rhodes locates five different types of policy networks along a continuum. At one
end of the continuum, Rhodes places the highly integrated “policy community”.
At the other end we find the loosely integrated “issue network”. In between,
Rhodes identifies “professional networks”, “intergovernmental networks” and
“producer networks”.
Policy communities feature stable relationships and a continuity of member-
ship. A policy community, Rhodes argues, is independent both from hierarchical
structures and other policy networks. Consequently, policy communities are in-
sulated from parliamentary and public scrutiny [Rhodes, 1997, p.38]. Policy
networks of this type are usually based on a major sectoral and functional in-
terest of the state. The examples Rhodes provides are education and fire services
[Rhodes, 1997].
Partly in response to criticism of the Rhodes model, Marsh and Rhodes ex-
tend the idea of policy communities beyond the strictly structural
[Marsh and Rhodes, 1992]. On this extended view, the ideal-type policy com-
munity
• limits participation by consciously excluding some social groups,
• provides for “frequent and high quality interaction” between policy com-
munity members on all relevant policy issues,
• ensures consistency in membership, values and policy outcomes,
• constructs a consensus of “ideology, values and broad policy preferences”
between participants,
• provides for a balance of power between participants based on the ex-
change of resources (which need not necessarily provide equal benefits to
all participants),
• obtains compliance of participants through a hierarchical network struc-
tures. [Rhodes, 1997, p.43–44]
At the other end of the spectrum, issue networks “. . . are characterised
by a large number of participants with a limited degree of interdependence”
[Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, p.19]. Weak structural links lead to an unstable en-
vironment which is not conducive to shared decision-making: the extent of
government-group interaction may be no more than the exchange of informa-
tion [Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, Rhodes, 1990, Rhodes, 1997]. Here, trust and
security are at a premium.
Like the idea of policy communities, Marsh and Rhodes later expand the
concept of issue networks. In particular, they add that issue networks
• encourage fluctuating membership,
• allow for limited consensus and instead create permanent conflict,
• limit interaction to consultation rather than bargaining,
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Type of Network Characteristic of Network
Policy Community/ Terri-
torial Community
Stability, highly restrictive membership, vertical inter-
dependence, limited horizontal articulation
Professional Network Stability, highly restrictive membership, vertical inter-




Limited membership, limited vertical interdependence,
extensive horizontal articulation
Producer Network Fluctuating membership, limited vertical interdepen-
dence, serves interests of producer
Issue Network Unstable, large number of members limited vertical
interdependence
Table 2.1: The Rhodes Model
• exhibit an unequal power relationships “. . . in which many participants
may have few resources, little access and no alternative” [Rhodes, 1997,
p.45]
In sum, R.A.W. Rhodes provides a model of policy-making based on net-
works between public institutions, private organisations, and interest groups.
These networks emerge from resource exchanges that lead to mutual organisa-
tional dependency. Variations in structural characteristics of policy networks
gives rise to distinct types of policy networks. Essentially, the Rhodes model
distinguishes types of policy networks by the degree to which participating or-
ganisations are integrated within the web of organisational dependencies. In
this way, Rhodes distinguishes policy networks in terms of their accessibility :
in general, the more integrated, the less accessible is the policy network. The
different forms of policy networks in the Rhodes model are summarised in Table
2.1.
Policy Communities: Networks of Policy-Makers
Policy network concepts inspired by American approaches provide an alterna-
tive to Rhodes’ structural model. Here the policy community idea has a more
“anthropological flavour”[Atkinson and Coleman, 1992, p.157], evoking the im-
age of a village community [Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974]. Rather than structural
constraints and resource dependencies, the policy community metaphor implies
that participants work within a shared framework of ideas and values. Grant
Jordan argues that the concept of the policy community “. . . rests firmly on
the notion that the particular policy of the moment is processed in a context
in which there is recognition that there are, and will be in the future, other
issues which also need to be dealt with” [Jordan, 1990, p.326]. Whereas policy
networks are forged by resource dependencies, the policy community works in
terms of an ideological or pragmatic understanding among individual partici-
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pants. Thus, policy networks describe the institutional locations or venues of
policy-making and policy communities depict collective policy actors.2
Based on American literature on sub-governments from the late 1950s and
1960s, the idea of policy communities has an different ancestry from the more
structural concepts. In 1965, J.L. Freeman suggested that in order to cap-
ture the essence of policy-making, analysis needed to disaggregate the policy
process. Political scientists’ attention, Freeman implied, was too focused on
the government while all relevant activity took place in “sub-governments”. A
sub-government, according to Freeman, comprised all those involved in decision-
making in a specialised area. He argued that the sum of all routine decisions in
these subsystems were public policy [Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, pp.5–7].
Closely related to the idea of sub-governments is the concept of “iron trian-
gles”. Iron triangles explain a particular type of government-group relationship.
Here three parties (usually from congress, a relevant interest group, and an ex-
ecutive agency) form a symbiotic relationship marked by mutual dependence.
Iron triangles determine policy with minimal input from the outside and hence
run counter to the pluralist ideal of an open policy process.3
Grant Jordan and Jeremy Richardson applied these broad concepts to British
policy-making in the late 1970s and early 1980s [Jordan and Richardson, 1987,
Richardson and Jordan, 1979].4 British policy-making, they contend, has be-
come “post-parliamentarian”. Public policy, they continue, no longer emerges
from conflict within political institutions but rather from a “myriad of inter-
connecting, interpenetrating organisations” [Richardson, 1996, p.6]. Faced with
complex policy processes in the differentiated polity, policy-makers within spe-
cialised policy arenas band together in an attempt to introduce some form of sta-
bility and predictability. Unlike in the Rhodes model, these communities emerge
from transactions between individual policy-makers at sub-sectoral level. Signif-
icantly, these “tribes” or “communities” (to extend the ethnographic metaphor
a little) are based, like all tribes, of a set of set of shared norms, values and
practises [Jordan, 1990].
Policy communities provide continuity and stability in complex policy-making
environments [Richardson, 1996]. A shared conceptual framework as well as
close and repetitive interpersonal contacts allow policy communities to control
change [Jordan, 1990]. Essentially, communities of policy-makers work on the
principle of exclusion. They create discursive structures that allow participants
to identify who is and who is not part of the club. Moreover shared conceptual
frameworks affect how issues can be discussed: Jordan observes that “mem-
bers of the system begin to debate in the same language and arguments are
2The thesis develops this idea in Chapters 4 and 5 where different models of collective
actors in policy processes are reviewed and evaluated.
3Which caused a pluralist backlash in the 1970s and 1980s. Most notably, Hugh Heclo’s
concept of the issue network points towards increasing dynamisation of American policy-
making. Issue networks, Heclo argues, host two somewhat contradictory tendencies. On the
one hand, issue networks feature a large number of frequently fluctuating interest groups
clamouring for policy-makers’ attention. Participation in American policy-making, Heclo
observes, has expanded to such an extent that “. . . it is all but impossible to identify clearly
who the dominant actors are” [Heclo, 1978, quoted in [Richardson, 1996], p.102]. On the other
hand, burgeoning participation and the proliferation of policy issues has also implied increasing
specialisation and the emergence of “highly knowledgeable policy watchers” [Heclo, 1978, p.49]
that concentrate policy-making capabilities.
4As an explicit attempt to justify pluralism in UK policy-making
[Atkinson and Coleman, 1992, Smith, 1993].
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treated seriously only when discussed in these common criteria” [Jordan, 1990,
p.326]. In this way, stability becomes synonymous with consensus-seeking: pol-
icy communities, replete with formal and informal rules of appropriate conduct,
avoid policy conflict by keeping conflicting views and approaches out of policy
communities.
Policy Universes: “Turning the Terminology on its Head”
Another British approach to policy networks originates with Maurice Wright
and Stephen Wilks. Crudely speaking, the work of the two social scientists
[Wilks and Wright, 1987] is conceptually located somewhere between the Rhodes
model and the more ethnological ideas of policy communities.5
Wilks and Wright model the relationship between industry and govern-
ment. They set out three themes: “to break away from system-level macro-
generalisations” and replace them with an empirically based approach, to em-
phasise the comparative aspect, and to develop “a more productive theoretical
approach” [Wilks and Wright, 1987, p.275]. Wilks and Wright suggest that the
policy network approach be reworked to produce a “more fine-grained analytical
schema” [Wilks and Wright, 1987, p.289].
Rhodes and Marsh identify three main areas where Wilks and Wright depart
from the Rhodes model [Rhodes, 1990, Marsh and Rhodes, 1992]. First, Wilks
and Wright emphasise the extremely disaggregated nature of policy-making.
The key to understanding decision-making, argue Wilks and Wright, is under-
standing that government is “fragmented, differentiated and fissiparous”. Not
only does the state have to be disaggregated at the sectoral level, as Rhodes
suggests, but also at the sub-sectoral level [Rhodes, 1997].
Second, restructuring policy network theory necessitates a number of redef-
initions. When invoking the policy community metaphor, Wilks and Wright
refer to “actors and potential actors drawn from the policy universe who share
a common identity or interest” [Rhodes, 1990, p.306]. This diverges from both
Rhodes’ and Jordan’s idea of a highly integrated and closely knit policy commu-
nity. Grant maintains that this version of the policy community exhibits three
characteristics: differentiation, specialised organisations and policy-making in-
stitutions, as well as personal interaction between its members.
Wilks and Wright argue that this more iterative and bottom-up format fa-
cilitates a comparative approach. By replacing the rigid image of the Rhodes’
policy community by a more flexible notion, Wilks and Wright argue, this for-
mulation gives researchers three further avenues of enquiry. First, they can
distinguish between factions in the policy community at sectoral and subsec-
toral level. Second, it allows researchers to identify actors excluded from the
policy network but included in the policy universe. Last, the membership of dif-
ferent networks within the same community is open to analysis [Rhodes, 1990,
p.306].
The broader term “policy universe” is defined by Grant as “the large pop-
ulation of actors and potential actors [who] share a common interest in in-
dustrial policy, and may contribute to the policy process on a regular basis”
[Jordan, 1990, p.7]. The policy community, a subset of the policy universe,
5Although, as we will see, their focus on interpersonal relations between policy actors places
Wilks and Wright considerably closer to Richardson and Jordan than to Rhodes.
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draws its members from the policy universe. In this context, the policy network
is the process that links the persons in the policy community [Rhodes, 1990, p.
306]. The image is one of Chinese boxes rather than the linear continuum that
Rhodes outlines.
Last, Wilks and Wright suggest that the level of analysis be refocused to the
micro-level: the level of personal interaction. Policy communities, they contend,
do not conform to institutional boundaries but rather are organised around a
set of personal relationships mediated by resource dependencies.
In sum, Wilks and Wright version of the policy network adds three elements
to the study of policy networks. It suggests disaggregation to both sectoral and
sub-sectoral level, suggests a focus on individual personal relationships, and, fi-
nally, rejects any macro-level theory in favour of an empirically based micro-level
analysis. Rhodes notes that Wilks and Wright’s “reformulation seeks precise
and operational definitions of communities and networks to facilitate micro-
level analysis” [Rhodes, 1990, p.307]. The policy community, in this sense, is a
more fluid idea than the rigorous resource-dependency model.
2.3 Policy Networks, Power and Accountability
Policy networks and policy communities, then, are contested concepts. Although
the idea running through all approaches is plausible and appealing, different
theorists come to very different conclusions about what policy networks are,
how they work, and what they do. All policy network models, however, make
two interrelated claims. First, an ontological claim, policy network theories
assert that mass democracies and the differentiated polity have qualitatively
changed the nature of policy-making and politics. Second, an epistemological
claim, network advocates suggest that understanding this new form of politics
requires a specific method of enquiry.
Yet, what do these two claims mean for the study of politics? Fundamen-
tally, political sciences (and the policy sciences) are about understanding the
nature and organisation of political power within a polity. Political scientists are
interested in how political structures give rise to power resources and in what
ways they enable or constrain the use of these resources by the state. What,
then, do policy network and policy community approaches have to say about
power and accountability?
State Power, Autonomy and the Differentiated Polity
The emergence of the differentiated polity, advocates of policy network ap-
proaches argue, has complex and ambiguous impacts on governments’ capacity
to control policy-making. The effect of policy networks is not so much a straight-
forward transfer of power from state actors to actors within policy communities.
Rather the advent of complicated and ever bifurcating policy networks funda-
mentally changes the nature of the political game. In the differentiated polity,
so the argument goes, conventional concepts of political power become increas-
ingly less applicable. As the “. . . state becomes a collection of interorganisational
networks made up of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor
able to steer or regulate” [Rhodes, 1997, p.57], tried-and-tested instruments of
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control, such as line management or incentive structures, become increasingly
blunt and ineffective.
Consequently, Smith argues that we need to rethink our concepts of state
autonomy and state power [Smith, 1993]. In the differentiated polity, the re-
lationship between government and groups is not a zero-sum game: increases
in interest group power do not necessarily imply decreases in state autonomy.
Since organisational resource interdependencies blur the distinction between the
governors and the governed, or, more prosaically, the state and civil society, pur-
suing policy goals becomes a common endeavour within each particular policy
network. In a very real sense, advocates of policy network approaches argue,
policy networks break down the competitive relationship between state actors
and interest groups: within policy networks, both sides of the classical political
divide become implicit, or even complicit, in each others policy-related activ-
ities. In this way, Smith continues, policy networks provide an organisational
infrastructure, replete with a wide range of useful policy-making resources that
state actors tap into when pursuing policy objectives. Policy networks, then,
imbue states with what Smith calls “infrastructural power”6 by exchanging re-
sources with non-state organisations, governments are able to formulate and
implement policies without having to resort to force or coercion.7
The structure of resource exchanges within a policy network, Smith con-
tends, determines whether policy actors can ‘get things done’. Yet, as we have
seen, different government-interest group configurations are more or less con-
ducive to ‘getting things done’. Smith argues that the more cohesive a policy
network, that is the more it resembles a policy community, the more infrastruc-
tural power it creates: frequent ‘high quality’ communication, tight interorgan-
isational linkages and, most importantly, the ability to exclude and marginalise
specific policy actors provide favourable structural means for policy-making.
By the same token, loosely organised issue networks provide actors with less re-
sources and institutional mechanisms for steering policy-making: institutional
plurality, clamorous policy debates, and transient policy actors provide far less
leverage on policy formulation and implementation [Smith, 1993]. If being able
to ‘get things done in politics’ is an indicator of autonomy and power, then,
Smith concludes, autonomy and power in the differentiated polity are not re-
ally attributes of states and their institutions. Rather it is the organisational
networks that cluster around a specific policy arena that are more or less au-
tonomous from each other. Power and autonomy, then, emerge from the struc-
tural characteristics of a particular policy network and not from the attributes
of individual organisations.
In sum, Smith contends that policy networks give rise to a completely differ-
ent game of politics than outlined in conventional political science, most notably
in pluralist theories. In particular, the rise of policy networks shifts the locus
of political power away from individual state institutions and towards networks
of policy actors. Moreover, this autonomy and power is a function of struc-
tural characteristics within policy networks: in general, Smith avers, the more
6The implication here is that networks not only create a resource environment for states,
although both Smith and Rhodes maintain that states are always dominant actors, but also
for other organisations within policy networks.
7Smith maintains that resorting to force and coercion, or what he calls “despotic power”, is
likely to be a relatively unsuccessful strategy in the long-run, see also Paul Sabatier and Hank
Jenkins-Smith’s notion of “raw power” [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993b] and Chapter 4.
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ideologically and organisationally cohesive, the more a policy network will be
able to succeed in pursuing its goals in relation to other policy communities.
Political power in the differentiated polity, then, is primarily structural and or-
ganisational: it is the power to exclude contending actors and voices from policy
communities and, by extension, from the policy agenda.
At a more concrete level, Rhodes’ analysis of changes in British policy-
making over the past three decades unearths similar developmental patterns
[Rhodes, 1997]. Throughout the post-war period but particularly in the past
two decades, Rhodes contends, Britain has witnessed the successive decline of
the so-called Westminster model of government.8 The public sector reforms
of the 1980s and 1990s, including privatisation, introducing new forms of pub-
lic service delivery, increasing public-private partnerships, or the creation of
special-purpose bodies and executive agencies, have “hollowed out” the British
state. Rhodes maintains that in the past 20 years or so, the British state — in
the course of dealing with messy policy problems — has lost governmental func-
tions upward to the European Union, downward to special purpose bodies and
outward to executive agencies [Rhodes, 1997, p.17 and p.54]. In short, policy-
making has become more complex as an ever increasing number of governmental
functions passes over from central departments into relatively autonomous net-
works of interdependent organisations.
As a result of these public sector reforms, British policy-makers now face an
increasing number of “self-organising, interorganisational networks”
[Rhodes, 1997, p.53]. This, he maintains, has fundamentally changed the rules
and structures of British policy-making. Rather than engaging in “government”,
policy-makers now contend with a system of “governance”. Rhodes defines this
system in terms of four characteristics:
1. Organisations within the system of governance are interdependent. Gov-
erning, Rhodes argues, no longer is the exclusive privilege of state in-
stitutions: policy-making now includes organisational actors from both
the private and voluntary sectors. This, Rhodes contends, has meant
that “. . . the boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors [in
Britain] became shifting and opaque”
2. Governance features ongoing interaction between network members “caused
by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes”
[Rhodes, 1997, p.53],
3. The interactions themselves take on the form of games “. . . rooted in trust
and regulated by the rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network
participants”
4. Self-organising, interorganisational networks feature a “. . . significant de-
gree of autonomy from the state”. Policy networks, Rhodes maintains, are
not accountable to the state. As a result, the state can only “. . . indirectly
and imperfectly steer networks” [Rhodes, 1997, p.53]
8Rhodes understands the Westminster model, the dominant model of explaining British
politics, to consist of a focus on “. . . parliamentary sovereignty; strong cabinet government;
accountability through elections; majority party control of the executive (that, Prime Minister,
cabinet and the civil service); elaborate conventions for the conduct of parliamentary business;
institutionalised opposition, and the rules of debate”[Rhodes, 1997, p.5]
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The concept of governance (understood as self-organising interorganisational
networks), Rhodes maintains, has become a more accurate depiction of British
politics than the Westminster model. More precisely, the idea of governance
describes the kind of fragmented political system the British polity has become
as a result of complex, uncertain and transversal policy problems.
How has the shift towards governance affected policy-making in Britain? By
outsourcing many governmental functions to policy networks and policy com-
munities, Rhodes argues that the British state has effectively exchanged direct
for indirect control over policy-making. Steering these organisational networks
requires a different set of skills than managing either hierarchies or markets.
For this reason, applying management strategies suitable for markets or hier-
archies to networks, Rhodes argues, is likely to fail: here he points to recent
British experiences with New Public Sector Management [Rhodes, 1997, pp.
55–56] where policy-makers essentially tried to control networks with market
mechanisms. Rather than relying on competition or line-management, Rhodes
contends that self-organising, interorganisational networks call for “intergovern-
mental management”, policy-makers will have to engage in “problem-solving,
interorganisational games, and networking” [Rhodes, 1997, p.56]. Networks, he
concludes, have become
“. . . a third governing structure. They are not better than either
bureaucracies or markets. They have different characteristics and
suit some policy areas some of the time. Reciprocity and interde-
pendence, not competition, characterise network relations. If there
is one phrase which captures the nature of IGM [intergovernmental
management], it is ‘mutual adjustment’. So, managing interorgani-
sational networks is both game-like and requires strategies rooted in
trust” [Rhodes, 1997, p.57].
Has the switch from government to governance reduced the capacity for United
Kingdom state actors to affect policy? In concrete British case, Rhodes argues
that the rise of self-organising interorganisational networks has indeed curtailed
state power (in the conventional sense). The failure on part of UK state actors to
appreciate the specific management requirements of policy networks has meant
that the “. . . centre’s capacity to regulate them remains underdeveloped; it has
only ‘loose leverage’ ” [Rhodes, 1997, p.57]. Public sector reforms in the UK,
Rhodes concludes, are flawed:
“They aimed to give the government more control, and they gave
the government more control (for example, finance) but over less
(for example, service delivery), because governance rivalled mar-
kets as the distinctive governing structure of the last two decades”
[Rhodes, 1997, p.57].
Although policy networks increase the complexity of policy-making, multiply
unintended consequences, and generally lead to ‘policy mess’, it is not policy
networks and governance per se that have transferred policy-making control
away from government. Rather, UK state actors have lost power to policy
networks because they applied management tools unsuitable for steering policy
networks.
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Democratic Accountability in the Differentiated Polity
Whereas the differentiated polity has complex and somewhat ambiguous im-
pacts on state autonomy and political power, the rise of fragmented and spe-
cialised policy networks has far more discernible repercussions for representative
democracy and democratic accountability. When assessing the impacts of policy
networks on democratic accountability, network theorists also pass judgement
on the normative aspects of the differentiated polity: in other words, discussing
the state of democratic accountability in a policy process characterised by frag-
mented and specialised policy networks means assessing whether or not policy
networks are a ‘good thing’ for representative democracies. However, perhaps
unsurprisingly, advocates of the different policy network approaches arrive at
quite divergent conclusions about the implications of the differentiated polity
for democratic accountability.
For Rhodes, policy networks and the differentiated polity represent a seri-
ous challenge to representative democracies. The complex interorganisational
networks that blur the line between civil society and the state, he maintains,
quite considerably undermine conventional mechanisms of democratic account-
ability. Policy networks in general and the more cohesive policy communities
in particular are what Rhodes calls “instances of private government”. In their
most effective form, policy communities are relatively closed to the public, cre-
ate privileged hierarchies with differential access to resources within networks,
and establish ‘rules of the game’ that favour established interests [Rhodes, 1997,
p.58]. Policy communities’ emphasis on continuity makes them inherently con-
servative in the sense that highly cohesive policy communities aim to maintain
the status quo. In an effort to avoid other policy actors ‘rocking the boat’, pol-
icy communities exclude dissenting voices by erecting high barriers to entry into
the community, by non-decisions, and by rigging the ‘rules of the game’ in such
a way as to preclude a level playing field. This, Rhodes argues, is anathema
to representative democracies since “. . . private government is bad government;
openness is the basic axiom of representative democracy” [Rhodes, 1997, p.22].
Moreover, Rhodes contends that representative democracies are institution-
ally ill-equipped to deal with, let alone democratically control, policy-making in
the differentiated polity. In the differentiated polity, Rhodes maintains, policy
formulation, decision-making as well as implementation takes place in complex
organisational webs consisting of diverse types of state and non-state institutions
often remote from parliamentary scrutiny. In this way, policy networks and pol-
icy communities effectively marginalise parliament from decision-making. Con-
ventional mechanism of democratic accountability, moreover, focus on single
institutions and their decision-making structures. In a policy process in which
policy seeps, bleeds and dissipates from a number of indiscriminate points in
complex policy networks, Rhodes maintains that the conventional focus on sin-
gle institutions leaves much of policy-making democratically unaccounted for.
This is why Rhodes concludes that “. . . accountability can no longer be specific
to an institution but must fit the policy and its network” [Rhodes, 1997, p.21].
Since representative democracies, Rhodes contends, “. . . were never designed
to cope with multi-organisational, fragmented policy systems”, bringing policy
networks to account implies devising new forms of democracy and democratic
accountability. Here, Rhodes points to the fundamental incongruence between
institutions of representative democracy (based on territoriality) and policy net-
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works (based on functionality). If policy-making in the differentiated polity is
to be democratically accountable, then, Rhodes avers, the mechanisms of demo-
cratic accountability need to be tailored to the requirements of fragmented
policy-making in interorganisational networks: in short, Rhodes calls for the
democratisation of functional subpolitical domains. This challenge, he contin-
ues, is not likely to have elegant and simple remedies since “messy problems
need messy solutions” [Rhodes, 1997, p.21]: accountability, Rhodes predicts,
will have to go hand in hand with further institutional differentiation. Mech-
anisms of democratic accountability will have to mirror the complexity and
plurality of institutional forms in the differentiated policy process. Although
Rhodes does not tell us what these new forms of accountability may look like,
he outlines three requirements for establishing these democratic mechanisms:
1. explicit accountability in multiple forms and forums;
2. openness of information;
3. flexible institutions that will permit experimentation with new forms of
democracy [Rhodes, 1997, p.198].
In turn, Jeremy Richardson is far less pessimistic about the democratic im-
plications of policy communities [Richardson, 1996]. Unlike Rhodes and other
theorists adhering to more structural concepts of policy networks, Richardson
sees the rise of policy communities as a reinvention or new expression of plural-
ist politics. The argument that policy communities are both structurally and
ideologically closed, he maintains, is somewhat suspect. Whereas the strict defi-
nition of policy communities emphasises continuity and ideological homogeneity
among policy actors, Richardson points to the dynamic nature of policy-making
evident in policy communities at, for example, European level. So, he argues,
while policy communities may close ranks for a specific period of time, the
dynamics of pluralist politics will inevitably rock policy community boats and
break down cohesive policy communities into more pluralist issue networks.
Richardson identifies two mechanisms or channels that challenge cohesive
policy communities. First, he points to the considerable pressure for admitting
new members into policy communities. Structural concepts of policy commu-
nities, Richardson contends, are unable to explain how policy communities can
absorb new members without disintegrating. By emphasising policy-making
continuity and consensus, these concepts gloss over the fact that “. . . in many
cases (rather like families and villages) the community holds together — in the
sense of exchange relationships — despite quite serious disputes and despite of-
ten having to admit new members” [Richardson, 1996, original emphasis, p.7].
Moreover, particularly at EU-level policy-making, policy actors in European
policy communities are too divergent to give rise to a “community of shared
views”. Policy conflict and fluctuation of policy actors, then, seem to be intrin-
sic to the workings of policy communities. Thus, Richardson (1996) concludes
that
“. . . even at the national level, it might be argued that the emphasis
on stability and consensus is one of the causes of the intellectual fa-
tigue which the policy network concept now exhibits. Even national
politics in the 1980s and 1990s has been very different to the pol-
itics of the 1960s and 1970s — not least because of a considerable
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degree of radical policy change and the mobilisation of new actors
. . . ” [Richardson, 1996, p.7].
Pressure from outside policy communities to admit new, potentially disruptive
members into cohesive policy communities, then, prevents policy networks from
closing off completely from public scrutiny and becoming democratically unac-
countable.
Second, links between different policy communities provide another means
for opening up cohesive policy networks. Links between policy communities
within and across different sectors provide leverage on cohesive private gov-
ernments by introducing new ideas, differing approaches and new demands on
policy-making. This, in turn, makes it more difficult for policy communities
to avoid the scrutiny of other policy actors and policy professionals. Linkages
between policy communities, then, provide a form of horizontal accountability
on policy community activities.
For Richardson, then, policy-making in the differentiated polity is an in-
herently dynamic and increasingly unpredictable undertaking. Using Rhodes
continuum of policy networks, Richardson argues that any particular policy
network may over time shift along the continuum from policy community to
issue network. For this reason, Richardson maintains,
“. . . it may be that at any given time several types of policy networks
(in the generic sense) are in operation . . . Also, over time, the policy
process might change its characteristics quite significantly, along the
continuum . . . ” [Richardson, 1996, p.9].
In sum, rather than the static image of cohesive and closed policy communi-
ties far removed from any form of democratic scrutiny, Richardson understands
policy-making to be a rather more unstable process in which policy community
structures persistently face challenges from outside groups as well as other pol-
icy communities. This, of course, is a way of restating that the policy process
conforms to the patterns of pluralist politics.
2.4 Critique: Terminology, Change and Ideas
The concept of policy communities and policy network provides an appealing
and arguably more accurate image of contemporary policy-making. However,
indeed like any theory or approach, the idea of the differentiated polity also
contains some decisive weaknesses.
Perhaps the most obvious criticism concerns the lack of consistent termi-
nology. As we have seen, researchers have generated a plethora of different,
overlapping and contradicting terms. In part, researchers use the same terms to
describe different phenomena. For example, the term “policy community” can
refer to a closed, tightly knit, ideologically coherent, and strongly interdependent
group of policy actors [Rhodes, 1990, Rhodes, 1997, Smith, 1993, Jordan, 1990],
a community of conflicting policy actors principally open to ‘outside’ influences
[Richardson, 1996], or loose collection of individuals and organisations poten-
tially interested in a particular issue [Wilks and Wright, 1987]. In part, and as
a consequence, analysts use different terms to denote the same phenomena. The
terms “policy networks”, “policy universe”, “policy domain”, or “policy arena”
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ostensibly describe a broad collection of individuals and organisations that are
in some way associated with a particular policy problem or policy sector. As a
result, the concepts become rather messy and vague. As Frank Nullmeier and
Friedbert Rüb, two German political scientists, observe:
“With terms such as ‘policy network’, ‘issue network’, ‘policy arena’,
‘iron triangle’, ‘policy community’, ‘policy domain’, ‘triple alliances’,
‘whirlpools’, ‘sub-system politics’, ‘policy style’, ‘policy universe’ the
policy sciences provide an abundance of concepts whose differences,
relations and uses in political science are highly contentious even
among policy scientists themselves. As a result, almost each au-
thor uses his own categorical framework”[Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993,
p.294].9
Why, then, has the study of these dependency relationships given rise to
such a wide spectrum of terms and meanings? Atkinson and Coleman sug-
gest that relations between government, interest groups and state bureaucra-
cies are actually far more complicated than policy network theories suggest
[Atkinson and Coleman, 1992]. Neither interorganisational resource dependen-
cies nor interpersonal relationships based on shared beliefs adequately capture
the complexities of how individuals and organisations interact in the policy pro-
cess. Policy networks and policy communities, then, are good metaphors. The
term “networks” provides an evocative image of a seamless web that resists,
by it’s very nature, any outside interference. The idea of a community con-
jures up images of a fundamental agreement, solidarity and even kinship. Yet,
while these metaphors are successful in providing tangible images of what are
in reality a very complex processes, it is precisely these strengths that make for
definitional disputes once researchers refine and operationalise their concepts
[Atkinson and Coleman, 1992].
However, terminological confusion aside, the policy network and policy com-
munity approach is also beset with more substantial difficulties. Although the
idea of the differentiated polity, regardless of the particular theoretical flavour,
describes policy-making in advanced capitalist democracies reasonably well,
the concept is less useful for explaining the dynamics of the policy process.
Analysing policy processes in terms of policy communities and policy networks,
argue Atkinson and Coleman,
“. . . tends to be dynamic in the sense that one learns about patterns
of interaction among various actors, the content of those interactions,
and the structures that channel communication. In this respect, net-
work studies have provided useful snapshots of the policy process at
a particular point in time, but they have devoted less attention to the
changes in processes and outcomes” [Atkinson and Coleman, 1992,
p.172].
Mapping relations between individual and institutional policy actors tells the
researcher little about how the policy process unfolds and how the character-
9This is my translation from the original German. The original passage reads: “Die Policy-
Forschung steuert mit ‘policy network’, ‘issue network’, ‘policy arena’, ‘subgovernment’, ‘iron
triangle’, ‘policy community’, ‘policy domain’, ‘whirlpools’, ‘sub-system politics’, ‘policy style’,
‘policy universe’ eine Fülle von Begrifflichkeiten bei, deren Differenzen, Relationen und poli-
tologischen Zwecke unter den Policy-Spezialisten selbst äusserst umstritten ist. Dies hat zur
Folge, dass beinahe jeder Autor sein eigenes Kategoriengerüst verwendet”
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istics of the network affect the policy process. In general, researchers applying
network approaches to policy-making are content with observing that the pol-
icy process in the “differentiated polity” is complicated and messy [Smith, 1993,
Rhodes, 1997]. Cohesive policy communities, so the argument goes, will operate
predominantly in terms of non-decisions and exclusion whereas issue networks
will give rise to the politics of the lowest common denominator. In either case,
policy-making is an incremental adjustment process that diffuses responsibil-
ity throughout the network: here, the policy is the product of an iterative,
multi-layered and arhythmic bustle of policy activity. In short, policy in the
“differentiated polity” just appears from this messy and inherently chaotic pro-
cess. Although there is much to commend this description of policy-making, it
is not very helpful for understanding, let alone affecting, the policy process.
This also makes [Atkinson and Coleman, 1992]. Essentially, network ap-
proaches are geared towards understanding and describing ‘normal’ politics.
Policy communities (either in Rhodes’ or in Jordan and Richardson’s sense)
are explicitly designed to avoid policy change: controlled membership, strong
integration, as well as a shared ideological framework preclude policy change in
favour of preserving the status quo. Here, political change is an unusual event
that throws the proverbial spanner into the smooth workings of a policy com-
munity. By the same token, the basic characteristics of issue networks are also
unlikely to change since decision-making is effectively gridlocked in a system of
highly conflictual yet weakly integrated interest groups.
Yet, if we are to believe the plausible claims by network theorists that policy
in the differentiated polity emerges from policy networks and policy communi-
ties, then these must also be the locus of wide-spread political change we are
experiencing at present. Rhodes’ central argument is that the shift from the
Westminster model to the differentiated polity is in fact at the heart of contem-
porary political change is not altogether convincing [Rhodes, 1997]. Although
network theorists have shown that big government and increasing specialisa-
tion has substantially altered policy-making in advanced industrial democracies,
there is little within the approach itself to explain how political change works
through the “differentiated polity” and how the differentiated polity itself may
change.
One of the main reasons the policy network and policy community approach
is relatively static is related to the somewhat marginal status of ideas, ideology
and knowledge within policy network theories. In general, policy network and
policy community approaches concentrate on the exchange relationships, be it
between individual or institutional policy actors, rather than on the ideas and
beliefs that these policy actors may hold. This, however, is not to say that
network theorists of either methodological bent discount the role of ideas and
ideology. In his theory of power dependence, Rhodes, referring to the work of
Sir Geoffrey Vickers [Vickers, 1965], points out that “. . . the appreciative system
of the dominant coalition influences which relationships are seen as a problem
and which resources will be sought”[Rhodes, 1997, p.36]. What is more, Rhodes
contends that the dominant coalition determines the ‘rules of the game’ within
the network; presumably, these rules reflect fundamental beliefs about how to
tackle the issue at hand and how to effectively organise policy processes. Jordan
is even more explicit: for him, “a policy community exists where there are
effective shared ‘community’ views on the problem.Where there are no such
shared attitudes no policy community exists” [Jordan, 1990, original emphasis,
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p.327]. So, ideas, ideology and knowledge seem to be important.
However, for all the effort that has gone into mapping and categorising
different types of exchange relationships, network theorists have paid scant at-
tention to understanding how ideas and ideologies interact with and impact on
the configuration of exchange relationships. First, it is not entirely clear from
the literature what “appreciative systems” or the “community of shared values”
exactly entail. It is unclear from the literature how these different ideational as-
pects (fundamental values, process-oriented beliefs, or epistemic commitments)
hang together to reinforce and justify a specific policy network configuration.
Second, a more fine-grained and systematic understanding of ideas and
knowledge would allow a clearer analysis of consensus and conflict in policy
networks. The Rhodes model, but also other approaches to policy networks,
deals with policy conflict in a rather binary way. Either cohesive policy com-
munities avoid principled conflict about ideas by simply excluding potential
dissenters or issue networks, which consist of nothing but conflict, produce pol-
icy by exercising “despotic power” [Smith, 1993]. In either case, the dominant
actor determines policy outcomes: in the former case by determining the rules
of the game, in the latter case by governmental volition. More specifically, it
would enable the analyst to identify the types of principled conflict ‘permitted’
in a particular policy network. In short, a more systematic approach to ideas
and ideology would provide the key to how policy networks manage principled
conflict.
Third, and related to the above, is the issue of systemic norms and normative
structures. Atkinson and Coleman point out that prevalent normative structures
beyond the boundaries of policy networks may have a decisive impact on the ex-
change relationships within policy communities [Atkinson and Coleman, 1992].
The overall structures, norms and practises of a polity as a whole, what Atkin-
son and Coleman call “systemic macro-variables”, may profoundly affect the
interactions within specific policy domains. Pointing to comparative research
on regulatory regimes [Vogel, 1986] and on different corporatist arrangements,
Atkinson and Coleman point to rather significant differences in the network
structure at sectoral level. For example, in countries where the polity is geared
towards competition, such as the United States, policy communities tend to
exhibit far more conflictual behaviour than in countries based on consensual
policy-making, such as the United Kingdom. At present, however, analysis
tends to end at the boundaries of the specific networks under consideration. In-
cluding wider systemic norms within the analytical framework, then, may help
explain the structures of conflict and interaction within specific policy arenas.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter shows how theories of policy networks and policy communities help
come to terms with the institutional and organisational structures of contempo-
rary policy-making. Realising that “institutions matter” but that policy-making
in the “differentiated polity” no longer takes place in formal political institu-
tions alone, concepts of policy networks and policy communities explicitly take
into account the impact of social relations and patterns of social transactions on
policy-making. While the so-called “Rhodes-model” understands networks to
emerge from resource dependencies between organisations, other approaches, no-
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tably Jeremy Richardson’s policy community framework, focus on transactions
between individual policy-makers. The chapter also shows that the different
flavours of network approaches come to different conclusions about the impact
of policy networks on pluralist democracy. While Rhodes sees the differenti-
ated polity as potentially watering down democratic accountability, Richardson
perceives policy communities as a rejuvenation of pluralism in mass democracy.
However, despite disparities between different approaches, concepts of policy
networks suggest that mapping the patterns of social transactions between in-
dividual or institutional policy actors reveals incentives and constraints that
significantly shape policy-making.
Chapter 2 has also pointed to the weaknesses of the policy network and policy
community approaches. Apart from a debilitating terminological feud between
adherents of differing approaches, policy network theories are poorly equipped
for understanding either organisational or policy change. This is methodolog-
ically hard-wired into the frameworks: in a very real sense, policy network
and policy community theories are one-dimensional in that they explain policy-
making solely in terms of organisational or institutional structure. Ideas, ide-
ologies or discourses, to the extent that they do figure in the theories, are added
on in an unsystematic manner. Thus, the network approaches have no means
of spotting and explaining how conflict arises between actors within and across
networks and communities.
How, then, can we use policy network and policy community approaches
for a discourse-based analysis of conflict about messy policy problems? The
following insights, then, will inform the conceptual framework for a policy-
oriented discourse analysis elaborated in Chapter 5:
Contemporary policy-making takes place in the “differentiated polity”. In
Europe, policy processes are located in functionally differentiated insti-
tutional networks focused on a specific policy issues (such as transport,
environment of social security policy). Alongside public sector institutions
(such as ministries or executive agencies), these institutional networks in-
clude organisations from the private and tertiary sectors.
The approaches discussed in this chapter provide three complementary per-
spectives on the differentiated polity. The Rhodes Model describes how
different institutional constellations function as a location or venue of
policy-making. Richardson’s concept of the policy community, in turn,
shows how individual policy-makers cohere to form collective policy ac-
tors. Wilks and Wright address both the venue and actor aspect of policy
networks: in their scheme of nested policy environments, policy universes
provide the organisational environment from which different policy com-
munities emerge. Understanding conflict about complex, uncertain and
transversal policy issues will require analysing the relationships between
venues, policy actors and policy environments.
Policy networks and policy communities have profound implications for the
exercise and distribution of political power within a polity. Smith’s idea
of “infrastructural power” implies that in the differentiated polity, policy
actors depend on resources and structures within the policy network to
formulate and implement the policies they prefer. This means that the
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autonomy and capacity to shape policy increasingly depends on control
over access to policy networks and policy communities.
However, we have also see that policy network and policy community ap-
proaches leave central questions unanswered:
• How can we re-integrate the role ideas, ideologies and knowledge into the
differentiated polity. The thesis will first discuss the role and function
of ideas, ideologies and knowledge for contemporary policy processes in
Chapter 3 and then explore how ideas can be integrated into a network-
based policy analysis in Chapter 4.
• How do policy networks change over time and what factors bring about
these changes? The thesis will address these questions in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5.
• What are the implications of the “differentiated polity” for democratic ac-
countability in contemporary pluralist polities? The thesis will return to






Traditionally, the analysis of how ideas, ideologies, and knowledge impact on
the policy process has led a Cinderella-type of existence in the policy sciences.
In the previous chapter we saw how policy network theorists relegate ideas, ide-
ologies and knowledge to the margins of their explanatory architectures. But
the thinkers and approaches discussed in the last chapter are not alone in un-
derestimating the role of ideas in policy processes. For the most part, policy
sciences have been preoccupied with wringing ‘objective truths’ out of policy
problems by using an impressive array of sophisticated scientific methods. For
a long time, policy analysts understood their role in the policy process as one
of ‘cutting through the crap’ of politics and, by applying objective methods
and tools, ‘getting to the bottom’ of social problems. By “speaking truth to
power”[Wildavsky, 1987], policy analysts would provide a shining beacon along
the path of objective, and rational decision-making.
The preference for policy analysis and policy-making sanitised of values and
ideas is part of what Deborah Stone calls “the rationality project” [Stone, 1997].
This project aims to rescue “. . . policy from the irrationalities and indignities of
politics, hoping to make policy instead with rational, analytical and scientific
methods” [Stone, 1997, p.6]. In terms of the rationality project, the body politic
is afflicted with a serious and unsightly illness making politics look “messy, fool-
ish, erratic and inexplicable” [Stone, 1997, p.6]. On this view, the palliative is ra-
tional, objective and value-free policy analysis to be judiciously administered by
skilled professionals. Indeed, many governments across Europe are reacting to
messy policy problems by suggesting a return to knowledge-based, objective and
evidence-driven policy-making
[Parsons, 2002, Strategic Policy-Making Team, 1999].
Yet, Stone and other policy scientists1 argue, the rationality project misses
the point. Whatever else it may be, policy-making in democratic polities is
fundamentally a process of argumentation. In principle, Giandomenico Majone
argues, policy decisions in liberal democracies are the outcome of an deliber-
ative process in which contending parties exchange arguments based on ideas
1Including, most prominently, Frank Fischer, John Forester, John Dryzek, Deborah Stone,
or Giandomenico Majone
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[Majone, 1989]. Far from being a pathology, deliberation and conflict featuring
rhetoric and persuasion are central to the policy process [Majone, 1989, p.2].
Ignoring these argumentative aspects not only means that policy analysts have
an incomplete understanding of what happens in real policy processes, they also
have a distorted perception of what ought to happen in policy-making. By purg-
ing values and ideology from policy-making, Stone contends that the rationality
project ignores
“. . . the essence of policy making in political communities: the strug-
gle over ideas. Ideas are a medium of exchange and a mode of influ-
ence even more powerful than money and votes and guns. Shared
meanings motivate people to action and meld individual strivings
into collective action. Ideas are at the centre of all political conflict”
[Stone, 1997, p.11].
If we are to understand contemporary policy processes, these thinkers con-
tend, ideas, ideology and knowledge must become an integral aspect and central
object of policy analysis. This, in turn, implies that policy analysis and planning
undergo an “argumentative turn”.2
In this chapter, we will review what this means for contemporary policy-
making and policy analysis. In doing so, this chapter aims to explore the theo-
retical context for policy-oriented discourse analysis as well as to identify useful
concepts for developing a discourse analytical framework. Section 3.1 and Sec-
tion 3.2 provide the conceptual backdrop by discussing the way the Argumenta-
tive Turn respectively portrays and criticises the conventional precepts of policy
analysis. In Section 3.3, the chapter introduces some alternative methods and
tools for policy analysis relevant to practical discourse analysis. The penulti-
mate section — Section 3.4 — picks up on some of the weaknesses inherent in
the argumentative approach to policy analysis and planning. The conclusion
summarises both the basic insights and the concrete conceptual tools relevant
for analysing conflict about messy policy problems.
3.1 Conventional Policy Analysis
Conventional tools of policy analysis, the thinkers of the Argumentative Turn
assert, have become blunt and rather unsafe to use. The ‘rationality project’
has given rise to three sets of interrelated misconceptions about policy analysis
and policy-making. First, a rather narrow notion of rationality, based on the
distinction of fact and value, has led policy analysts to adopt inappropriate
and unrealistic standards for analysing social problems and policy processes.
Second, a restrictive concept of the rational, theorists of the Argumentative Turn
contend, has focused policy analysis on decision-making. Third, the ‘rationality
project’ rather inaccurately portrays what policy analysts actually do.
2The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, which is also the title of Frank
Fischer and John Forester’s edited volume[Fischer and Forester, 1993], encompasses a rather
disparate assembly of thinkers and paradigms. Despite considerable differences between the
approaches found under this label, they all share a fundamental scepticism toward conventional
policy analysis based on the “rationality project”. Instead, the theorists and researchers prefer




For thinkers within the Argumentative Turn, many problems in contemporary
policy analysis and policy-making stem from a restrictive and narrow defini-
tion of the rational. This particular view of rationality, which emerged from
the Enlightenment, assumes that we can neatly separate the objective from the
subjective. According to this model of reason, the world is a place that the
scientist, given proper training and the appropriate methodology, can describe
in terms of facts and relationships between facts. On this view, which John
Dryzek calls “objectivism”, science is “. . . a single universally applicable set
of rules and procedures for the unambiguous establishment of causal relation-
ships” [Dryzek, 1993, p.213]. The facts that sciences uncover are real, hard and
incontestably true statements about the world. Values, in contrast, are matters
of belief, ideology and even myth. More importantly, however, values lie in
the realm of the subjective; they are part of a world hidden from science and
rational methods [Douglas, 1992]. While, then, rational science provides knowl-
edge of objective reality, subjective values always remain a matter of individual
judgement.
Yet, how can we be sure that the facts really reflect objective reality? In
order to safeguard objectivity, “objectivism” imposes some rather rigorous stan-
dards of what forms of enquiry are to count as science. In this context, Dryzek
identifies three research traditions that have set scientific standards for pol-
icy analysis: positivism,3 critical rationalism and the so-called analycentric
mode. The first tradition, associated with 18th century thinkers such as Au-
guste Compte or St. Simon, stipulates that a science feature a rigorous empirical
methodology capable of generating general laws (so-called covering laws) that
explain observed uniformities [Kaplan, 1993]. Here, science can only make au-
thoritative statements about means (facts) but not, however, about ends (values
or objectives) [Dryzek, 1993]. The problem with positivism, Dryzek contends,
is two-fold. On the one hand, the covering laws that are supposed to provide
the empirical basis of policy action are very scarce in the social science. On the
other hand, the assumption that scientists can operate with a given and un-
controversial set of objectives (provided by policy-makers) is simply unrealistic.
Dryzek maintains that, in real policy processes, values and objectives are vague,
multiple, and inherently fluid [Dryzek, 1993, p.218]. Pretending as if objectives
and values are fixed, he concludes, introduces a bias into analysis: either the
analysis serves established interests or it is simply irrelevant.
The second research tradition is associated with the philosopher of science
Sir Karl Popper. The main argument of critical rationalism is that scientific the-
ories and hypotheses can never be conclusively proven by empirical evidence.
Rather, the aim of scientific enquiry is to disprove or falsify existing scientific
hypothesis and theories. While successive failure to falsify theories and hypothe-
ses strengthens the confidence in existing knowledge, scientists should always
be alive to the possibility of falsification in the future. The idea of critical ra-
tionalism crucially depends on free debate and open criticism within a scientific
community. Policy-making, Popper argued, is a very similar process to that of
3Dryzek, unlike other theorists of the Argumentative Turn, feels that positivism, at least
in its classical form, has little relevance for policy-making and policy analysis. He argues
that it is very difficult to find any contemporary researcher who claims to adhere to positivist
conceptions of science
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scientific enquiry. Here, scientific hypotheses become policies and experiments
become the implementation of policies. For this reason, Popper argued that
social change should take place in small, incremental steps, so-called “piecemeal
social engineering”. Like the in scientific community, policy should be subject to
wide criticism within an “open society”. The weaknesses of critical rationalism,
Dryzek contends, lie in its “impoverished notion of discourse” and rigid ideas of
what constitutes a valid scientific experiment [Dryzek, 1993]. Like positivism,
Popper’s conception of science relies on a sharp distinction of fact and values.
Valid experiments, in science as in policy-making, need to be comparable and
reproducible. This implies that not only the conditions but also the values and
goals that guide an experiment remain constant throughout the investigation.
Scientific exchange and debate, then, can only be about facts and empirical evi-
dence emerging from experiments (or implementation). Again, a rational debate
about values and goals is inherently beyond the scope of scientific enquiry.
The last body of knowledge in the ‘objectivist’ vein is what Dryzek, fol-
lowing William Dunn [Dunn, 1993], calls the ‘analycentric mode’. This corpus
consists of a number of different methods and techniques such as Cost-Benefit-
Analysis, decision analysis, multi-attribute utility analysis, linear programming,
and systems analysis [Dryzek, 1993, p.221]. Unlike positivist prescriptions for
analysis, these techniques do not rely on empirically verified covering laws.
Rather, the authority of these approaches resides within the methodology itself
[Dryzek, 1993]. Here, the aim is to evaluate different policy alternatives by rank-
ing their possible outcomes. Thus, conclusions “. . . take the form of ‘policy A
will maximise the amount of value B produced’ rather than ‘policy A will cause B
to happen’ ” [Dryzek, 1993, p.221]. However, methods in the analycentric mode,
Dryzek argues, are highly stylised depictions of reality with little relevance to
real-life policy-making [Dryzek, 1993, p.221]. These models evaluate alternative
policy pathways as if decision-making were in the hands of a benevolent dictator
and the policies implement themselves [Dryzek, 1993, Majone, 1989]. Moreover,
Dryzek contends that the methods and techniques in the analycentric mode have
inbuilt, often implicit, value structures and biases. For example, Dryzek argues
that a technique such as cost-benefit analysis is based on the concept of Pareto
efficiency. Thus, Dryzek concludes,
“. . . the models that [the analycentric mode] uses are consequently
never more than a gross oversimplification of a complex reality,
rooted as they all are in a single analytical framework chosen from
the many that could be employed within the analycentric mode”
[Dryzek, 1993, p.222].
In sum, the objectivist bias, based on a narrow idea of the rational, creates a
restrictive conception of scientific enquiry. By drawing and maintaining a sharp
boundary between objective facts and subjective values, objectivism determines
what is and what is not a suitable object for scientific enquiry: on this view,
science is essentially about gathering and assessing facts while remaining silent
about goals and values. More importantly, the focus on objective facts assumes
that rational and objective techniques have a privileged access to reality. Since
science and scientific methods, so the argument goes, can help us understand




Objectivism replete with the strict separation of fact and value, the thinkers of
the Argumentative Turn contend, has given rise to a specific mode of reasoning
in the policy sciences. This mode of reasoning, Stone points out, emerges from
perceiving society in terms of the market model. Here, society becomes
“. . . a collection of autonomous, rational decision-makers who have
no community life. Their interactions consist entirely of trading with
one another to maximise their individual well-being. They have
objectives and preferences, they each compare alternative ways of
attaining their objectives, and they each choose the way that yields
most satisfaction. They maximise their interest through rational
calculation” [Stone, 1997, p.9].
The market model, then, provides a very specific conception of rational be-
haviour: acting rationally implies “. . . determining the best means to a given
end” [Dryzek, 1993, p.213].
Within this paradigm, rational action necessitates some form of decision
process to evaluate and choose possible courses of action. What features, then,
characterise ’rational decision-making’? Since facts describe how the world re-
ally is and since there is no way of verifying values, any decision or course of ac-
tion, if it is to be rational, ought to base on objective facts rather than subjective
values. In order to ensure that decisions are rational, would-be policy-makers
need only subject their decision processes to a rational and logical sequence of
steps [Majone, 1989, Stone, 1997]. These include
1. identifying objectives,
2. identifying alternative courses of action,
3. predicting possible consequences of each alternative (by using science to
compile facts),
4. evaluating the possible outcome of each alternative,
5. selecting the alternative that maximises objectives [Stone, 1997, p.8].
This model of rational decision-making, proponents of the Argumentative
Turn maintain, has become the cornerstone for policy analysis [Majone, 1989,
Stone, 1997]. Rational decision-making or, to use Herbert Simon’s term “synop-
tic rationality” has become both a descriptive and normative model for rational
behaviour [Simon, 1945]. Not only does the model claim to provide a useful tool
for understanding decision-making processes, it also prescribes a certain form
of reasoning for would-be decision-makers.
What is more, conventional approaches have elevated the model of rational
decision-making to a general conception of policy-making. Here, organisations
and institutions in the policy process become unitary actors that, like individual
market agents, are capable of clearly formulating and ranking preferences. By
extension, political arenas become market places in which these unitary actors
face optimisation and maximisation problems. Within this ideational set-up,
policy-making and politics are little more than a stream of decisions issuing from
individual and organisational policy actors. On this view, Stone maintains, the
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policy process is similar to a production process “. . . where policy is created in a
fairly orderly sequence of stages, almost as if on an assembly line” [Stone, 1997,
p.10]. Here, politics and policy-making become “decision-theory writ large”
[Majone, 1989, p.25]. Analysts are encouraged to look for discrete stages in
the life-cycle of a policy which follow the steps outlined in the rational decision
model. For liberal democracies (such as the United States), Stone outlines these
stages as follows:
“An issue is placed on the agenda, and a problem gets defined. It
moves through the legislative and executive branches of government,
where alternative solutions are proposed, analysed, legitimised, se-
lected, and refined. A solution is implemented by the executive
agencies and constantly challenged and revised by interested actors,
perhaps using the judiciary branch. And finally, if the policy-making
process is managerially sophisticated, it provides a means of evalu-
ating and revising implemented solutions” [Stone, 1997, p.10].
In sum, conventional approaches to policy analysis equate the policy process
with rational decision-making. This model, based on the conception of a mar-
ket, has both a descriptive and normative dimension. Not only does the ra-
tionality project understand rational decision-making as a suitable model for
analysing policy processes, it also implies that following a synoptically rational
prescriptions leads to better policy outcomes.
The Rational Decision-Maker
The rationality project, its focus on rational decision-making and its adherence
to a market model of society has also created a particular image of analysts in the
policy process. By insisting that “. . . there are objective and neutral standards
of evaluation that can be applied to politics, but that come from a vantage point
outside politics” [Stone, 1997, p.12], the ‘rationality project’ places the policy
analyst above the political fray. As a wielder of objective and rational methods,
the policy analyst, if the analysis is to remain uncontaminated by ideas and
values, needs to remain in a place remote from the vagaries of politics, power,
and influence.
Majone shows how what he calls “decisionism” extends the sharp distinction
between the objective and subjective to the activities of policy analysts. Within
decisionism, the primary task of a policy analyst, Majone contends, is to pro-
vide objective, non-partisan, problem-solving resources. On this view, policy
analysts map alternatives for policy-makers and evaluate possible consequences
using rational and objective techniques. In short, “. . . the analyst’s job is to
determine the best means to achieve given goals” [Majone, 1989, p.21].
Goals and objectives of policy, however, are strictly off limits for policy ana-
lysts. Investigating policy goals and policy objectives would imply exploring the
realm of values, which, by definition, is closed to rational scientific methods. On
this view, then, policy analysis (finding out the about the ‘how’) is a fundamen-
tally different task from policy advocacy (finding out about the ‘why’): whereas
the former can rely on the certitude of objective facts, the latter activity is an
exercise in opinion and speculation.
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3.2 The Problem with Conventional Policy Anal-
ysis
The theorists of the Argumentative Turn take issue with conventional precepts
of policy analysis. Ideas of objectivist science and rational policy-making, they
contend, are fundamentally flawed in two respects. First, models of objective
policy analysis and rational decision-making are wholly inaccurate depictions
of real-life policy processes. Second, objectivism, instrumental rationality and
synoptic decision-making processes give rise to inappropriate and even irrelevant
normative standards for policy analysis. Replacing these with more sensible and
relevant standards, they contend, implies understanding the way policy analysts
really behave, deducing what sort of policy processes this behaviour gives rise
to and, in the light of this enquiry, remodelling our fundamental approach to
policy analysis.
What Policy Analysts Actually Do
The Argumentative Turn unravels the rational model of policy analysis and
policy-making by looking closely at what policy analysts actually do in real-life
policy processes. Policy analysis, the thinkers of the Argumentative Turn point
out, is not merely about understanding social problems but also about inter-
vening in policy processes and social life. By paying “. . . close attention to the
actual performances of argumentation and the practical rhetorical work of fram-
ing analyses, articulating them, constructing senses of value and significance”
[Fischer and Forester, 1993, p.5], the thinkers of the Argumentative Turn show
how the activity of analysing policy consistently and necessarily breaches the
boundary between objective and subjective.
Policy analysts, they argue, operate within real social settings characterised
by value systems, political power, personal authority and influence. In these
settings, facts never speak for themselves; policy analysts always have to show
a sceptical and often hostile audience how analysis relates to the issue at hand
[Stone, 1997]. In order to do their jobs, then, policy analysts have to use per-
suasion, rhetoric and argument.
If policy analysts do not provide objective and impartial advice from outside
the policy process, what is it they do provide? Majone maintains that “. . . in a
system of government by discussion, analysis – even professional analysis – has
less to do with formal techniques of problem-solving than with the process of
argument” [Majone, 1989, p.7]. Essentially, he continues, policy analysts pro-
duce arguments for use in policy debates. In addition to informing policy actors,
these arguments are designed to, among other things, outline the problem at
hand, construct a compelling case for a particular course of action, provide legit-
imation and justification, build alliances within the community of policy actors,
and mobilise resources within the policy process [Stone, 1997, Majone, 1989].
This form of activity, Majone maintains, is considerably closer to jurispru-
dence than to engineering or science. Policy analysts, if they are to impact on
the policy process, require a similar set of skill to those of a lawyer. A policy
analyst, Majone points out, needs to critically probe assumptions, needs to pro-
duce and evaluate evidence (rather than data, see also [Adler and Haas, 1992]),
should be able to construct and argument from many different sources and,
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most importantly, needs to communicate effectively with non-specialist audi-
ences [Majone, 1989, p.22].
Wielding theses skills, Majone argues, leads to fundamentally different out-
puts than scientific enquiry. Science, he contends, aims at providing demon-
strations. These, in turn, assume consensus on the problem formulation, no
conflict of interests and values, as well as no implementation aspects. Moreover,
a demonstration implies full knowledge of all alternatives, all relevant facts, all
present and future preferences and all possible consequences of each alternative
[Majone, 1989, p.22]. In contrast, real life policy analysis aims to generate argu-
ments. Whereas demonstrations relate to a system of formal rules of inference
and axioms, arguments are based on values and opinions. Arguments use logical
inferences but, unlike demonstrations, these inferences are not exhausted by the
deductive system of formal statements. Further, demonstrations are designed
to convince specialists with the requisite technical knowledge. Arguments, in
turn, always aim at a particular audience and attempt to mobilise support for a
particular thesis. Most importantly, Majone maintains, arguments do not aim
to produce “intellectual agreement” but are geared towards inciting action or
creating a disposition to act [Majone, 1989, p.22].
The activity or “craft” of constructing and communicating arguments, Ma-
jone argues, implies constantly overstepping the divide between fact and value.
Majone outlines four areas in which actual policy analysis blurs the distinction
between the objective and the subjective. First, policy analysts are involved in
both using and setting norms for public policy. Whereas conventional models
of policy-making assume that analysis starts when policy actors have agreed on
goals and values, Majone maintains that analysis plays a major role in defining
these values. In real policy processes, policy objectives are a moving target that
shift along with changes in overall value structures. Indeed, Majone implies that
values may change as a result of policy analysis. Policy analysts not only apply
norms (i.e. does policy A fulfil objective α), they actively set norms (i.e. what
is a suitable objective for policy A). Moreover, in issue areas featuring large
degrees of uncertainty, Majone contends, the difference between norm-setting
and norm-using is often unclear. Uncertainty creates a large degree of discretion
for policy-makers implementing policies. In these issue areas, policy analysts
will often be called upon to interpret observed reality [Adler and Haas, 1992]
in order to understand what fulfilling objective α may actually entail. Thus,
just as implementing policy is a way of formulating policy, norm-setting over-
laps with norm-using [Majone, 1989, p.26]. This process of norm-setting, which
helps define and focus policy problems, requires persuasion and argument on
the part of the policy analyst.
Second, Majone points to the distinction between discovery and justification.
The process of discovery refers to the application of scientific methods to a
social problem. Justification, in turn, implies communicating and justifying
these findings to a specific audience. Again, Majone argues, policy analysts
honour this distinction more in the breach than in observance. Just as scientists
have to justify a private discovery to an audience of other scientists, policy
analysts justify decisions and policies to other policy actors [Majone, 1989, p.29].
Justification and legitimation of policies, Majone suggests, is an integral part
of the policy process. Policies require constant updating: they need to adapt to
changing environmental conditions (changes in policy community structure or
shifts in values) and they have to ensure continued support from actors within
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the community. Post-decision justification, Majone avers, is a crucial element of
policy-making: far from being mere rationalisation, post-hoc analysis is critical
to the ongoing life-cycle of a policy. Policy-makers, then, need both ex-ante and
ex-post analysis in order formulate and adapt policy.
Third, Majone investigates the distinction between analysis and advocacy.
Like the other distinctions derived from the objective/ subjective schism, Ma-
jone argues, the differentiation between analysis and advocacy is difficult to
maintain in practise for three reasons. As we have seen, analysis in the objec-
tivist approach is limited to providing knowledge about means, not about goals
or values. However, Majone argues, values in policy processes are fluid and
dynamic: the choice of means and values depends on the policies and policy
objectives that already exist in the policy process. Policy processes, he con-
tinues, do not take place in a socio-institutional vacuum. Rather, policy pro-
cesses depends on institutional structures, replete with codified value systems.
Policy-maker, then, need advice about both technical means and policy goals.
Another reason why analysts necessarily engage in policy advocacy, Majone ar-
gues, is that many policy problems are “trans-scientific” [Weinberg, 1972]; that
although we can formulate the problem in terms of science, the problem will
not yield to scientific methods. For this reason, any set of data may be con-
sistent with competing and conflicting social scientific theories. Since, Majone
asserts, there are no meta-rules for choosing scientific theories, the analyst has
to chose a particular approach and advocate this frame to the relevant audi-
ence of policy actors. Again, the choice of any particular theoretical model
implies a value judgement on the part of the policy analyst. The last reason for
engaging in advocacy as well as analysis relates to the issue of policy innova-
tion. Majone asserts that the institutional realities of policy processes militate
against new ideas. Bureaucratic inertia and the inherent conservatism of po-
litical processes allow established interests to keep new ideas off the political
agenda. Further, innovative approaches, by definition, lack any empirical basis
or evidence. Objective and impartial analysis oriented along given values alone,
Majone concludes, rarely leads to policy change. For this reason, policy analysts
have to ’sell’ new ideas to a sceptical audience of policy actors. Here, policy
analysts blend reasoned analysis with the craft of persuasion.
Fourth, Majone shows that the supposed separation of advice and persua-
sion is unrealistic in practise. In real policy processes, policy analysts provide
three kinds of advice to policy-makers. The first type of advice, which Majone
calls “prescription”, provides the decision-maker with the “. . . best, cheapest
and most efficient” way to achieve a particular policy objective. For the ana-
lyst to provide this type of counsel, policy objectives need to be unambiguous
and the available means need to be clear. Prescription, then, comes closest to
the rational and objective ideal of policy analysis. The second type of counsel,
which Majone calls simply “advice”, helps policy-makers structure and define
a policy issue. Policy analysts advise policy-makers, Majone contends, when
the nature of a social problem is unclear and when there are many conceivable
solutions to a particular issue. Majone labels the third type of policy counsel
“persuasive advice”. Here, analysts try to redirect policy-makers preferences,
attitudes or beliefs. This kind of policy analysis, Majone argues, becomes neces-
sary when policy-makers are “blinded by stereotypes” or are victims of “wishful
thinking”. In this situation, policy analysts speak truth to power. Each form of
advice, Majone asserts, requires an increasing degree of persuasion, argument
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and rhetoric.
Analysing policy in real political and socio-institutional setting, then, is far
more than simply applying rational problem-solving techniques to social prob-
lems. Policy analysts, operating in socio-institutional and political settings,
need a broad range of skills to both understand the issues at hand and commu-
nicate the analysis to policy-makers. Typically, Fischer and Forester argue, the
activities of a policy analyst include
“. . . the scanning of the political environment for support for and op-
position to potential recommendations, the anticipation of threats
and dangers that policy and planning measures might counteract,
and the subtle negotiating that transpires between agency staff who
are always seeking to learn, to protect working relationships, and to
maintain their own strategic position as well” [Fischer and Forester, 1993,
p.6].
Doing this inevitably means blurring the lines between fact and value, between
reason and power, and between the objective and the subjective. Policy an-
alysts define problems by using language, rhetoric and interpretation. Facing
ill-defined social problems in dynamic socio-institutional settings, policy ana-
lysts are invariably forced to make value judgements in their analyses. Ana-
lysts need to decide on what particular model is appropriate for the specific
issue and setting at hand, what data to rely on, how to organise evidence and
what aspects of the problem to highlight. The value judgements, Fischer and
Forester argue, also help set policy agendas: policy analysis “. . . focuses at-
tention selectively and deliberately, enabling a more focused consideration of
some alternatives and excluding others from practical consideration altogether”
[Fischer and Forester, 1993, emphasis added, p.6]. Quite contrary to the con-
ventional image of the policy analyst as a neutral and impartial observer, policy
analysts, the value judgements they make and the findings they peddle actively
shape policy outputs and policy outcomes.
The aim here, however, is not to criticise the actual practise of policy-making.
Rather, the aim here is to point out that the idealised vision of sanitised policy
analysis and policy-making is, at best, a nuisance for policy analysts and, at
worst, a distorting influence. The ideal of objective and value-free analysis,
argue Fischer and Forester, has placed policy analysts operating in real political
and institutional settings in an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, policy-
makers expect politically astute and relevant analyses of social problems. On the
other hand, the canon of rational and objective analysis expects policy analysts
to stay aloof of real policy processes. Policy analysts, then, are perpetually torn
between applying rational techniques to policy issues to produce “rationally
sound policy analysis” and “the organisational networking,‘boundary spanning’,
relationship building, and ritualised bargaining that analysts must do to work
in policy and planning processes at all” [Fischer and Forester, 1993, p.6].
The upshot of the argument, then, is that the strict separation of the objec-
tive and subjective is as untenable in practise and it is undesirable in theory. In
order to analyse policy at all, analysts are constantly overstepping this bound-
ary at both an analytical and a practical level. What is more, the theorists of
the Argumentative Turn maintain, the artificial and counterfactual separation
of fact and value distracts from the real issues involved in policy analysis and
policy-making. Fischer and Forester argue that as long
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“. . . as students and practitioners of policy analysis and planning
think of the political and the rational [fact and value] as antithetical,
planners and policy analysts will seem to have impossible jobs. For
these analysts are political animals whether they wish to be or not”
[Fischer and Forester, 1993, p.4].
Policy analysis takes place in political and institutional settings. To pretend
it does not, the Argumentative Turn asserts, hides from analytical view the
more pressing questions of how policy analysts and policy analysis impact on
the policy process. More importantly, however, the distinction between fact
and value is a misleading normative model for policy analysis. The theorists of
the Argumentative Turn bristle at the objectivist conceit that sound analysis
is free of values and beliefs. Not only is policy analysis about making value
judgements in practise, it should be about values judgements in theory since,
as Majone forcefully argues,
“. . . to say anything of importance in public policy requires value
judgements, this artificial separation between values and rational
capabilities is a threat to all notions of public deliberation and de-
fensible policy choices” [Majone, 1989, p.8].
Analysing the actual practises of policy analysts provides the thinkers of the
Argumentative Turn with the key for criticising the basic precepts of rational
policy analysis. If, as the enquiry into the activity of policy analysis shows,
the policy process is not a neat succession of rational steps, then what is the
nature of policy-making in differentiated polities? And, if instrumental ratio-
nality provides a misleading model of reasoning for policy analysis, what mode
of reasoning is appropriate for understanding policy issues?
The Argumentative Policy Process
The discovery that the practise of policy analysis has little in common with
the prescriptions for objective enquiry has significant implications for the ra-
tional model of the policy process. Argumentative policy analysis that deploys
persuasion and rhetoric sits uncomfortably with the image of a neatly logical
and rational mode of (aggregated) decision-making. Instead, the Argumenta-
tive Turn implies that the policy-process is a far messier and more engaged
phenomenon.
Rather than understanding politics and policy-making in terms of the mar-
ket, Deborah Stone urges us to locate politics in what she calls the “Polis”
[Stone, 1997]. Politics, she argues, is far more than the sum of individual op-
timisation and maximisation decisions. Most importantly, politics takes place
in and between different political communities. These communities, she avers,
use the full battery of cultural techniques to recruit and retain members: po-
litical communities make use of symbolism to inspire loyalty, they construct
a system of values reflecting the good (and the evil) life, and they create a
sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The Polis, then, is the battleground on which dif-
ferent political communities fight over competing conceptions of the good life.
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Box 3.2: Politics in the Polis Political activity in the Polis, Deborah Stone
argues, follows a different set of rules than in the market. In particular, Stone
outlines ten features of the ‘Polis’:
1. The Polis is a community or multiple communities “with ideas, images, will,
and effort quite apart from individual goals and behaviour” [Stone, 1997,
p.32]
2. The Polis has a conception of public interest, even if it may only be an
ideal that policy actors struggle over.
3. Most policy problems are what Stone calls “common problems”. These
type of problems refer to “. . . situations where self-interest and public in-
terest work against each other . . . ” [Stone, 1997, p.22]. Common prob-
lems raise the issue of collective action to motivate policy actors to forego
private benefits (or shoulder social costs) for the “collective good”.
4. Influence and political power are pervasive in the Polis. Moreover, Stone
argues that policy actors constantly contend and question the border be-
tween legitimate influence and coercion.
5. In the Polis, cooperation between policy actors is at least as important as
competition.
6. Loyalty to a political community is the norm rather than the exception.
7. The basic unit of analysis or the “building blocks” of the Polis are groups
and organisations, not homogenised and stylised rational individuals.
8. Information in the Polis is never perfect and is never freely available.
Rather, information is always incomplete and uncertain. Policy actors will
use uncertainties and deploy information strategically.
9. The Polis is governed by “laws of passion” as well as by “laws of matter”.
The former set of laws tells us that resources are scarce, they invariably
deplete with use, and using one resource precludes using another. The
“laws of passion”, however, postulate that some resources, such as social
capital or political skill, increase with use. Moreover, according to the
“laws of passion”, the Polis permits ambiguity: the same policy issue can
mean different things to different constituencies in the Polis [Stone, 1997,
pp.30–31].
10. Change in the Polis “. . . occurs through the interaction of mutually defining
ideas and alliances” [Stone, 1997, p.32]. The primary struggles in the Po-
lis, Stone asserts, concern ideas. Clashing conceptions of the good life and
the conflicts these clashes give rise to drive political change in the Polis.
Stone argues that in the Polis, policy actors will use ideas to strengthen,
undermine, and form new alliances in an attempt to control the policy
process. The struggle for legitimacy and about ideas makes the Polis a
dynamic and ever-evolving sphere of political activity. Unlike the market
model, Stone maintains, the Polis is not inherently teleological: policy ac-
tors never solve social problems once and for all. Rather, policy interaction
in the Polis features the constant drawing and redrawing of battle-lines as
policy actors define and redefine policy issues [Stone, 1997, pp.33–34].
The distinctive feature of the argumentative policy process is that conflict is
endemic. Policy-making, on this view, has little in common with rational prob-
lem solving. Rather policy processes are disputes and conflicts about the very
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nature of policy problems. In the Polis, social groups and political communities
are perpetually embroiled in struggles over ideas, values and beliefs. Yet, the
rational model of policy-making understands conflict over ideas, ideology and
beliefs as an aberration or deviation from the rational policy process. On this
view, struggles over values and beliefs are obstacles or even misunderstandings
that rational analysis can clear out of the way. In contrast, the argumentative
approach to policy-making sees conflict over ideas and values as constitutive
of the policy process: here, policy-making is inherently about value-conflicts.
“Ideas”, Stone informs us,
“are the very stuff of politics. People fight about ideas, fight for
them, and fight against them. Political conflict is never simply over
material conditions and choice, but over what is legitimate. The
passion in politics comes from conflicting senses of fairness, justice,
rightness and goodness” [Stone, 1997, pp.33-34].
Moreover, the theorists of the Argumentative Turn assert, these conflicts
over values, ideas and beliefs are not necessarily resolvable by objective analy-
sis. Martin Rein and Donald Schön distinguish conflict amenable to resolution
by recourse to facts (so-called policy disagreements) from “intractable policy
controversies” that
“. . . are immune to resolution by appeal to the facts. Disputes of
this kind arise around such issues as crime, welfare, abortion, drugs,
poverty, mass unemployment, the Third World, the conservation
of energy, economic uncertainty, environmental destruction and re-
source depletion, and the threat of nuclear war. Disputes such as
these tend to be intractable, enduring, and seldom finally resolved”
[Rein and Schön, 1994, p.4].
In policy controversies, facts and evidence become a resource in the rhetor-
ical struggle for legitimacy in the public sphere. Parties to such a controversy
use “different strategies of selective attention”: they differ on the data they
accept as evidence, what facts are relevant and even what is to count as a fact.
Even if the parties in a policy controversy focus on the same set of facts, they
interpret the facts differently thus developing “. . . a remarkable ability, when
embroiled in a controversy, to dismiss the evidence adduced by . . . antagonists
[Rein and Schön, 1994, p.5].
In an argumentative policy process, argue the theorists of the Argumentative
Turn, intractable policy controversies are likely to be the norm rather than the
exception. In a policy process based on argument, policy actors facing complex,
uncertain and transversal policy problems will bring different sets of values
and beliefs to bear on policy issues. These, in turn give rise to fundamentally
divergent interpretations of the social issues. The argumentative policy process,
then, centres on how policy actors struggle to accrue legitimacy for their specific
interpretations of social reality.
If, as the thinkers of the Argumentative Turn claim, objective analysis and
the rational mode of reasoning does not provide any insights into real policy-
making, how can (and should) we analyse the argumentative policy process?
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Political Reasoning
In order to both understand actual policy processes and provide analysis of
any relevance, the thinkers of the Argumentative Turn maintain, policy analyst
need to jettison the artificial dichotomy between fact and value. In real policy
processes, characterised by conflict over fundamental beliefs and values, the ra-
tional always implies the political. By applying reason to policy issues, policy
analysts also exercise political power [Stone, 1997]. Understanding these pro-
cesses, Stone contends, requires a different form of reasoning than on offer from
objectivism. Whereas the rationality project operates in terms of “calculating
reasoning” (doing X will provide more or less of A), Stone urges policy analysts
to think in terms of “political reasoning”.
Political reasoning, Stone argues, relies primarily on the strategic use of
metaphors. Policy actors use metaphors to describe policy issues. These
metaphors, Stone argues, create categories that policy actors use to understand
complex and inherently ambiguous social problems. Policy actors use these cat-
egories to sort events, phenomena, and issues into different conceptual boxes.
Essentially, she argues, these conceptual boxes allow policy actors to recognise
when specific events and issues are similar and when they are not. Political rea-
soning, Stone tells us, “. . . is primarily a reasoning of sameness and difference,
and of good and bad or right and wrong” [Stone, 1997, p.377]. On the basis of
this classification and differentiation, policy actors construct and define social
problems. In short, analysis imposes an order or a structure on an inherently
fluid and ambiguous reality. By constructing categories of sameness and differ-
ence or, as Martin Rein and Donald Schön suggest, by “naming and framing”,
policy analysis “. . . provides conceptual coherence, a direction for action, a ba-
sis for persuasion, and a framework for the collection and analysis of data . . . ”
[Rein and Schön, 1993, p.153].
However, by creating these categories of difference and sameness, politi-
cal reasoning gives rise to conflict within and between political communities.
“Naming and framing”, Rein and Schön point out, is neither an obvious nor an
uncontested process. In an argumentative policy process, categories and inter-
pretations of policy issues become the rhetorical battle standards around which
policy actors seek to build coalitions and alliances in the struggle for legitimacy
and power. Yet, by constructing systems of meaning and significance, analysis
and analysts invariably highlight certain aspects of a particular policy problem
at the cost of other aspects. Since understanding ill-defined and ambiguous pol-
icy problems is associated with a considerable degree of uncertainty, assigning a
set of categories to a policy issue is always a matter of interpretation and value
judgement. Policy actors (including policy analysts) rely on their judgement,
guided by fundamental values, on what issues, events, or conditions to include
into categories. Political conflict, in turn, erupts over differences in interpre-
tation over what to include in or exclude from conceptual categories. Naming
and framing itself, then, is an argumentative process, arguably the most funda-
mental of all processes in politics. Policy actors strategically deploy rhetorical
resources to draw boundaries both at the conceptual and organisational level
[Stone, 1997]. These lines define what is good or bad, affluent and poor, efficient
or wasteful, and feasible or futile.
The main point of the Argumentative Turn is that drawing these lines is
never a politically neutral activity. Defining an issue in one way rather than
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another, drawing the line here rather than there, is likely to have very tangible
effects in terms of who is responsible for dealing with a problem, who is to blame
for causing the problem, and what is to be done about the problem. In short,
drawing lines implies distributing legitimacy and power. For this reason, Stone
contends that,
“Reasoned analysis is necessarily political. It always involves choices
to include some things and exclude others and to view the world in
a particular way when other visions are possible. Policy analysis is
political argument, and vice versa” [Stone, 1997, original emphasis,
p.375].
Within an argumentative policy process, the ideal of objective and value-free
analysis is little more than a pipe-dream. Policy analysts, no matter how ’ra-
tional’ their analytical methods, cannot escape the logic of political reasoning:
drawing conceptual lines invariably means making a statement about causes,
liability and blame. This, in turn, is likely to be contested by those who inter-
pret the policy issue differently. Policy-making, then, is a ongoing and circular
process of drawing lines, contesting these categories, and, as a result of policy
conflict, redrawing conceptual and organisational boundaries. To understand
this process, the theorists of the Argumentative Turn maintain, policy analysts
have to leave behind the sterile fact/value distinction and devise analytical in-
struments that take into account the rhetorical, metaphorical and argumentative
nature of political reasoning.
3.3 Alternative Concepts for Policy Analysis and
Policy-Making
Understanding the policy process in terms of argument, rhetoric and persuasion
implies viewing policy-making as an inherently conflictual process. The point
of the Argumentative Turn is that in policy-making and politics, there can be
no privileged position outside this messy and unsavoury brawl of values, norms,
and beliefs. More specifically, advocates of the Argumentative Turn maintain,
those rational tools and methods that are supposed to provide an objective
view of social problems, are, just like any other set of ideas and beliefs, part of
the political fray: like any other ideology, instrumental rationality, objectivism
and decisionism impose a specific order onto a fluid and plastic reality, create
epistemological categories and articulate a specific set of values.
How, then, can we get an analytical handle on policy-making in the argu-
mentative policy process?
Frames and Policy Stories
In the argumentative policy process, the theorists of the Argumentative Turn
suggest, principled conflict arises because individual and institutional policy
actors define policy issues in terms of incompatible values and beliefs. One way
of studying how these conflicting sets of beliefs impact on the policy process
is the concept of “frames”. Applying frames to social reality, Rein and Schön
argue,
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“. . . is a way of selecting, organising, interpreting, and making sense
of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analysing,
persuading, and acting. A frame is a perspective from which an
amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of
and acted on” [Rein and Schön, 1993, p.146].
Frames give policy-actors the cognitive and conceptual tools to understand and
interpret political events, facts and scientific evidence. Frames allow policy ac-
tors to ascribe symbolic meaning and significance to political life. These frames
cannot, argue Rein and Schön, be reduced to interests because “. . . it is the
frames held by the actors that determine what they see as being in their interests
and, therefore, what interests they perceive as conflicting” [Rein and Schön, 1994,
p.29, original emphasis]. In this sense, frames cannot be falsified: Rein and
Schön observe that “. . . if objective means frame-neutral, there are no objective
observers” [Rein and Schön, 1994, p.30]. All policy argument, then, takes place
within one or another frame of reference.
John Dryzek identifies five social science frames relevant for policy analysis:
welfare economics, Public Choice Theory, information processing, social struc-
ture and political philosophy.4 The existence of multiple frames, he argues,
undermines the feasibility of objective and uncontested scientific truths. In real
policy processes, he contends, many different
“. . . social science frames of reference can be applied to the analysis of
policy. It is not just that these frames give different answers to policy
questions. Rather, each frame treats some topics as more salient
than others, defines social problems in a unique fashion, commits
itself to particular value judgements, and generally interprets the
world in its own particular and partial way” [Dryzek, 1993, p.222].
Here, frames are similar to “a language or even a culture shared by a tribe of
experts”. Like frames in Rein and Schön’s approach, Dryzek argues that policy
actors use frames to construct multiple and conflicting interpretations of social
reality, not least the reality of complex, uncertain and transversal policy issues.
The five frames, he points out, “. . . show that multiple theories can be brought
to bear in any given situation. And each frame comes complete with both a
lens for interpreting the world and procedures for testing its own hypothesis –
but not necessarily for testing those generated in other frames” [Dryzek, 1993,
p.223].
This, then, is the primary source of conflict in the argumentative policy pro-
cess. As we saw in the previous section, conflicts in the Polis are not amenable to
resolution by recourse to objective facts or rational analysis. These controversies
“. . . cannot be understood in terms of the familiar separation of ques-
tions of value from questions of fact, for the participants construct
the problems of their problematic policy situations through frames
in which facts, values, theories and interests are integrated. Given
the multiple social realities created by conflicting frames, the par-
ticipants disagree both with one another and also about the nature
of their disagreements” [Rein and Schön, 1993, p.145].
4And, one might add, argumentative policy analysis.
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By applying different frames to messy policy problems, policy actors arrive
at fundamentally incommensurate accounts of social reality. In argumentative
policy processes, these conflicting accounts vie for legitimacy by questioning the
fundamental definition of the policy issue.
Yet, how can policy analysts recognise frame-based policy arguments? In
other words, what form do these policy arguments take in the Polis?
In policy processes and policy debates, the thinkers of the Argumentative
Turn assert, frames are articulated in terms of stories. Policy actors use the
entire range of literary techniques to construct coherent and persuasive narrative
accounts of social problems and issues. Rein and Schön argue that “. . . these
problem-setting stories, frequently based on generative metaphors, link causal
accounts of policy problems to particular proposals for action and facilitate
the normative leap from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ ” [Rein and Schön, 1993, p.148]. Policy
argument, then, tells a story: it outlines a setting, provides heroes and villains,
suggests a solution, and, most importantly, is guided by a moral [Stone, 1997].
Box 3.3: Stone’s Types of Policy Stories Stone identifies two basic archetypes
of policy stories. The first type is the “story of decline”. Policy actors that apply
this narrative structure conjure up an image of persistent decline, suggesting the
urgent need for policy action along the lines implicit in their story. Within this
first archetype, Stone points to two variations. First, policy actors can tell a story
of “stymied progress”. Here, the story line tells us that “. . . in the beginning
things were terrible. Then things got better, thanks to a certain someone. But
now somebody or something is interfering with our hero, so things are going to
get terrible again” [Stone, 1997, p.142]. A second variation on the decline theme,
Stone argues, is the tale of “change is only an illusion”. Here, policy actors point
out that, contrary to popular belief, change (either decline or improvement) is
either not actually taking place or is moving in an opposite direction to what it
may appear.
The second archetype Stone identifies is the “story of helplessness and control”.
Here policy actors tell a tale of apparent helplessness in the face of a bad situation.
The aim of the story is to show that, in fact, we are less helpless about the situation
than we initially assumed. Again, this archetype suggests that, now we know there
is something we can do to remedy the situation, urgent policy action is necessary.
Again, Stone points to two sub-plots in the helplessness and control policy story.
The first is the well-known story of conspiracy: this yarn suggests that helplessness
in the face of a particular problem was in fact a cover for a group manipulating
and causing the situation. The conspiracy story, Stone avers, “. . . moves us
from the realm of fate to the realm of control, but it claims to show that all
along control has been in the hands of a few who have used it to their benefit
and concealed it from the rest of us” [Stone, 1997, p.143]. Another variation
within this archetype, the mirror image of the conspiracy story, is the story that
blames the victim. This story, like the ’conspiracy’ tale, redefines helplessness
in the face of a problem into an issue of human agency. Rather than locating
the blame with individuals outside the immediate situation, this story makes the
individuals or groups affected by the problems responsible for causing the situation.
Policy actors use policy stories to ‘deliver’ policy arguments to a critical
audience. The aim of policy arguments, as we saw in previous sections, is
persuade other policy actors to understand issues in a particular way and thereby
to mobilise support for policy action. By looking at policy issues through the
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“perceptual lenses” [Allison, 1971] of a particular frame and by packaging these
findings in a narrative format, policy actors try to win over other groups and
individuals to their preferred story line. By outlining what the problem is, who
or what is responsible for causing it and how to go about solving the problem,
policy stories provide a means for policy actors to identify with and communicate
a particular course of action. Policy stories, Stone concludes,
“. . . are tools of strategy. Policy makers as well as interest groups
often create problems (in the artistic sense) as a context for the
actions they want to take. This is not to say that they actually cause
harm and destruction so they will have something to do, but that
they represent the world in such a way as to make themselves, their
skill, and their favourite course of action necessary” [Stone, 1997,
p.162].
The idea of frames and policy stories, then, provides the policy analyst with a
means for grasping different constructions of social reality.
Reforming Policy Analysis and Policy-Making
As we have seen, the theorists of the Argumentative Turn urge policy analysts to
fundamentally rethink the way they go about policy analysis. One of the main
messages of the Argumentative Turn is that policy analysis and policy analysts
are considerably more than mere spectators and observers of the policy drama.
On the contrary, by wielding scarce specialist skills, policy analysts define policy
problems, set policy agendas, and outline possible alternatives. Policy analysis
creates a sense of what is and is not feasible. In this way, policy analysts delimit
and outline possible courses of action within a polity. This is a subtle, but rather
incisive, exercise of political power.
In the past, claim the thinkers of the Argumentative Turn, analysts have
handled this power rather carelessly. In general, they contend, analysis has
strengthened the status quo and has precluded change [Dryzek, 1993]. Much of
this power, however, rested on the claim to a privileged access to reality. Having
done away with the artificial separation of the objective from the subjective and
having shown that policy analysis is an inherently political activity, the thinkers
of the Argumentative Turn also reflect on what this may mean for policy analysis
and policy-making.
Realising that policy analysis has a significant impact on policy-making,
the Argumentative Turn propose to recast the conventional role of the policy
analyst. Rather than a mere technician who creates specialist knowledge, the
Argumentative Turn envisages a more expansive role for policy analysis and pol-
icy analysts. Alluding to Harold Lasswell’s initial vision for the policy sciences,
the Argumentative Turn sees policy analysts as the “guardians of democracy”.
Since democracy is fundamentally an argumentative process, policy analysts
should use their specialist skills to illuminate the “contingencies of democratic
deliberation” [Fischer and Forester, 1993, p.7].
Democratic deliberation, Fischer and Forester contend, is always vulnerable
to distortion, manipulation and corruption. Deliberation can be a means of
civic learning: policy-makers, citizens and policy analysts alike can use the ar-
gumentative nature of policy processes to learn from one another. However, the
same processes are also prone to manipulation by forces in the policy processes
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that have have better argumentative skills, more authority and, most impor-
tantly, more resources [Fischer and Forester, 1993]. As Dryzek points out, the
deliberative process “. . .may involve information overload, by accident or by de-
sign. Technical jargon, slanted rules of admissibility of evidence and argument,
and the deliberate stigmatisation of unconventional proposals can all affect the
outcome of debate” [Dryzek, 1993, p.227].
Policy analysts, Fischer and Fischer argue, have a central role in this delib-
erative process. Not only do they have the specialist skills for analysing policy
problems, they also have (or could have) an understanding of the argumentative
nature of policy-making. On this view, policy analysis not only informs about
social problems but also has a pedagogic and emancipatory function in the
process of argument itself [Fischer and Forester, 1993, Dryzek, 1993]. Armed
with concepts such as frames and policy stories, policy analysis should engage
in what Rein and Schön call “frame-reflective” analysis. Analysis of this kind
seeks “. . . to explicate the conflicting frames inherent in policy controversies so
that we can reflect on them and better grasp the relationship between hidden
premises and normative conclusions” [Rein and Schön, 1993, p.150]. In this
way, argumentative policy analysis explores the ambiguities and consequences
inherent in policy stories and contributes to overall learning. Further, policy
analysts can apply their argumentative tools to identify manipulations of pol-
icy agendas, illegitimate uses of power, skewed distribution of information, and
attempts to distract attention form the real issues [Dryzek, 1993, p.228]. Here,
policy analysts act as a counterweight to what Dryzek somewhat dramatically
calls “the agents of distortion”. Argumentative policy analysis can (and accord-
ing to Dryzek has the moral obligation to) question abuses of the policy process
on part of established interests.
In the argumentative policy process, then, policy analysis takes on a me-
diating function at two levels. At one level, policy analysis provides reasoned
arguments that help policy actors understand complex issues, define social prob-
lems and set policy agendas. At a more abstract level, frame-critical analysis
promotes and safeguards the health of the argumentative process itself. By
probing policy stories and by revealing both their inherent assumptions as well
as as their argumentative function, policy analysis becomes a means to commu-
nicate across different frames and belief systems. This analysis-led process of
cross-frame communication, the theorists of the Argumentative Turn suggest,
can foster mutual learning between contending policy actors. Argumentative
policy analysis can also cry foul when established interests usurp and abuse
democratic procedures. Thus, rather than providing technical knowledge for
maintaining the status quo, frame-critical policy analysis should aim to promote
“. . . a continuous process of mutual learning through discourse” [Majone, 1989,
p.41]. Argumentative policy analysis, then, potentially is the linchpin of mod-
ern democracies: it both enlightens policy actors via criticism, advocacy, and
education as well as sets the standards of argument and intellectual engagement
in public discourse.
The findings of the Argumentative Turn also have considerable normative
implications for the structure of policy processes. Given that the Argumentative
Turn relativises sciences’ claim to authoritative knowledge, it follows that policy
processes should be open, or at least more open, to forms of policy argument that
deviate from the objective ideal. Rather than constructing the policy process
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as a means of discovering a single optimal solution for a particular problem,5
the Argumentative Turn asks how we may conceive of policy processes that
would allow for different policy arguments to vie for legitimacy without claiming
a privileged access to reality. Here, the theorists of the Argumentative Turn
suggest a procedural solution.6 Rather than thinking of policy processes in
scientific or engineering terms, they urge us to understand policy-making as a
forensic procedure. “Whereas the aim of jurisprudence,” William Dunn argues,
“. . . is to study the variety of concepts and procedures used to resolve
legal claims, the aim of the applied social sciences is to investigate
concepts and procedures used to argue and settle practical claims.
The applied social sciences may therefore be described as ‘gener-
alised jurisprudence’ or, alternatively, as ‘jurisprudence writ large’ ”
[Dunn, 1993, p.263].
In this vein, Majone proposes to organise policy processes as adversarial
procedures. In fora such as science courts or citizens’ juries, policy analysts
could provide an arena for policy actors to present their policy stories. Similar
to a court of law, these adversarial procedures could stipulate rules of evidence,
of argument, and deliberation [Majone, 1989]. In this way, Majone argues,
policy processes would allow communication across different frames as well as
across the lay/expert divide.
More radical proposals for restructuring policy processes propose a shift
away from liberal democracies altogether. Recognising the in-built conser-
vatism of representative liberal democracies, these theorists see the “vindica-
tion of the argumentative turn” in establishing grass-roots democratic pro-
cesses [Dryzek, 1993, p.228]. Policy processes in a deliberative democracy, based
on extensive citizen participation, would replace conventional, expert-oriented
processes characteristic of liberal democracies. Within these processes citizen
knowledge, by definition highly contextualised and local, would balance the more
universal and general knowledge systems of experts. Policy processes within the
deliberative democracy, then, would be more inclusive and would impose less
distortions on the argumentative process. Policy outcomes, in turn, would be
based on a consensus that more closely resembles Habermas’ idea of the ideal
speech situation [Dryzek, 1993, Dryzek, 1990].
In sum, the Argumentative Turn not only criticises conventional policy anal-
ysis and policy-making practises, but also points to new ways of going about
analysing and formulating public policy. In this sense, Fischer and Forester
maintain, the Argumentative Turn
“. . . does much more than simply announce the underwhelming news
that policy analysis is an interpretative enterprise. Instead, this
view suggests far more provocatively and productively that careful
analysis of policy and planning problems can develop better technical
information and cultivate the moral imagination of all those involved
in the policy and planning process” [Fischer and Forester, 1993, p.7].
5Which, of course, does not exist due to different framings of any one issue.
6Although prescriptions and visions of different theorists diverge considerably.
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3.4 Critique
The Argumentative Turn urges us to fundamentally reconceptualise the policy
analysis and, by extension, policy-making. We have seen how thinkers such
as Deborah Stone, Giandomenico Majone, Frank Fischer or John Dryzek have
dissected the assumptions that underpin rational and objective policy analysis.
We have also seen that, if we take a close look at what policy actors actually do,
policy analysis is inseparable from the value judgements, the ideological battles,
and rhetorical games characteristic of politics in general. In a very real sense,
the Argumentative Turn suggests that policy analysis is, to paraphrase Carl
von Clausewitz, politics pursued by other means [von Clausewitz, 1940]. As we
have seen, the implications of this insight for analysis and policy-making are
considerable.
Yet, as thorough the critique of arcane conceptions of science and restric-
tive notions of rationality may be, the Argumentative Turn also reveals decisive
weaknesses. Although the Argumentative Turn is a rather heterogeneous assem-
bly of theories and approaches, there are two broad issues where all approaches
fail to convince.
“The Spectre of Relativism” and the New Role of the Policy
Analyst
Deflating the myth that science provides a privileged access to reality raises
some rather uncomfortable questions. Policy analysis, the theorists of the Ar-
gumentative Turn insist, draws on many different frames and thereby creates
multiple constructions of social reality. If all of reality is socially constructed
and there are no absolute standards for evaluating analysis (such as, say, objec-
tive science), does this mean that one policy story is as valid as any other policy
story? If there is no agreed-upon way of distinguishing one narrative from an-
other, does this mean that “anything goes”? In other words, as Rein and Schön
argue, pointing to the existence of multiple possible frames and policy narratives
invites the “spectre of relativism” [Rein and Schön, 1993].
In fairness, the problem of relativism is not limited to the Argumentative
Turn. Any social scientist who claims reality is socially constructed will, sooner
or later, have to face the issue of how to deal with and choose between conflicting
accounts of reality. This question has cropped up in anthropology, sociology,
ethnography, and, rather belatedly, in political science.
In general, there have been two broad responses to the problem of relativism.
The first response simply refuses to acknowledge relativism as a problem at all.
Indeed, proponents here argue, there is no immediate access to reality. All we
know is mediated by language and social structure: one form of knowledge, say
science, no more reflects reality than any other form of knowledge, say literature.
Since we are social and cultural animals, there is no conceivable position outside
society from which we could construct a meta-narrative to evaluate different
constructions of social reality. Attempting to do so is worse than futile since
it implies imposing an arbitrary order onto inherent difference. All we can
say for certain is that different accounts of reality are, well, different. Passing
judgement on contending social constructions of reality in terms of truth, logic,
or reason is about as meaningful as evaluating elephants’ ability to fly. As social
scientists, then, we should abandon the quest for universal meaning and instead
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celebrate (and vigorously defend) socio-cultural difference.7 Clearly, this view
leaves little room for policy analysis in any form.
The second response, which by and large is the approach taken by the
thinkers of the Argumentative Turn, shies away from extreme relativism. Al-
though there are multiple constructions of reality, not all constructions of reality
are equally valid. Here, the natural and social worlds are real, although our rep-
resentations of them may be socially constructed. Some accounts of reality, then,
are a better reflection than others. The problem here, however, becomes how
one can tell an accurate from an inaccurate policy stories. Rein and Schön, lean-
ing on Richard Rorty’s terminology, speak of normal and abnormal discourse
[Rein and Schön, 1993]. A normal discourse “. . . proceeds under a shared set of
rules, assumptions, conventions, criteria, and beliefs, all of which tell how, over
time and in principle, a disagreement can be settled”. An abnormal discourse, in
turn, takes place “. . . in those situations in which agreed-upon criteria for reach-
ing agreement are not the essential elements upon which communication among
contending actors is based” [Rein and Schön, 1993, p.149]. Is there, then, a way
of describing abnormal discourse in terms of some normal discourse?
The issue of epistemological relativism, despite the arcane language in which
it is debated, is of considerable significance for contemporary policy processes
and their outputs. If there is no way of reflecting upon, criticising or obtaining
consensus on any policy-relevant knowledge, then the dynamics of argumen-
tative and conflictual policy processes invariably leads to the circular, iterative
and unproductive “policy mess” German commentators describe as Reformstau.
The question about understanding abnormal discourse, then, is essentially the
question of whether policy actors can deal with intractable policy controversies
without recourse to (illicit) discursive or infrastructural power or whether policy
actors are doomed to ride the misery-go-around of Reformstau.
In broad terms, the theorists of the Argumentative Turn (or at least those
few who even address this issue) resolve the issue in terms of procedure rather
than epistemology. The work of Stone and Majone also Fischer and Forester
and, taking a more radical stance, John Dryzek implies (although never explic-
itly states) that, at least for policy analysis and policy-making, there are indeed
meta-narratives. Roughly, these meta-narratives consist of the normative struc-
tures of democracy itself. The underlying norms and practises of democracy, so
the argument goes, provide the normative yardsticks for measuring and evaluat-
ing contending policy stories. In other words, conflicting policy stories are not
so much ‘true’ or ‘false’; rather, policy stories are either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in the
way they conform to the normative precepts of argumentative and discursive
democracy. This, then, shifts the focus from the substance of policy arguments
to the form of policy arguments.
The implicit argument here is that existing democratic institutions have lost
touch with the underlying idea of democracy. Recall that Majone understands
democracy as being a ‘government by discussion’. Mass democracies, replete
with large bureaucracies and a swarm of experts, have transformed policy pro-
cesses from the exchange of argument into a parody of scientific and managerial
efficiency. Assessing policy arguments in terms of objective scientific standards,
so the argument goes, completely misses the point [Stone, 1997] of democratic
argumentation: these are, the thinkers of the Argumentative Turn point out,
7Of course, this is a somewhat unkind caricature of a rather more complex argument.
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the wrong standards for choosing between contending frames and policy stories.
What is important in this context is how the argument itself (both in terms
of formal and performative characteristics) promotes or hinders a democratic
process of consensus-seeking and deliberation. For this reason, the theorists
of the Argumentative Turn propose adversarial procedures of deliberation that
regulate the form of argument rather than the substance. The concrete reform
proposals, as we have seen, vary considerably. On one end of the spectrum,
where we may find Giandomenico Majone or Deborah Stone, the proposals
are limited to introducing new procedures of argument and evidence into ex-
isting policy process. At the other end of the spectrum, where we find John
Dryzek, reform proposals suggest completely remodelling democratic polities to
make policy processes conform as closely as possible to Jürgen Habermas’ ideal
speech-situation.
So far so good (if one believes in the ideal speech situation, that is). The
problems associated with constraining relativism in terms of democratic proce-
dures relate to the role of policy analysis in this deliberative framework. Recall
that the argumentative policy analyst effectively guards the integrity of the
democratic and argumentative policy processes. By acting as a catalyst be-
tween contending coalitions, by using specialist skills to educate and enlighten
policy actors, or by pointing to foul play in the policy process, policy analysts
safeguard the ‘proper’ procedures of an argumentative and deliberative policy
process.
But is this ‘new’ role any different from the conventional role of rational
policy analysis? Exchanging instrumental rationality with communicative ra-
tionality or calculating reason with political reason, does not necessarily alter
the function of policy analysts in the policy process. Whereas conventional
policy analysts applied objective and rational methods to the policy process,
‘argumentative policy analysts’ now bring deliberative and discursive methods
to bear on the politics. The former concentrates on substance and epistemes,
the other concentrates on procedure and norms. Rational science promises a
privileged access to reality; argumentative analysis promises a critical insight
into the socially constructed nature of policy stories. Rational and objective
policy analysis stands above contending policy stories; argumentative policy
analysis, to extend the spatial metaphor, stand between policy stories. Yet,
both forms of knowledge claim to in some way transcend the different forms of
local knowledge in the policy process. Ultimately, the shift does not significantly
change the telos or purpose if policy analysis: policy analysis still aims to use
specialised knowledge to make politics more ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’.
More importantly, however, the shift from rational to argumentative pol-
icy analysis leaves the privileged status of policy analysis and policy analysts
virtually untouched. The ideological logic of instrumental rationality and ob-
jectivism must place the analyst in a privileged position outside politics lest
rational analysis be contaminated by values, beliefs or power. The logic of the
Argumentative Turn, however, foresees a pivotal role for policy analysis within
policy processes. As we have seen, for argumentative policy processes to work,
policy analysts need to be guardians, educators, and, most worryingly, referees.
So, policy analysts are still the ones who ‘know’ better, have clearer insight and
should be telling other policy actors what to do: policy analysts are still the
experts. Furthermore, since fact and value in politics are inseparable, new style
policy analysts will, as a matter of necessity, also enlighten policy actors about
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their values. In short, argumentative policy analysts not only tell other policy
actors what to do but also what to believe: here, policy analysis becomes the
moral guardian of deliberative democracies.
Apart from being downright frightening, this vision is highly problematic
for a number of reasons. First, it is wholly unclear why argumentative policy
analysis is in any way more democratic than the rational orthodoxy. If the
point of the Argumentative Turn is to highlight how conventional policy analysis
excludes certain voices from policy-making, then it is not at all transparent how
the ‘moral guardianship’ will in any way remedy this situation. Exclusion will
simply focus on another set of policy actors, presumably those with the ‘wrong’
set of values or the inappropriate argumentative design. Moreover, exactly like
conventional policy analysts, the democratic accountability of argumentative
policy analysts is spurious. Policy analysts (rational or argumentative) are
not elected into any type of office, do not report to any democratic institution
(such as a parliament), and always are sensitive to their clients’ needs. The
lack of formal and institutional democratic constraints on analysis is lamentable
enough in conventional policy processes. It becomes alarming in policy processes
devoted to promoting the “force of the better argument” where policy analysts
decide what is or is not to count as a better argument.
Second, the methods and approaches of the Argumentative Turn are them-
selves not immune to instrumental and strategic deployment. Many of the
theorists, particularly however John Dryzek, seem to associate the approaches
and methods of the Argumentative Turn with some sort of moral rectitude
[Dryzek, 1990, Dryzek, 1993]. They seem to imply that frame-critical analysis
invariably leads to an enlightened, meaning argumentative, view of the policy
process. As a result, Dryzek sees stark choices for policy analysts: they
“. . . can choose to side with authoritarian or with liberal democracy.
My own position is that defensible policy analysis must side with
open communication and unrestricted participation: in other words,
with participatory and discursive democracy” [Dryzek, 1993, p.229].
But what happens if they choose not to side with the forces of good? The
methods and approaches of the Argumentative Turn are powerful tools for de-
constructing policy stories. Just like rational and objective analysis, however,
there is nothing stopping policy actors using argumentative methods to further
particular and exclusive ends. In fact, most thinkers of the Argumentative Turn,
such as Stone and Majone, repeatedly demonstrate that policy actors do just
that [Stone, 1997, Majone, 1989]. Coupled with the privileged position within
policy processes, then, there is no reason to believe that deliberative democracy
will be any less exclusive than conventional policy processes.
Last, elevating the policy analyst to some form of educator or moral guardian
contradicts the democratic ambitions of the Argumentative Turn. What starts
out as a forceful criticism of how policy analysts deploy scientific knowledge to
secure a privileged position in the policy process, comes full circle, not unlike
the farm-yard revolution in George Orwell’s Animal Farm, when the thinkers of
the Argumentative Turn reinstall the policy analyst as the moral arbiter of de-
liberation: at first, all systems of knowledge are relative, but then some systems
turn out to be more relative than others. In a very real sense, the Argumentative
Turn undermines its own critique of rational ideology. On the one hand, they
very convincingly demonstrate that objective knowledge is really no different
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from other forms of knowledge in the policy process. On the other hand, they
imply that frame–critical and argumentative analysis does in some way tran-
scend other forms of knowledge. In this way, the thinkers of the Argumentative
Turn undermine one of their strongest arguments: real policy processes are
messy and defy attempts by policy analysts of making them more rational. It
also leaves us with an unpalatable choice: either we accept the moral guardian-
ship of deliberative policy analysts as a way of dealing with intractable policy
controversies or we resign ourselves to a circular, iterative and conflictual policy
mess.
The Institutional Dimension
The Argumentative Turn competently reintegrates the study of ideas, beliefs and
values into policy analysis. As we have see, systems of knowledge, ideologies
and values, they argue, are a crucial element of policy-making. Moreover, the
Argumentative Turn provides a set of tools, such as frames and policy stories,
to analyse the role of ideas in policy processes. Yet, what about institutions?
How do frames and policy narratives relate to institutional structures and in-
stitutional practises?
Regrettably, the theorists of the Argumentative Turn provide few answers.
Most of the writers discussed so far recognise the relationship between institu-
tions and political argument, but, more often than not, leave it at that. Rein and
Schön, are probably most explicit [Rein and Schön, 1994, Rein and Schön, 1993].
Frames, they contend, never interpret themselves (just as facts never speak for
themselves); the interpretation and application of frames presumes some form
of agency. In policy processes, groups and individuals become what Rein and
Schön call “sponsors” of frames. These groups and individuals develop frames
by explicating their assumptions and creating metaphors for communicating
frames to other policy actors.
Yet, many questions remain open. How do institutions shape frames? Surely,
institutional practises and institutional structures impact on the way policy ac-
tors perceive social issues. Paul Pierson, commenting on social welfare reforms,
argues that established welfare state structures (e.g. social insurance structures,
see Chapters 8 and 9) have given rise to a specific way of understanding and deal-
ing with social policy problems [Pierson, 1994]. Alternatively, how do frames
affect institutional practises? Can we expect a change in institutional practises
on the basis of an observed frame-shift? Empirical evidence from the United
Kingdom seems to point in that direction. As we saw in the previous chapter,
Rhodes identifies a rather momentous change in British public administration
as a result (at least in part) of a frame-shift at the political level [Rhodes, 1997].
Further, how do conflicts over frames shape the institutional landscape? If pol-
icy stories aim at mobilising policy actors, we should expect conflicts over policy
stories to affect the constellation and configuration of policy networks and pol-
icy communities. These relationships, however, remain largely unexplored by
the theorists of the Argumentiative Turn.
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3.5 Conclusion
The Argumentative Turn in policy analysis and planning skillfully reminds us
that ideas, knowledge and beliefs play a pivotal role in policy-making. By
exploding the myth of rational and objective policy science, the Argumentative
Turn exposes the inherently political nature of policy analysis. Politics and
analysis, they argue, are two sides of the same coin: analysing social problems
implies affecting political processes just as policy-making inherently imposes
categories on an unruly world. Denying that policy analysis and policy analysts
are implicated in the exercise of political power, they point out, either risk
producing irrelevant analysis or wielding power (inadvertently or purposely)
on some one else’s behalf. The Argumentative Turn, then, appeals to policy
scientists to accept their political roles and to exercise their powers prudently
and cautiously.
Focusing on the role of ideas, beliefs and values in policy-making leads to
a more conflictual image of the policy process. The Argumentative Turn un-
derstands the policy process as a battleground in which different policy actors
fight over ideas. The argumentative policy process does not follow the logical
sequence of stages or steps outlined by rational decision-making. Rather, policy
making in real political processes is a far more messy, iterative and divisive af-
fair. Conflict between contending parties in the policy process is endemic and,
as a rule, rarely amenable to resolution by rational analysis. The thinkers of
the Argumentative Turn suggest that we acknowledge this unruly process as
inevitable, even desirable. Fundamentally, policy processes are about conflicts
over ideas and beliefs not about finding efficient means for predefined end. No
amount of analysis and planning, contend the the theorists of the Argumentative
Turn, is likely to change this: real policy processes populated with real policy
actors fighting for values and beliefs will (rightly) understand any attempt of ra-
tionalising and sanitising policy processes as a political act of aggression. In this
way, policy processes will always wind and twist themselves out of the rational
shapes objective analysis would impose onto them.
For this reason, theorists of the Argumentative Turn have developed alter-
native methods for analysing public policy. Tools such as frames, narratives and
policy stories are supposed to enable the policy analysts to take a critical view of
conflictual policy processes about messy problems. They allow policy analysts
both to probe the underlying assumptions of any particular policy argument
and to evaluate the performative aspects of policy stories.
Yet, we have also seen that the Argumentative Turn has decisive weaknesses.
In particular, the more radical approaches envision a pivotal and democratically
spurious role for argumentative policy analysts. Using their specialist skills,
policy analysts should graduate from being mere technicians to being the ethical
guard of democracy. However, without adequate democratic safeguards, about
which the Argumentative Turn is silent, this new role of policy analysis is as
open to abuse as is the conventional role of analysis and planning. What is more,
while the Argumentative Turn acknowledges the relationship between ideas and
institutions, it has little to say about how social structures affect frames or
policy narratives.
What can the Argumentative Turn contribute to a policy-oriented framework
for discourse analysis? In a very real sense, the ideas reviewed in this chapter
form much of the conceptual context for the enquiry of this thesis. The following
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insights and concepts, then, will inform the analysis in Part II of the thesis:
Contemporary policy processes are fundamentally argumentative, deliberative
and conflictual. Policy emerges from contests in which competing politi-
cal constituencies struggle over ideas about how best to structure society.
This struggle is not only about formulating the most effective responses
to policy challenges but also about the basic definition and significance of
messy policy issues. Understanding these argumentative and inherently
conflictual policy processes requires critically scrutinising the actual pro-
cesses of argument and communication in contemporary policy-making. In
other words, the way policy actors argue, deliberate and engage with con-
tending policy arguments significantly shapes policy outputs and policy
outcomes.
Political constituencies use ideas, ideologies and knowledge to make sense of
messy problems. Yet, on this view, knowledge is never complete or abso-
lute but always partial and relative. That is why political constituencies
using different systems of knowledge will interpret messy policy issues in
fundamentally divergent ways. Since there is no vantage point from which
to adjudicate and resolve this struggle of ideas and values, policy conflict
is norm rather than the exception in contemporary policy processes;
Thinkers of the Argumentative Turn suggest that we think of systems of ideas,
ideologies and knowledge in terms of “frames”. Policy actors rely on these
coherent but selective ideational frameworks for constructing plausible and
credible policy arguments for use in argumentative policy processes. Ar-
ticulated in terms of “policy stories”, these narratives provide an account
of cause and effect, blame and culpability, as well as resolution and remedy
of messy policy problems. Policy stories help political constituencies co-
here around common policy project and justify their political involvement
to others.
A corollary is that any knowledge in the policy process — particularly policy
analysis — is always an integral part of the argumentative struggle over
the naming and framing of messy policy issues. This means that policy
analysis is never value-free or power-neutral and policy analysts, if they
are to remain relevant, cannot disassociate from struggles over values and
power. By shaping definition of messy problems and the policy agendas to
deal with them, policy analysis affects the accessibility of policy processes:
policy analysis helps organise some actors into politics while organise oth-
ers out of politics [Schattschneider, 1960]. What is more, the strategic use
idea, ideology and knowledge also determines the quality of interaction
between policy arguments organised into policy processes. Understanding
the relationship between knowledge, power and policy-making requires
becoming “frame-reflective”.
This chapter also leaves a number of important questions unanswered:
• How do institutions shape ideas, ideologies and knowledge and vice versa?
In the following chapter, the thesis will look at ways of analysing the way
institutional and ideational structures shape policy-making.
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• If rationality (either instrumental or communicative) can no longer au-
thoritatively adjudicate frame-driven policy conflict, how can contempo-
rary policy processes avoid becoming mired in circular conflict? This is a
question that will also be addressed in the following chapter.
• What are the implications of the Argumentative Turn for democratic ac-
countability in contemporary pluralist polities? As we have seen, the ideas
and concepts of the Argumentative Turn throw up some thorny questions
concerning the viability of pluralist democracy in contemporary policy-
making contexts. In the conclusion, we will return to think about these
questions in more depth.
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Chapter 4
How Institutions Matter for
Ideas (and Vice Versa):
Explaining Policy Conflict
in an Institutional Context
The past two chapters have reviewed the conceptual background for policy-
relevant discourse analysis of European issue domains. The concept of the “dif-
ferentiated polity” — introduced in Chapter 2 — suggests that contemporary
policy-making takes place in distinct organisational clusters centred on specific
functional policy issues. Here, institutional and interpersonal patterns of trans-
action form networks that span formal organisations from the public, private
and tertiary sectors. Variations in network constellations give rise to divergent
opportunity and constraint structures for policy-makers thereby shaping policy
processes. The approaches and theories reviewed in Chapter 3 suggest that what
goes on in these fragmented institutional sites of policy-making is an inherently
argumentative, deliberative and conflictual contest about the naming and la-
belling of messy policy problems. Here, policy conflict is the inevitable outcome
of policy actors making sense of complex, uncertain and transversal policy prob-
lems in terms of fundamentally incompatible frames. Since any relevant policy
analysis must engage with beliefs and values of contending policy actors, knowl-
edge and knowledge producers are invariably implicated in the argumentative
contest for ideas and power.
Yet, the previous chapters have also shown that the different approaches ei-
ther rely exclusively on structural or ideational factors to explain contemporary
policy-making. What is missing is an account of how institutions and ideas
interact to shape policy processes and policy outputs. That is why this chapter
compares approaches that focus on how policy emerges from the interplay of
institutions and ideas.
In the following, then, we will look at five different approaches: “the Polit-
ical Science of Knowledge” [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993],1 the “Multiple-Streams
Analysis” [Kingdon, 1984, Zahariadis, 1999],
1A rather inelegant translation of Wissenspolitologie.
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“Epistemic Communities” [Haas, 1992b], the “Advocacy Coalition Framework”
[Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993a] and “cultural theory”
[Douglas, 1987, Thompson et al., 1990]. Each of these theories bears a distinct
family resemblance. All assume that both institutions and ideas matter for
policy-making. Each approach questions conventional explanatory frameworks
in political science and the policy sciences and therefore attempts to recast pol-
icy analysis into a more plausible theoretical context. Each of the frameworks
integrates the basic insights of the previous two chapters in different ways. As we
shall see, the approaches provide tools for understanding the way policy actors
grapple with messy policy problems in real institutional settings. It is from this
reservoir of terms, concepts and ideas that the framework for a policy-oriented
discourse analysis of transport, environment and social policy issues will emerge
in Chapter 5.
Each section briefly outlines each theory, approach or framework. This
overview will attempt to convey (as concisely as possible) the aims and assump-
tions of the approach as well as how the key concepts explain policy-making.
Each section concludes with an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of
the theories.
4.1 The Politics of Knowledge and Knowledge
Markets
Frank Nullmeier and Friedbert Rüb initially designed the “Politics of Knowl-
edge” to explain German pension policy-making in the 1980s.2 In the course of
the decade, the two social scientists argue, the German welfare state changed
from being a system that ameliorated social problems (the welfare state or
Sozialstaat) to a system concerned solely with its own institutional survival
(the security state or Sicherungsstaat). While conventional political science
would predict a considerable degree of political conflict to accompany trans-
formation on that scale, Nullmeier and Rüb point out that policy conflict was
conspicuous in its absence. On the contrary, these fundamental policy changes
apparently enjoyed extensive support among ostensibly competing experts, ad-
ministrators, and politicians. It seemed as if the very nature of the pension
issue, not to mention Reason itself, dictated a specific set of policy solutions
to German decision-makers. Not trusting the depth or scope of this consensus,
the two German political scientists assumed that something else was going on.
This something, they suspected, had to do with the way policy actors used ex-
pert knowledge to crowd out or co-opt political opponents in order to prevent
political conflict from even arising. The aim of the “Politics of Knowledge”,
then, is to provide a framework for analysing how policy actors deploy expert
knowledge to, paraphrasing E.E. Schattschneider, mobilise bias and narrow the
scope of political conflict [Schattschneider, 1960].
2See also Chapter 9.
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Assumptions
The Politics of Knowledge is based on three fundamental assumptions.
Policy actors socially construct reality. Unlike rational choice approaches
would have us believe, Nullmeier and Rüb tell us that politics is not deter-
mined by rational individual responses to objective constraints in a reality
‘out there’. Rather, policy actors react to and interact within a socially
constructed world. For this reason, analysts should not assume that con-
straints, interests and policy preferences are exogenously given. Finding
out why policy actors construct reality in one way rather than another is
an integral part of the Politics of Knowledge [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993,
p.25].
Knowledge and power are codeterminate. For Nullmeier and Rüb, knowledge3
and political power are two sides of the same coin. On the one hand,
the two German social scientists argue, knowledge always emerges from
institutional structures, be they universities, commercial research and de-
velopment installations, or government research departments. These in-
stitutions, replete with a set power relations, will colour and shape the
type of knowledge produced within their confines. On the other hand, the
exercise of political power in contemporary polities crucially depends on
expert knowledge. As we saw in the previous chapters, rational decision-
making in any policy field is synonymous with knowledge-driven policy
formulation. For this reason, knowledge always is as plastic and con-
tested as the social structures from which it emerges. Moreover, different
types social power structures will give rise to different forms of knowl-
edge. Rather than speaking of knowledge in the singular, Nullmeier and
Rüb urge us to think of many different ways of interpreting the same
reality [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993, p.26].
Politics is a conflict about the validity of knowledge. In addition to arguing
over more guns or more butter, policy actors will also dispute rival as-
sumptions (e.g. how much butter is healthy for the average person?),
contending definition of policy problems (e.g. is this a question of agricul-
tural or defence policy?), as well as norms and interests (e.g. does military
defence take precedent to subsidising dairy farmers?). If institutions are
to survive, Nullmeier and Rüb maintain, they need to engage in and win
these contests of meaning. Institutional policy actors need to demonstrate
periodically that they are capable of dealing with social problems. Here,
learning takes place in the context of conflicting institutional power struc-
tures: new and emergent knowledge is always subject to scrutiny by an
audience that may have more to lose than an academic argument.
In sum, Nullmeier and Rüb’s approach assumes that politics, political conflict
and political action are in some way based on socially constructed knowledge.
Thus, the study of politics, which is the study of political power, becomes the
“Politics of Knowledge”: an analysis of how policy actors use expert knowledge
as a means of wielding political power.
3Which they rather broadly define as anything that can be learned or culturally transmit-
ted.
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Key Concepts and How They Work: Knowledge Markets
and Self-Referential Policy Cycles
The central descriptive concept of Nullmeier and Rüb’s approach is the “knowl-
edge market”. All organisations and institutions, Nullmeier and Rüb main-
tain, are partially open to flows of knowledge and argument from their envi-
ronments. These organisational spaces are so-called “partial public spheres”4
which, Nullmeier and Rüb emphasise, are not restricted to political institutions
alone. Organisations in the private sector, in public administration, or in the
tertiary sectors are also constantly producing, circulating and reviewing policy-
relevant knowledge. These interorganisational and quasi-public spheres, where
policy actors argue about policy issues, deliberate new knowledge, and trade
information, are what Nullmeier and Rüb call “knowledge and interpretative
markets”.5 By using the image of the market, Nullmeier and Rüb convey (or
wish to convey) that policy-making emerges from a competition of ideas.
Knowledge markets, Nullmeier and Rüb argue, arise in these partial pub-
lic spheres under specific circumstances. First, knowledge markets develop
in the context of uncertainty about the policy issue in question. For exam-
ple, the issue of global climate change, where scientific uncertainties are very
high, has given rise to lively policy debates and considerable political conflict
[Thompson and Rayner, 1998b, Thompson et al., 1998]. Conversely, the ques-
tion of whether the Earth is round or flat has not (recently) been the stuff of
scientific dispute. Second, knowledge markets presuppose choice between com-
peting interpretations of a social or natural condition. As we shall see, the policy
debate about global climate change, for instance, features at least three com-
peting interpretations of the causes of global warming which vie for legitimacy
in (partial) public spheres: an explanation that sees population growth as the
main culprit of global climate change, an approach that blames profligate North-
ern consumption habits for anthropogenic climate change, and a theory that
perceives distorted resource prices as the main cause of global climate change
[Thompson and Rayner, 1998a, Thompson et al., 1998]. Last, knowledge mar-
kets assume that access to these partial public spheres is at least nominally
open. Like product and service markets, however, what is important here is
the idea (rather than the reality) of free exchange and unlimited access: as
Nullmeier and Rüb put it, the “idealisation of openness justifies the metaphor”.
In terms of our global climate change example this means that although anyone
can contribute to the global climate change debate in principle, it is questionable
whether anyone without scientific credentials is likely to be taken very seriously.
In short, knowledge markets describe policy networks in which actors face messy
policy problems.
The degree of openness to policy actors and ideas, then, is a central char-
acteristic of knowledge markets. A knowledge market in which many different
4In the sense that a policy community or policy network is nominally public but also has
elements of a ‘private government’.
5Although one would associate scientific and disciplinary deliberation most readily with
a partial public sphere dedicated to the production and refinement of knowledge, Nullmeier
and Rüb contend that this is only one of the many types of possible knowledge markets.
Unfortunately, however, they leave us in the dark about what distinguishes different types of
knowledge markets and what examples of alternative knowledge markets may be (except for
perhaps the knowledge market concerning pension reform in Germany, yet even here they are
strangely vague, see below).
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policy actors (individuals or institutions) argue about a multitude of competing
ideas and interpretations, Nullmeier and Rüb argue, signifies an open knowledge
market [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993, p.28]. However, like markets for goods and
services, policy actors can also “monopolise” knowledge markets by restrict-
ing both policy actor participation as well as ideational choice. Monopolised
markets, Nullmeier and Rüb argue, produce knowledge that disqualifies from
the outset alternative interpretations, thereby reinforcing institutional closure
(few policy actors) by so-called “interpretive closure” (few policy arguments)
[Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993, p.29].
This mutually reinforcing dynamic between the ideational and the institu-
tional aspects of knowledge markets, Nullmeier and Rüb assert, leads to a norm
and knowledge consensus among policy actors. In practise, this means that
actors in closed knowledge markets accept a particular interpretation of the is-
sue in question as true: this body of knowledge then becomes dominant within
the knowledge market [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993, p.29]. The norm and knowl-
edge consensus implies that policy actors not only agree on how to define an
issue but also on what policy action the problem requires. In closed knowl-
edge markets, Nullmeier and Rüb conclude, dominant consensual knowledge
becomes the absolute truth that squeezes out ideational choice. For example,
in the past two decades economists worldwide have converged on neo-classical
methods and approaches to the detriment of alternative frameworks (such as
evolutionary economics or Marxian economics).
Since incentives for policy actors to ‘rock the boat’ weaken as the degree of
openness on knowledge markets declines, Nullmeier and Rüb imply that mo-
nopolised knowledge markets are unlikely to change from within. The major
external threat to dominant knowledge and established policy actor networks,
Nullmeier and Rüb suggest, are “debates” that take place in other knowledge
markets. These debates concern specific issues, problems, or themes that are rel-
evant for more than one knowledge market. A prominent contemporary example
here is the ongoing debate about sustainable development. Initially, the concept
emerged in the context of environmental policy
[WCED, 1987]. Yet, the idea of tempering behaviour in the present so as not
to compromise the range of options available in the future has proved to be
extraordinarily compelling. So compelling, in fact, that policy actors soon ex-
tended its logic to other policy arenas increasingly remote from environmental
policy. Wherever the sustainability debate has turned its attention, it very ef-
fectively questioned existing concepts and policies. Thus, by creating networks
of related policy arguments that transcend the boundaries (and therefore the
control) of particular knowledge markets, debates can challenge the established
social relations and dominant knowledge structures in specific issue areas.
Institutionally and ideationally closed knowledge markets lead to what the
two researchers call self-referential policy cycles (politischer Eigenzyklus). These
types of policy cycles are characterised by three defining features. First, in self-
referential policy cycles, institutional needs rather than the needs of a specific
target group (such as pensioners, the mentally ill, hospital patients, the envi-
ronment, etc. ) are the basis for policy-making. The aim of all policy-making,
Nullmeier and Rüb argue, is survival of the institution at all costs. Second,
policy processes are self-referential if they exclude rival constructions of needs
or rival interests from the problem definition and the agenda-setting process.
Last, self-referential policy cycles emerge from knowledge markets that portray
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institutional needs as absolute necessities [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993, p.65]. This
type of closed policy process, Nullmeier and Rüb point out, leads to a cumulative
approach to solving policy problems. Here, policy actors plot a policy course in
terms of cumulative small decisions. The cumulative policy-makers, then, are
both more purposive than Charles Lindblom’s incremental decision-makers who
merely “fly by the seat of their pants” [Lindblom, 1958, Lindblom, 1977] and
more circumspect than Herbert Simon’s synoptic decision-makers [Simon, 1945]
who weigh all possible alternatives and outcomes. Cumulative decision-making,
Nullmeier and Rüb contend, is a strategy guided by the (perceived) needs of the
system; what seems to be an incremental and unstructured process is in reality
oriented along long-term policy goals.
Nullmeier and Rüb use the concepts of knowledge markets, debates and
self-referential policy cycles to analyse the politics of expertise at two distinct
levels. At the first level of analysis, Nullmeier and Rüb describe the types and
distribution of policy-relevant knowledge throughout the political system. This
level of analysis provides an overview of the structure of knowledge markets and
the allocation of different market shares among policy actors. Building on this
first level, the Politics of Knowledge then proceeds to ask why certain forms of
knowledge succeed in policy processes while others fall by the wayside. Success6
in knowledge markets, Nullmeier and Rüb suggest, depends on the capability
and opportunity to exercise political power. Like in more conventional mar-
kets for goods and services, the degree of control over events in a knowledge
market depend on factors such as resources, personnel, decision-making capaci-
ties, charisma, etc. However, unlike more familiar markets, success in knowledge
markets additionally requires a control over what Nullmeier and Rüb call “inter-
pretative and knowledge resources”. These include both the material conditions
for producing knowledge (access to training and know-how, physical infrastruc-
ture, funding, staff, etc.) as well as the ability to “mobilise good reasons”. The
latter, somewhat elliptical factor, refers to the ability of policy actors to produce
high quality policy arguments. Like all resources, Nullmeier and Rüb argue, the
capacity to produce policy-relevant knowledge is unevenly distributed within
any society. This, in turn, favours the closure of knowledge markets and skews
the policy-making playing field [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993, p.31].
The focus of the “Politics of Knowledge”, then, is the intimate relationship
between expert knowledge and political power in real-life policy processes. The
approach is designed to help us understand how policy actors exercise political
power whenever they apply expert knowledge and, by the same token, how
decision-makers require expert knowledge about a policy problem to exercise
political power. The concept of “knowledge markets” implies that the people
who wield scientific and technical expertise are not neutral, let alone innocent,
bystanders of the political drama. Rather than a mere source of information,
expert knowledge in Nullmeier and Rüb’s framework is a powerful political
weapon that can discredit competing interpretations, close down rival policy
options, and narrow the scope of political action.
6Nullmeier and Rüb do not provide a definition but we can assume that success is expressed
in ‘increasing market shares’ and impact on policy outputs.
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Evaluation
The “Politics of Knowledge” describes the way policy actors strategically deploy
knowledge and expertise in an attempt to control policy networks and policy
processes. By monopolising Knowledge Markets, policy actors can successfully
reduce the accessibility of “partial public spheres’ and thereby maximise their
influence and autonomy over policy-making. Moreover, the interaction between
institutional and ideational structures, Nullmeier and Rüb argue, shapes pol-
icy processes: monopolised knowledge markets generate “self-referential policy
cycles”. In this way, Nullmeier and Rüb provide some evocative metaphors for
thinking about the role of knowledge in contemporary policy processes. Un-
fortunately, many of these metaphors and theoretical mechanisms are far more
convincing when viewed from afar. Closer inspection of the key concepts of the
Politics of Knowledge throws up many unanswered questions.
The first area of weakness concerns the vagueness surrounding the idea of
knowledge markets. It is not entirely clear where knowledge markets begin and
where they end. It would seem that knowledge markets are interorganisational
yet informal arenas for producing and disseminating policy–relevant knowledge.
However, are knowledge markets driven by specific issues (such as global climate
change, road pricing, crime, or unemployment), are they defined by their types of
knowledge producers (for example, scientists or government researchers), or do
knowledge markets emerge analogously to policy sectors (such as social policy,
environmental policy, or defence policy)? Do knowledge markets span different
policy communities and levels of governance? Unfortunately, Nullmeier and
Rüb provide many vague hints but ultimately leave us in the dark about what
exactly defines and delimits knowledge markets.
Moreover, it is also not quite clear what exactly is supposed to be going
on in these knowledge markets. Again, Nullmeier and Rüb are not terribly
specific but it would stand to reason that knowledge markets provide an arena
for arguing about established and emergent knowledge. If this is the case, why
is this any different from a ‘debate’? Nullmeier and Rüb indicate that ‘debates’
are discussions that take place in specific knowledge markets but may be relevant
for other knowledge markets. In that case, how do these debates affect other
knowledge markets? Is it via policy decisions, via participants that are active in
more than one knowledge market or via power structures? Because the central
concept of the Politics of Knowledge is fundamentally vague, we are left to
speculate.
Further, while Nullmeier and Rüb spend a lot of time theorising about closed
knowledge markets, they provide a disappointingly anaemic account of open
knowledge markets. In open knowledge markets, they argue, alternative courses
of action and different interpretations of reality to co-exist (and, presumably,
compete) in the same public or semi-public space. And leave it at that. Open
questions include: What are the conditions that favour open knowledge mar-
kets? How can policy makers bring about open knowledge markets? What sort
of impact do open knowledge markets have on policy outcomes? And, most
importantly, what are the benefits of open knowledge markets? While economic
theory is very clear on the benefits of competitive markets (efficient allocation
of resources), Nullmeier and Rüb leave it to the imagination of the reader to
come up with the benefits of open knowledge markets. In essence, Nullmeier
and Rüb are asking us to prefer open knowledge markets simply because are
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not closed.
The second set of weaknesses concerns the general suitability of the market
metaphor. Although markets provide a neat general image, closer scrutiny shows
that the analogy only holds at a very abstract level. In Nullmeier and Rüb’s
framework, who are the consumers and who are the producers of knowledge?
Policy actors are not the same as rational economic agents: both their policy
goals as well as their strategies differ quite considerably. Whereas economic
agents are interested in maximising profits or utility, policy actors have a far
more complex set of policy goals and strategies (as we saw in the previous
chapter). We can, then, expect quite different patterns of behaviour than in
markets.
Further, markets are quintessentially about trade. Yet, in knowledge mar-
kets, it is not entirely clear who is trading what. Knowledge itself is, in Samuel-
son’s sense, a public good and not amenable to trading[Samuelson, 1948]. Add
to that the reams of literature by economists dealing with science, technology
and innovation that argue against establishing markets7 for knowledge and it
becomes difficult to see what it is that Nullmeier and Rüb’s knowledge mar-
kets actually trade. Moreover, do specific knowledge markets offer one type
of knowledge (disciplinary knowledge, applied vs basic science, policy-relevant
knowledge, religious knowledge, everyday knowledge) or do they offer different
types? If they do specialise, what types of knowledge are we likely to find on
what types of markets? Again we can see that the lack of definition and clar-
ity in the knowledge market concept itself has knock-on effects throughout the
theoretical edifice.
In sum, Nullmeier and Rüb designed the Politics of Knowledge to explain
policy-making in one particular issue area: public pension provision in Ger-
many. As we will see in Chapter 9, German pension policy-making in the
1980s was dominated by a highly coherent and tightly organised policy com-
munity of experts that dominated problem-definition and agenda-setting. Here,
Nullmeier and Rüb’s theoretical edifice works rather well as a critical tool. By
showing how policy actors deployed knowledge and institutional resources to
close knowledge markets and limit debate to ‘innocuous’ issues, the “Politics
of Knowledge” shines a none too favourable light on German pension policy-
making in the 1980s. By its very nature, the idea of knowledge markets revolves
around the costs of relatively exclusive and expert-led policy networks. How-
ever, the approach excludes (or at least heavily discounts) the potential benefits
of such policy styles and network structures (such as, most prominently, creat-
ing a stable and predictable policy environment). As such, Nullmeier and Rüb’s
approach is useful for identifying and criticising closed-shop policy processes.
Yet, in light of the weaknesses of the approach identified above, it is question-
able whether the “Politics of Knowledge” travels well to other issue areas or
indeed, as we shall see in Chapter ??, the same issue area over time.
What can we take from the “Politics of Knowledge”? First, policy emerges
from a competition of ideas in a knowledge market. This notion suggests that the
production, dissemination and application of expert knowledge in “partial public
spheres” also sets policy agendas and exercises power. Second, the accessibility
of knowledge markets can change over time. Policy actors deploy expertise
and knowledge to control network membership and the agenda by monopolising
7Admittedly, these economists are thinking about monetarised markets for knowledge.
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knowledge markets. Last, policy actors strategically utilise expert knowledge
to achieve and establish “epistemic sovereignty” (Wissenshoheit) in a policy
network.
4.2 Garbage Cans and Multiple Streams
If the “knowledge markets” of the preceding section help us understand how
decision-makers keep issues off policy agendas, so-called Multiple Streams Anal-
ysis (MSA) aims to explain the exact opposite. Based on John Kingdon’s appli-
cation of the Garbage Can model to the United States federal government, MSA
describes how issues get onto policy agendas and how policy actors formulate
responses to these issues [Kingdon, 1984, Kingdon, 1995, Cohen et al., 1972,
Zahariadis, 1999].
Assumptions
Multiple streams analysis rests on four interrelated assumptions:
Policy-processes are “Garbage Cans”: In their Garbage Can model of organisa-
tional behaviour, Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen outline
decision-making in so-called “organised anarchies”[Cohen et al., 1972]. In
these types of organisations, preferences are problematic, the technology
to realise these preferences is unclear and participation in the organisation
is fluid. A university, the authors point out, is a typical example of an
organised anarchy. In organised anarchies, decision-making is not a linear
process: policy problems are neither clearly defined nor can the organisa-
tion neatly dispense with them. Rather, argue Cohen, March and Olsen,
the Garbage Can process features four relatively independent streams:
problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. As a result,
organised anarchies are “. . . a collection of choices looking for problems,
issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they may be
aired, solutions looking for issues to which they may be the answer, and
decision-makers looking for work” [Cohen et al., 1972, p.2].
Organised anarchies give rise to ambiguity: Multiple Streams analysis assumes
that policy-makers operate in conditions of fundamental ambiguity. This
means that for any single issue or phenomenon, there may be several
different, often conflicting, ways of thinking about and perceiving it. Am-
biguity, Nikolaos Zahariadis points out, is not the same as uncertainty.
Whereas information and knowledge may reduce uncertainty, no amount
of information can reduce ambiguity.8 We can also think of ambiguity as
what happens when policy actors use different cognitive and normative
frames to make sense of the world.
Organised anarchies and ambiguity mean that understanding policy-making
requires a logic based on time rather than on rationality: The use of
a rationality-based logic typical of conventional social science presumes
8However, many scholars [Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998, Thompson and Rayner, 1998a] use
the term “uncertainty” to refer to what Kingdon and Zahariadis call “ambiguity”.
95
that policy actors understand both their preferences and the policy prob-
lems they face. In organised anarchies under conditions of ambiguity,
however, preferences are as unclear as the nature of the policy issue at
hand. Zahariadis argues that choosing under conditions of ambiguity
is an exercise in coming to terms with complex reality rather than ra-
tional problem-solving. Since organised anarchies and ambiguity mean
that many different issues are constantly clamouring for policy-makers’
attention, time management rather than task management is the key skill
[Zahariadis, 1999].
Complexity, ambiguity and chaos are the rule rather than the exception: As
we saw in Chapter 3, the “rationality project” depicts the messy, unpre-
dictable, and normative nature of politics as an unwanted deviation from
rational policy-making. Multiple Streams Analysis, however, suggests that
complexity, chaos and disequilibrium are inherent characteristics of policy-
making in pluralist systems.
Key Concepts and How they Work: Streams, Coupling and
Launch Windows
Kingdon applies the Garbage Can model to politics to explain why certain issues
rise to the top of policy agendas when they do. Like Cohen, March and Olsen,
Kingdon conceives of policy-making systems (in this case the United States
Congress) as organised anarchies composed of independent streams. However,
unlike the organisational theorists, Kingdon distinguishes participants from pro-
cesses. So while participants in policy processes9 are not a separate stream in
Kingdon’s model, he identifies three independent process streams in the polity:
a problem stream, a policy stream and a politics stream.
The problem stream consists of competing problem definitions. Kingdon dis-
cerns three mechanisms with which policy problems are brought to the attention
of policy-makers: indicators, events and feedback. Changes in indicators, such
as GDP, the level of unemployment, or population statistics, not only draw at-
tention to a particular problem as it develops, but also construct a particular
image of an emerging policy problem. For example, the OECD’s Programme for
International Student Assessment (PISA) publishes a periodical report compar-
ing the educational achievements of 15 year olds across industrialised countries.
In the last reports, German students did comparatively poorly. As a result of
the report, the problem of the “new German education catastrophe”10 shot right
to the top of the German policy agenda in 2001 and has become a major issue
in the general election campaign of 2002. Further, events such as catastrophes
or personal experiences focus policy-makers’ attention on societal conditions.
The most prominent recent example of such a focusing event is the terrorist
attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001. Ever since the attack,
policy-making throughout the industrialised world has focused on security is-
sues. As a direct result, European governments, most prominently Germany,
have introduced rather restrictive public order and public security legislation.
9Which not only include politicians, advisors, civil servants but also journalists, researchers
and interest group representatives.
10Again, this is my own translation of “neue deutsche Bildungskatastrophe”
[Anonymous, 2001].
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Last, feedback on the performance of existing policies alerts policy-makers to
unanticipated implementation problems. For example, by the mid-1990s it had
become clear that official flexible retirement provisions introduced by the Ger-
man pension reform of 1989 were not very popular with workers [Schmähl, 1999].
This signalled to policy actors that the reform had done little to curb the abuse
of the pension system as a means of easing older and less productive workers
out of the labour market. This allowed the pension issue to claw its way back
onto the German policy agenda by the mid-1990s (see also Chapter 9).
The second stream is the policy stream where policy solutions float about as
if in a “primeval soup”. Here, experts and specialists from policy communities
that make up the organisational environment come up with ideas and design
policy solutions. These ideas are then tested in a number of possible venues
(including hearings, meetings, parliament, position papers, etc. ). Some policy
solutions will rise to the surface of the primeval soup, other policy solutions will
simply die and others still will be recombined with different ideas (a process
Kingdon refers to as successive “softening up”). Although there are many ideas
floating around in the policy stream, only very few solutions receive serious at-
tention at any one time. Policy-makers decide to pay attention to a particular
idea on the basis of whether the policy solution seems technically feasible and
whether the idea is in harmony with the policy-maker’s values and beliefs. The
upshot of the argument is that the way policy solutions rise to the top of the
agenda follows a different, far more complex logic than conventional theories of
rational problem solving assume. Rather than simply providing solutions to pol-
icy problems, different policies compete in an evolutionary process for survival
and supremacy. In that process, very much like living organisms, ideas evolve
and mutate. For example, recent pension reforms in Germany have introduced
private pension provisions alongside traditional social insurance mechanisms.
These new pension schemes, however, bear only a slight resemblance to the rad-
ical market-oriented reform proposals championed both by economists within
Germany [Börsch-Supan, 1999, Miegel and Wahl, 1999] and by institutions such
as the World Bank [James, 1994].
The third stream in Kingdon’s model, the political stream, determines the
status of a particular issue. Its components are the national mood, the constel-
lation of organised political forces, and the make-up of government. The idea
of national mood “. . . refers to the notion that a fairly large number of individ-
uals in a given country tend to think along common lines and that the mood
swings from time to time” [Zahariadis, 1999, p.77]. Policy-makers, Kingdon
argues, pick up on national moods and national mood swings through instru-
ments such as opinion polls. For example, in the aftermath of 9/11, the national
moods in the United States and in many western European countries swung in
favour of military, or at least armed, responses to the perceived ‘terrorist threat’.
Another, possibly less dramatic example is the current eurosceptical and anti-
immigration mood that seems prevalent in many EU countries. Further, the
political stream also depends on the activities of interest groups. Governments,
Zahariadis argues, look very closely to the patterns of support and opposition
among pressure groups hoping to derive an image of broader consensus patterns
within the polity. Examples here include the way governments in corporatist
polities (i.e. Austria, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Germany) will test ideas
and policy proposals with key corporatist interest representation before com-
mitting to any policy action. Last, continuity and change in the make-up of
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government and parliament determines the opportunities and likelihood of pol-
icy shifts.
Kingdon argues that issues climb to the top of policy agendas when all three
streams converge at a single point. This, in turn, occurs when so-called “policy
entrepreneurs” join together or, to use Kingdon’s term, couple different streams.
These policy entrepreneurs, who invest “. . . their resources – time, energy, rep-
utation, money – to promote a position for anticipated future gain in the form
of material, purposive, or solitary benefit” [Kingdon, 1995, p.179], match pol-
icy problems to existing solutions and bring this package to the attention of
policy-makers in a position to act on the issue [Zahariadis, 1999, p.84]. If pol-
icy entrepreneurs are sufficiently deft or sufficiently fortuitous (or both), the
coupling of process streams opens a policy window. Similar to launch windows
in space travel, policy windows are opportunities for policy-makers to act on a
certain policy issue that are available for a limited time only.
In general, Kingdon identifies two types of these “temporal stimuli for choice”
[Zahariadis, 1999, p.8]. The first type of policy window opens in the problem
stream (say as the result of an event). Windows of this type, Zahariadis main-
tains, will favour a “consequentialist coupling” of policy streams meaning that
policy entrepreneurs and policy actors will try to find solutions to policy prob-
lems. A particularly clear example is gun control legislation in the United
Kingdom in the mid-1990s. Following a particularly bloody incident in which a
disturbed gunman murdered a class of primary school children in Dunblane, the
British government very swiftly drafted and passed a comprehensive gun con-
trol law. In contrast, policy windows that open in the politics stream (say as
the result of an election), argues Zahariadis, will favour a “doctrinal coupling”
of streams. Here, policy actors look for policy problems to match predefined
solutions. By way of example, Zahariadis points to the British Conservative
Party’s enthusiasm applying market-oriented policies, specifically privatisation,
to all types of policy issues ranging from health care to education. Kingdon
argues that, regardless in which particular stream they open, some policy win-
dows appear regularly (such as the budget) while others are unpredictable (such
as earthquakes).
After a limited amount of time, Kingdon argues, policy windows will in-
evitably close. Once a policy window closes, no further policy action on this
particular issue is possible. Policy windows, Kingdon maintains, close for a
number of reasons. First, policy-makers may feel they have suitably addressed
the policy issue. For example, pension reform policy windows in Germany
tend to close when the government passes the reform legislation [Ney, 2001,
see also Chapter 9]. Second, policy windows close when decision-makers fail
to generate any action on a particular topic. A good example here is the
abortive pension reform in France. In 1995, the French government under the
Gaullist Prime Minister Alain Juppé attempted to retrench public sector pen-
sion schemes but had to back down due to massive nation-wide protests against
the planned reforms; as a result, the policy window closed and has not yet
reopened [Bonoli, 2000, Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000, Bozec and Mays, 2001].
Third, policy windows may close because there are no suitable policy alterna-
tives available. Fourth, the person who opened the policy window may no longer
be in power. At the international level, the Middle-East peace initiative of the
late 1990s initiated by the United States president Bill Clinton fizzled out (and
turned into a very violent Israeli-Palestinian conflict) as soon as Mr. Clinton
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was succeeded by President George W. Bush. Fifth, the crisis that caused a
policy window to open may simply pass. For instance, the civil war in Bosnia,
a acute military and humanitarian crisis in the early to mid-1990s, no longer
is quite as pressing as it was. Last, policy windows may close because another
crisis dramatically crashes onto the scene. Again, 9/11 is a good recent exam-
ple: issues that occupied European policy-makers such as BSE, food safety, or
genetic research into stem cells were relegated into policy-making obscurity by
the terrorist attack.
Evaluation
Although Kingdon provides a dynamic and complex model of how ideas interact
with institutional structures, Multiple Streams Analysis is open to at least three
criticisms. First, the approach has no explicit concept of policy actors and
human agency. Although Kingdon points to a wide array of participants in
the policy process, he tells us very little about what makes these policy actors
‘tick’. A corollary of this criticism is the fact that Multiple Stream analysis
has no theory of action that explains the political behaviour of individual or
collective policy actors. While the Multiple Streams shows that ideas (in the
policy stream) spur policy-makers to action, it is also clear that individual self-
interest motivates policy entrepreneurs [Zahariadis, 1999, p.78]. Unfortunately
it is not very obvious when policy actors will be motivated by self-interest and
when they will react to social constructions (i.e. deft couplings of streams).
Moreover, while Kingdon convincingly shows that policy-making is a struggle
of ideas and frames, he is less explicit about how different frames and ideas will
influence political behaviour and policy action.
Second, although the Multiple Streams framework quite impressively dis-
misses the myth of rational policy-making, Kingdon (and Zahariadis) are less
forthcoming about the socio-institutional origins of these ideas and frames. Re-
call that experts and specialists generate ideas in policy networks and that these
ideas then float and compete in a “primeval soup”. In what ways, then, do the
institutional structures and organisational practises of these communities im-
pact on the types of policy solutions generated in the policy stream? Nothing in
the Multiple Streams approach allows us to relate institutional structures and
practises to the types of policy solutions that emerge from the policy stream.
In the Multiple Streams framework, ideas and policy solutions just seem to ma-
terialise from the complex environment of policy networks that make up the
primeval soup.
Yet, it seems a little implausible that institutional structures will have little
discernible effect on policy solutions. On the one hand, thinkers in the New Insti-
tutionalist vein of policy analysis [Skocpol, 1995, Ostrom, 1991, Pierson, 1996,
March and Olsen, 1989] have pointed out how past policy decisions constrain
and even determine policy-makers’ choices in the present. For example, in coun-
tries with welfare states based on the social insurance model (such as Austria,
Germany, or France) the scope of technically ‘feasible’ and normatively suitable
policy solutions is closely circumscribed by the workings of welfare state institu-
tions themselves [Bonoli, 2000]. On the other hand, Nullmeier and Rüb’s idea
of closed knowledge markets shows that specific institutional forms give rise a
very specific types of policy solutions, namely solutions that bolster the existing
closure of knowledge markets. The free evolutionary competition of ideas out-
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lined by Kingdon, then, seems to be the result of a specific socio-institutional
set-up. For these reasons, the Multiple Streams approach needs a concept both
of how organisational structures in the polity regulate the competition between
conflicting ideas in the primeval soup and of how these organisational structures
impact on the types of policy solutions on offer.
Last, in its implicit fatalism, the Multiple Streams approach is also somewhat
politically complacent. Multiple Streams analysis, Zahariadis notes, sacrifices
the ability to predict policy processes in order to more accurately portray the
complexities of contemporary policy-making [Zahariadis, 1999]. Indeed, one of
the strengths of Multiple Streams Analysis is that it manages to transport a
sense of this complexity very effectively. However, Multiple Streams analysis is
also rather frustrating. Since the interaction of the different streams is essen-
tially chaotic, depending as it does on random and unpredictable events such as
aeroplane crashes or earthquakes, Multiple Streams analysis tells us how policy-
making works without providing tools to do anything about it. This, of course,
begs the question: if policy-making is this kaleidoscopically complex and multi-
faceted business over which we have little or no influence, why bother analysing
politics in the first place? Why should researchers expend their most valuable
and scare of all resources (time and effort) to study a system of human inter-
action about which they can do very little anyway? Moreover, the implication
here, very much like Charles Lindblom’s early formulations of incrementalism,
is that we can do nothing to improve policy-making because pluralist polities,
by and large, are about as good (i.e. fair, efficient or democratic) as they can
get. Reminiscent of Winston Churchill’s aphorism, Multiple Streams Analysis
leads us to believe that while imperfect and a little capricious at times, con-
temporary democratic systems (particularly those resembling American-style
pluralism) are the best we can hope for.
On the more positive side, the Multiple Streams framework does feature
a number of rather unique strengths. First, unlike most models of meso-level
policy-making, Multiple Streams analysis connects policy communities and pol-
icy networks to broader political events. Whereas the concepts discussed in
Chapter 2 depict policy communities as relatively insulated from one another,
the Multiple Streams framework shows that, despite fragmentation and special-
isation, policy communities are connected, albeit in complex ways. Even though
external events may not be able to determine policy outcomes within a policy
community, Zahariadis argues that these events certainly influence the policy
options decision-makers choose when policy windows open [Zahariadis, 1999].
Again, the most prominent recent example is the terrorist attack on the World
Trade Center. Despite this event being of no direct relevance to many policy
communities, it has coloured debates and policy choices in areas as diverse as
domestic law and order, ethnic relations, or development policy.
Second, assuming that process streams are relatively independent (or that
their relationship is so complex as to seem independent) means that the analyst
needs to “uncover rather than assume rationality” [Zahariadis, 1999, p.93]. Un-
like conventional theories of the policy process, Multiple Streams analysis does
not assume from the outset that policy-making is about rational problem solv-
ing. Rather, as we have seen, policy formation has more in common with social
learning as policy actors come to with ambiguous policy problems. Thus, the
Multiple Streams framework turns its back on the aspirations of the rationality
project by abandoning what Zahariadis calls the “illusion of control”. In this
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sense, the Multiple Streams framework very plausibly operationalises some of
the key insights of the Argumentative Turn discussed in the previous chapter.
Perhaps the most refreshing feature of Multiple Streams Analysis is the way
it depicts the complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty in contemporary policy
processes. By skillfully applying the Garbage Can model of organisation, King-
don not only produces a charmingly irreverent portrayal of agenda-setting, he
also manages to demonstrate how complexity and chaos emerge from relatively
well-known and straightforward aspects of the rational decision process. Mul-
tiple Stream Analysis loosens the logical (but counterfactual) relationship in
which the ‘rationality project’ places policy actors, policy problems and policy
solutions. By doing this, the framework points to the importance of context
rather than purpose in policy-making. Here, policy-making is the net result of
complex institutional interactions and unpredictable events [Zahariadis, 1999].
What is more, Kingdon suggests that this state of affairs may be the rule rather
than the exception: since streams are independent and since serendipity is an
important determinant of policy outcomes, it is unlikely for policy systems to be
in equilibrium. In terms of the Multiple Streams Analysis, then, the ambiguity,
uncertainty, and general messiness so abhorrent to the rationality project is an
integral and constitutive feature of contemporary policy-making.
4.3 Epistemic Communities
Unlike the “Politics of Knowledge”, the concept of Epistemic Communities fo-
cuses on policy-making at international level. Increasingly, Peter Haas argues,
policy-makers in the international field are faced with complex and uncertain
policy problems such as stratospheric ozone depletion, transboundary air pol-
lution or global climate change [Haas, 1992b, Haas, 1992a]. While the transna-
tional nature of these issues demands inter-state collaboration, the accompany-
ing complexity and scientific uncertainty make co-operation rather precarious.
In short, state actors in international arenas face messy policy challenges. In
these situations, Haas points out, scientists and professionals help state actors
make sense of policy issues by applying their expert knowledge in an effort to
reduce uncertainties. The Epistemic Communities approach, then, aims to un-
derstand how these experts and their expert knowledge affect the formation of
international policy regimes.
Assumptions
Haas makes two general assumptions: one about the nature of contemporary
policy-making and another about expert knowledge:
Policy-making takes place in policy networks populated by knowledge-based ex-
perts. The Epistemic Communities framework conceptualises contempo-
rary states in a similar way to the policy network and policy community
literature reviewed in Chapter 2. Like Rhodes, Richardson or Smith,
Haas also points to the rapid expansion of state functions, the speciali-
sation of administrative capacities, and growth of professionalisation that
has characterised the post-war period. Haas argues that this develop-
ment has had two significant effects. First, the fragmentation of policy-
making has coincided with the emergence of the “policy expert” as well as
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a “. . . deference paid to technical expertise and, in particular, to that of
scientists” [Haas, 1992b, p.1]. Second, this development is in part due to
the nature of policy issues and problems themselves. Policy issues in the
differentiated polity, Haas maintains, have become increasingly complex
and uncertain, often affecting several different policy domains at once
[Haas, 1992b, p.12]. State actors in these situations are often unclear
about where their interests lie, let alone how to go about maximising
these preferences. Additionally, uncertainty may lead to misperceptions
about the way actors behave, why they behave the way they do, and the
nature of international settings. For this reason, the conventional wisdom
of international relations, which assumes states know their policy prefer-
ences and know how to pursue them, seems of little use for understanding
the formation of international policy regimes under scientific and political
uncertainty. Rather, Haas argues, coming to grips with the way policy-
makers handle uncertain and complex issues requires looking beyond the
structural imperatives imposed on state actors in the international anar-
chic system.
Although reality is socially constructed, consensus on knowledge is possible.
Explicitly rejecting the extreme constructivist position.11 Haas prefers
what he calls an “essentialist/materialist” view of expertise and knowl-
edge [Haas, 1992b, p.22]. Here, “. . . the world is a real and separate ob-
ject of enquiry that exists independently of the analyst and that although
the categories in which it is identified are socially constructed, consensus
about the nature of the world is possible in the long-run” [Haas, 1992b,
p.23]. What is important to Haas is the social consensus about knowl-
edge rather than the consistency or fit of this knowledge with reality. The
questions here are how actors form a consensus on knowledge12 on the
one hand and how this knowledge is diffused to other actors on the other.
Moreover, Haas is interested how this consensual knowledge affects the
political behaviour of policy actors. Whether or not this particular piece
of knowledge is true in any substantial or philosophical sense is less im-
portant for the Epistemic Communities approach. In sum, knowledge in
the Epistemic Communities approach, like in knowledge markets, emerges
from a distinctly social process of conflict, negotiation, and adjustment.
Key Concepts and How They Work: Epistemic Communi-
ties
The term “epistemic communities” refers to “. . . a network of professionals with
recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an author-
itative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area”
[Haas, 1992b, p.3]. Epistemic Communities strongly resemble policy communi-
ties and policy networks discussed in Chapter 2. However, epistemic commu-
nities are a special type of policy networks13 with distinct characteristics. To
11which holds there is no way of directly observing reality since all our knowledge is socially
mediated by language.
12Which is very similar to concerns of Nullmeier and Rüb’s approach discussed above.
13Probably, epistemic communities are closest to “professional networks” on Rhodes’ con-
tinuum. See Table 2.1 in Chapter 2.
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qualify as an epistemic community, networks consisting of scientists or profes-
sionals must
1. share a set of normative and principled beliefs;
2. share a set of causal beliefs;
3. share notions of validity (which are intersubjective, internally defined cri-
teria for weighting and validating knowledge in the domain of their exper-
tise, i.e. agreed-upon standards for knowing when the community is right
or when it is wrong);
4. possess a common policy enterprise (which is a set of practises associated
with a set of problems on which their expertise is focussed) [Haas, 1992b,
p.3].
Epistemic Communities are always a subset of professional or scientific com-
munities. For example, Haas argues that economists as a whole do not qualify
as an epistemic community, whereas Keynesians and Monetarists economists
are distinct epistemic communities. Haas’ central claim is that these networks
of knowledge-based experts shape international policy-making and policy co-
ordination under conditions of scientific uncertainty: in other words, it models
the way policy actors deal with messy policy problems in the international sys-
tem of states. How, then, does the Epistemic Communities approach explain
international policy-making?
Policy processes driven by epistemic communities, Haas maintains, typically
run through three stages: uncertainty, interpretation, and institutionalization.
First, crises focus policy-maker attention on a specific issues or problems. On
closer inspection, policy actors realise how little they know about the issue.
This, in turn, leads to the generation of data and information concerning the
particular problem. At this point, uncertainty is a problem for state actors since
it obscures where and in what ways the state needs to exercise political power
[Haas, 1992b, p.3]. In these types of situations, Haas, maintains, it becomes
difficult to identify potential allies and strategies that may maintain the state’s
relative position in the international arena. Uncertainty at this level may even
lead to a breakdown of operating procedures and, as institutions grapple to deal
with the new situation, to new patterns of behaviour [Haas, 1992b, p.14].
Second, uncertain and complex problems have multiple, partially estimable
consequences that call for interpretation. Poorly defined policy problems require
a specific type of information that can depict the social/ physical processes in-
volved, link these with other processes and outline the likely consequences of
action [Haas, 1992b, p.4]. This, Haas points out, is what epistemic communities
supply to policy actors. By applying their expertise as well as their principled
beliefs to a specific issue, epistemic communities construct plausible policy sto-
ries about what is going on. In this way, epistemic communities enable states
to identify their interests, recognise allies and choose the most suitable policy
instruments. Thus, epistemic communities focus, delimit and help select policy
alternatives for dealing with complex and uncertain policy problems: in other
words, Haas argues, epistemic communities exercise political power by shap-
ing policy actors’ perception of both the problem and possible policy solutions
[Haas, 1992b, p.15].
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Third, the Epistemic Communities’s influence on policy-makers may lead
to the institutionalization of new forms of policy behaviour. As we have seen,
Haas believes that epistemic communities can influence policy making both
indirectly (i.e. by defining policy issues, by identifying state interests or by
pointing to features salient for negotiations) and directly (by formulating policy
measures). By convincing state actors to respond to a crisis or policy issue in a
specific manner, epistemic communities can create a path or trajectory for other
decision-makers to follow. Decision-makers may actually converge on a set of
co-operative policy norms and practises informed by the causal and normative
beliefs of the epistemic community. In this way, Haas concludes, patterns of
international policy co-operation may harden into international policy regimes
even where systemic power concentrations alone would not encourage policy
co-ordination.
Evaluation
The Epistemic Communities framework highlights the way experts make sense of
messy policy problems and how this contributes to the international institutional
policy environments. By applying their specific frames to messy policy problems,
scientists in epistemic communities interpret and translate data into policy-
relevant arguments. By foregrounding certain aspects and backgrounding others
according to the normative commitments and policy project constitutive of the
Epistemic Communities , scientists help state actors define their interests in
the international arena. Unlike Nullmeier and Rüb who explain policy-making
primarily in terms of the institutional context of knowledge markets, Peter Haas’
approach focuses on the way groups policy actors deploy expert knowledge to
shape institutional environments at international level.
However, a close review of the Epistemic Communities framework, Sheila
Jasanoff and Brian Wynne argue,
reveals a number of shortcomings [Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998]. First, they ar-
gue that it may not be the epistemic communities as much as the epistemes,
that is the ideas themselves, that drive international policy-making. This line
of criticism, based on the thought of Emile Durkheim, sees deep-seated, un-
questioned beliefs as guiding international political behaviour far more deci-
sively than relatively loosely integrated networks of scientists and professionals.
Another, second line of attack reasserts the state’s primacy in international
policy-making while recognising the cognitive aspects of policy-making. The
model of epistemic communities, proponents argue here, has not paid sufficient
attention to the state’s role in formulating and shaping information for pol-
icy [Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998, p.51]. Third, since scientists will paper over
real differences in order to influence policy agendas and secure research funds,
Jasanoff and Wynne are suspicious of the framework’s ability to identify shared
causal beliefs and values. In this context, they also point out that it is not
entirely clear how consensual knowledge impacts on policy-making in the long-
run. Will policy actors interpret and act upon this consensual knowledge in the
same way over time? Fourth, since epistemic communities are not part of all
stages of regime formation in international policy-making, Jasanoff and Wynne
argue that it is difficult to determine whether they are independent motivators
of international co-operation or merely catalysts. Last, the two social scientists
point out that the idea of epistemic communities does not explain why and
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under what conditions scientists and professionals cohere as a social group. In
short, it is not clear what produces social solidarity and what provides for social
integration in epistemic communities. Often epistemic communities are loose
networks of highly heterogeneous actors. As Jasanoff and Wynne point out,
such groups
“. . .may never achieve either the boundedness or the internal cohe-
sion and common purpose that one intuitively associates with the
term epistemic community. From a constructivist standpoint, these
are contingent entities, representing temporarily stable but institu-
tionally fragile conjunctions of social, ethical and cognitive forces.
Nonetheless, such networks can serve as effective levers for interna-
tional agenda setting and policy co-ordination”
[Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998, p.53].
Additionally, the epistemic community approach tells us very little about
the relationship between different epistemic communities within a specific pol-
icy domain. The fact that epistemic communities are sub-sets of wider scientific
communities implies that the relations among different epistemic communities
must be conflictual or at least competitive. How, then, does this conflict and
competition play out in the policy processes? Does this competition have any
impact on the types of interpretations and advice epistemic communities pro-
vide to policy-makers? Or, as Nullmeier and Rüb would argue, do different
types of institutional structures (i.e. knowledge markets) lead to different types
of competition? Why do policy-makers prefer one epistemic community over
another? Unfortunately, the Epistemic Communities approach provides us with
few answers.14
There are, however, also a number of features that speak in favour of the
Epistemic Communities approach. First, like knowledge markets, it understands
policy as being more than simply the outcome of an exercise of power within
given institutional structures. Rather, the idea of epistemic communities shows
how expert knowledge shapes policy outputs and international regime forma-
tion. Second, an important message of the epistemic community concept is that
ideas and knowledge never impact on the policy process by themselves. Rather,
policy actors (in this case scientists or professionals) have to engage in some form
of social interaction and have to create some form of stable social group that
acts as a vehicle for transporting ideas into the policy process. In other words,
the diffusion of ideas in policy processes requires some form of collective human
agency. Third, the concept of epistemic communities is also based on the notion
that policy actors will form networks defined by shared beliefs and norms. For-
mal institutions, then, may not be as important an influence on policy-making
as these informal networks of policy actors based on epistemic affinity. Last,
the epistemic community approach provides a vocabulary and conceptual lan-
guage to analyse the way ideas help set agendas and define policy problems.
By reducing uncertainty for policy actors, epistemic communities delimit and
14The empirical applications of the epistemic community approach, particularly
[Peterson, 1992], actually describe quite a lively struggle as diverging Epistemic Commu-
nities compete for legitimacy in the relevant knowledge markets,to use Nullmeier and Rüb’s
terminology. Unfortunately, Peter Haas and Immanuel Adler seem less interested in this com-
petition than in the process of regime creation that take place after a particular epistemic
community has managed to ‘sell’ their definition to policy-makers.
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select possible courses of action and thereby exercise a considerable amount of
power. In a very real sense, Haas suggests that Epistemic Communities’s guide
policy-makers through the mess.
4.4 The Advocacy Coalition Framework
The two theories discussed so far have focused on one particular aspect of policy-
making. Nullmeier and Rüb’s Politics of Knowledge concentrates on the cogni-
tive and institutional barriers to free policy debate while Peter Haas’ Epistemic
Communities model looks at expert networks that generate and diffuse policy-
relevant knowledge.
In this respect the Advocacy Coalition Framework is different. Although
it would be unfair to describe the Advocacy Coalition Framework as a theory
of everything, the framework is a very comprehensive and structured model of
policy-making in contemporary pluralist democracies.The central aim of the Ad-
vocacy Coalition Framework is to understand and explain how policy changes
and evolves in functional political subdomains that characterise the differen-
tiated polity. In particular, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith are interested in un-
derstanding the role of what they call “technical information” relative to more
traditional political factors (e.g. resources, power, influence) in the evolution of
policy.
Assumptions
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith base the Advocacy Coalition Framework on four
broad assumptions.
Policy-making takes place in “policy subsystems”. The locus or venue of pol-
icy change is the “policy subsystem”. Thus, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
acknowledge that policy-making takes place in discrete functional subdo-
mains or policy networks. These policy subsystems are populated with
policy actors such as researchers, journalists, or scientists (in addition to
more familiar policy players e.g. interest groups, elected officials, bureau-
crats, and so forth). Similarly, policy subsystems, Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith argue, include policy actors from all relevant levels of governance.
Policy change in these institutional settings, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
contend, takes at least a decade
[Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993a, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999].
All public policies are either implicitly or explicitly guided by some theory of
cause and effect: For this reason, analysts should treat policies as if they
were belief systems. Like belief systems, the theories implicit in policies
structure values, the perception of important causal relationships, aware-
ness of world states, as well as an understanding of the efficacy of policy
instruments.
Individuals are not rational utility maximisers: The Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work suggests a model of the individual that decisively departs from the
conventional rational actor paradigm. On the one hand, individuals are
subject to “bounded rationality” [Simon, 1945]. This means that human
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faculties for processing information are inherently limited and, as a result,
any attempts at comprehensive or synoptic rationality are doomed to fail.
On the other hand, individual rationality is also confined by so-called “cog-
nitive biases” and “heuristics” that systematic distort human judgement
[Kahnemann and Tversky, 1981, Kahnemann and Tversky, 1984]. In the
Advocacy Coalition Framework, these two characteristics of human rea-
soning reinforce each other. Since information processing is subject to
inherent limitations, individuals will tend to rely on heuristics to imbue
perception with some structure and meaning, albeit biased. On this view,
then, perception is refracted through normative and perceptual beliefs.
Perceptual filters and lenses, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue, will af-
fect individual behaviour at least as much (but probably more) than will
cost-benefit calculations. In practise, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue
that cognitive biases will lead individuals to fear potential losses more
than to value potential gains.15 In sum, then, individuals in the Advo-
cacy Coalition Framework aim to act rationally (and probably think they
do so) but are detracted from the rational path by a host of complex per-
ceptual and motivational constraints [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999,
p.131].
Organisational affiliation is not primordial: Where a policy actor sits, Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith argue, does not necessarily tell us everything about
where this policy actor stands. Individuals in the Advocacy Coalition
Framework can and will adopt beliefs and value structures that may run
counter to the dominant ideology of their formal institutional affiliation.
In essence, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith are postulating that formal institu-
tional affiliation may not be the main determinant or predictor of individ-
ual behaviour in all circumstances. This also means that, like Wilks and
Wright suggested in their nested policy community approach (see Chapter
2), that the policy relevant social groups consists individuals within in-
volved in a stable pattern of transactions that spans and transcends formal
institutional boundaries and affiliations.
Key Concepts and How They Work: Policy Subsystems,
Policy Belief Systems, Advocacy Coalitions Policy Brokers
and Policy-Oriented Learning
The Advocacy Coalition Framework is a highly systematic and carefully struc-
tured theory. Like a mechanical watch, the Advocacy Coalition Framework
consists of a number of moving parts that slot into an overall theoretical frame-
work and interact with other elements of the theory. Once all parts are properly
oiled and wound-up, the Advocacy Coalition Framework shows us a number of
things about policy-making.
Box 4.4 lists the hypotheses that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith explore using
the Advocacy Coalition Framework.
15This particular cognitive bias is described by Prospect Theory. For a critique of Prospect
Theory, see [Douglas and Ney, 1998].
107
Box 4.4: The Hypotheses of the Advocacy Coalition Framework
Sabatier and Hank-Jenkins-Smith formulate hypotheses for three broad areas:
Hypotheses Concerning Advocacy Coalitions
• Hypothesis 1: On major controversies within a policy subsystem when
policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents
tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so.
• Hypothesis 2: Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substan-
tial consensus on issues pertaining to the policy core, although less
so on secondary aspects.
• Hypothesis 3: An actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects
of his or her (its) belief system before acknowledging weaknesses in
the policy core
Hypotheses Concerning Policy Change
• Hypothesis 4: The policy core attributes of a governmental pro-
gramme in a specific jurisdiction will not be significantly revised as
long as the subsystem advocacy coalition that instituted the pro-
gramme remains in power within that jurisdiction — except when
the change is imposed by a hierarchical superior jurisdiction.
• Hypothesis 5: The policy core attributes of a governmental action
programme are unlikely to be changed in the absence of signifi-
cant perturbations external to the subsystem, i.e. changes in socio-
economic condition, public opinion, system-wide governing coalitions,
or policy outputs from other subsystems.
Hypotheses Concerning Learning Across Coalitions
• Hypothesis 6: Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most
likely when there is an intermediate level of informed conflict between
the two coalitions. This requires that
1. Each have the technical resources to engage in such a debate;
2. The conflict be between secondary aspects of one belief system
and core elements of the other or, alternatively, between impor-
tant secondary aspects of the two belief systems.
• Hypothesis 7: Problems for which accepted quantitative data and
theory exist are more conducive to policy-oriented learning across
belief systems than those in which data and theory are generally
qualitative, quite subjective, or altogether lacking.
• Hypothesis 8: Problems involving natural systems are more conducive
to policy-oriented learning across belief systems than those involving
purely social or political systems because, in the former, many of
the critical variables are not themselves active strategies and because
controlled experimentation is more feasible.
• Hypothesis 9: Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most
likely when there exists a forum that is
1. prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions
to participate and
2. is dominated by professional norms.
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In the Advocacy Coalition Framework, policy subsystems are home to two or
more competing advocacy coalitions organised around different policy belief sys-
tems. Regulated and mediated by a “policy broker”, competing and conflicting
advocacy coalitions will aim to enshrine their beliefs in policy measures. Pol-
icy change can either originate from outside the policy subsystem or, given the
right conditions between advocacy coalitions, can come about by knowledge-led
policy-oriented learning within a subsystem. This learning process that emerges
from the conflictual interaction between advocacy coalitions is the main focus
of the Advocacy Coalition Framework.
What lies behind these terms?
The Moving Parts: Policy Subsystems, Advocacy Coalitions and Pol-
icy Belief Systems
The institutional backdrop for advocacy coalitions is the so-called “policy sub-
system”. A policy subsystem consists of “. . . those actors from a variety of public
and private organisations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or
issue such as air pollution control, mental health, or surface transportation”
[Sabatier, 1993, p.17]. Since Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith include a wide variety
of different institutions and policy actors in this definition, policy subsystems
more closely resemble policy networks and policy communities (discussed in
Chapter 2) than iron triangles. Like epistemic communities or knowledge mar-
kets, policy subsystems shift attention away from formal institutions usually the
object of a political scientist’s enquiry: rather, policy emerges from the complex
interaction of public and semi-public institutions (such as universities) as well
as the private sector and the media.
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that policy subsystems depend on both
relatively stable and relatively dynamic external factors. The stable factors
include the constitutional order, basic attributes of problems and goods, the
endowment of resources across the polity as a whole, or the socio-cultural
norms prevalent within the society. In turn, the dynamic “system events” en-
compass things like general changes in society and economy, shifts in public
opinion, changes to the governing coalition of the polity as a whole, or pol-
icy decisions from other policy subsystems [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999,
p.120][Parsons, 1995, p.198]. Figure 4.1 below provides a schematic overview of
policy subsystems.
Applications of the Advocacy Coalition Framework to real-life policy issues
have suggested that policy subsystems will develop different characteristics and
features over time. Older or maturer subsystems, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
contend, will feature policy actors that regard themselves as a semi-autonomous
community sharing a domain of expertise [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999].
This community, they continue, will have sought to influence policy for at least
7-10 years. Another telling sign of a mature subsystem is the existence of
specialised departments or sub-units at all relevant levels of government that
deal with the particular issue. Similarly, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith point
out that a subsystem is likely to be mature if interest groups or specialised
units in interest groups regard the issue in question a major social problem
[Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.136].
For example, as we shall see in Chapters 8 and 9, policy subsystems dealing


























































































Figure 4.1: Policy Subsystem
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decades. Here, policy actors clearly stake out their claim in terms of expertise.
Since pension policy-making requires “credible technical data” [Reynaud, 2000,
p.9], pension policy subsystems in Europe tend to consist exclusively of profes-
sionals such as actuaries, legal experts or economists [Ney, 2001]. Not only do we
find entire departments at all levels of governance that deal with pension issues
(e.g. the United Kingdom has recently renamed the Department of Social Secu-
rity to Department for Work and Pensions), old age income provision has gen-
erated an entire organisational environment in itself [Bonoli, 2000, Ney, 2001].
In continental Europe, corporatist interest groups such as, most prominently,
labour unions and employer’s representatives, not only consider pensions an im-
portant issue but are often formally implicated in managing them (see Chapters
8 and 9.
Younger or nascent policy subsystems, in turn, are likely to be more fluid
and unpredictable. They emerge either as a spin-off from established policy
subsystems (when, for example, some policy actors are unhappy with the way
a specific aspect is being dealt with) or as a result of a new policy problem
or a reconceptualisation of an existing issues (such as the environmental issue
in the late 1970s and early 1980s). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith aver that the
constellation of policy actors and interests in younger systems is less likely to
be stable or fixed. Here, policy actors will be in the process of getting to grips
with the nature of the issue at hand and, in this process will be discovering their
policy preferences and policy beliefs.16
Policy communities concerned with global climate change in the early 1990s
could be an example for nascent subsystems. Although institutional structures
for dealing with environmental issues were in place in many countries, these
tended to concentrate on relatively localised environmental problems (such as
the siting of hazardous facilities, air or water pollution, etc.). The global and
inherently transversal aspects of climate change, however, required some re-
thinking and reshuffling of political responsibilities as well as the creation of
specialist sub-units. Moreover, the wide variety of policy actors involved, in
terms of professions, scientific background and institutional affiliation, shows
that policy actors were still getting to grips with the issue. Today, the global
climate change debate still features policy actors from many professional disci-
plines and organisational backgrounds, yet now they all call themselves experts
on global climate change (e.g. members of the IPCC). Most significantly, how-
ever, was the initial suspicion of environmental pressure groups towards the
issue of climate change: the need to cut carbon dioxide emission, they feared,
may provide a selling point for nuclear power.
Whether nascent or mature, policy subsystems provide the institutional set-
tings in which policy actors operate. Here, the Advocacy Coalition Framework
aggregates policy actors into so-called “advocacy coalitions”. These, argues
Sabatier, are composed of
“. . . people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials,
interest group leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief
system - that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and prob-
lem perceptions - and who show a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated
activity over time” [Sabatier, 1993, p.25].
16This may imply that policy-oriented learning primarily takes place in nascent systems.
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Depending upon its age, a policy subsystem consists of 2–4 politically significant
advocacy coalitions. Mature policy subsystems feature less advocacy coalitions
because they either converge or are crowded out of the subsystem over time.
Yet, regardless of the age of a policy subsystem, advocacy coalitions compete
and conflict to realise their specific policy goals and political agendas.
These goals and agendas, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue, are deter-
mined by “policy belief systems”. Each advocacy coalition in any given pol-
icy subsystem coalesces around and evolves with a particular policy belief sys-
tem. In effect, these policy belief systems set value priorities, structure per-
ceptions of causal relationships, mould perception of states of the world, and
affect how an individual policy-maker views the efficacy of different policy tools
[Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993a].
Policy belief systems have a threefold, hierarchical structure. The base of
policy belief systems is made up of “deep core beliefs” consisting of fundamental
norms based on ontological axioms. Applying to the political system as a whole,
deep-core beliefs are very resistant to change. In fact, Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith judge changes to deep-core beliefs to be akin to “religious conversions”.
The second layer consists of “policy core beliefs” which contain the fundamen-
tal policy positions and strategies for attaining core values. Although policy
core beliefs are also very sluggish to change, they are, in principle, amenable to
learning. Since beliefs in the policy core apply to the entire policy subsystem,
they provide what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith call the “glue” for individual ad-
vocacy coalitions. Policy core beliefs are the basic normative and causal beliefs
about a specialised domain which is the ostensible raison d’être for the advocacy
coalition [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.121]. The outer layer of policy
belief systems comprises the “secondary aspects”: these are the instrumental
decisions and information searches necessary to implement the policy core. Sec-
ondary aspects pertain to the seriousness of the problem at hand, the relative
importance of causal factors, or policy preferences regarding the desirability of
regulation. These more peripheral beliefs, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith point
out, are most susceptible to change in the light of new data, new experiences or
new political strategies [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.121].
Ticking Away: Conflict, Policy-Oriented Learning and Change
How, then, do the different elements of the Advocacy Coalition Framework help
us understand policy change?
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith point to three sources of policy change in plu-
ralist policy subsystems. First, changes in external factors (see Figure 4.1) may
bring about policy change in subsystems through a variety of mechanisms.17
Second, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith point to personnel changes in advocacy
coalitions: new individuals in advocacy coalitions may not only bring a fresh
outlook to policy issues but also may introduce new policy styles to the ad-
vocacy coalition and policy subsystem. What Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith are
17Which include: changes in the basic attributes of the problem area, shifts in the basic
distribution of resources across different policy subsystems, the transformation of cultural
values and social structures, or reforms to the basic legal framework. Additionally, so-called
“dynamic system events” may include changes in the broader political landscape, fluctuations
in socio-economic conditions and technology, changes to the governing coalition, as well as
policy decisions and policy impacts from other subsystems.
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most interested in, however, is explaining how policy changes because of conflict
between competing advocacy coalitions within subsystems.
In the Advocacy Coalition Framework, policy conflict between advocacy
coalitions is unavoidable. At any one time, advocacy coalitions are devising and
implementing strategies to translate policy beliefs into actual policy. This gives
rise to conflict or at least competition between different advocacy coalitions.
While shared perceptual lenses and similar perceptual biases will foster social
cohesion within a given advocacy coalition, these same perceptual filters will
make it very difficult for individuals to agree with or even understand policy
arguments from other advocacy coalitions. That and the tendency to evaluate
losses and gains asymmetrically, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith aver, leads pol-
icy actors to demonise the political opposition. By exaggerating the potential
costs rivals can inflict, the opposition will seem more powerful and more ’evil’
than they may actually be. For this reason, conclude Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, policy conflict is likely to be far more substantial and stubborn than
conventional social science approaches, particularly rational choice, would as-
sume [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, pp.140–141].
Policy conflict is mediated and moderated by what Sabatier calls a “policy
broker” who is primarily concerned with the policy subsystems’ stability. The
policy broker, who can be a senior civil servant or an elected official, will at-
tempt to negotiate compromises between the contending advocacy coalitions.
As a result of this mediating activity, advocacy coalition strategies may (or,
indeed, may not) result in policies and policy change. Successful strategies for
affecting policy-making will feed back into the policy process of the subsystem
(see Figure 4.1). Based on either the evaluation of decisions, new information or
external dynamics, advocacy coalitions may revise their beliefs and their strate-
gies. Consequently, advocacy coalitions may adopt new approaches that include
major institutional revisions at the level of collective choice, minor revisions at
the operational level, or they may leave the subsystem to affect policy at a
different level [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.121].
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith draw particular attention to the enlightening
effects of technical information. By looking at the “. . . relatively enduring al-
terations of thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and
are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives” or “policy-
oriented learning” for short, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith want to understand
how ideas shape policy [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993a, p.19]. However,
policy-oriented learning in the Advocacy Coalition Framework is a fragile, ar-
duous and unlikely process which always takes place within the context of princi-
pled conflict. Due to perceptual lenses and ideational filters, individual members
of advocacy coalitions will acquire knowledge and information selectively. These
lenses will select information and knowledge that buttresses deep and policy core
beliefs. Since, however, core beliefs are beyond empirical verification and are
acquired through socialisation, most learning takes place in secondary aspects
of policy belief systems.
When does learning in a policy subsystem take place? Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith outline three conditions that are conducive to policy-oriented learning.
First, the level of conflict between advocacy coalitions within a policy subsys-
tem needs to be at an intermediate level. At a high level of conflict, policy
actors perceive the outcome of the dispute as central to affirming core policy
beliefs which lowers the willingness to engage in constructive debate. In the ex-
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treme, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith maintain, high levels of conflict deteriorate
into a “dialogue of the deaf”. Examples abound: they include issues such as
abortion, welfare state retrenchment, defence, or food safety. Second, Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith assert that learning in a policy subsystem requires the issue
to be analytically tractable. The more practitioners and analysts can agree on
what is to count as a valid fact, the easier learning across and within different
advocacy coalitions will be. Conversely, the higher scientific uncertainties and
the more complex the issue area, the more policy actors will fall back on socio-
ideological world-views to interpret political life. This means, for instance, that
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith would expect policy-oriented learning to be more
likely to take place in pension policy-making than in the global climate change
debate. Last, professional analytical forums tend to promote policy-oriented
learning. Here, the barriers to entry are the technical training and professional
qualifications that define the forum itself. In a professionalised forum, Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith hold, policy debate takes place within a framework of pro-
fessional norms and shared assumptions about the validity of evidence. Due
to their common assumptions of scientific validity, professionalised forums are
most conducive to policy-oriented learning across the boundaries of different
advocacy coalitions. A prominent example of a professionalised forum is the
Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC).
On the basis of applied case studies, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith distinguish
major from minor policy change. Major policy change, Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith postulate, occurs when policy core aspects of governmental programmes
get reformed. This, they admit, is an infrequent event that, nonetheless, will
have a significant impact. For example, shifting a pension system from mostly
public to mostly private provision, as has taken place in Poland in the late 1990s
[Ney, 2003, Perek-Bialas et al., 2001, see also Chapter 9], would be a major pol-
icy change. Minor policy change, in turn, refers to the more common changes
in secondary aspects: here we may point to the incremental downward adjust-
ments of non-contributory elements in continental European pension systems
throughout the 1980s and 1990s [Ney, 2001, Ney, 2003, Bonoli, 2000]. In either
case, the scale of policy change, i.e. whether it is major or minor, is always
context specific. This means that what policy actors in a specific policy sub-
system consider to be major policy change may very well be a minor change
in the superordinate or overall political system. For example, changing the an-
nual pension indexation in the United Kingdom from wages to prices in the
early 1980s was major change in terms of the pension policy subsystem (since
it changes the whole character of pension benefits, see Chapters 8 and 9) but a
relatively minor reform in terms of the welfare state as a whole.
Since major policy change, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith point out, is a low
probability/high impact event it is notoriously difficult to predict. Still, the two
American social scientists try to identify indicators for major policy change.
First, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that external changes are a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for major policy change within a subsystem.
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith consider external events to open windows of oppor-
tunities that actors within the subsystem must exploit [Kingdon, 1984]. Second,
they point out that different institutional structures and political cultures will
require different level of political consent needed for major policy change. In
dirigiste and centralised systems (such as France) major policy change may
require less than a majority; in classic parliamentarian systems (such as the
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United Kingdom or New Zealand), major policy change requires a “bare major-
ity”; in pluralist and poly-centric systems (such as the United States), large
scale policy change requires what a Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith call a “su-
per majority”; and, finally, consociational political systems (e.g. Switzerland
and the Netherlands) will require a consensus for major policy change to occur
[Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.148].
In this context, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith identify three pathways to ma-
jor policy change. First, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith point to a process they
call “competitive policy escalation”: here, an upsurge of public concern leads
to the replacement of one dominant advocacy coalition by another in a very
short space of time. Examples here may include the sudden policy shift of
the United States concerning chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) [Haas, 1992a]: in a
relatively short time period, the advocacy coalition (or epistemic community)
favouring a complete ban on CFC managed to dominate the policy process that
resulted in the Toronto Protocol. Second, policy change may occur when a
minority coalition increases in significance and seeks to exploit an external dis-
turbance. Often, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith point out, the advocacy coalition
will not have the requisite votes and will look to forge short term and unstable
alliances. They also note that this is a common feature in supermajoritarian
systems. Last, major policy change may occur when all coalitions perceive ex-
isting policy processes as unsatisfactory and unconstructive. Finally, the policy
conflict should not be purely normative but should also have an empirical aspect
[Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.150].
Evaluation
By analysing the role of knowledge and policy-belief systems in policy change,
the Advocacy Coalition Framework focuses on the interaction of institutional
structures and policy conflict. In this way, the Advocacy Coalition Framework
provides a way of tracing and understanding changes in policy networks in terms
of ideational divergences. Like Epistemic Communities (and unlike Nullmeier
and Rüb ), the Advocacy Coalition Framework explicates the interaction be-
tween institutions and ideas using an actor-driven explanatory strategy: advo-
cacy coalitions and their belief-systems shape the networks in policy subsystems
rather than the other way around. Although the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work is a very thorough and well crafted theoretical construct, it is also open
to a number of criticisms.
First, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith say relatively little about the internal
structures of advocacy coalitions. It is reasonable to think of advocacy coali-
tions as interorganisational networks. As we saw in Chapter 2, interorganisa-
tional networks may evolve into many conceivable configurations. Yet, while
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith devote a lot of space to predicting (more or less in
an ad hoc way) how different types of members may behave under certain con-
ditions, systematic thinking on how advocacy coalitions work as social systems
is conspicuous in its absence. Surely, advocacy coalitions will have implicit (and
perhaps even explicit) rules concerning the relationship between members, the
flows of resources and information as well as what we can call the pecking order
determining central and more peripheral members of coalitions. By the same
token, it seems sensible to assume that the policy belief systems will shape the
coalition structure or network configuration. For example, an advocacy coali-
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tion that believes in and speaks out for individual rights probably would not
choose to control all policy statements of members; it is far more likely that
these advocacy coalitions will have a very loose conception of coalition mem-
bership. Likewise, we should be surprised to find many citizen’s initiatives and
grass-roots movements in an advocacy coalition that strongly believes in the
primacy of scientific knowledge. What is missing from the Advocacy Coalition
Framework, then, is an account of how advocacy coalitions are structured and
develop over time as well as how the coalitions structure impinges on their policy
belief system and vice versa.
Second, although the entire theoretical style of the Advocacy Coalition
Framework seems to suggest that policy-making is a conflict over different social
constructions of reality, it seems as if Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith feel rather ill
at ease with the idea of social constructivism. For example, Wayne Parsons
points out that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith seem to treat system parameters
(see Figure 4.1) as objective constraints in the ‘world out there’. Yet, as we
have seen earlier in this chapter as well as in Chapter 3, Nullmeier and Rüb
unequivocally show that individual and organisational policy actors react to
interpretations of specific situations, including an image of the institutional en-
vironment or the ‘world out there’. What Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith seem to
either forget or to ignore is that their ideas of policy-subsystems, policy belief-
systems, etc. are merely conceptual constructs that analysts superimpose on a
highly complex reality.18
This becomes clear when Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith grapple with the idea
of policy change. As we have seen, the Advocacy Coalition Framework provides
us with a very neat and practical definition of major and minor policy change.
However, deciding what is to count as major policy change is in itself a highly
political and contentious process. As we shall see in Part II, but what should
also be familiar from following any policy debate even at a cursory level, one
of the central points of contention in any policy conflict is the interpretation
of policy decisions. Depending on the political climate, decision-makers will
tend to overstate the scale of change (if change was desired) or play down the
effects of change (if the electorate expected continuity). The opposition, in turn,
is eager to tar a policy initiative as ‘too little, too late’ or an ‘unprecedented
departure from accepted policy principles’. In short, there may not be a simple
objective measure for major or minor policy change.
And if that is true, then the different elements of belief systems themselves
may not behave quite as orderly as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith assume. Al-
though the idea that policy beliefs subdivide into different elements with vary-
ing susceptibility to change is intuitively appealing, it may not be quite so easy
in practise to ascribe different aspects of belief systems to the categories. As
we shall see in Chapter 9, what may be a secondary element for one advocacy
coalition may be part of the policy core in another. In real policy debates, then,
it often is not terribly clear what part of a coherent policy story articulates
a deep core belief, a policy core belief or a secondary aspect. To define these
elements in terms of their susceptibility to change is clearly self-defeating (and,
in fairness, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith do not try to do so). However, Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith’s difficulties both to decisively pin down what policy core
18Incidentally, this also is a criticism levelled at the policy network and policy community
literature, see Chapter 2.
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elements may be as well as to uphold the hierarchical relationship between the
different elements of belief-system obscures more than it explains. In any case,
however, the claim to an objective measure for major and minor policy change
also looks decidedly shaky.
Third, on closer inspection the entire idea of policy-oriented learning looks
rather suspect. According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, policy-oriented learn-
ing primarily takes place on the basis of so-called technical information. De-
spite providing explicit definitions for just about everything else in the frame-
work, the two authors are rather woolly on what this term actually means.
Not only does the framework tell us very little about what this information
communicates to policy actors, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith are also relatively
taciturn about who produces this information under what conditions and how
all this contributes to the enlightenment function. And yet, if we are to be-
lieve Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, this technical information is so persuasive,
it can lead to “. . . relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural in-
tentions. . . ” [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993a, p.19]. Given the absence of a
clear definition, we are left to suspect that technical information is persuasive
because it conveys ‘objective facts’. The implication here seems to be that while
perceptual lenses, cognitive biases and inherent constraints to rationality may
hinder individuals from understanding or correctly interpreting objective facts,
if truth is spoken to power over long enough a time period, say a decade or so,
truth will eventually seep through the cognitive constraints and inspire learn-
ing. This, then, is a reintroduction of the distinction between facts and values
through the back-door. In a very real sense, the enlightenment function and
technical information in the Advocacy Coalition Framework demotes political
contestation and policy conflict as means of learning in favour of a rationalistic
and technocratic conception of knowledge.
A corollary to this criticism is Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s poorly con-
cealed disdain for politics. Not only does the Advocacy Coalition Framework
explicitly state that policy-making is a matter for policy elites, many of the pre-
scriptions for achieving policy change aim at reducing rather than expanding
the scope of political conflict. While policy-oriented learning requires a profes-
sionalised forum, major policy change requires negotiations in private: progress
in policy-making, it would seem, demands excluding rather than including pol-
icy actors. While this may be true in an empirical and pragmatic sense, it
does leave a rather unpleasant normative after-taste. Effectively, Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith tell us that efficiency, learning and generally getting things done
in policy-making is fundamentally incompatible with the competitive and messy
policy conflicts characteristic of pluralist democracy. In order to grow and de-
velop, politics and policy requires the ordering and helping hand of rational and
objective science that produces facts. Thus, the Advocacy Coalition Framework
brings us back full circle to the rationality project.
Fourth, although Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith admit that the Advocacy Coali-
tion Framework works best in OECD countries
[Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999], Parsons suggests that its use may be con-
fined to North American policy processes only. Indeed, more than a decade
after its inception, 23 of the 34 published studies look at North American cases:
only 8 cases consider European policy-making, and 2 deal with policy processes
in the rest of the world (Australia and Indonesia). Even a very favourable com-
mentator could hardly consider that a balanced spread of case studies. For this
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reason, Parsons argues that the Advocacy Coalition Framework is specifically
tailored to the polities featuring an open and consultative policy style prevalent
in the United States [Parsons, 1995]. However, in polities, he continues, that
are more forward looking and tend to impose policy decisions (such as many Eu-
ropean polities), the Advocacy Coalition Framework may have less explanatory
power. One of the reasons this may be the case, Parsons contends, is that the
Advocacy Coalition Framework has little to say about political power. Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith dismiss what they call the use of “raw political power” in
favour of policy-oriented learning. However, argues Parsons, a closer look at the
conditions that favour policy oriented learning reveals that they exclude “. . . a
very large number indeed of policy arenas and policy issues. The model puts
itself forward as a more realistic framework than the ‘stagist’ approach, and yet
in this regard the AC theory appears to be occupying a space somewhere in the
land of Oz” [Parsons, 1995, p.202].
On the positive side, however, the Advocacy Coalition Framework is still a
comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding contemporary policy-
making. Compared to the other theories and approaches discussed in this chap-
ter, the Advocacy Coalition Framework arguably provides the clearest and most
precise theoretical structure. In the Advocacy Coalition Framework, Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith have clearly laid out the underlying assumptions and have
provided (reasonably) clear definitions of (most) key terms and concepts. What
is more, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith formulate the mechanics of their approach
in terms of testable hypotheses (see Box 4.4). Not only does this clearly spell out
the way the Advocacy Coalition Framework model is supposed to work, it also
provides a practical handle on analysing complex policy issues. Another posi-
tive aspect of the Advocacy Coalition Framework is that it substantially deviates
from the standard social science assumptions about the nature of individuals
and organisations. By postulating that individual judgement may strive to be
rational but is shaped by socio-cultural and cognitive constraints, so-called per-
ceptual lenses, the Advocacy Coalition Framework explicitly acknowledges that
policy decisions depend on social and institutional factors. Moreover, rather
than assuming that individuals are rational actors and that organisations are
rational actors writ large, the Advocacy Coalition Framework understands that
social relations within organisations may be complex and that individual be-
haviour may be motivated by more than maximising fictitious utility functions.
Demonstrating that policy conflict within policy subsystems often emerges from
fundamentally different perceptions of the same issue goes a long way towards
explaining why policy conflicts never seem to resolve the way Rational Choice
Theory predicts. In short, the Advocacy Coalition Framework provides a very
structural and operational way of studying how policy actors draw lines in the
sand and why they defend these lines conceptual lines so vigorously.
4.5 Cultural Theory
When Mary Douglas first conceived of the Grid/Group Analysis — later to be-
come cultural theory — it was little more than a heuristic tool. The framework
allowed Douglas and like-minded anthropologists to compare the relationships
between cosmology and social structure across different institutional contexts.
Due in a large part to Mary Douglas’ interest other disciplines but also to the
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commitment of a multi-disciplinary group of researchers who have refined the
approach over the past decades, cultural theory has explained social phenomena
in a wide variety of different disciplines and fields [Mars, 1982, Adams, 1995,
Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982, Thompson et al., 1990]. Yet, what is it about
cultural theory that engages the imagination of sociologists, geographers, envi-
ronmental scientists, economists and, lest we forget, political science and policy
analysts?
Assumptions
Like much of social scientific theory, cultural theory rests on assumptions about
the nature of knowledge, of individuals and of organisations. Unlike most con-
ventional social scientific theory, cultural theory departs from standard assump-
tions. Cultural Theorists, then, believe the following:
Reality is socially constructed: Like the idea of knowledge markets or epistemic
communities, cultural theory assumes that individual actors will perceive
and understand the world around them in terms of socially constructed
categories. In cultural theory, like in Nullmeier and Rüb’s Politics of
Knowledge, social constructions of reality are never absolute or definite
but always malleable and contested. However, unlike social scientific ap-
proaches associated with ‘postmodernity’, cultural theory does not assume
that there are as many potential social constructions of the world as there
are individuals. Rather, cultural theory espouses what Michael Thompson
calls “constrained relativism” [Thompson, 1996]. Here, social structures
gives rise to distinct classes of interpretations and constructions of reality;
the number of coherent and stable social depictions and interpretations of
reality are, therefore, constrained by the number of stable social structures
within any social system.
There is no such thing as an organisation, only different ways to organise and
to disorganise: Cultural theory does not define institutions and organisa-
tions in terms of their formal labels (e.g. parliament or tax office). Rather
than trusting the somewhat static concept of formal institutions, cultural
theorists look for and analyse activities of organisation and disorganisa-
tion; an institution, then, describes how individuals choose to live together
and they order their social relations. For this reason, any given formal or-
ganisation may house a multitude of different, and often competing, types
of organisational activities.
The person who interacts in social contexts is an inherently social and political
animal: On this view, individual preferences and tastes are not given
but develop in social interaction with other individuals. This interaction,
in turn, takes place within social structures that provide individuals with
the necessary symbolic and communicative tools for interacting with other
individuals. Hence, for cultural theorists, human interaction outside social
structures is as unthinkable as it is impractical.
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Key Concepts and How They Work: Social Solidarities,
Cultural Bias and Mutual Antagonism
Cultural theory, is based on the simple but powerful insight that the way we
organise our social relations shapes the way we perceive the world and, con-
sequently, the way we behave.Cultural Theorists look to the “. . . the various
ways in which we bind ourselves to one another” or “social solidarities” to
explain individual and collective behaviour [Thompson et al., 1999]. Social sol-
idarities, Michael Thompson, Gunnar Grenstad and Per Selle argues, consist of
distinctive but coherent patterns of social relations, policy-belief systems (which
Cultural Theorists call “cultural biases”), and characteristic patterns of be-
haviour [Thompson et al., 1999]. These three elements reproduce and support
each other in complex and non-linear ways. Social structures shape the cultural
biases individuals use to socially construct the world. These create incentives
for and legitimate specific patterns of behaviour which, in turn, reinforce and
reproduce social structures and world-views.
Cultural theory enables analysts to map social solidarities and analyse the
complex social dynamics that result from their interaction. However, cultural
theory, is not about measuring or ranking social solidarities against an external
standard of objectivity or rationality. In a world of plural social solidarities,
Cultural Theorists know that knowledge and truth are necessarily relative. Yet,
unlike much of post-modern social and political thought, Cultural Theorists
see no reason why there should be an infinite number of ways in which policy
actors can socially construct the world. Rather, socio-institutional relativism
is inherently constrained: at any one time, Cultural Theorists argue, social
systems consist of no more than five competing social solidarities.19
19Technically, this is what Michael Thompson calls the “Impossibility Theorem”. For a
mathematical treatment of the Impossibility Theorem, see [Schmutzer and Bandler, 1980,
Schmutzer, 1994]
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Box 4.5: Grid/Group and the Cultural Map
Although the “impossibility theorem” [Thompson et al., 1990,
Schmutzer and Bandler, 1980] provides the rigorous and formal foundation
for cultural theory today, the basic idea of contesting plural social solidarities
emerged from a more pragmatic context [Thompson et al., 1999]. Suspecting
there to be a “concordance between symbolic and social experience”, the social
anthropologist Mary Douglas needed a scheme to identify and classify social
contexts [Douglas, 1970, Douglas, 1982]. She suggested mapping and comparing
the
“. . . interaction of individuals within two social dimensions. One is
order, classification, the symbolic systems. The other is pressure, the
experience of having no option but to consent to the overwhelming
demands of other people” [Douglas, 1970, p.81].
These two dimensions — “Grid” and “Group” respectively — make up the hori-
zontal and vertical axis of a system of co-ordinates. The vertical grid axis depicts
“. . . the complementary bundle of constraints on social interaction, a composite
index of the extent to which people’s behaviour is constrained by role differentia-
tion, whether within or without membership of a group” [Gross and Rayner, 1985,
p.6]. The horizontal group axis, in turn, “. . . represents the extent to which people
are restricted in thought and action by their commitment to a social unit larger
than the individual” [Gross and Rayner, 1985, p.5].
As we move along the Group dimension, “. . . the individual is more and
more deeply committed to a group, so choices are more standardised as
we move from the left across the diagram” [Douglas, 1996, p.68]. Mov-
ing up the grid dimension depicts social contexts in which discriminating sys-
tem of rules become increasingly dense and complex. Thus we should ex-
pect a high grid score “whenever roles are distributed on the basis of ex-
plicit public social classifications, such as sex, colour, position in a hierarchy,
holding a bureaucratic office, descent in a senior clan or lineage, or point
of progression through an age-grade system” [Gross and Rayner, 1985, p.6].
The Scope of Policy Conflict: Five Social Solidarities
Two of the five social solidarities on the Cultural Map (see Box 4.2), individ-
ualism and hierarchy, are well-known to the social sciences. Though equally
important for the viability of social systems, the other three cultural archetypes
egalitarianism, fatalism and autonomy- are relatively unknown to social research
and have not been systematised with respect to one another as, for instance, is
the case with individualism and hierarchy, c.f. [Williamson, 1975].
Members of the individualist social solidarity prefer ego-centred networks
that allow for maximum individual spatial and social mobility. Since these net-
works feature weak social controls in the form of rules, tradition or customs,
individuals regulate their relations with other free agents through negotiation
and contract. For this reason, members of the individualist social solidarity
champion individual rights, liberties and responsibilities. The world, they ar-
gue, is there for the taking: what may seem to others to be problems or barriers
are simply opportunities for innovative and hard-working entrepreneurs. For
individualists, human nature, characterised by a healthy dose of self-interest,
is robust and innovative, and positively thrives on challenges. Here, competi-
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tion with others for scarce resources is the strategy of choice and what counts
is the bottom-line. The best environment for human development, so the in-
dividualist argument goes, is the rough and rugged world of the free market.
Since the market rewards intelligence, acumen and hard work while punish-
ing free-riding, individuals either innovate or suffer the consequences of failure
[Douglas and Ney, 1998].
The hierarchical social solidarity, by contrast, is characteristic of
“. . . tradition-bound institutions in which everyone knows his place, but in which
that place might vary with time” [Gross and Rayner, 1985]. Rather than indi-
vidual rights and liberties, members of “nested bounded groups”
[Schwarz and Thompson, 1990] emphasise duty, obligation and loyalty toward
the institution, be it a tribe, a ministry or a regiment. Hierarchies come
equipped with a wide range of explicit and implicit social control mechanisms
such as rules and regulations, traditions and customs, as well as ancestry and
lineage. At each institutional level, a battery of finely-tuned and appropriately
tailored norms, incentives and sanctions guide individual behaviour, rewarding
loyalty and punishing transgression. For hierarchical actors, managing and reg-
ulating social relations (or, indeed, anything) is very much a hands-on task and
is best organised from the top on down. Left to its own devices, so the argu-
ment goes, the world would inevitably descend into disorder and chaos. Human
nature, weak and fallible as it is, yearns for order and stability. For this reason,
forsaking social mobility and competition in return for the security and order
of a strong institution is a small price to pay for members of the hierarchical
social solidarity.
Egalitarian actors live in networks that do not differentiate between members
while clearly distinguishing the group itself from the outside world. Egalitarian
social relations feature few, if any, formal rules regulating conduct (unlike hier-
archies) and entail the rejection of measures of social distance such as wealth
and physical prowess (unlike individualists). Due to the absence of clear rules
and regulations for succession, leadership tends to be charismatic. As a result,
egalitarian enclaves are often in a state of mobilisation: suspicion of contami-
nation from the outside and treason from within make this form of organisation
the most unstable and fluid. Yet, this endemic fission is not seen as a problem
by those committed to the principle of “small is beautiful”. Applying a critical
rationality to the world, egalitarians typically rail “. . . against formality, pomp
and artifice, rejecting authoritarian institutions, preferring simplicity, frankness,
intimate friendship and spiritual values” [Thompson, 1996]. Humans, egalitar-
ians argue, are fragile and under duress: coercive institutions with their inhu-
mane hierarchies as well as ruthless markets that value everything in terms of
money stunt individual development and smother the delicate human personal-
ity. Small and intimate societies based on absolute equality and intersubjective
solidarity, in turn, provide a suitable environment for individual well-being and
the satisfaction of real human needs [Douglas and Ney, 1998].
Fatalism describes marginal and precarious social environments. Individu-
alised by social isolation yet still subject to stringent regulations, fatalists lack
both the freedom of choice afforded by open social networks and the security
of cohesive groups. With little control over their lives and no means of in-
fluencing their social or natural environments, fatalists simply concentrate on
coping [Schwarz and Thompson, 1990]. For fatalists, the world and society are
an inherently inscrutable and capricious. Other people, even those that share
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their social isolation, remain “mysteriously unpredictable” and untrustworthy
[Douglas and Ney, 1998]. In fact, fatalists trust in nothing at all except the
certain knowledge that there is no rhyme or reason, no telos and certainly no
justice in life. Bobbing along in the cold ocean of life, being dragged this way
and that by strong but unpredictable currents, it is all fatalists can do to keep
their chins above the water.
Autonomy is the preferred form of social organisation of the hermit. While
the other four forms are based on some form of coercion, the realm of autonomy
is a space free of all social pressures. Thompson argues that autonomy is “. . . a
curious sort of solidarity . . . because it stabilises itself by the deliberate avoid-
ance of all coercive involvements” [Thompson et al., 1999, p. 11]. Unwilling
or unable to compromise autonomy and self-determination by interacting with
others, the hermit withdraws completely from society.
Appendix A.1 describes the way different social solidarities socailly construct
nature in divergent ways.
The Dynamics of Policy Conflict: Self-Organising Disequi-
librium Systems
Social solidarities, Cultural Theorists argue, are in constant rhetorical and sym-
bolic conflict about how to best structure social relations. This conflict erupts
and re-erupts because each social solidarity defines itself in contradistinction to
the others. Choosing one social solidarity implies rejecting the others. Mary
Douglas maintains that any
“. . . act of choice is also active in their [the individuals’] constitution-
making interests. A choice is an act of allegiance and a protest
against the undesired model of society. On this theory each type of
culture is by its nature hostile to the other three cultures. Each has
its strengths, and in certain circumstances each culture has advan-
tages over the others. And each has its weaknesses. But all four
coexist in a state of mutual antagonism in any society at all times”
[Douglas, 1996].
Somewhat against intuition, Cultural Theorists maintain that the symbolic
and rhetorical conflict among social solidarities is a source of social cohesion. As
Douglas points out, each cultural bias socially constructs the world by semiotic
selection and negation: each cultural view contains blind-spots and weaknesses.
Each socio-institutional form, whether it be the individualism, hierarchy, egal-
itarianism, or fatalism, is suited to solving different types of social problems
[Schmutzer, 1994, Thompson et al., 1990].20 The weaknesses of one particular
social solidarity creates problems another solidarity is able to solve. Thus, both
cognitively and institutionally, the different cultures depend on one another to
define and reproduce themselves. This insight has been developed into the so-
called “requisite variety condition” [Thompson et al., 1990, Thompson, 1997,
Thompson et al., 1999]. In order to function at all, the argument goes, any
social entity, whether it is an nomadic tribe, a political party, a multi-national
corporation, or a nation-state, must have all four cultural types engaged in
rhetorical and symbolic conflict. Any social system lacking one or more social
20The autonomy of the hermit by definition solves no problems of other social solidarities.
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solidarities will, ultimately, run into serious problems because it cannot rely on
the competitive intervention of other cultures to counter-balance the disadvan-
tages of individual cultural archetypes. Thompson maintains that the
“. . . basic idea is that each way of organising ultimately needs the
others, because they do something vital for it that it could never
do for itself. Indeed, this sort of dependency does not have to be
mutual; it is enough if each way does something vital for just one of
the others and no one of them is left out” [Thompson, 1997, original
emphasis, p.16].
Although each social solidarity has its specific weaknesses, each is also expert
in pointing to the weaknesses of rival social solidarities. For this reason, Thomp-
son argues that social interaction between the different cultures is necessarily a
complex, dynamic and chaotic conflict. Social systems containing their full com-
plement of social solidarities are what Thompson calls “self-organising disequi-
librium systems”. Here, each social solidarity aims to achieve viability in a com-
petitive environment. In doing so, each culture disorganises other solidarities:
social interaction is always conflictual and always detrimental for one or more of
the competing cultures. Yet, at the same time, each culture needs the others to
be able to define itself in contradistinction to them. Social change in these types
of systems is ubiquitous but complex and unpredictable. Therefore, Cultural
Theorists argue that social systems are indeterministic, non-linear, far from
equilibrium, and highly sensitive to initial conditions [Thompson et al., 1999,
p.10].
Public Management and Cultural Theory: A Practical Ap-
plication
How can cultural theory, rooted in social anthropology, help make sense of
problems and processes in public policy-making and public management? In his
book, The Art of the State, Christopher Hood applies cultural theory to public
management [Hood, 1998]. The four social solidarities, he contends, give rise to
four distinct but competing styles of public management: Bossism, Choiceism,
Groupism, and Chancism. Each management style has specific strengths and
weaknesses:
Bossism: In the past as well as today, hierarchies dominate the administration
of public affairs and services. Bossism, Hood argues, manages public pol-
icy in terms of oversight and control. For hierarchies, control “. . . implies
a ladder of authority, conscious oversight and inspection, formal power
to approve or reject, to pronounce on disputes or complaints, to forbid,
command, permit and punish” [Hood, 1998, p.51]. We can recognise struc-
tures of control and oversight in the plethora of regulatory committees,
auditors, comptrollers, inspectorates, and policing agencies that are part
of both the reality as well as the caricature of contemporary public man-
agement.
Choiceism: The individualist approach to public management, Hood argues, is
based on competition and rivalry, a doctrine Hood calls Choicism. Public
management for individualists is all about providing ’effective accountabil-
ity’ and ’efficiency’ in public services by “. . . making producers responsive
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to customers in market-like relationships, just as business firms sometimes
claim to be accountable to their customers” [Hood, 1998, p.55]. Wher-
ever we find competitive tendering for scarce resources, quasi-markets,
performance-related pay structures, outsourcing or public-private part-
nerships, Choiceism is at work.
Groupism: Egalitarian public management relies on mutuality and peer pres-
sure to control public officials. Choicist and bossist public institutions,
egalitarians claim, “. . . no social cohesion, and will consequently lack the
capacity to broker social compromises or even to survive when they are
pitted against rival organisations in extreme circumstances” [Hood, 1998,
p.60]. For egalitarians, decisions are best taken collectively: peer re-
view processes, collegiate decision-making or the imprecise boundaries be-
tween formally hierarchical job descriptions are all hallmarks of groupist
decision-making structures. These structures, so the argument goes, en-
hance both performance (by pooling resources) and accountability (by
diffusing decision-making power equally among the all members). Hood
points to citizen’s armies (like in Switzerland), open plan offices in which
management works with the staff (as in Japan), or community-based co-
production of social services (for example, long-term care in Nordic coun-
tries) as examples functioning groupist solutions to public management
problems.
Chanceism: “Contrived randomness” introduces fatalism to public manage-
ment. Chancism aims to break-up or prevent any undesired forms of
co-operation and collusion by injecting a dose of mistrust. This entails
randomising instances of control (such as audits, inspections, members on
boards, juries, etc. ) to introduce an element of unpredictability. Random-
ness and chance, so the argument goes, stifles any attempt at corruption
or wrongdoing that requires a modicum of trust in one’s colleagues. Ex-
amples, Hood argues, include jury service or unpredictable postings (e.g.
journalists and diplomats to stop them ‘going native’).
Evaluation
Unlike the other approaches reviewed in this chapter, the relationship between
institutional structures and ideational frames is at the very centre of what cul-
tural theory is trying to explain. In a very real sense, the concept of socio-
cultural viability revolves around understanding the different ways in which
social structures can relate to specific frames. The typology of social solidar-
ities provides a means of mapping different institutional contexts to different
types of cosmologies. What is more, by grounding conflicting frames in incom-
patible forms of social organisation, cultural theory provides a way of dissecting
and explaining the structure of policy conflict.
Ever since cultural theory left its disciplinary home in social anthropology for
the wider world of social science, it has been the object of much critical attention.
Although Mary Douglas had made forays into a number of different disciplines
since the early 1970s [Douglas, 1970, Douglas and Isherwood, 1979], it was only
her work with Aaron Wildvsky on risk perception [Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982]






























Figure 4.2: The Cultural Map
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It is not surprising, then, that most damaging line of criticism directed at
cultural theory has emerged from the risk research community [Boholm, 1996,
Sjoberg, 1998, Oltedal et al., 2004]. The main thrust of their argument is that
cultural theorists are unable to muster compelling empirical evidence21 in sup-
port of their claims regarding individual attitudes to risk and risk perceptions.
The argument that the cultural biases underlying different social solidarities
shape risk attitudes and risk perceptions, these critics contend, cannot be sub-
stantiated by the empirical survey research undertaken by the late Karl Dake
and others [Dake, 1996, Marris et al., 1998]. In fact, the critics contend, these
and other studies show that cultural biases “. . . are not major factors in risk per-
ception, but make a very minor contribution to its explanation” [Sjoberg, 1998].
This observation has given rise to two types of conclusions. First, some crit-
ics — particularly Lennart Sjöberg — see this as sufficient grounds to surmise
that “. . . Cultural Theory simply is wrong” and that the quantitative scales
derived from cultural theory “. . . do not seem particularly well suited for the
task of explaining technology and environment concerns and perceived risks”
[Sjoberg, 1998, pp.149-150]. The reason, other argue, is that cultural biases
may be too blunt a tool for explaining the dynamic and complex interplay of
factors that generate risk perceptions: instead of illuminating the determinants
of individual attitudes towards risk, the inherent reductionism of the grid/group
diagram crowds out a more sensitive understanding of risks and risk perceptions
[Zinn, 2004]. Second, other critical voices have been more reluctant to dismiss
cultural theory as a whole on the strength (or rather the weakness) of exist-
ing quantitative survey data [Oltedal et al., 2004]. Instead, these critics suggest
that vague operationalisation of cultural theory for rigorous quantitative re-
search is at least partly responsible for weak empirical support [Boholm, 1998].
This debate revolves around technical issues such as adequate survey design,
sample sizes, the significance of correlations, as well as the mode of data anal-
ysis [Sjoberg, 1998, Oltedal et al., 2004]. The upshot of this line of reasoning
is that many of the central concepts of cultural theory — such as cultural bias
and its role in individual preference formation — are ambiguous or, where they
are relatively precise, present thorny problems for survey-oriented research that
cultural theorists have yet to overcome.
While it may seem a little premature to dismiss cultural theory in its en-
tirety, the question of its operationalisation for empirical research — not merely
quantitative survey research — is a real issue. A strength of cultural theory and
its research community is the interdisciplinarity in both theoretical orientation
and empirical application. However, since cultural theory has been applied to a
wide variety of social scientific disciplines, researchers have adapted the frame-
work to suit their particular analytical needs. This has inevitably led to some
terminological variability that has not always contributed to conceptual clar-
ity. For example, researchers closer to the disciplinary ’roots’ of the grid/group
analysis, meaning social anthropology and sociology, will tend to refer to the
social solidarities in terms of their organisational forms. So here the cultural
map consists of markets, hierarchies, enclaves, and isolation. In contrast, po-
litical scientist, who have mostly been influenced by Michael Thompson’s and
Aaron Wildavsky’s work, will label the social solidarities as groups of people,
21The critics understand empirical evidence to exclusively mean quantitative data from
structured surveys
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i.e. individualists, hierarchists, egalitarians and fatalists.22
This terminological inconsistency has given rise to two unfortunate effects.
First, terminological discrepancies complicate communication between cultural
theorists, other researchers and policy practitioners. In a very real sense, dif-
ferent and inconsistent labels create needless obstacles for understanding what
are relatively straightforward ideas. This has been exacerbated by the ten-
dency among cultural theorists to use ‘shorthand’ thereby projecting an un-
duly simplified image of the framework. For example, the habit of referring
to social solidarities as groups of people has often led researchers outside the
cultural theory-community to believe that grid/group analysis is about clas-
sifying personality types rather than forms of socio-institutional contexts, see
[Oltedal et al., 2004] or [Zinn, 2004]. Second, while the methodological techni-
calities of survey research are of limited relevance to a discourse-oriented re-
search endeavour, the underlying problem of operationality remain. Although
cultural theory has inspired a rich variety of policy research in the past two
decades [Thompson et al., 1990, Coyle and Ellis, 1994, Thompson et al., 1998,
Thompson and Ney, 2000, Verweij and Thompson, 2006], the terms and con-
cepts remain underdetermined for use in a policy-oriented discourse analysis.
While concepts such as the typology of social solidarities, social relations, cul-
tural bias, or the myths of nature are relevant for discourse analysis, they still
require some transcription and adaptation for use in contemporary contexts of
policy-making.
In what ways, then, is cultural theory relevant to a framework of policy-
oriented discourse analysis? First, cultural theory grounds contending social
constructions of reality (or messy policy issues) in socio-institutional structures,
norms and practises. In this way, cultural theorists acknowledge that policy-
making takes place in a “contested terrain” defined by plural and competing
forms of rationality. Here, no form of rationality can subsume any other. By
the same token, these forms of rationality are constrained and limited by their
close relationship to types of institutional structure. While rationalities are
plural, they are not infinite: in fact, they can be described in terms of a ty-
pology based on “two dimensions of sociality” [Douglas, 1970]. Second, this
typology of social solidarities and cultural biases serves as a tool for identifying,
grouping and analysing policy discourses. The basic social solidarities outlined
above are blue-prints for assembling and reproducing socio-institutional frames.
These basic indicators allow analysts to make sense of the cacophony of voices
and claims that characterise contemporary policy debates. Moreover, this ty-
pology Third, cultural theory is about understanding the origins and functions
of social conflict. As we have seen, fundamental discrepancies between forms
of social organisation fuel mutual antagonism between members of social soli-
darities. Yet, at the same time, these socio-institutional tensions contribute to
healthy but turbulent and non-linear social development. In short, unlike the
“rationality project”,cultural theory contends that value-driven conflict is not
only inevitable but necessary.
In sum, cultural theory is a theory of organisation, legitimation, and argu-
ment: it is a theory about how people choose to live together and, once that
explicit or tacit choice has been made, how they construct a symbolic world
22This is the nomenclature adopted in this thesis in order to be consistent with other cultural
theory applications in political science and the policy sciences.
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in order to justify their preferred form of organisation. cultural theory is also
a structural theory: it asserts that there is a relationship between the social
structures in which individuals find themselves and the kinds of “perceptual
lenses” [Allison, 1971] people will wear. Moreover, cultural theory is a theory of
the person: it explicitly rejects the idea of the skeletal, socially atomised, and
utility maximising individual entrenched in Anglo-Saxon social science. cultural
theory tells us that the person is inherently relational, meaning that individuals
define themselves via their social environments: they way we shop and furnish
our homes [Douglas, 1996], the way we pilfer from our employers [Mars, 1982],
how we decide what risks to take [Adams, 1995], and how we decide on what
technology to use [Schwarz and Thompson, 1990] are shaped by the social re-
lations we enter into. Last, cultural theory is also a theory about argument,
dispute and debate: members of different social forms are in constant rhetorical
and antagonistic exchange in an attempt to legitimate their symbolic ordering
of the world in the face of competing orderings.
4.6 Conclusion
Chapter 4 has outlined five social scientific theories that explain contemporary
policy processes in terms of both institutional and ideational structures. First,
Nullmeier and Rüb’s concept of “knowledge markets” explains how policy ac-
tors use expertise to limit access to policy-making. Second, Multiple Streams
analysis, based on the Garbage Can model of organisational behaviour, shows
how the complex and chaotic interaction of ideas, policy problems and events
determines policy agendas. Third, the notion of Epistemic Communities pro-
vides a set of terms for analysing and describing the role of knowledge-based
experts in international policy processes. Fourth, we saw that Paul Sabatier’s
and Hank Jenkins-Smith Advocacy Coalition Framework is a rather compre-
hensive approach for explicating the role of technical information in long-term
policy change. Last, the chapter reviewed cultural theory which, based on in-
sights from social anthropology, maps different frames onto fundamental forms
of social organisation.
As we have seen, all four approaches bear a distinct family resemblance. At a
fundamental level, all frameworks discussed here strive to explain contemporary
policy-making in terms of the interaction between the institutional structures
and the world-views that exist in political systems. This means that the dif-
ferent approaches share many of the basic assumptions concerning the nature
of policy actors, ideas and knowledge, as well as political structures. First,
all approaches assume that policy-making takes place in quasi-autonomous and
specialised policy networks that characterise the differentiated polity. Second,
all frameworks are suspicious of the conventional rational actor model as an
appropriate depiction of individual or institutional policy actors. Rather, while
actors may aspire to rationality, a variety of (good) reasons (e.g. perceptual
limitations, cultural bias, etc. ) may put synoptic rationality permanently be-
yond reach. Third, all theories assume that policy actors use different cognitive
and normative frames to make sense of messy policy issues. Although different
theorists find distinct ways of articulating this insight, they all seem to agree
that constructing the world according to divergent frames gives rise to funda-
mental uncertainty and ambiguity. Since this fundamental ambiguity is not
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amenable to objective and scientific enquiry, different interpretations of ostensi-
bly the same phenomena generate conflict within policy processes. As a result,
most of the theorists discussed in Chapter ?? are sceptical of the aspirations
of the ‘rationality project’: rather than understanding rational policy-making
to be fundamentally anathema to frame-based policy conflict, the theorists dis-
cussed above prefer to portray policy-making as an intricately intertwined with
an argumentative struggle over symbols and meaning
However, as do members of a family, the approaches also differ in important
ways. The principal difference between the various approaches is that they
articulate the basic relationship between ideas, institutions and policy-making
by using different methods and conceptual tools. This inevitably gives rise to
disparities, many of which, however, are simply terminological or differences in
degree. So when Peter Haas speaks of “epistemic communities” or Paul Sabatier
and Hank-Jenkins-Smith refer to “advocacy coalitions”, all theorists are, by
and large, referring to the same type of social phenomenon that cultural theory
calls “social solidarities”. In each case, the frameworks provide a language for
describing aggregate policy actors that coalesce around a constitutive set of
beliefs and values. Similarly, when these thinkers refer to “shared principled
beliefs and values”, “frames” or “policy belief systems”, they are describing
systematic sets of ideas that affect perception and guide behaviour. This, then,
is what Cultural Theorists such as Mary Douglas have referred to as “cultural
bias” since the late 1960s.
Other dissimilarities between the approaches are more substantial. On the
one hand, the Politics of Knowledge and Multiple Streams analysis concentrate
on how contexts shape policy outputs and policy outcomes. The former ap-
proach explains how certain types of policy outcomes, i.e. an overriding concern
for stabilising the institutional frameworks at the cost of policy substance, en-
sue from the institutional set-up of knowledge-markets. The latter framework,
in turn, shows how policy problems, policy solutions, and political events cre-
ate the ‘right’ political contexts for an issue to rise to the top of the policy
agenda. Both the Politics of Knowledge and Multiple Streams Analysis tend
to emphasise the structural determinants rather than the ideational aspects of
policy-making. In this sense, these two approaches are context-driven explana-
tions of how ideas and institutions shape policy-making. As if to underline the
importance of context over agency, these approaches have a less detailed and
explicit concept of individual and institutional policy actors.
On the other hand, both the Epistemic Communities approach and the Ad-
vocacy Coalition Framework concentrate on how policy emerges from the in-
teraction between different aggregate policy actors. While the Epistemic Com-
munities approach focuses on the consultative activities of knowledge-based ex-
perts, the driving force in the Advocacy Coalition Framework are groups of
policy-makers who perceive and interpret the world similarly. Both theories ex-
plain policy-making in terms of how the activities of these groups shape policy
outputs and policy outcomes: the Epistemic Communities approach shows how
groups of scientists and experts can shape problem definition and policy formu-
lation while the Advocacy Coalition Framework sees policy change as emerging
from the conflict between different advocacy coalitions. This, then, is a more
actor-driven explanatory strategy.
The two explanatory strategies deal very differently with policy conflict and
consensus. Although all approaches understand policy conflict to be an inher-
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ent characteristic of contemporary policy-making in pluralist systems, the two
styles come to very different conclusions about the impact of conflict on pol-
icy outputs. Whereas the context-driven approaches, particularly the Politics
of Knowledge, see the restriction of conflict and competition to be detrimental
to effective policy-making, both actor-driven approaches suggest that effective
decision-making requires reducing the scope of political conflict. In a very real
sense, both Haas as well as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith suggest that conflictual
policy issues need to be removed from the public sphere and transferred to an
exclusive forum of experts. In contrast, Nullmeier and Rüb (and to a lesser
extent Kingdon) argue that closing off access to policy debates can only ever
lead to self-referential and ultimately irrelevant policy outputs.
cultural theory provides an account of how structures and ideas shape be-
haviour and interaction including, of course, political behaviour and interaction
in the public sphere. For Cultural Theorists, all human behaviour and inter-
action is intrinsically political since it is always about fostering solidarity by
nurturing social structures and defending fundamental beliefs. In this way,
cultural theory straddles both actor-driven and context-driven theories of the
policy process. Unlike the other approaches discussed in Part I, cultural theory
explicitly conceptualises the relationship between social structure, cultural bias
and individual behaviour. The typology of social solidarities, that is integrated
packages of social structures, policy beliefs and behavioural patterns, provide
an additional explanatory dimensions to notions such as epistemic communities
or advocacy coalitions. On the one hand, cultural theory helps the analyst un-
derstand how the internal patterns of transaction within advocacy coalitions or
epistemic communities structures the policy stories of these groups. Using cul-
tural theory, the analyst can relate a particular way of naming and labelling an
issue to a specific social solidarity. On the other hand, the dynamic aspects of
cultural theory allow the analyst to trace and anticipate, if not predict with any
certainty, the direction of policy debates and institutional changes within policy
subsystems. In short, while the other theories of the policy process provide a
body for the discursive analysis of problem definition and agenda-setting (i.e.
a model of the policy process), cultural theory provides the soul of this thesis’
framework (i.e. a model of what actually goes on in the policy process).
How, then, can we assemble the different concepts, ideas and tools to exploit









How can theories and approaches discussed in the last three chapters help un-
derstand and analyse policy conflict about messy policy problems?
The following chapter selects and ‘bootstraps’ insights and concepts dis-
cussed in Part I into a framework for analysing discourses in contemporary
European policy domains. This involves identifying complementarities and syn-
ergies between different frameworks and their conceptual architectures. The
hope here is to neutralise as much as possible some of the weaknesses identified
in each approach while still retaining an incisive analytical tool.
The aim of this chapter is to devise a conceptual framework for systemati-
cally analysing policy conflicts about complex, uncertain and transversal policy
challenges. In order to do this, the framework needs to do two things:
• Map the institutional and ideational landscapes of policy conflict in the
differentiated polity. This, in turn, requires that the framework is capable
of identifying different policy actors and their policy arguments (the scope
of policy conflict). Moreover, the approach needs to understand how and
on what terms policy actors relate to one another (the structure of policy
conflict);
• Trace movement and change within these institutional and ideational land-
scapes of policy conflict. The conceptual framework needs to show how
the institutional environments shape conflict and how conflict over time
shapes the institutional environment (the impact of policy conflict);
Section 5.1, then, outlines how concepts and approaches discussed in Part
I of the thesis contribute to analysing the scope and structure of policy con-
flict within differentiated policy domains. Section 5.2 outlines a theoretical
scaffolding for analysing the role of frame-based policy conflict in policy and
institutional change. Section 5.4,in turn, discusses the methodological issues
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concerning the application of the bootstrapped conceptual framework to actual
policy issues. In the conclusion, this chapter turns to the questions the frame-
work for policy-oriented discourse analysis leaves open and points to ways of
extending and augmenting the approach.
5.1 Scope and Structure of Policy Conflict in
the Contested Terrain
Understanding and analysing conflict about messy policy problems implies we
come to terms with
• the locus of policy conflict;
• the policy actors and their policy arguments;
• the nature of policy interaction in the venues of policy conflict.
The following section discusses each in turn.
The Contested Terrain
The fundamental assumption of this framework, in line with authors discussed
in Chapter 2, is that contemporary policy-making takes place in functionally
differentiated institutional networks focused on a particular policy problem. In
short, policy emerges from the “differentiated polity”.
Following Michael Thompson, we shall call the broad institutional and or-
ganisational context of contemporary policy-making the “contested terrain”.
Similar to Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright’s idea of the “policy universe”
[Wilks and Wright, 1987], the contested terrain encompasses all policy actors
and policy arguments relevant to the issue in question. Here, individuals or or-
ganisations become relevant to any policy issue as soon as they publicly express
interest in any aspect of policy-making about the particular problem.
The term describes both an institutional and ideational space. At institu-
tional level, the contested terrain consists of both organisations and individuals.
Following Rhodes, organisations are related to one another in terms of mutual
resource dependencies. Individuals in the contested terrain relate to one an-
other in terms of different interpersonal relationships (that may or may not
include resource dependencies). The point here is to include both interorgani-
sational as well as interpersonal networks in the explanatory framework. In a
very real sense, the contested terrain describes the largest possible set of organ-
isations, individuals and their relationships that participate in policy-making.
At the ideational level, the contested terrain describes the totality of ideas and
arguments concerning a particular policy problem. Similar to John Kingdon’s
concept of the problem and policy streams [Kingdon, 1984, see Chapter4], the
contested terrain is the habitat of all problems and policy solutions.1 Here, the
contested terrain delineates the reservoir of concepts and arguments available
to actors for use in policy processes.
1Unlike Kingdon’s idea, however, policy problems and policy solutions in the contested
terrain do not bob around in a ‘primeval soup’ waiting to be recombined in any which
way. Rather, only certain combinations of problem definition and policy solution are viable
[Thompson et al., 1990].
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Yet, who are these policy actors?
5.1.1 Scope: Types of Advocacy Coalitions and Policy
Stories
The approaches reviewed in Part I share a fundamental scepticism of the con-
ventional rational actor paradigm. Instead of reducing policy-making to the
spare calculus of utility-maximisation, ascribed either to a rational individual
or an organisation assumed to behave like a rational individual, the frameworks
of Part I reintegrate the socio-institutional dimension into the analysis of policy-
making. As we have seen in Chapter 3, this involves conceiving of individual
policy actors as inherently social and political animals. Such policy actors rely
on the cognitive and normative resources provided by social collectives to make
sense of messy policy problems and to coordinate their policy action. Thus, the
task here is to conceptualise and operationalise these insights for policy-oriented
discourse analysis.
Of all the frameworks discussed, cultural theory explicitly addresses the
relationship between of social cohesion and shared perception. As we saw in
the previous section, the concept of a “social solidarity” links social structure
to ideas and patterns of behaviour. However, since the concept refers to any
collective social actor, it remains somewhat unfocused for use in policy analysis:
while social solidarities help understand what policy conflict is about, it is not
entirely clear how these collectives get articulated in actual policy contexts.
Conversely, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s term “advocacy coalition” pro-
vides a precise definition of a social collective in contemporary policy processes.
However, as we have seen, the Advocacy Coalition Framework offers little to dis-
tinguish one advocacy coalitions from another. The approach merely assumes
that advocacy coalitions conflict because their policy-belief systems diverge: it
remains unclear for what reasons and in what ways policy-belief systems are
incompatible.
In order to help explain how policy actors deal with messy policy problems
and how this gives rise to policy conflict, we need fill the Advocacy Coalition
Framework’s skeletal concepts with cultural theory’s substantive analysis. Doing
that will give a clearer organisational shape to the idea of social solidarities.
However, before exploring the synergies of the Advocacy Coalition Framework
and cultural theory, we need to enlist the help of the Argumentative Turn to
modify the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s somewhat rigid notion of a “policy-
belief system”: this will sensitise the analysis to contending social constructions
of reality based on plural rationalities.
From Policy-Belief Systems to Policy Frames
As we have seen, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith base the concept of “policy-
belief systems” on Herbert Simon’s observation that human rationality is in-
herently bounded. Thus, with the help of concepts from cognitive psychology
[Kahnemann and Tversky, 1984], Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith set out to explain
why policy behaviour deviates from an instrumentally rational norm. The “en-
lightenment function” of “technical information”, then, is about extending the
bounds of our limited rationality. Policy-oriented learning is about wearing
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down cognitive biases.2 and finding a common, consensual and, most impor-
tantly, rational ground for policy-making, see also [Parsons, 2002]
However, the review of approaches in Chapter 3, particularly Donald Schön
and Martin Rein’s idea of “intractable policy controversies” but also John
Dryzek’s account of multiple frames, suggests that such an intellectual and
political project is problematic. Recall how these thinkers stress that frames
determine and constitute (rather than distort and simplify) the perception of
policy problems: a frame
“. . . is a way of selecting, organising, interpreting, and making sense
of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analysing,
persuading, and acting. A frame is a perspective from which an
amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of
and acted on” [Rein and Schön, 1993, p.146].
Significantly, Rein and Schön argue that there is no epistemic position outside
frames. This means that there is no way of evaluating a frame other than from
within another frame. As we have seen, this undermines the conventional idea
of objectivity as being the ‘view from nowhere’ since “. . . if objective means
frame-neutral, there are no objective observers” [Rein and Schön, 1994, p.30].
It follows, then, that knowledge about messy policy problems is invariably so-
cially constructed. More significantly, the existence of multiple frames and the
inability to resolve or reduce these frames to one another suggests there is no
single standard of rationality. Instead, frames point to the existence of plural
rationalities.
As we have seen, the three-tiered notion of policy-belief systems reintro-
duces the primacy of instrumental rationality in form of “technical information”
through the back-door of cognitive psychology. Instead, since this conceptual
framework aims to provide a tool for frame-reflection, it will rely on the more en-
compassing and holistic concept of “policy frames” to explain how policy actors
make sense of messy policy problems.
How do frames relate to advocacy coalitions?
Contending Advocacy Coalitions and Their Policy Stories
cultural theory’s typology of contending social solidarities provides a frame-
work for understanding why different advocacy coalitions perceive messy policy
problems in conflicting ways. We can use cultural theory to distinguish different
types of advocacy coalitions on the basis of the way they organise their “nontriv-
ial degree of coordinated activity over time” [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993b].
On this view, an advocacy coalition can adopt any of four basic types of social
relations outlined by cultural theory:
• hierarchy: here, advocacy coalitions resemble “nested, bounded groups”;
• individualism: members of advocacy coalitions are organised in competi-
tive “ego-focused networks”;
• egalitarianism: this describes individual policy actors that coordinate
their policy-making activity in terms of “bounded, egalitarian groups”;
2such as Kahnemann and Tversky’s “negativity bias”,[Kahnemann and Tversky, 1981].
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• fatalism: “isolation” describes the situation of policy actors whose lack of
support from a cohesive advocacy coalition group severely curtails their
autonomy in the contested terrain;
Policy frames used by actors will systematically differ according to the distinct
pattern of transactions that characterises an advocacy coalition. The underlying
policy frame (in, to use cultural theory’s terminology, cultural bias) associated
with each form of organising advocacy coalitions provides a basic normative and
cognitive framework for perceiving and making sense of complex, uncertain and
transversal policy problems. In this way, each underlying policy frame functions
as a blueprint for constructing plausible and credible policy arguments
Methodologically, we can think of these policy arguments as coherent nar-
ratives or stories (see Section 5.4). In debates about messy policy problems,
competing advocacy coalitions use these narratives to make a plausible case
for or against a particular course of action. Policy narratives are a means of
claiming legitimacy for a particular policy solution and, more profanely, rallying
support in a policy dispute. As the label suggests, narratives tell a story: they
provide a setting, point to the villains, identify heroes and, most importantly,
are guided by a moral. Since policy stories are designed to persuade, they are
necessarily value-oriented [Adler and Haas, 1992, Rein and Schön, 1994, p.29].
Yet this does not mean that policy narratives are mere opinion or fiction. Policy
stories explicate problems by recourse to rational methods: logic, consistency,
and objectivity play an important role. Therefore, frames (constituted by cul-
tural biases replete with myths of nature and constructions of the person) help
policy actors identify the ‘right’ data and evidence about any policy issue, select
the most ‘salient’ and ‘relevant’ features, and weave all this into an plausible
policy story aimed at persuading other policy actors.
The typology of advocacy coalitions based on cultural theory’s classification
of social contexts provides a means of sounding out the scope of policy conflict
in any contested terrain. Policy debate in the contested terrain features three
different types of policy stories told by the rival types of advocacy coalitions.3
These three stories delimit the pool of available problem-definitions, analyses
and possible solutions available in the contested terrain. Ideas or concepts
outside this policy space are not so much ‘unthinkable’ as simply not thought
about.
Now we know what the policy actors are, what is it that they do?
3This is because only the so-called active social solidarities — individualism, hierarchy
and egalitarianism — participate in policy contention. While fatalists would conceivably have
an interest in contributing to policy deliberation, their socio-institutional environments per-
mit no political involvement. And even if they did manage to participate, fatalists would
see no point in diverting scarce resources from the demanding tasks of coping with the in-
scrutable. Hermits, in turn, have neither interest nor opportunity to participate in policy
debates [Thompson et al., 1990]. Unlike fatalist actors, hermits could choose to participate,
but, in exercising their choice, they would enter into the type of coercive social involvement
that hermits are at such pains to avoid.
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Structure: Conflict, Argument and Controversy
Advocacy coalitions aim to enshrine their fundamental values in policy.4 These
fundamental values are derived from the policy frames peculiar to each basic
type of advocacy coalition. By realising their values in policy, advocacy coali-
tions establish epistemic sovereignty5 over policy-making: this provides advo-
cacy coalitions with autonomy to pursue their policy agendas. In fundamentally
argumentative policy processes, striving for epistemic sovereignty involves vy-
ing for legitimacy and credibility in the public debate. By pitting policy stories
against each other, rival advocacy coalitions aim to demonstrate the superiority
of their particular framing and solution to messy policy problems.
Box 5.1.1: Epistemic Sovereignty and Policy-Making Autonomy
The term epistemic sovereignty describes a situation in which a single policy
frame provides the dominant perceptual lens for interpreting a particular policy
issue. Epistemic sovereignty involves control of a single advocacy coalition over
the definition, production, administration and dissemination of policy-relevant
knowledge in a policy subsystem.
The term policy-making autonomy denotes a state of affairs in
which a single advocacy coalition in a policy subsystem is free to
define policy issues, set agendas and formulate policy either with-
out having to consult or include contending advocacy coalitions.
The contested terrain, then, features policy debates in which competing ad-
vocacy coalitions pursue epistemic sovereignty by vying for legitimacy. Since
members of advocacy coalitions define messy policy issues using policy frames
that emerge from incommensurable forms of social organisation, policy debate
is inherently conflictual and competitive (which is why Nullmeier and Rüb be-
lieve it resembles a “knowledge-market”). This conflict is neither amenable to
resolution by recourse to facts nor by bargaining. On the one hand, the facts
and even what are to count as a facts are object of the dispute and, on the
other, bargaining presupposes a common base which is also subject to contro-
versy. In short, conflict between advocacy coalitions in the contested terrain is
an “intractable policy controversy” in which
“. . . two or more parties contend with one another over the definition
of a problematic situation and vie for control of the policy-making
process. Their struggles over the naming and framing of a policy
situation are symbolic contests over social meaning of an issue do-
main, where meaning implies not only what is at issue but what is
to be done” [Rein and Schön, 1994, p.29].
The upshot of this line of argumentation is that fundamental, value-driven
conflict is inevitable in the contested terrain. This also means that, unlike ad-
vocates of the “rationality project” suggest, fundamental conflict is an intrinsic
and ‘normal’ aspect of contemporary policy-making. On this view, conflict in a
4The word ‘policy’ is to be understood in the widest possible sense and includes, among
other things, policy inputs (such as policy relevant research, expert opinions, hearings, polls,
etc.), policy outputs (green papers, white papers, statutes, laws, programmes, etc.,), or insti-
tutional structures (personnel in key positions, control of new organisations, etc.)
5Nullmeier and Rüb have called this Wissenshoheit.
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policy subsystem is neither haphazard nor random. Given that advocacy coali-
tions are empirical expressions of social solidarities, we should expect conflict
to flare up along the fault lines that separate contending types of advocacy
coalitions.
However, cultural theory would also lead us to expect some agreement or,
at least, mutual rejection between contending types of advocacy coalitions. On
the grid/group diagram, all social solidarities share one dimension with all the
others. Thus, advocacy coalitions sharing the high group dimension (hierarchy
and egalitarianism) would both reject policy stories that highlight individual
rights over collective duties. The obverse applies to advocacy coalitions that
share the low group characteristic (fatalism and individualism): here, policy
stories and, in the fatalists’ case, worldviews6 would express suspicion of and
distrust in collective action. By the same token, advocacy coalitions that feature
low grid characteristics (individualism and egalitarianism) would reject policy
measures that favour explicit regulation and stratification. High group advocacy
coalitions (hierarchy and fatalism), in turn, would view spurn any policy that
proposed to break down established categories and distinctions between people
and things.
5.2 Impact: Conflict and Change
So far, the bootstrapped conceptual framework provides a vocabulary for under-
standing how policy frames give rise to conflict in debates about messy policy
problems. However, can the framework help analyse policy change in the dif-
ferentiated polity?
Before dealing with this question, this section will briefly define what in-
stitutional and policy change mean in this conceptual context. Moreover, the
section will expand the spatial model of policy environments (i.e. the contested
terrain) to enable the analysis of movement and change. Then, the section
will tentatively outline how frame-based conflict between advocacy coalitions
may catalyse and contribute to institutional and policy change. This part of
the conceptual framework is exploratory and, with the concomitant case study
in Chapter 9, aims at hypothesis-building, theory construction and method-
reflection rather than theory testing.
Defining Change
Change and transformation in policy processes is a slippery notion. Not only
does change take place at many levels and in many places simultaneously, it
also moves in all directions at once. To further complicate matters, whether,
how much and where change is taking place is open to interpretation; in other
words, the locus, extent and direction of change is part of the “intractable policy
controversy” that characterises frame-based policy debate.
Getting an analytical handle on institutional and policy change means find-
ing a way of making change less complicated without unduly reducing the com-
plexity of socio-institutional transformation. In terms of the conceptual frame-
work elaborated so far, we can think of change as taking place in two interrelated
6Recall that since fatalists take no active part in policy conflict, they do not formulate
policy stories[Douglas, 1992, Thompson et al., 1990].
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dimensions. First, institutional change refers to structural transformations of
networks in policy spaces. This includes changes in the organisational composi-
tion, institutional structures and the interorganisational interdependencies that
constitute policy domains. It also includes the relationships between individual
actors in advocacy coalitions and the relationship between advocacy coalitions.
Second, policy change describes ideational changes in policy outputs: following
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, these are revisions to the underlying theory that
informs and guides policy.
Using the typology of advocacy coalitions and policy frames based on cul-
tural theory, we can calibrate and reconstruct change in both dimensions. At
institutional level, the typology of advocacy coalitions helps identify and trace
the movement of advocacy coalitions into and out of policy spaces. Movement of
organisational or individual policy actors affects relative strengths of advocacy
coalitions and thereby the organisational composition of policy spaces. Any
change in composition of any particular advocacy coalition is likely to have
implications for the overall institutional composition of the policy space. For
example, the influx of egalitarian actors into the contested terrain of the global
climate change debate forced the rearrangement of interorganisational ties and
relationships. Similarly, at the level of policy, we can use the cultural theory ty-
pology of policy frames to reconstruct the content and direction policy change.
For example, the decision to privatise a public institution (say the water util-
ities) points towards an underlying shift in policy frames from a hierarchical
policy frame to a more individualist argument.
Policy Spaces
Analysing change at institutional or policy level requires expanding the spatial
model of the policy environment. Tracing institutional movement and change
requires (at least) two nested layers of policy space in addition to the “contested
terrain”: one space that provides the institutional context, one space to host
the contested terrain and one space to structure the policy process. Thus, we
need to distinguish three nested layers of policy space:
The public sphere in the differentiated polity is the fundamental institutional
and ideational environment for all policy domains. This space contains all
contested terrains as well as the macro-political superstructure for policy-
making.7 Depending on the type of policy domain, the public sphere
may either be oriented towards the European and international level of
governance (as is the case with the transport sector, see Chapter 6 or
the national policy-making arena (as is the case with pension reform, see
Chapter 9).
As we have seen, the contested terrain [Thompson et al., 1999] is the space
that contains all advocacy coalitions and policy arguments relevant to a
particular policy problem. This, then, is the place where debates about
messy policy problems between competing advocacy coalitions are staged.
These debates are frame-based, intractable policy controversies about the
7This wider institutional context is usually referred to as the ’polity’. Alternatively, Baum-
gartner and Jones see the macro-political structure to be a sphere of “serial processing”
whereas the sphere consisting of policy subsystems is concerned with “parallel processing”
[Baumgartner and Jones, 1993].
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naming and labelling of complex, uncertain and transversal policy prob-
lems.
The policy subsystem is the institutional locus of policy- and decision-making.
This means that advocacy coalitions in policy subsystems engage in debate
about setting the policy-agenda and concrete policy formulation. These
deliberations differ from the wider debate in that they impact directly on
the policy agenda, policy formulation and implementation.
Since we have assumed that all advocacy coalitions aim to enshrine their
values in policy outputs, members of contending advocacy coalitions will aim
to colonise the locus of policy-making. In general, then, individual and organ-
isational policy actors will attempt to move from the public sphere into policy
subsystems. Since any policy actor or policy argument expressing an inter-
est in any aspect of policy-making qualifies as relevant, the boundary between
the public sphere and the contested terrain is highly permeable by definition.8
Movement into the policy subsystem, however, depends on the accessibility of
the particular policy subsystem: the higher the accessibility, the more advocacy
coalitions enter the policy subsystem. Depending on the degree of accessibility,
policy subsystems consist of a subset of advocacy coalitions and policy frames
from the contested terrain.
Using the cultural theory typology of advocacy coalitions and policy frames,
we can distinguish policy subsystems according to their accessibility:
• Inclusive policy subsystems: these subsystems feature all three types of
active advocacy coalitions (hierarchy, individualism, and egalitarianism).
Here, the policy subsystem subsumes the contested terrain. In inclusive
policy subsystems, policy outputs contain ideas, concepts and approaches
of all three policy frames. Policy debate is inherently conflictual;
• Partially inclusive policy subsystems: These subsystems feature only two
of the three active types of advocacy coalitions. Policy outputs in partially
inclusive policy subsystems reflect both policy frames. Policy debate is
characterised by bargaining and compromise;9
• Exclusive policy subsystems: these policy subsystems are populated by
only one of the three active types of advocacy coalitions. Policy reflects
only one policy frame. Policy debate is characterised by consensus.
How, then, does the framework explain the role of policy conflict in move-
ment and change from one type of policy subsystem to another?
8This, of course, is an assumption that needs to be relaxed for a more thorough investigation
of institutional and policy change.
9Unlike the inclusive policy subsystem, compromise and bargaining in a bi-polar policy
subsystem is possible since contending advocacy coalitions establish a base in the area of
agreement. However, a cultural theory analysis suggests that agreement is limited to general
principles and policy issues and is therefore fragile.
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Box 5.2: Modified Definition of Policy Subsystems A “policy subsystem” con-
sists of “. . . those actors from a variety of public and private organisations who
are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue such as air pollution control,
mental health, or surface transportation”[Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993b].
Policy subsystems are composed of a subset of actors and their policy argu-
ments drawn from the “contested terrain”. The relation between policy subsystem
and contested terrain varies positively with the accessibility of policy subsystems.
Dynamics: The Life-Cycle of a Policy Subsystem
Over time, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith contend, policy subsystems find a steady
state by reducing the scope of policy conflict. As a policy subsystem matures,
they argue, it becomes less accessible: while a younger policy subsystem may
feature as many as four advocacy coalitions, mature subsystems typically host
two or even a single advocacy coalition. Over time, they argue, some of the
contending advocacy coalitions will either be subsumed or crowded out.
But there is more to say about this process. Recall from Chapter 2 that
Richardson (unlike Rhodes) understands policy subsystems to evolve in both
directions: at times, policy subsystems will consolidate and exclude members,
at other times external pressures will squeeze new members into the policy
subsystem. In this way, he argues, policy subsystems move back and forth
along Rhodes’ continuum. This suggests that policy subsystems develop along
a cyclical (or at least an oscillating) rather than a linear pathway. Figure 5.1
depicts the way policy conflict promotes cyclical developmental pathways of
policy subsystems.
On this view, the interaction between two countervailing forces causes pol-
icy subsystems to cycle between different degrees of accessibility. On the one
hand, the inherent antagonism between advocacy coalitions gives rise to en-
demic policy conflict. The fundamental intractability and incommensurability
of contending policy frames means that policy debate is in constant danger of
degenerating into a “dialogue of the deaf”. The resultant policy deadlock creates
pressures for narrowing the scope of policy conflict. Mutual antagonism between
policy actors implies that members of advocacy coalitions equate policy-making
autonomy with the exclusion of rival advocacy coalitions and their policy sto-
ries. Once in a position of power, advocacy coalitions will use overt means
(bans, restrictions on freedom of expression, etc.) as well as more subtle tools
(erecting high discursive barriers of entry) to defend their autonomy in the pol-
icy subsystem. This, then, reduces the accessibility of the policy subsystem.
On the other hand, excluding contending advocacy coalitions from the policy
subsystem leaves policy-making vulnerable to conceptual blindness and policy
failure (see Box 5.2). Displaced advocacy coalitions in the contested terrain will
thematise these policy failures and will mobilise against the ruling advocacy
coalitions. This, in turn, produces pressures to open policy subsystems.
How does the life-cycle play out?
Inclusion In an inclusive policy domain, accessibility encourages a wide range
of policy actors to move into the contested terrain. Here, they compete over
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the naming and framing of the messy policy problem in question. Since in-
clusive policy subsystems feature all three types of active advocacy coalitions,
debate is inherently conflictual and intractable. Such a policy debate promotes
both policy innovation and critical scrutiny of contending policy proposals. On
the one hand, accessible contested terrains enable a free flow of knowledge and
ideas into and out of policy subsystems: as policy actors move into the con-
tested terrain from the wider public sphere, they bring with them new ideas
and concepts. On the other hand, since contending types of advocacy coalitions
are inherently suspicious of one another, they will scrutinise and criticise rival
policy arguments and policy stories.
Yet, despite policy and institutional innovation, the innately unstable con-
stellation of the triangular contested terrain (a “dynamic disequilibrium system”
[Thompson et al., 1999]) may deteriorate into a “dialogue of the deaf”. When
this happens, divisive and intractable policy conflict may produce policy dead-
lock and policy impasse. This, then, creates a receptive climate or mood in the
contested terrain for narrowing the scope of policy conflict.
Institutionalization and Contraction The collapse of policy debate into
a “dialogue of the deaf” renders an inclusive contested terrain ‘ripe’ for insti-
tutional and policy change. Given a suitable external trigger (say an change
of government or a focusing event such as a natural catastrophe), one or two
advocacy coalitions can wrest policy-making autonomy from the other policy
contenders. This may operate through a variety of mechanisms such as insti-
tutional path dependencies, power asymmetries in the public sphere, superior
political strategising of a particular advocacy coalition, or socio-political changes
elsewhere in the wider polity (i.e. joining the EU, change of government, etc.).
Significantly, part of the success of an advocacy coalition may simply be due
to ‘being at the right place at the right time’ [Kingdon, 1984]: for example, in
response to a crisis or catastrophe, a particular advocacy coalition may pro-
pose the only workable policy solution for overcoming the crisis. Policy-making
autonomy allows advocacy coalitions to institutionalise and consolidate their
epistemic sovereignty over the policy subsystem. This implies structurally and
discursively restricting access to the policy subsystem. In practise, this means
that advocacy coalitions remodel the institutional structure of policy subsystem
to resemble preferred patterns of social relations, define the issue to reflect their
preferred framing of the problem, and implement policies to promote preferred
patterns of behaviour in society.10
This, then, contracts the policy subsystem to a subset of actors and argu-
ments in the contested terrain. As the dominant advocacy coalitions consolidate
their institutional and ideational autonomy over the policy subsystem, contend-
ing policy actors will leave the contested terrain.11
10In a very real sense, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s idea of a professionalised forum is a
means of institutionally and discursively restricting accessibility to narrow the scope of policy
conflict.
11This does not, however, imply that the excluded advocacy coalition disappears completely
from the contested terrain. As the political pay-off and incentive structures change with
institutionalization of a particular policy story, some individual and institutional actors will




























Figure 5.1: Cyclical Pathways of Policy Subsystems Development
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Exclusion Exclusion narrows the scope of policy conflict to either an exclu-
sive or partially inclusive policy subsystem. Exclusive policy subsystems are
best described by Rhodes’ “policy community”: membership of the policy sub-
system is tightly integrated into a single advocacy coalition, held in place by a
common ideational frame to justify policy action that reproduces a shared pat-
tern of transactions. The advantage of such a constellation is that policy-making
becomes stable and predictable. Here, the single policy frame reduces conflict to
technical issues of interpretation. Since consensus is possible, policy-makers can
react swiftly and decisively to perceived policy problems. The major disadvan-
tage of exclusive policy subsystems is that increasing epistemic sovereignty im-
plies growing insulation from the contested terrain and wider public sphere. As
the dominant advocacy coalition further contracts the scope of policy-conflict,
exclusive policy subsystems are vulnerable to developing “self-referential policy
cycles” [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993]. Here, the institutional integrity of the pol-
icy subsystem becomes the dominant policy objective for ruling advocacy coali-
tions. In short, by narrowing the scope of policy conflict, advocacy coalitions
also narrow their perspective on policy problems and the policy environment:
under these conditions, advocacy coalitions increasingly succumb to conceptual
blindness.
In a very real sense, partially inclusive systems combine the worst of both
worlds. On the one hand, consensus on the framing of messy policy issues is
fragile since advocacy coalitions enter the area of agreement from fundamen-
tally different premises (see Chapters 6 and 8). In order to maintain agreement
necessary for policy-making, advocacy coalitions need to ensure that policy de-
bate does not thematise fundamental issues that would spark an intractable
policy controversy. Policy debate, then, either becomes increasingly tangential
to perceived policy problems or it dissolves into fundamental policy conflict.
Either case undermines the actors’ ability to formulate effective and expedi-
tious policy responses. On the other hand, partially inclusive policy subsystems
are not completely immune to conceptual blindness despite a wider spectrum
of available policy strategies. Yet, the limitations of policy debate exacerbate
tendencies towards conceptual blindness by partially muzzling criticism. More-
over, when things go wrong, the colluding advocacy coalitions blame each other.
When this occurs, partially inclusive policy subsystems may develop into exclu-
sive systems as one of the advocacy coalitions leaves or is subsumed into the
dominant advocacy coalition.
Deinstitutionalisation and Expansion Narrowing the scope of policy con-
flict either partially or absolutely provokes two counter-reactions in the con-
tested terrain. First, the biased and selective construction of messy problems
leaves policy solutions vulnerable to ‘unanticipated consequences’.12 As the
policy subsystem develops, these unanticipated consequences will surface and
lead to public management failures (see Box 5.2). Second, the crowding out of
rival advocacy coalitions does not quell policy conflict but merely displaces it
into the contested terrain or the public sphere. Excluded policy actors will find
other, often less appropriate, ways of making their voice heard (see Appendix
B). Both reactions reinforce each other in undermining the credibility and le-
12Of course, these consequences are only unanticipated for advocacy coalitions stuck in their
particular policy frame without the benefits of frame-based criticism and conflict.
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gitimacy of the sovereign advocacy coalition: displaced policy actors will focus
on and thematise policy failure thus exerting pressure on the ruling advocacy
coalition.
This, then, creates a potential opportunity — similar to John Kingdon’s
“launch windows” — for expanding access to the policy subsystem. Again,
whether or not policy actors can use this opportunity may depend on a number
of external factors, not all of them predictable or controllable. Given the right
type of external stimulus or event, policy subsystems become permeable and
accessible. At this point, the policy agenda expands to include new definitions,
approaches, and solutions of the messy policy problem.
Unlike Nullmeier and Rüb argue for monopolised knowledge markets, then,
drivers of change in policy subsystems always are both endogenous and exoge-
nous. More precisely, this conceptual framework suggests that change at any
level occurs when developments and pressures in the policy environment meet a
fertile policy debate inside the particular policy subsystem. This means that the
dynamic external system events alone (for example the change of government)
may not suffice to impose change on an insulated and policy subsystem. While
external events may trigger a process that eventually leads to policy change
within a subsystem, the debate and structures within the policy subsystem
must be at a point in the development cycle that make advocacy coalitions and
policy actors sensitive to competing ideas and framings of messy policy issues.
For sake of exposition, the life-cycle outlined above starts from an inclu-
sive policy subsystem. However, there is no inherent reason that processes of
institutional and policy change should originate in open and inclusive policy de-
bates. Depending on institutional and ideational structures in the wider policy
environment, cycles of change and transformation may originate at any point in
the cycle. Moreover, given the significance of unpredictable external events on
reform trajectories, the progression from on stage to the other in the cycle is not
necessarily smooth. Rather, policy subsystems expand and contract in many
different ways: smooth and gradual some of the time, bumpy and precipitous
at others.
In sum, two central characteristics of contemporary policy-making (which
form the basic assumptions of this conceptual framework) ensure that policy
subsystems and the processes they structure never settle at an equilibrium. In-
stead, policy conflict contributes to the expansion and contraction of policy
subsystems as policy actors contend for legitimacy and epistemic sovereignty in
the contested terrain. On the one hand, incommensurable framings of messy
policy issues give rise to irresolvable tensions between different types of advo-
cacy coalitions. On the other hand, the inherent selectivity of frames implies
that epistemic sovereignty fuels policy contention: left to their own devices, ad-
vocacy coalitions will succumb to their ‘conceptual blindness’ and be surprised
by unanticipated consequences. Thus, policy domains are ‘dynamic disequlib-
rium systems’ where policy conflict drives (but does not necessarily determine)
policy change [Thompson et al., 1990, Thompson et al., 1999].
Box 5.2 shows different forms of public management failure in terms of the
cultural theory-typology of public management styles.
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Box 5.2: Public Management Failures
In his book The Art of the State, Christopher Hood applies cultural theory to the
analysis and practise of public management. As we saw in the introductory chap-
ter of this thesis, Hood identifies four basic approaches to public management
that correspond to the contending social solidarities outlined by cultural theory
(Bossism, Choicism, Groupism, Chancism). Each of these public management
styles, Hood contends, “. . . is likely to have its own inbuilt Achilles’ Heel or
characteristic path to collapse” [Hood, 1998, p.27].
Public management strategies based on Choicism mobilise the self-interest
of public service providers. The downside of incentive-based public service
provision, Hood contends, is that self-interest trumps collective or public interest.
This leads to public management failures such as of corruption, front-line
abandonment, and self-indulgence.
Bossism, the hierarchist approach to public management, suffers from excessive
trust in authority and expertise. Here, belief in the infallibility of leadership
discourages critical and careful scrutiny of policy decisions. As a result, errors
go unnoticed or, if noticed, unquestioned. This, then, leads to spectacular,
large-scale and expensive policy disasters. Examples include the Chernobyl
nuclear accident or the Space Shuttle crashes.
The structural inability to bring disputes among egalitarians to an end, Hood
maintains, is the major weakness of Groupism. Lack of either centralised
authority or rules of engagement cause prolonged and festering disputes among
rival factions of egalitarians. The associated management failure here is policy
paralysis as contending factions descend into self-absorbed conflict sometimes
only tenuously related to the policy issue at hand.
Last, the inherent apathy and quietism of fatalism lead to the characteristic pub-
lic management failures of Chancism. Fatalist public management failings result
from “. . . a cocktail of lack of enthusiasm, lack of disposition to take responsi-
bility or to plan for apparently predictable events” [Hood, 1998, pp.43-44]. As
a result, public management inevitably repeatedly fails to deal with (apparently)
straightforward challenges. Furthermore, Hood argues that in crisis situations,
the apathy and inability to improvise often exacerbate instead of ameliorate the
crisis.
5.3 Addressing Weaknesses
One of the aims of assembling this bootstrapped conceptual framework for
policy-oriented discourse analysis is to exploit the complementarities between
the different approaches discussed in Part I of this thesis. Bringing together
the strengths of the frameworks and approaches, it was argued, could help over-
come the inherent weaknesses identified in the course of the discussion. How,
then, does the conceptual framework address the problems of individual theories
discovered in Part I?
In essence, the framework explores the role of policy conflict about messy
issues in contemporary European policy domains by looking at both institutions
and ideas. It does so by combining the insights and concepts from the (British)
147
policy network literature with the notions and instruments of the thinkers close
to the Argumentative Turn. By locating policy processes in the “differentiated
polity”, casting “advocacy coalitions” as the main actors that vie for legitimacy
in terms of incommensurable “policy frames”, the conceptual framework has
tried to achieve two interrelated goals: on the one hand, to place the insights of
theArgumentative Turn into an institutional setting and, at the same time, to
systematically integrate ideas, ideologies and worldviews into the policy network
account.
Integrating the Advocacy Coalition Framework and Cul-
tural Theory
While much of the material discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 5 serves as the
theoretical context for the conceptual framework, the backbone of the tool-
box has emerged from combining central concepts of the Advocacy Coalition
Framework with cultural theory. As we have seen, these two theories are richly
complementary. Engaging both approaches with each other addresses a number
of issues that have emerged in the course of the theoretical discussion of Part I.
First, by using cultural theory’s typology of social solidarities to systemati-
cally analyse and classify advocacy coalitions and their associated policy frames,
the discourse-analytical tool-box grapples with the issue of socio-institutional
complexity in contemporary relations between state and civil society. The four
types of advocacy coalitions (hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism and fatal-
ism) form a parsimonious set the organisational building blocks with which the
analyst can reconstruct complex policy networks and policy communities. Just
like the three basic parts of an Bohr’s model of the atom recombine into dif-
ferent types of elemental atoms which, in turn, can reconstruct highly complex
molecules, so can the three basic types of advocacy coalitions help map complex
socio-institutional topographies of policy-making.
Second, applying cultural theory’s typology of social solidarities to policy
actors also deals pragmatically with the “spectre of relativism” raised by the
Argumentative Turn. Assuming that the all knowledge is relative but that this
relativism is constrained by the five ways of social organisation identified by
cultural theory [Thompson et al., 1990], allows meaningful analysis of policy
processes characterised by conflict over socially constructed knowledge. In a
very real sense, all approaches discussed in Chapter 4 assume that perception
and knowledge are socially constructed but that political constituencies can
agree and successfully act upon this knowledge without necessarily committing
an act of illegitimate oppression. This implies that actors’ perceptions, assess-
ments and judgements of messy policy problems are right at least some of the
time. Extending cultural theory’s typology of social solidarities to advocacy
coalitions simply provides a tool for analysing how, when and why policy actors
will be right and wrong about complex, uncertain and tranversal policy prob-
lems. More importantly, however, constrained relativism creates a theoretical
space (and the conceptual tools) for critical analysis of policy conflict: unlike
more fundamentalist post-modern analysis, the conceptual framework assumes
that systematically thinking about frame-based policy conflict can avoid policy
mess.
Third, the integration of cultural theory with the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work also irons out some of the creases in either approach. As we have seen,
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cultural theory provides the Advocacy Coalition Framework with a theory of
what distinguishes advocacy coalitions and what motivates their mutual an-
tagonism. The typology of advocacy coalitions, then, grounds differences in
policy-belief systems in the patterns of transactions that constitute advocacy
coalitions. Not only does this help structure the analysis of conflict in policy sub-
systems, it also introduces rationality (albeit of the plural and functional sort) to
the Advocacy Coalition Framework. As we have seen, the original formulation
of policy belief-systems relies on cognitive heuristics to explain deviations from
instrumental rationality. Grounding frames in the social relations of advocacy
coalitions provides four different yet legitimate bases for formulating rational
policy arguments. In turn, the basic concepts and constructs of the Advocacy
Coalition Framework operationalise cultural theory for use in policy analysis.
The concept of the “advocacy coalition” gives concrete shape to cultural the-
ory’s more general notion “social solidarities”. Likewise, the policy subsystems
locates the mutual antagonism of social solidarities within specific and, more
importantly, empirically tangible institutional settings. Additionally, this richer
model of collective policy actors in the differentiated polity also goes some way
toward addressing the paucity of agency in the MSA approach: the discourse-
analytical framework allows for organisational complexity but also places policy
actors into focus of the analysis. In sum, the Advocacy Coalition Framework
brings to the fore the elements in cultural theory relevant to policy analysis and
places them into an institutional setting while cultural theory provides the a
theory of why and how advocacy coalitions conflict in policy subsystems.
Policy Frames
A central element of the conceptual framework devised in this chapter is the idea
of a “policy frame” and the associated notion of the “policy story”. Adopting
these ideas from thinkers such as Deborah Stone, Donald Schön or John Dryzek
has some beneficial implications for both the Advocacy Coalition Framework
and cultural theory. As we saw above, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s three-
tiered concept of the “policy-belief system” proved to be of little use for the
analytical project of this thesis. Replacing “policy belief systems” with “pol-
icy frames” enables the analysis of conflict about messy policy issues in terms
of competing social constructions of reality. Moreover, “policy frames” close
the back-door Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith had kept open for instrumental ra-
tionality to slip in as enlightening ‘technical information’. By the same token,
however, the cost of using policy frames rather than the more structured no-
tion of policy belief-systems is that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s mechanism for
policy-oriented learning no longer works (see 5.5).
In terms of cultural theory, the concept of “policy frames” provides a mean-
ingful way of operationalising cultural biases. A key element of the criticism
levelled against cultural theory is the weak empirical evidence to support pre-
dictions of risk perceptions based on the cultural biases. Part of this weakness,
so the argument goes, is due to the vague operationalisation of cultural theory’s
basic concepts for empirical analysis. The idea of policy frames and the con-
comitant methodological instrument of “policy stories”, however, are a way of
implementing cultural bias for empirical analysis far more congenial to the dis-
cursive character of cultural theory. On this view, cultural biases are fundamen-
tal principles that guide the collection, selection and interpretation of evidence
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on any issue: they are, in effect, blueprints for assembling, formulating and
constructing arguments within specific institutional and situational contexts.
However, they do not in any direct sense determine the substance of specific at-
titudes. Rather, as Mary Douglas (following Ludwig Fleck) argues, it is better
to think of cultural biases as “thought styles” [Douglas, 1987, Douglas, 1992].
Significantly, applying a thought-style is an eminently social process: it is a
means of galvanising a group around a set of shared beliefs thus bringing about
social cohesion. That is why it should not come as a surprise that attitudinal
survey research has produced only weak support for cultural biases: cultural
biases determine the way cohesive groups of policy actors come to reach com-
mon conclusions about messy policy issues in specific settings. Cultural biases,
however, do not determine the conclusions in any absolute sense. Policy frames
and the investigative tool of policy stories, then, allow the analyst to reconstruct
the application of a “thought-style” to a particular policy issue. The aim here is
to understand how policy frames (or cultural biases) shape the process of social
cogitation about, engagement with and argumentation over a messy policy is-
sue. Once the policy story — that is the concrete application of a cultural bias
to an issue within a specific socio-institutional setting — is reconstructed, the
analysis allows some prediction concerning agreement and disagreement within
the policy debate.
In this way, the discourse-analytical framework identifies structure and,
therefore, constraints in the reservoir of policy ideas and policy solutions that
is constituted by contending policy frames. Unlike Kingdon’s primeval soup of
policy solutions in which ideas and concepts seem to float freely waiting to re-
combine or decompose, the policy solutions in the triangular reservoirs are not
necessarily compatible. These ideas and concepts are rooted in fundamentally
contending policy frames that support incompatible forms of social organisa-
tion. Recombination, then, requires innovation, application and adaptation of
solutions to different concepts.
Nested Policy Space and Change in Policy Networks
Further, extending of the spatial model of the policy environment to three layers
of nested policy space attempts to adapt the Advocacy Coalition Framework
to the realities of contemporary European policy-making. As Parsons (1995)
rightly points out, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s original concept of “policy sub-
systems” assumes them to be open and intrinsically pluralist spaces. While this
may be true for the US contexts in which the Advocacy Coalition Framework
has been developed and tested, this is of limited relevance for the institution-
ally more insulated policy networks that characterise European policy-making.
As Rhodes’ continuum suggests, different patterns of resource dependencies be-
tween different types of institutions give rise to policy networks that are more
or less accessible for specific policy actors [Rhodes, 1990, Rhodes, 1997]. This
builds on and extends Nullmeier and Rüb’s idea of closed and open “knowledge
markets”: for policy-making in Europe, it is important to be able to identify
who is ‘inside’, who is ‘outside but interested’ and who is ‘outside’ the policy
process. What is more, the idea of policy debate in the contested terrain sharp-
ens the vagueness identified in Nullmeier and Rüb’s “knowledge market” while
preserving the spirit of knowledge-driven competition for power.
Last, the conceptual framework also tries to illucidate the role of frame-
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based conflict in processes of institutional and policy change. This, then, re-
sponds to the justified criticisms identified in Chapter 2 concerning the static
nature of policy network and policy community theories. In particular, the
conceptual tool-box concentrates how policy conflict within policy domains and
policy subsystems can create the conditions in which advocacy coalitions be-
come susceptible to change initiated either within the contested terrain or from
outside the policy domain. The aim here is not to explain the process of insti-
tutional and policy change as a whole. Rather, the theoretical analysis sought
to understand the role of frame-based conflict about messy policy issues in the
socio-institutional evolution of European policy domains. This, then, is largely
an exploratory exercise in hypothesis-building rather than theory testing.
5.4 Methodological Considerations in Applying
the Framework to Policy Issues
The case studies in Part II of thesis will apply this conceptual framework in two
basic ways. First, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will apply the conceptual tool-box for
policy-oriented discourse analysis to gauge the scope and analyse structure of
conflict about messy policy issues in the contested terrain of three policy do-
mains. Second, Chapter 9 applies the more dynamic and exploratory analysis
of conflict and policy change to continental European pension reform processes.
Both applications of the discourse-analytical framework have different method-
ological implications.
Gauging the Scope and Structure of Policy Conflict
The aim of this application of the discourse-analytical framework is to map the
landscape of policy conflict in a particular policy domain. This involves probing
both the scope and the structure of policy conflict. Here, the scope of conflict
refers to the basic types of policy argument within a contested terrain. The
structure, in turn, refers to the areas of agreement and disagreement between
different policy frames on the issue in questions.
In practise, this implies three analytical tasks. First, the analysis involves
identifying the contending advocacy coalitions in the contested terrain. Second,
main part of the analysis requires unearthing policy arguments associated with
each advocacy coalition. Here, the analysis identifies and reconstructs contend-
ing arguments championed by each advocacy coalition. Last, the analyst needs
to juxtapose and systematically compare contending policy arguments in terms
of their areas of agreement disagreement.
The basic method used to sound out the scope and ascertain the structure
of policy conflict is the policy story. As we saw above, this approach allows the
reconstruction and standardisation of policy arguments from a wide range of
sources. Essentially, policy stories break down (or analyse) policy arguments
from a range of sources and contexts into common and comparable categories.
Policy stories encapsulate and convey the essence of both the factual substance
and argumentative style that underlies the policy arguments proffered by differ-
ent actors within contending advocacy coalitions. What is more, policy stories
provide a comparative framework for analysing policy arguments across time,
space and a wide range of boundaries (advocacy coalitions, national, regional,
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policy domain, etc.). The policy stories method reconstructs policy arguments
as coherent narratives by breaking them down into the following comparative
categories:
• The Setting: here, the analysis unearths the basic assumptions guiding
the narrative;
• The Villains: this category helps isolate the way a particular advocacy
coalition and their associated policy frame define a policy issue. Here, the
analyst will reconstruct the way members of advocacy coalitions perceive
causality as well as apportion blame for the policy issue in question;
• The Heroes: Each policy problem also implies a suitable policy solution.
This category concentrates collating on the proposed solutions both in
terms of measures, institutional responsibility and implementation path-
way;
Reconstructing policy stories requires data in the form of text. This means
that the basic unit of data is a public argument which comprises “. . . a set
of reasons given in support of something” [Pearsall, 2002] in the context of a
public debate on a contentious issue. Textual arguments come in many different
forms and can be found in many different socio-institutional contexts. The three
criteria of data eligibility and validity that emerge from these conditions are:
• Data must be in textual form: this includes anything that can be tran-
scribed into text;
• Data must be argumentative;
• Data must be publicly accessible;
These conditions do not disqualify statistical or other forms of numerical data
a priori. However, they do stipulate that statistical data in an of itself has no
explanatory significance.13 Rather, the policy story method understands and
analyses statistical data as part of an argument within a debate. Thus, it is the
performative aspects of statistics in a specific debate onto which the policy-story
method focuses the analysts’ attention.
Box 5.4 outlines the primary sources of textual data for this thesis.
13Again, note that this is not the same as saying statistics on their own are not significant.
However, an analysis guided by the policy-story method would look to reconstruct the political
story that the statistics are trying to tell. This, then, is an inherently interpretative and
hermeneutic exercise
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Box 5.4: Sources of Data and Types of Analysis The three main sources of textual
data for this thesis are:
• Policy documents: this includes material such as white papers, green pa-
pers, mission statements, briefing papers, conference proceedings, minutes
of meetings, position papers, communications, etc.
• Semi-structured expert interviews: In the framework of the PEN-REF
project, country teams conducted expert interviews with pension policy-
makers. The questionnaire (see appendix ?? was common to all interviews.
However, given the open-ended nature of these questions, actual interview
varied across and even within countries.
• Academic and research outputs: Last, the thesis has relied on academic
and research outputs both as primary data (i.e. as instances of public policy
arguments) as well as secondary background and commentary.
The status of data source depends on the type of analysis.
The analysis of the data itself involves interpretation and categorisation of
the text at three interrelated levels. First, the analysis interprets and classifies
the immediately accessible content of the text. Second, the analysis delves
deeper in an attempt to reveal the underlying normative assumptions and social
commitments that inform the text. Here, cultural theory’s typology of advocacy
coalitions and policy frames provides indicators (for example the “myths of
nature”) for unearthing implicitly arguments at the constitutive level. Last, the
analysis scrutinises the performative functions of the text in galvanising support
in the advocacy coalition and vying for legitimacy in the contested terrain.
In terms of sources of textual data, the reconstruction of policy stories relies
mostly on policy documents and academic literature. Since the case studies
were not designed with comparability in mind14 the sampling structure and
criteria differ. Chapter 6 concentrated on European transport policy actors and
international transport researchers that had thematised or addressed the issue
of accessibility. Chapter 7 represents a literature survey among researchers
of the (then) emerging field in environmental security. Chapter 8, in turn,
purposely limited the sample to international organisations active in the pension
reform debate. The aim here was to contrast debate among these international
organisations with policy debates at national level to ascertain the agenda-
setting impact of international organisations on social policy issues traditionally
firmly within the purview of national government.
Charting Movement and Change in Contested Terrains
The second, more exploratory application of the discourse-analytic framework
in Part II aims to trace movement and change at both institutional and policy-
making levels. Whereas the analysis of Chapters 6, 7, and 8 use the framework
to chart the scope and structure of policy conflict, Chapter 9 attempts to un-
derstand the role of frame-based policy conflict in continental European pension
reform processes.
14Recall that these case studies are independent articles published in a time period spanning
about eight years.
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This requires adopting a more variegated methodological strategy. Essen-
tially, investigating the role of policy conflict in the evolution of policy domains
and policy subsystems involves the following:
• describing the social system under investigation at (at least) two different
points in time;
• showing that there has been change in important variables from one point
in time to the other;
• explicating the role of policy conflict in moving the social system moved
from one state to the other.
The dynamic analysis of continental European pension reform in Chapter 9
attempts to explain reform of pension systems in terms of changes in the two
dimensions discussed in the preceding chapters: institutions and ideas. First,
the analysis focuses on the way interorganisational and interpersonal patterns
of transactions developed over the course of 10-15 years. Second, the analysis
looks at the changes in the scope and structure of policy debate about demo-
graphic ageing over the same time period. Thus, after showing how institutional
and policy debates differed in continental European pension policy-making, the
analysis attempts to isolate and explain the contribution of frame-based policy
conflict to this process of transformation.
Each of these dimensions requires a different methodological approach.
Analysing the social relations of pension policy networks necessitates under-
taking a qualitative social network analysis. Gauging the change in the scope
and structure of the contested terrain of pension policy-making in continental
Europe calls for the methodological approach outlined in the previous section.
Last, understanding the role of policy conflict in the transformation of pension
policy processes required using the dynamic framework designed above.
The data for the exploratory dynamic analysis is also essentially qualita-
tive and textual. Given the requirements of a pluralist methodology, Chapter
9 draws on all three sources of textual data: policy documents, expert inter-
views and academic literature/ research outputs. In sounding out the scope of
policy conflict, Chapter 9 relies mostly on policy documents, using data from
expert interviews to corroborate and emphasise specific aspects. The quali-
tative network analysis relied mostly on information about interorganisational
and interpersonal relationships gleaned from expert interviews (see appendix C)
and academic literature. In reconstructing historical developments in pension
policy domains, the analysis used academic sources to corrobarate and examine
individual expert accounts of the development.15.
15However, the policy frame used by individual expert actors in the contending advocacy
coalitions also provides the perceptual filters for making sense of past as well as present and
future events. What was recounted to me (and the other interviewers in the PEN-REF country
team) was a heavily edited account of historical developments that served to justify current
policy arguments, strategic engagement and social commitments. For example, experts in the
German social security administration all agreed on the source of all woes in the German public
pension system: not demographic ageing or globalisation but the alleged misappropriation of
social security funds by the Kohl administration in order to finance reunification without
having to raise taxes overtly was to blame, see Chapter 9
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5.5 Conclusion: Open Questions and Issues
This chapter concludes the discussion of the theoretical background and the
conceptual reservoir of the thesis. Against this backdrop, this chapter has as-
sembled a bootstrapped and pluralist conceptual framework for identifying and
systematically comparing contending frames in European policy domains. The
purpose of this discourse-analytical framework is to analyse the nature and role
of policy conflict about complex, uncertain and transversal policy problems in
contemporary European processes.
In order to develop this bootstrapped conceptual framework, Part I has
focused on two broad streams in the policy science literature. On the one
hand, Chapter 2 discussed approaches designed to analyse the “differentiated
polity”. On the other hand, Chapter 3 looked at recent theoretical contributions
that aim to reinstate the analysis of ideas, ideologies and worldviews to public
policy analysis. In Chapter 4, the thesis analysed five different social scientific
approaches that explain contemporary policy-making in terms of the interplay
between institution and ideas.
The discussion in Part I has highlighted the specific strengths and weak-
nesses of each approach. More importantly, the discussion has demonstrated
that the approaches are complementary in important ways. The objective of
this final chapter in Part I of the thesis was to find a way to make use of these
complementarities. By building on synergies between the theories and by neu-
tralising identified weaknesses as much as possible, this chapter has assembled
a set of concepts and tools for systematic policy-oriented discourse analysis. In
particular, the conceptual framework facilitates two related types of analysis:
Sounding out the scope and structure of frame-based conflict in the
policy debates about messy policy problems. Here, the conceptual
tool-box provides a framework for identifying, analysing and comparing
contending advocacy coalitions and their policy frames. By reconstruct-
ing the policy stories competing policy actors use to vie for legitimacy
in the contested terrain, the analysis can map the extent as well as the
limits of policy conflict. Moreover, systematic and comparative analysis
of contending framings of messy policy problems allows the exploration of
potential areas of agreement and compromise. This type of analysis, then,
maps the landscape of policy conflict within a policy domain at any point
in time;
Understanding the impact of policy conflict on the institutional
transformation and policy change. This type of analysis enables re-
tracing movement through and change of socio-institutional landscapes
over time. The purpose of this analysis is to isolate the contribution of
frame-based policy in the way structures and outputs of policy subsystems
evolve. This requires comparing the institutional and ideational structures
of contested terrains over time as well as understanding the way frame-
based policy conflict promoted this evolution.
While the conceptual framework addresses issues and weaknesses of the ap-
proaches discussed in Part I, there are still a number of open questions. Most of
these relate to the dynamic account of institutional transformation and policy
change outlined in the sections above. We have seen how policy conflict in an
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inclusive contested terrain potentially gives rise to dynamic processes of insti-
tutional and policy change. However, the dynamic processes initiated by policy
conflict on their own do not explain the transformation of institutional struc-
tures and policy contents. While policy conflict creates a basic predisposition
towards change within policy subsystems and the contested terrain (either by
miring policy-making in a “dialogue of the deaf” or by creating self-referential
policy cycles that lead to policy failure) a number of other internal and external
factors determine whether, how, and to what effect policy subsystems embark
on a reform trajectory.
A more comprehensive explanation of institutional and policy change would
need to address the following issues:
External Events, the Wider Institutional Environment and Policy
Conflict: The conceptual framework concentrates on analysing policy conflict
and its impacts within specific policy domains. What is more, the tool-box has
not been overly explicit about the relationship (structural or otherwise) between
specific policy domains and the wider public sphere. For this reason, a more
complete explanation of change would need to address the following questions:
How do socio-economic and political institutions at European or international
level affect policy conflict at the level of policy domains and policy subsys-
tems? Europeanization and globalisation impinge significantly on policy-
making within specific policy domains. Both the concrete institutional
changes at European level and the less tangible but nonetheless signifi-
cant impacts of socio-economic globalisation provide advocacy coalitions
with a wider repertoire of organisational and ideational resources. What is
more, many policy domains, such as food safety or global climate change,
have been transported into national public spheres by the processes of Eu-
ropeanization and globalisation. It is unlikely, then, that increasing inter-
dependence at political, social and economic levels will have no discernible
effect on policy conflict within specific policy domains. Understanding the
mechanisms and regularities by which these different levels interact must
be an integral aspect of any general explanation of institutional change in
European policy domains.
How do institutional structures and networks at national or regional level im-
pinge on policy conflict? Despite many observers forecasting the imminent
demise of the nation state in Europe, national policy contexts remain a
central focal point for policy-makers and policy actors. This is true even
when advocacy coalitions in any given European policy domains span re-
gional and national borders. National governments continue to provide
institutional platforms, and thereby resources, for policy formulation and
policy implementation. The institutional structures and practises within
the wider policy environment at national level, then, are likely to chan-
nel material and immaterial resources into and out of individual policy
domains. The overall institutional and ideational make-up of national
polities determines the shape, speed and direction of these resource flows.
How do different types of national or international political institutions give
rise to different types of external events and how do these affect conflict
at policy domain level? Recall that, following Kingdon, external events
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and shocks precipitate institutionalization or deinstitutionalisation pro-
cesses in the conceptual framework: here, external events catalyse and
focus pressures for change within policy subsystems (either Reformstau
or policy failure) thereby triggering dynamic adjustment processes. Dif-
ferent types of political and socio-economic institutions may conceivably
give rise to specific types of triggering events within policy subsystems.
For example, the European Court of Justice produces different types of
potential triggering events than labour unions in high corporatist pol-
icy environment. Moreover, depending on the level if integration within
the international and national policy environment, different types of pol-
icy domains may be sensitive to different types of triggering events and
external shocks. For example, while the so-called assessment reports of
the IPCC have a considerable impact on the structure of policy conflict
in the national or European policy debate on global climate change, the
WHO policy document on active ageing has a far less direct and more at-
mospheric impact on domestic policy domains dealing with ageing issues
[WorldHealthOrganisation, 2002, Ney, 2004b].
Responding to these open questions would necessitate extending the theoreti-
cal and conceptual range of the bootstrapped conceptual framework. In par-
ticular, the conceptual framework would need to take literature into account
that examines and compares national policy-making mechanisms across dif-
ferent countries. This includes work on the comparative political economy
and comparative politics of policy-making in European countries as well as
the process of Europeanization [Synder, 1999, Tonra, 2001, Knill, 2001]. More-
over, understanding how international institutions and the process of socio-
economic globalisation impinge on frame-based conflict within policy subsys-
tems requires integrating insights from contemporary theories in international
relations [Held, 1995, Holden, 2000, Keohane and Nye, 2001], international po-
litical economy [Vogel, 1998, Ayres, 2002, Przeworski, 2003] as well as institu-
tional and ideational globalisation [Hall, 1998, Hall, 1997, Blyth, 2002].
Contested Terrains and Policy Subsystems: Although the approach has
focused on the interplay of institutional and ideational structures in contested
terrains and policy subsystems, there are still a number of open issues.
What institutional and ideational factors determine the accessibility of policy
subsystems and contested terrains? Accessibility is a central feature of the
dynamic processes outlined above. However, the exposition has not speci-
fied the institutional and ideational characteristics that promote or hinder
accessibility. Design features of macro-and meso-political structures (i.e.
the party system, modes of societal mobilisation, social capital, electoral
systems at any level of governance, public management structures, etc.)
are likely to have a significant impact on the accessibility of any given
policy subsystem. What is more, the impact of these socio-political insti-
tutions is refracted through the other types of institutions, most notably
economic structures.
What are the institutional and ideational conditions that lead to a “dialogue
of the deaf” in inclusive policy subsystems or to break-down in exclusive
policy subsystems? Similarly, the approach does explicitly not touch on
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the institutional and ideational conditions that cause the deterioration of
debate into a “dialogue of the deaf” leading to a policy deadlock. It is
conceivable that the nature of policy issues, the structure of network con-
stellation in the policy subsystem, as well as the argumentative culture
could promote or prevent the degeneration of policy debate into impasse.
By the same token, there may be organisational constellations or discursive
practises that could ameliorate or retard potential policy failures due to
conceptual blindness in exclusive policy subsystems. Again, it is conceiv-
able that institutional and ideational characterists may render exclusive
policy subsystems feasible.16
How do organisational structures and discursive practises in contested terrains
affect the speed and direction of adaptive trajectories? Existing institu-
tional structures and discursive practises are likely to provide the organ-
isational and ideational resources that policy actors use to bring about
reform. In this sense, institutions and practises determine at least some of
the direction of change and transformation [Pierson, 1994, Pierson, 1996,
Pierson, 2001]. A more comprehensive and general account of institutional
change in the differentiated polity needs to examine the impact of path
dependencies.
Addressing these issues requires extending the conceptual framework to include
tools and methods that allow a more detailed analysis of the interrelationship
between organisational structure and discursive practise. Analysing the im-
pact institutional and network structures involves including work on network
theory and social network analysis [Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004, Bogason, 2000,
Wasserman and Faust, 1994] as well as on systematic accounts relating insti-
tutional structure to decision-making (such as [Steinmo et al., 1992]). Under-
standing the nature and role of discursive practises in contemporary Euro-
pean policy processes requires the integration of the theoretical and empirical
work on discourse in European policy-making [Berman, 1998, Berman, 2001,
Schmidt, 2000, Schmidt, 2002, Schmidt and Radelli, 2004, Howarth et al., 2000,
Sikkink et al., 2002]
Learning: By replacing Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s notion of “policy-belief
systems” with the more amorphous concept of “policy frames”, the schematic
mechanism of ‘policy-oriented learning’ is not conceptually feasible. However,
the conceptual framework has not replaced the idea of policy-oriented learning
with another, more suitable notion. Thus, the following questions still require
attention in future:
How do ideas and knowledge get transferred across contested terrains and policy
subsystems? At present, the conceptual framework suggests that learning
takes place when members of advocacy coalitions import new concepts and
ideas horizontally (i.e. from other policy domains) or vertically (i.e. from
other levels of governance). Understanding these learning processes will
require a detailed analysis of how advocacy coalitions as well as the insti-
16However, the extension of the conceptual framework for analysis of pluralist democracy
in the Conclusion hypothesises that some structural features are more likely to give rise to a
“dialogue of the deaf” than others.
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tutional and ideational structures of policy domains (see above) promote
or hinder this flow of knowledge.
How does learning within policy frames and policy stories take place? A far
more involved issue concerns learning within policy frames. In other
words, this analysis aims to ascertain how policy interactions affects the
policy frames and policy stories that advocacy coalitions champion.
How do advocacy coalitions forget? Similarly, an more comprehensive account
of socio-institutional change needs to understand how advocacy coalitions
forget the lessons ostensibly learned from policy-making in the past. The
historical record of policy-making in Europe provides no reason to assume
that policy conflict and policy interaction contributes to social, intellectual
and cultural progress punctuated by occasional bottlenecks. Rather, a
comprehensive account of change needs to be able to be able to retrace
policy evolution in any direction.
This, then, requires broadening the conceptual scope to include theoretical and
empirical literature on policy diffusion [Berry and Berry, 1999], social learning
[Rein and Schön, 1994] as well as a more thorough engagement with the micro-
sociological aspects of cultural theory [Douglas, 1982, Mars, 1982, Douglas, 1987,
Douglas, 1992, Douglas, 1996].
The following chapters will apply this framework to a range of different
issue areas. The first three chapters of Part II apply the framework primarily
as a means of gauging the scope and analysing the structure of conflict about
messy policy issues for each domain (European transport policy, environmental
security, and pension reform). Chapter 9 concentrates on reconstructing and









Accessibility is a key, if not the key concept in transport policy-making. Com-
mon sense would suggest that investment into roads, rail, public transport, and
aviation infrastructure should increase and widen individual’s ability to access
locations.
Yet, accessibility, in keeping with transport policy objectives in general, is an
ill-defined and multi-faceted concept. There is little or no consensus in the wider
policy debate that accessibility is a policy goal worth pursuing. Even among
those who agree that accessibility is a ‘good’ (as opposed to a ‘bad’), the concept
shows remarkable resilience to concrete application, a characteristic it shares
with other concepts both in transport policy and in other policy arenas. What
is more, the notion of accessibility is closely linked to notoriously difficult policy
concepts such as mobility, need, and well-being. In short, the idea of accessibility
contributes to making transport a complex, uncertain and transversal policy
problem.
Depending on the policy context and the level of policy argument, accessibil-
ity means different things to different types of policy actors. Understanding the
role the term accessibility plays in transport policy deliberation means that we
come to grips with two dimensions of transport policy-making: first, the differ-
ent possible uses of the term, and, second, the socio-institutional policy contexts
in which policy actors apply the idea of accessibility. After briefly outlining the
European transport policy issue in Section 6.1, in Section 6.2 we will disaggre-
gate the use of the term accessibility at two analytical levels. At the semantic
level, we will look at the set of problems and issues the term highlights. At the
normative level, we will scrutinise the different implicit and explicit normative
assumptions that underlie the concept of accessibility.
An analysis of this type is, however, insufficiently dynamic. In a very real
sense, the state of confusion that characterises transport policy debates re-
lates to changing perceptions concerning the social benefits of modern transport
in particular and of industrial society in general [Banister and Button, 1993b,
Banister, 1995]. The impact of what Ronald Inglehart calls “post-material” val-
ues on transport policy deliberation has thrown some of the central concepts
of transport policy-making into sharp relief. Whereas policy-makers would not
have questioned the inherent desirability of increased mobility, accessibility, and
increased average journey speeds twenty-five years ago, it is not at all clear that
accessibility, say to a wildlife reserve for recreational purposes, is a policy goal
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worth striving for today. In short, the entrance of a new policy story into the po-
litical fray has undermined conventional certainties in transport policy-making.
In Section 6.3, then, we will apply the conceptual framework for policy-
oriented discourse analysis developed in Chapter 5 to fathom the scope of con-
flict about European transport policy. In particular, the section will use the
cultural theory-inspired typology of advocacy coalitions and their policy frames
to reconstruct and compare competing policy stories about accessibility. Sec-
tion 8.3 looks at how the scope of policy conflict shapes the European transport
debate. This section will explore the structure of policy conflict about trans-
port policy. The section shows how conflict in European transport policy is
endemic and intractable because it emerges from fundamentally incompatible
framings of accessibility. In the final section, the chapter scrutinises the poten-
tial impacts of frame-based conflict on policy-processes in the subsystems. The
conclusion, then, will try to draw some policy-relevant inferences for transport
policy-making in Europe.
6.1 The European Transport Policy Issue
As a public policy issue, transport in Europe has much in common with many
other policy spheres. Like many currently disputed issues, the developments in
European transport that policy-makers, researchers, and the public alike wel-
comed as firm evidence of socio-technical progress not even two decades ago are
now disputed, contentious, and politically divisive. Transport policy, a one-time
symbol of European policy-making prowess along with social and industrial pol-
icy, has become a messy policy domain embroiled in divisive conflict. Unlike
many other policy spheres, such as global climate change, the problems in trans-
port policy are, it would seem, fairly evident and immediate (anyone who lives
in a European city will readily agree). Indeed, most contemporary transport
policy literature, whether it be a European Union policy-document, a critical
scholarly analysis, or a populist call to arms, begins by pointing to very similar
phenomena.
There are four sets of phenomena that characterise developments in the
European transport sector: the rapid growth in transport demand, the modal
shift that satisfies this demand, the changing patterns of land use, and the
increasing social costs of these developments.
Increasing European Demand for Transport
Transport demand in Europe (including Eastern Europe) has experienced rapid
growth since World War II. “Our welfare societies”, contend Veli Himanen and
Pieter Nijkamp and J. Padjen, “have apparently generated a complex array
of contact patterns (material and immaterial) which require physical interac-
tion at an unprecedented scale” [Himanen et al., 1993, p.8]. They describe
the spatial development of Europe in terms of a “geography of movement”
[Himanen et al., 1993, p.2]: the demand for the movement of goods and people
in Europe is at a historically unprecedented level and will continue to rise in
the future.
Passenger transport, the European Commission, surmises, has become a
growth industry. Not only has the passenger transport sector consistently out-
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performed the economy as a whole (growing faster than average Gross Domestic
Product by about 1 percentage point), it has also increased its spatial scope with
average journey distances virtually doubling from 16,5 km in 1970 to 31,5 km
in 1993. At present, transport constitutes about 7% of GDP in the European
Union [Commission, 1995b, p.2].
The figures for freight transport are very similar. Over the past three decades
or so, demand for the movement of goods has increased from 700 000 mil-
lion tonne-kilometres in 1981 to ca 1 100 000 million tonne-kilometres in 1994
[of Ministers of Transport, 1998a]. This trend is set to continue: the European
Commissioner for transport, Neil Kinnock, foresees a 70% rise in freight move-
ment in the next seven years [Kinnock, 1997a, p.1].
Meeting Demand on the Road
The expansion of road transport, both in terms of privately owned cars and
heavy goods vehicles, has absorbed most of the spectacular rise in transport de-
mand to the detriment of other transport modes
[Himanen et al., 1993, Banister and Button, 1993b, Commission, 1995a]. The
flexibility and independence a private car affords has led to a situation where cars
are responsible for three-quarters of all passenger kilometres travelled in the Eu-
ropean Union [Commission, 1995a, p.1]. By the same token, the changing nature
of logistics and stock management (e.g. just-in-time distribution) confer a com-
parative advantage onto road haulage
[Banister and Button, 1993b, p.3].
The numbers are impressive. In Britain alone, the Department of Transport
(DoT) predicts an increase in road traffic of 83%-142% in the next thirty years
[Schofield, 1993, p.117]. A three-fold increase in car ownership in Britain, Bert
Morris argues, will meet increasing demand for passenger transport. In Aus-
tria, the traffic on motorways is set to increase by 37% between 1993 and 2000
[of Ministers of Transport, 1998b]. At the European level, Kinnock maintains
that road haulage will take the lion’s share of the predicted 70% growth in de-
mand thus increasing its share in freight transport from 70% to 80%. At the
same time, he continues, railways’ share of passenger and freight transport has
fallen from 10% to 6% and 32% to 14% respectively [Kinnock, 1997b].
Changing Patterns of Land-Use
Another distinct feature the European transport policy issue are the changes
in land-use patterns that have both caused and exacerbated present transport
trends. All major European cities, maintains Peter Hall, have decentralised since
World War II [Hall, 1995]. David Banister and Kenneth Button argue that ex-
tortionate prices for inner city housing, a general increase of income levels and
the consequent desire to own a car, as well as people’s (somewhat abstract)
desire for space have depopulated urban areas [Banister and Button, 1993a].
This suburbanisation and de-urbanisation of residential housing and employ-
ment has fundamentally altered transport behaviour. As a result, complex
and longer car journeys have replaced the “simple journey-to-work pattern”
[Banister and Button, 1993a, p.2] leading to more road-based traffic. The net
result, Hall maintains, has been a significant increase in journey lengths with
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no obvious savings in journey times despite ever increasing capacities for speed
in all transport modes [Hall, 1995].
The Social Costs of Rapid Transport Growth
Whereas policy-making conventionally assumed that the inherent benefits of
transport systems invariably outweighed their costs by several orders of mag-
nitude, the public, researchers, and some policy-makers have gradually become
more critical. In the last two decades, there has been a growing awareness that
the benefits of transport may no longer justify the costs it incurs. In general,
the transport literature identifies three types of social costs associated with the
transport system: congestion, pollution, and accidents.
The combination of rapid growth in transport demand, the modal shift to-
wards road transport, and the changing patterns of land-use have produced sig-
nificant congestion on European roads. Himanen, Nijkamp and Padjen speak of
congestion as a “post-modern transport problems” because conventional trans-
port policy options, that is increasing road capacity, are no longer open to policy-
makers. European cities are close to their absolute capacity and observers in-
creasingly point to the ineffectiveness of new road investment in reducing conges-
tion [Banister and Button, 1993a, Himanen et al., 1993, Commission, 1995b].
The European Commission maintains that it
“. . . is sometimes argued that the best remedy against congestion is
to simply provide more infrastructure. Notwithstanding the need
for additional infrastructure in Europe for other reasons, this state-
ment is generally untrue: as motorists are discouraged from using
a congested road there is a ‘latent’ demand which is triggered once
extra capacity becomes available. In the long run congestion will
persist”[Commission, 1995b, p.16].
Congestion incurs a cost: it hinders the mobility of people and goods. The
European Commission estimates these costs to the European Union economy
to be in the region of 2% of European Union gross domestic product.
Another interrelated set of social costs of transport emerge from increased
pollution. The transport system, argue Banister and Button, causes environ-
mental problems at the local, trans-boundary, and global level. At the local
level, the noise from vehicles, be they cars, Heavy Goods Vehicles, trains or
aeroplanes, has matured from being a mere nuisance to an environmental prob-
lem of significant proportions. At the transboundary and global levels, the
emissions from road vehicles, aeroplanes, ships, and trains (in this case, indirect
emissions) significantly contribute to phenomena such as acid rain, stratospheric
ozone depletion, concentration of tropospheric ozone, and global climate change
[Banister and Button, 1993a, p.4]. In terms of human health, the European
Commission maintains that
“. . . [a]ir pollution problems (e.g. ozone) in summer are requiring
that, on more and more occasions, citizens across Europe have to
refrain from outdoor activities. It is estimated that thousands of
European citizens die each year from just one form of air pollution
(particulate matter) – according to some studies air pollution from
transport kills more than 6000 people in the United Kingdom alone”
[Commission, 1995b, p.1].
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Again, these developments represent a cost to society. The European Com-
mission estimates that, excluding the costs of climate change, costs from air
pollution amount to 0,4% of European Union gross domestic product and that
noise pollution costs Europe 0,2% of aggregated European income. Last, Eu-
ropean accident statistics show that increased transport demand, coupled with
increasing vehicle capacities, has come at a grim price: the Commission reports
that about 50 000 people are killed in transport accidents in Europe each year.
The estimated financial costs of transport accidents is about 1,5% of European
Union gross domestic product [Commission, 1995b, p.22].
6.2 The Concept of Accessibility
Understanding how different policy actors respond to the problems identified
in European transport means that we have to come to grips with the basic
terms used in the policy debate. In what follows, we will analyse the concept
of accessibility both in terms of its differing semantic meanings and in terms of
the different normative contents implied in varied uses of the idea.
Defining Accessibility: the Semantics of the Term
Ideally, policy debate should be based on terms and concepts that are clear to all
policy actors. In reality, however, policy communication is more complex: basic
ideas and concepts in transport discourse are vague and thereby always open to
interpretation. The idea of accessibility is no exception. Policy actors, operating
from within different types of advocacy coalitions (see Chapter 5), interpret the
concept in terms of their particular frames. Yet, policy actors often deploy
the term as if there were a hardened consensus on what accessibility means.
Closer inspection, however, reveals that there is no clear, let alone unambiguous,
definition of accessibility in the literature. In fact, policy actors more often than
not will refer to accessibility without providing any definition.
At a very general level, accessibility refers to “. . . the ease with which people
can travel to and from a particular location” [Banister and Hall, 1995, p.278].
Accessibility, then, is a characteristic or property of a location, an object, or
a service. Work, shops, the public transport system, medical care, legal aid,
and leisure facilities are things that can be more or less accessible.1 The Euro-
pean Commission, while discussing public passenger transport, refers to ‘system
accessibility’ as a desirable property of public transport systems:
“Access to passenger transport is crucial. Improving system accessi-
bility covers a wide range of areas. This includes the design of rolling
stock and (intermodal) stations, linking residential areas to central
trip-attracting activities (work, places, shopping, leisure activities),
serving rural and peripheral areas and meeting the needs of people
with reduced mobility” [Commission, 1995a, original emphasis, p.6].
At a general level, then, it would appear as if accessibility is a structural phe-
nomenon: it is an attribute of objects such as locations and services.
Yet, as the last passage indicates, accessibility also describes individuals and
groups of individuals. Researchers often use the term to discriminate between
1Including, as we saw in Chapter 5, policy subsystems.
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groups of individuals who, for a variety of reasons, have less accessibility to
locations and services than others. For example, David Denmark speaks of
the ‘transport disadvantaged’: these are people who “. . . have mobility and ac-
cess problems” [Morgan, 1992, p.2, quoted in [Denmark, 1996]]. Who are these
individuals? Denmark identifies them as being the “. . . poor, the elderly, the
handicapped (sic) and especially those from minority groups” [Denmark, 1996,
p.2]. The European Commission similarly uses accessibility to outline a par-
ticular social group. “Public passenger transport”, the European Commission
argues,
“is particularly important for those who have no access to private
cars, if they are to have access to employment, services such as shops
and schools, to leisure activities, holiday destination and to family
and social contacts” [Commission, 1995a, p.2].
Here, accessibility is something that certain individuals and groups possess and
others do not: it is, in short, a second order level of accessibility referring to in-
dividual capabilities. Whereas structural accessibility assumes that individuals
have access to suitable means of transport, this level of accessibility focuses on
individual problems, due to disability or poverty, with access to transportation.
However, the neat distinction between structural (first-order) and individual
(second-order) accessibility breaks down when policy actors apply accessibility
to macro-level phenomena. In transport modelling, researchers are fond of us-
ing the concept to describe particular geographical and socio-economic regions.
The SSASI model (Socio-Economic and Spatial Impacts of Trans-European Net-
works) , along with many other transport models, defines accessibility as the
“. . . the relative locational advantage of each region with respect to relevant
destinations in other regions and in the region as a function of travel time or
travel cost (or both) to reach these destinations by the strategic road and rail
networks” [Bökemann et al., 1997, p.12]. Intransparent wording aside, who or
what exactly is more accessible is unclear. Is it the locations in a specific region?
Or is it the individuals and groups of individuals (such as, say, enterprises, po-
litical groups, or families)? Is it the services this region offers? Or the region’s
the labour supply? Arguably, regional accessibility refers to both structural and
human resource features simultaneously: regions have a comparative advantage
because their individuals can access to means of transport and because their
locations are embedded in a functioning transport infrastructure.
In sum, the literature is unclear about what the term accessibility means.
On the one hand, the term depicts characteristics of locations and services.
On the other hand, researchers also use the term to distinguish different social
groups: those with full accessibility to services and locations and those with
restricted accessibility to desired locations due to restricted access to transport.
However, policy actors rarely keep these levels of aggregation and definition
apart: often, as the SASI model illustrates, accessibility, when applied to socio-
economic rather than purely geographical regions, points both to structural
characteristics and individual capabilities.
Accessibility and Mobility
The idea of accessibility is very close to the concept of mobility both in terms
of meaning and function in the transport policy discourse. Like the term ac-
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cessibility, mobility plays a pivotal role in transport policy debates, be they
of political or academic nature. Like accessibility, the meaning of mobility is
fluid and fuzzy. What is more, the relationship between these two ideas in the
literature is less than clear. A sensible ‘division of labour’ between the two
concepts could mean that while accessibility predominantly describes the social
and structural features of a particular location, mobility would be an indicator
for the individual’s ability to reach certain destinations.
A cursory overview of the literature, however, reveals that there are at least
four different relationships between the concept of accessibility and the concept
of mobility.2 First, some researchers use the terms mobility and accessibility
interchangeably. Denmark, while quoting Altshuler, suggests that “. . . mobility
is most usefully conceived in terms of the ease with which desired destinations
can be reached . . . ” [Altshuler, 1979, p.3, quoted in [Denmark, 1996]]. This
definition of mobility is very similar to Hall and Banisters’ definition cited above.
Here, accessibility implies mobility and vice versa [Banister and Button, 1993a,
Banister and Hall, 1995]: there is no necessary uni-directional causal link from
one to the other. Accessibility is a precondition for mobility to the same degree
as high mobility will indicate high accessibility.
A second relationship forges a direct causal link between the two terms. Here
accessibility is a precondition of mobility. Access to transport, A. Downie ar-
gues, makes abstract concepts such as access to activities meaningful
[Downie, 1994]. Here, accessibility becomes a functional condition (or, more
philosophically, a transcendental argument) for mobility: without access (to,
say, a car or to public transport) individuals cannot be mobile. Denmark simi-
larly, if somewhat less forcefully, identifies mobility as
“. . . a complicated function depending on a range of variables in-
cluding access to a car as a driver or passenger; public transport
availability, accessibility and relevance; location of residence in re-
lation to required services and social outlets; the health of the per-
son involved; the availability of paratransit or community transport;
ability to pay for a suitable transport mode; and the existence of
user or supply-side subsidies” [Denmark, 1996, p.5].
Although Denmark understands accessibility as one of many ingredients that
make up mobility, the direction of causation is clear: the structural variable
(accessibility) determines the individual variable (mobility).
A third relationship between accessibility and mobility in the literature re-
verses this causality. Rather than mobility depending on the accessibility of
locations and services, it is accessibility that is shaped by the degree of indi-
vidual or collective mobility. Quoting a National Roads and Motorists’ Associ-
ation (NRMA) study, Denmark surmises that transport disadvantage “. . .most
commonly results in reduced mobility. This in turn, reduces access to essential
services and resources including employment, shops, commercial and community
services, and cultural and leisure facilities”
[NationalRoad andMotorists Association’s Public Affairs Group, 1995] quoted in
[Denmark, 1996, p.5]. The logic of this relationship is as follows. A particular
2Denmark, perhaps unwittingly, illustrates the fluidity of the two terms. Within one page,
he refers to three different possible analytic relationships between mobility and accessibility
[Denmark, 1996]
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condition, such as disability or poverty, impairs individuals’ mobility. Since indi-
vidual’s are not mobile, they cannot access desired locations and services: thus,
mobility (individual variable) determines the accessibility (structural variable).
Last, Himanen, Nijkamp and Padjen, arguing in terms of welfare economics,
conceive of accessibility and mobility as expressions of two incompatible eco-
nomic principles: efficiency and distributional equity. Mobility, they maintain,
“concerns the Spatial Movement (sic) of people and goods”. Mobility is a crucial
factor in balanced economic growth: it matches input factors in the production
process as well ensuring an efficient distribution of final products. Conversely,
accessibility “refers to the ease with which people can reach desirable facilities
(e.g. schools, hospitals, work, recreation areas), and has as such direct distri-
butional aspects”. This, they continue, means that facilities such as schools,
hospitals, shops, etc. ought to be equally accessible to all: in short, accessibility
is a public good. However, the policy objective of providing efficient mobility
as well as universal accessibility are ultimately contradictory: a Pareto-optimal
distribution of transport resources will, in terms of welfare economics, not nec-
essarily imply equal access to all locations and services [Himanen et al., 1993,
p.10].
Why do policy actors and researchers conceive of and deploy the term ac-
cessibility so inconsistently, even within the same article or policy document?
Accessibility, Well-Being and Equity: the Normative Im-
plications of the Concept
Policy actors define and use the concept of accessibility in fundamentally di-
vergent ways because the concept is inherently value-laden. Throughout the
transport policy literature, the link between transport (and the accessibility
that accompanies it) and human well-being is a recurring theme. In the White
Paper on Employment, Growth and Competitiveness, European Commission
(1993) argues that Europe’s
“. . . ascendancy in the past was due to the quality of its communi-
cations networks, which gave its inhabitants easy access to natural
and technical resources. By developing the movement of people and
goods, Europe has been able to marry economic prosperity, quality
of life and commercial efficiency. . . ” [Commission, 1993, p.34].
What is true for regions is also seems to be true for individuals: Denmark,
quoting Martin Wachs, argues that mobility is “. . . an ‘essential service’ for
the elderly . . . , critical to their physical, social and psychological well-being”
[Denmark, 1996, p.5].
Yet, not all transport commentators agree that the relationship between
modern transport and human well-being is positive. In his forceful polemic,
Hermann Knoflacher points to modern transport ‘madness’ as the root of all
contemporary human misery. The proliferation of motorways, coupled with
incompetent town and city planning, have created misanthropic (“menschen-
feindlich”) environments: traffic noise deprives people of their right to a good
night’s rest, transport related emissions are poisoning humans and nature, and
transport infrastructure not only insults the eye but also strangles local eco-
nomic growth.
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Well-being, particularly the distribution of well-being, is inextricably linked
to questions of equity and fairness. As Himanen, Nijkamp and Padjen suggest
in the passage above, accessibility, or the lack of it, has implications for an
equitable distribution of burdens and well-being in a society. But what would
an equitable distribution of costs and benefits look like in terms of accessibility?
Again, different policy-actors resolve this question in various ways.
For some researchers and policy actors, equity means the fair allocation of
costs between individual transport users. Here, there are no a priori differences
between individual transport users: just as rational individuals enter the market
on equal terms, there is nothing that intrinsically distinguishes one transport
user from the other. This notion of transport equity, which Todd Litman calls
‘horizontal equity’, “. . . incorporates the concept that consumers should ‘get
what they pay for and pay for what they get’ . . . ” [Litman, 1996, p.1]. Con-
versely, having others pay for the costs one incurs is inequitable. The European
Commission, while addressing transport externalities, concludes that external
costs
“. . . imply that individual transport decisions no longer lead to an
outcome that is desirable from the point of view of society as a
whole. Moreover, the external costs are paid by others: tax payers
implicitly end up footing the bill of road maintenance and health
care due to damage from air pollution, whilst damage to buildings
and crops results from acidification and other forms of pollution is
paid by house owners, businesses and farmers. This is unfair and
inefficient” [Commission, 1995b, p.5].
The message is clear: the more accessibility one wants, the more one has to pay.
Yet, is equity in accessibility always a question of matching demand and sup-
ply (or matching wants to purchasing power)? Other transport commentators
point out that accessibility is more than a commodity: accessibility is a levelling
device and therefore is synonymous with equity. Litman summarises this form
of equity in the somewhat cumbersome term “vertical equity with regard to
needs and ability”. In particular, it is a measure
“. . . of whether an individual is relatively transportation disadvan-
taged compared with others in the community. It assumes that
everyone should enjoy at least a basic level of access, even if people
with special needs require more resources per mile, per trip or per
person.” [Litman, 1996, p.1].
Here, providing equity means providing accessibility. By the same token, the
absence of accessibility creates inequities. There is, then, a role (or even a duty)
for transport policy in rectifying these perceived inequities. In this context,
Denmark surmises:
“Certainly, if a lack of appropriate transport is preventing some dis-
advantaged people from getting to government, commercial or com-
munity services it would seem reasonable that transport provision
should be used as a tool to deliver equitable access” [Denmark, 1996,
p.7].
The same normative implications of accessibility reappear at the macro-level:
when discussing regional socio-economic disparities, policy actors apply the
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same line of argumentation. In the European Commission, the idea of cohe-
sion expresses interregional equity. Again, the tool for achieving socio-economic
equity, or cohesion, is providing accessibility. The European Commission clearly
links cohesion with accessibility when it maintains that
“. . . if Europe is to reach its goal of regional cohesion, then each re-
gion should have access to the major markets of the European Union.
This is particularly important for developing small and medium sized
towns as a network of regional centres required for ensuring the avail-
ability of essential public services such as education and vocational
training” [Commission, 1995a, p.3].
Unlike market-oriented approaches that conceive of equity as the fair distribu-
tion of costs incurred by accessibility, this view understands equity as a function
of accessibility. What is more, the implications for transport policy differ con-
siderably from more market-based ideas. Whereas the latter would rely on the
‘invisible hand’ to provide equity, the former envisages a strong role for active
policy action: policy actors can deliver equity by providing accessibility via the
transport system.
A third approach to accessibility and equity, however, is less optimistic.
Rather than relying on the market or transport policy, this perspective iden-
tifies the locus of inequity within modern transport systems themselves. The
Austrian transport expert Hermann Knoflacher, a vociferous proponent of this
approach, perceives transport systems to be inherently inequitable. Transport
infrastructure, he argues, intrinsically favour large-scale, centralised economic
activity. Motorways, high speed rail links, and airports link strong economic
centres thus bypassing small-scale local economic activity. The result, Knof-
lacher contends, is economic, social, and cultural dependence of peripheral re-
gions on more central regions as transport saps local labour supply, destroys
local businesses, and flattens regional cultural diversity. Accessibility, Knof-
lacher maintains, means little more than the appropriation of the small and
indigenous by the large and centralised.
In sum, the term accessibility is extraordinarily difficult to pin down. In
some contexts it refers to structural qualities, in others it describes individual
attributes. In others still, accessibility characterises both structural features
and individual capabilities. Yet, these differences do not stem from an inherent
confusion or incompetence in the transport research community: indeed, these
differences are not even random. As the preceding section has hopefully shown,
accessibility is a value-laden concept inextricably intertwined with ideas of hu-
man well-being and equity. Values, in turn, are not empirically falsifiable and
thus open to interpretation. As we saw in Part I of this thesis, interpretation
does not take place in a social vacuum. In order to understand what the various
definitions of accessibility mean for policy-making, we have to understand the
socio-institutional frames and policy stories from which these definitions emerge.
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6.3 The Scope of Policy Conflict in European
Transport Policy-Making: Three Policy Sto-
ries
Where, then, do the differing definitions and interpretations of the concept of
accessibility originate? How can we make sense of these conflicting perceptions
of accessibility?
The following section applies the framework for policy-oriented discourse
analysis to the policy debate about transport in Europe. The aim is to sound
out the scope of potential policy conflict in European transport policy-making.
In other words, this analysis maps the ‘contested terrain’ of European transport
issues. Using the cultural theory-inspired typology of advocacy coalitions and
their policy frames, this section identifies three competing policy stories about
transport and accessibility: a hierarchical story about accessibility, regional de-
velopment and social cohesion; an individualist story about horizontal fairness;
and the egalitarian story about the corrosive effect of accessibility and contem-
porary transport systems. Each story —reconstructed int the narrative form
— sets out from a distinct set of assumptions, identifies the villain of the story
(the problem) and offers heroes (the solution) to save the day. In this way, each
story constructs links of cause and effect; each story suggests a particular course
of action. More significantly, each story defines accessibility in a different way.
Accessibility as Regional Development and Cohesion: a Hi-
erarchical Story
For the most part of the post-World War II era, rational planning approaches,
typically but not exclusively found in government hierarchies, have dominated
the transport policy debate. Based to a large degree on engineering and eco-
nomic models, the classical view of transport planning has defined the transport
issue in terms of a purely technical problem to be conquered by the application
of increasingly sophisticated technologies. On the conceptual level, these tech-
nologies comprise transport models with increasing numbers of variables; on
the concrete level, the high speed railways, the high-tech aviation hardware,
and the ever-increasing efficiency of motor cars bear witness to transport plan-
ning’s belief in technology. Yet for all the apparent objectivity and rationality
inherent in the classical transport perspective, the approach is based on some
strong assumptions concerning accessibility.
The Setting — Basic Assumptions
The basis of rational transport planning approaches is that there is a strong
positive link between accessibility, i.e. the ease by which individuals can reach
desired locations, and economic growth. Banister and Lichfield see the clear-
est expression of this assumption in the logic of Classical Location Theory
[Banister and Lichfield, 1995]. Here, the (monetary or utility) values of different
locations depend on the location’s degree of accessibility. Transport costs, this
approach argues, are a key determinant of land and rental values. Moreover,
land use is tied to the rent level in the market: changes in transport costs lead
to changes in rental values which, in turn, affect land use. As a result, the
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more transport costs have fallen, the less people are averse to longer journey
distances: this logic explains the increasing suburbanisation trends in industri-
alised countries [Banister and Lichfield, 1995, p.7].
The underlying rationale of this approach was developed in the United States
of the 1950s where researchers first started to systematically analyse the rela-
tionship between spatial organisation and location. Analysis of transport pat-
terns United States cities of the late 1950s found that accessible locations were
more likely to attract development than inaccessible locations. These findings
suggested there was “land-use transport feedback cycle” meaning that land-use
patterns depended on the location of human activities such as work, shopping,
or leisure. The distribution of these activities implied a strong role for transport
systems: in order to partake in desirable activities, individuals had to use the
transport system [Wegener, 1995, p.157].
The classical transport management approach, then, accords a strong role
to transport in spatial development. The common wisdom that emerged from
these early transport studies was that
1. transport shapes cities;
2. transport policy affects the spatial organisation and development of cities;
3. transport is a function of land-use;
4. land-use policy influences transport [Wegener, 1995, p.159].
Moreover, these conclusions foresaw a strong role for rational transport plan-
ning. Since journey and location decisions were co-determinate, United States
planners concluded that they had to consider transport and land-use planning
together [Wegener, 1995, p.157]. If transport determines the development of lo-
cations, then the rational planning of transport could induce land-use patterns
that would lead to economic growth. Conversely, a deterioration of transport
systems leads to economic decline. The European Commission expressed these
sentiments by arguing that transport networks
“. . . are the arteries of the single market. They are the life-blood of
competitiveness, and their malfunction is reflected in lost opportu-
nities to create new markets and hence in a level of job creation that
falls short of our potential”[Commission, 1993, p.19].
Increasing traffic volume, brought about by improved accessibility, necessarily
becomes a sign of economic prosperity. For example, Bert Morris points to the
strong positive relationship between income and car ownership [Morris, 1993,
p.148]. The European Commission’s “Common Transport Policy” (CTP) aims
to promote regional cohesion, meaning the harmonisation of economic perfor-
mance across different European regions, by producing, improving, and upgrad-
ing transport links: in short, cohesion is a function of economic growth which
in turn depends on the provision of accessibility.
The Villains — Policy Problems
Whom or what does the hierarchical planning view make responsible for the
transport policy issue?
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From this perspective, transport problems are little more than technical
management problems. Bert Morris, a representative of the British Automo-
bile Association (AA), somewhat predictably contends that car ownership is the
key variable in the transport policy debate. In Britain alone, he continues, car
ownership will dramatically increase in the coming years. In the light of an
increasing number of cars on the road, future transport problems will emerge
from congestion and system inefficiencies: he argues that urban congestion is
the result of illegal parking and poorly planned roadwork [Morris, 1993, p.149
and p.152]. Similarly, the European Commission bemoans the slowing of trans-
port infrastructure investment in Europe. What is more, they continue, the
networks that do exist are poorly co-ordinated interregionally, internationally,
and intermodally. “The fact that not enough attention has been paid to devel-
oping infrastructures”, the European Commission avers, “is one of the reasons
for the deterioration in the quality of life” [Commission, 1993, p.22].
In short, the classical planning view sees present transport problems as a
purely technical issue of providing increasing degrees accessibility. On the one
hand, lack of physical transport infrastructure not only jeopardises economic
growth (in terms of the costs of congestion), but also individual well-being (pol-
lution, loss of income) and regional cohesion. On the other hand, these tenden-
cies are exacerbated by inefficient management of existing transport structures.
The Heroes — Policy Solutions
The diagnosis of transport problems in the classical planning view leads to
clear policy prescriptions: the provision of more infrastructure and the efficient
management of existing networks.
This is reflected in the objectives of the European Union’s Common Trans-
port Policy. First, the policy aims to reinforce the internal market by facilitating
the free movement of goods and persons, an aim that can only make sense if
there is a positive link between accessibility and growth. Second, the European
Union plans to eliminate regulatory obstacles, hoping to encourage the develop-
ment of a coherent and integrated transport system based on the best available
technology. Third, the Commission will reduce regional disparities by providing
accessibility to land-locked, island, and peripheral regions. Fourth, this devel-
opment must be environmentally sustainable in terms of global climate change.
Last, the new and improved transport system must be safe [Rienstra et al., 1997,
p.273]. In sum, the European Commission proposes to promote “. . . new and
better designed infrastructures, accessible to all citizens, will permit
• better, safer travel at low costs, and thus an increase in trade, while re-
ducing costs and distances and creating scope for other activities;
• effective planning in Europe in order to avoid a concentration of wealth
and population;
• bridge-building towards Eastern Europe, which is essential in order to
meet requirements, step up investment, and promote trade.” (p.39)
What does this mean in practise? Since accessibility means economic growth,
of which increasing traffic volumes are an indicator, the policy-maker must max-
imise the full economic potential inherent in the growth of transport. In short,
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the classical transport approach leads to more roads, railways, and waterways.
The Trans-European Networks (TENs) Project of the European Commission
foresees
“70,000 kms of rail track, including 22,000 kms of new and upgraded
track for High Speed Trains; 15,000 kms of new roads, nearly half
in regions on the outskirts of the Union, to complete a 58,000 km
or improved network already largely built; combined transport cor-
ridors and terminals; 267 airports of common interest and networks
of inland waterways and sea ports” [Commission, 1998, p.1].
The total cost of the project, the European Commission estimates, will be no
less than Euro 400 billion by 2010.
Efficient management of transport necessitates suitable rational planning
instruments and tools. The assumption that policy-makers can direct regional
development and economic growth by manipulating accessibility means that
these phenomena must be amenable to quantification, modelling, and prediction.
The tools, instruments and indicators of the classical planning approach reflect
this belief.
Planning and allocation decisions in transport policy-making heavily rely
on quantitative models based on discounting techniques such as Cost-Benefit-
Analysis (CBA) and Multi-Criteria-Analysis (MCA).3 The goal of transport
models, such as the EUNET model sponsored by the European Commission,
is to “. . .measure the impacts of transportation policies in general and specific
transportation system investments in particular” [Bökemann et al., 1997, p.9].
Exact measurement and quantification of the socio-economic impacts associated
with increased accessibility is necessary if planners are to assess the degree to
which accessibility fosters economic growth. Furthermore, given the volume
of expenditure in transport projects such as “. . . the Trans-European Networks
(TETN) programme, the need for consistent prediction and rational and trans-
parent measurement of the likely socio-economic impacts of major transport
system improvements becomes obvious” [Bökemann et al., 1997, pp.8–9]. Three
things are important here: first, the belief that transport systems are control-
lable; second, that complex transport phenomena are amenable to quantitative
modelling and prediction; third, that rational models imbue the transport plan-
ner with control over highly complex social, economic, and political processes.
How do planners know they have fulfilled their objectives? In other words,
how do planners define accessibility in the concrete terms of quantitative in-
dicators? Again, the SASI project provides a good example of how planners
translate the basic assumptions into functional model parameters. The SASI
project aims to measure both the social and economic impacts of transport
infrastructure investment as well as it contribution to European regional co-
hesion. Since accessibility means economic growth, the only logical indicator
for the degree of accessibility is regional gross domestic product per capita
[Bökemann et al., 1997, p.12]. Regional cohesion in turn, Dieter Bökemann,
Roland Hackl, and Hans Kamar argue, is a more difficult concept to quantify:
that is why “. . . the cohesion measures used in this study reflect the even or un-
evenness of the spatial distribution of socio-economic and accessibility indicators
3For a critique of the use of such models in transport policy-making, see [Adams, 1995,
Knoflacher, 1997].
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among the regions” [Bökemann et al., 1997, p.34]. There are, then, three sets
of indicators to cover both the social and the economic aspects of accessibility.
The economic measure of accessibility is, as mentioned, gross domestic product
per capita. Regional unemployment, in turn, measures the social availability of
jobs. Last, the SASI project uses both income and regional unemployment as
cohesion indicators on the European scale.
These indicators reflect the basic assumptions of the classical planning view.
In the SASI model, accessibility is regional gross domestic product: the more
accessibility, the higher gross domestic product. The qualitative dimensions of
accessibility, such as the social exclusionary effects of poor public transport, low
car ownership, etc. have been faded out of analytic perspective. In sum, the set
of indicators are tied to a structural conception of accessibility.
Accessibility as Horizontal Fairness: The Market and Trans-
port
In recent years, voices critical of the assumptions and policy prescriptions of the
classical planning approach have increasingly found their way into the transport
policy debate at all levels. Many of these voices question the validity of the clas-
sical planning ideology both in terms of its understanding of transport problems
and in terms of its policy solutions. It may very well be, these critics argue, that
the entire assumptional edifice on which planners have based transport policy
for the past three decades is fundamentally flawed. In particular, many of these
voices contend, the classical planning approaches have taken insufficient account
of market mechanisms.
The Setting — Basic Assumptions
Rather than understanding accessibility and the transport system as a sim-
ple systems amenable to prediction and quantification, this approach suggests
that accessibility is more complex. In this perspective, transport infrastructure
investments exist within a dynamic system of complex exchanges where partic-
ipants react and adapt to signals from other actors: this, of course, is a market.
This is not to say that transport investment does not imply economic growth:
it means, however, that there are always other, possibly unintended, outcomes
that accompany infrastructure investments. As Banister and Lichfield note,
“[t]he changes in accessibility resulting from new investment in an
already dense and congested network will not be of a sufficient scale
to have a major long-term impact on the local economy. They
are unlikely to be of a sufficient scale to attract major new em-
ployment into the city. Their impact may encourage longer dis-
tance travel out of the city as the new investment will make other
locations more accessible; accessibility works in both directions”
[Banister and Lichfield, 1995, p.280].
Accessibility, then, is better understood in terms of complementarity of diverse
competitive networks. Rather than analysing investment in terms of a sin-
gle transport sector, such as rail, Banister and Lichfield suggest we comprehend
“. . . the impact of one new link on the network as a whole”
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[Banister and Lichfield, 1995, p.280]. In contrast to the uni-directional, mecha-
nistic logic of the classical planning approach, the market-based view advocates
a more relativist and flexible approach to accessibility: not the narrow impact
on a particular sector but the impact of infrastructure investment on the rel-
ative competitive positions of particular networks is important. Banister and
Lichfield conclude by stating that new
“. . . concepts of networks and accessibility are required to determine
under what conditions the competitive position of one network will
be changed as compared with another on at least three dimensions
to influence expectations, to facilitate co-ordination and to ensure
compatibility” [Banister and Lichfield, 1995, p.280].
How can a market-based approach fulfil these requirements? The basic as-
sumption of market-oriented approaches to transport policy is that, in general,
markets are efficient when left alone. This means that as long as prices accu-
rately reflect the underlying costs of any particular resource or service, the mar-
ket will efficiently allocate resources according to demand and supply. What is
more, phenomena in transport emanate from the complex interaction of individ-
ual and self-interested decisions: transport users are rational utility maximisers
who adapt their behaviour to market signals.
When, however, markets fail, resource prices will not reflect the underlying
costs. Since market-behaviour depends on price signals, distorted prices lead
to inefficient market-behaviour. Individuals will over-consume resources priced
below their true costs and, likewise, under-consume resources that are over-
priced. This, in turn, can lead to economically inefficient producer behaviour
such as rationing and price-dumping. The net result is an inefficient allocation
of resources and, put plainly, waste.
Why do markets fail? When left to their own devices, markets, in theory,
automatically adjust as individuals adapt their behaviour to changing price sig-
nals: markets form expectations and co-ordinate compatible transactions. Yet,
if policy-makers tamper with the complex web of individual transactions that
make up the market, this self-equilibrating mechanism breaks down.4 Thus,
market-based approaches, quite unlike the classical planning approaches, per-
ceive a very different role for public policy. Rather than actively regulating and
directing transport policy decisions, market-based approaches imply leaving as
much decision-making as possible to consumers. The rationale, as Banister and
Lichfield outline above, is that individual behaviour in markets is too flexible,
adaptive, and complex to predict with any certainty, let alone postulate a uni-
directional link between accessibility and income. Accessibility, then, is not so
much a cause of economic growth as it is one of many factors that influence
individual transport decisions.
The Villains — Policy Problems
The view from the market interprets the present transport issue in industri-
alised countries in a fundamentally different way than the classical planning
approaches. For years, market advocates maintain, planners and policy-makers
justified transport infrastructure investment, meaning predominantly roads, in
terms of economic growth and the subsequent regeneration of depressed regions.
4There can, of course, be very good reasons for introducing market distortions.
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Yet, the advocates of market-oriented approaches argue, there is very lit-
tle evidence of these alleged benefits [Banister and Lichfield, 1995]. Whereas,
Banister and Lichfield maintain, infrastructure investments undoubtedly have
an impact on land and rental values, the effects are not nearly as simple as
Classical Location Theory would predict. Often, infrastructure investments do
not create new economic activity in a region, but merely displace activities
from other regions: rather than efficiency gains, investment leads to shifts in
the Pareto optimal distribution [Banister and Lichfield, 1995, p.4]. Even where
there are efficiency gains, they argue, the scale of measurable impact may be
very small and highly localised.
A major reason, contend Banister and Lichfield, why the positive relation-
ship between economic growth and accessibility does not hold is that transport
costs make up a small part of production costs. Firms look to other factors, such
as land value, labour costs, or tax structures, in their location decisions. Addi-
tionally, transport infrastructure investment is subject to diminishing marginal
returns: every new (and expensive) transport link in Europe yields less and less
in terms of accessibility. These two factors in combination, they conclude, may
mean that lower transport costs are a marginal factor in firms’ location decisions
[Banister and Lichfield, 1995, p.5].
What is more, at the regional level, the classical planning approach system-
atically plays down the costs of transport infrastructure investments. More often
than not, Banister and Lichfield continue, investments such as high speed rail
links provide more benefits to central regions than peripheral areas thus under-
mining urban/ rural regeneration policy objectives [Banister and Lichfield, 1995,
p.4]. Further, increases in journey lengths, the accompanying pollution, and
congestion may outweigh the benefits associated with increased accessibility.
Instead, more roads invariably mean more traffic. With increasing traffic
volumes, they continue, comes more pollution, less accessibility for those with-
out cars, and the relocation of industrial, leisure and shopping facilities into
green belts. Not even car-users have profited: increasing road traffic coupled
with suburbanisation have generally increased the journey distances, congested
the roads, increased pollution, and have exacted a gruesome price in terms of
accidents. The European Commission, when commenting on fair and efficient
road pricing, argues that
“[r]educing pollution and congestion by means of increasing road
capacity is — in many cases — not the best option. The cost of
construction of road (and parking) capacities in densely populated
areas continues to increase. Studies indicate that improving and ex-
tending infrastructure results in more journeys overall as road users
make use of the new or improved facilities. The environmental im-
pacts both of these extra journeys and of the construction of the
road infrastructure may outweigh any benefits in improved traffic
flows” [Commission, 1995b, p.4].
Why have transport policies so spectacularly failed? The answer, contend
market advocates, is simple: the transport market is distorted. Transport
prices, particularly road transport prices, do not reflect the full social and en-
vironmental costs it incurs [Himanen et al., 1993, Banister and Lichfield, 1995,
Commission, 1995b]. This leads to signal failures and to inappropriate con-
sumer behaviour [Himanen et al., 1993]: individuals consume “too much” road
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transport compared to other modes to which the explosion in car-ownership and
road congestion bears witness.
What is more, misguided policies exacerbate these signal failures. Insuffi-
cient information about individual market behaviour leads to what Himanen,
Nijkamp and Padjen call public “response failures”: regulation to charge the
transport consumer the marginal social costs often misses the mark because
“. . .most actors appeared to have creative talents in circumnavigating interven-
tion measures”. Similarly, the European Commission reflects on the disadvan-
tages of transport regulation:
“Most policies that have been devised so far do not influence these
[transport] decisions directly and, therefore, overlook an important
factor — human behaviour. Transport choices are influenced by
transport prices and there is evidence that for many journeys there
is a mismatch between transport prices paid by individual users and
the underlying costs. The result is that decisions are distorted and
too much of the wrong sort of transport occurs at the wrong place
and the wrong points in time” [Commission, 1995b, p.2].
The bottom-line, this view informs us, are external costs (that is, costs that a
transport user incurs but someone else pays) for which, as Section 6.1 indicated,
consumers are increasingly unwilling to pay.
The Heroes — Policy Solutions
In order to re-establish the self-equilibrating market mechanisms in transport,
policy-makers must make transport prices reflect their true social and environ-
mental costs. Neil Kinnock, the European Commissioner for Transport main-
tains that efficient pricing of road transport “. . . can consequently be a valuable
complement to other policies for trying to ensure a better distribution of trans-
port within and across modes, space and time. Or to put it simply: we won’t
get transport right if we don’t get the price right” [Kinnock, 1995, p.2].
How can policy-makers ‘get the prices right’? A number of policy tools are
available for internalising external transport costs. In theory, policy-actors can
fall back on command and control regulations such as subsidies. However, as
Himanen, Nijkamp and Padjen point out, regulation may exacerbate market
distortions. Furthermore, argue the market advocates, tools that work with
market forces are more flexible, efficient, and less costly than command and
control measures. Assuming that policy-makers can tie costs closely prices,
market-based instruments are more effective if the policy-problem varies across
space and time as does the European transport issue [Commission, 1995b, p.8].
The European Commission outlines five reasons for adopting pricing strate-
gies in the European Union. First, regulation cannot tap into all the mecha-
nisms needed for changing transport consumer behaviour. Second, the costs of
regulation have increased so that replacing regulation with pricing may bring
about efficiency gains. Third, technical advances, such as electronic telematics,
would allow the introduction of pricing strategies. Fourth, liberalisation in the
framework of internal markets means that market distortions across modes and
operators will disappear. Last, the present transport issue calls for integrated
and flexible responses that only pricing can offer [Commission, 1995b, p.10].
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There are two main economic instruments open to policy-makers: charging
users directly and fiscal measures. Tackling congestion means using both strate-
gies: whereas telematics allow the policy-maker to charge the costs directly to
the user, fiscal measures attempt to create an incentive structure in which the
‘right kind’ of transport consumption takes place. Examples are differentiated
vehicle taxes based on the environmental characteristics of the vehicle, differen-
tiated fuel taxes, and the removal of diesel subsidies.5
In sum, the market-based approach suggests that accessibility plays a rel-
atively minor role in regional economic growth. It is merely one of the many
factors that influence individual transport decisions. Transport prices, or, more
precisely, the correspondence of prices and underlying costs, are far more signif-
icant in determining transport and locational decisions. Accessibility, regional
economic growth, and regional cohesion will fall into place once policy-makers
‘get the prices right’.
Accessibility as a ‘Bad’: An Egalitarian Story
Although classical transport planning and market-based approaches interpret
the transport issue very differently and arrive at divergent conclusions, both
of them are grounded in the socio-economic system of advanced capitalism:
although both perceive the relationship between accessibility and regional eco-
nomic growth differently, both assume that they are socially desirable.
This is precisely where both classical transport planning and market-based
approaches differ from what we will call the ecological approach.
The Setting — Basic Assumptions
The ecological view of transport policy is the voice of protest. Current theory
and practise of transport policy in industrialised countries, it argues, is hope-
lessly confused, irrelevant to real human needs, and fundamentally immoral.
Misguided transport and land-use policies have left us with environments that
cannot fulfil our basic social and biological needs. Congestion, accidents, com-
muting, long journey distances, and, particularly, pollution are depriving people
of their basic human rights to a liveable and healthy life.
Why, then, do planners and policy-makers continue destroy the natural and
social world with environmentally rapacious and socially disastrous transport
infrastructure? The reason, this view maintains, is because policy-makers are
both ideologically and structurally trapped in a socio-economic system that sys-
tematically sets the wrong priorities. Pollution, congestion, or accidents are not
the root cause of present transport problems: they are mere symptoms of a
deeper social malaise. Advanced capitalist systems, this voice proclaims, are
fundamentally inequitable: what we experience as traffic problems are the re-
sults of an economic, social, and political system that inequitably distributes
costs and benefits across society. It is no coincidence, argue proponents of this
view, that the women, elderly, ethnic minorities, and the poor have accessi-
bility problems: it reflects the low value the capitalist system places on these
groups. It is also no coincidence that transport policy is biased in favour of
road transport: powerful economic interests, such as the automobile industry
5For a full discussion of market-based measures, see also [Pearce, 1990, Pearce, 1991].
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and the construction industry, have long captured the political decision-making
process.
Tinkering with the system, as the classical transport planning and market-
based approaches suggest, is less than useless; it merely reproduces existing
inequalities. Addressing transport problems means fundamentally rethinking
our economic, political, and socio-cultural values: in short, it requires a holistic
approach to socio-economic change so that we can live in harmony with ourselves
and with nature.
The Villains — Policy Problems
In terms of accessibility, the ecological approach suggests we have to overcome
prevailing transport ideologies. Hermann Knoflacher argues that current trans-
port thinking amounts to little more than ideological obfuscation of the facts and
downright deception of the citizen [Knoflacher, 1997]. Conventionally, policy-
makers justify transport infrastructure investments in terms of time saved on
journeys. This, however, is an illusion stemming from an overly particularistic
approach to transport analysis. A holistic approach shows, Knoflacher con-
tends, that there are in fact no time savings across the entire system. Transport
is a zero-sum game: ten minutes saved on one individual’s journey imply that
someone else’s journey time increases [Knoflacher, 1997, pp.43-48].6. Yet, since
journey times are distributed inequitably, the illusion that modern transporta-
tion saves time survives and flourishes.
This logic, supported by deceptive theoretical constructs such as CBA and
MCA leads to a transport system geared for ever increasing speeds
[Knoflacher, 1997, pp.84-87]. Policy-makers, captured by the road construction
lobby, commission the whole-sale destruction of the natural environment by
building more and more motorways and high speed rail links [Knoflacher, 1997,
p.83 and p.86]. Yet, contends Knoflacher, policy-makers and conventional trans-
port researchers have fundamentally confused cause and effect. Knoflacher here
contrasts micro- to macro-mobility: the former is slow, life-sustaining, and envi-
ronmentally sustainable mobility within small regional areas, the latter is high
speed, socially and environmentally damaging movement of people and goods
across vast distances. Whereas policy should be promoting micro-mobility and
thus reducing the speed of the transport system, policy-makers constantly seek
to increase speeds thus destroying humans’ social and environmental habitats.
Rather than being a boon to regions and society, Hermann Knoflacher main-
tains that accessibility is the cause of human misery in industrialised countries.
Improvements in accessibility always means the relative devaluation of a weak
region compared to a strong area. High speed links between small and central
locations usually spell the social, cultural and economic death of the weaker
region. As work and services, such as shopping, health care, and government
services shift from the periphery to the centre, the indigenous transport pat-
terns that sustained a fragile socio-cultural network are brutally torn apart.
6John Adams [Adams, 1995, Adams, 2005] and Mayer Hillman [Hillman, 1999] make sim-
ilar claims for road safety. Road safety measures, including safer cars, seatbelts, wider roads,
etc. they contend, merely make motoring safer (and more convenient) for motorists. The
increased speeds that road safety measures engender disproportionally increase risks to non-
motorists (pedestrians and cyclists) The secular decline in road accidents that transport statis-
tics allegedly reflect merely document the fact that, since roads are now far too dangerous,
non-motorists have all but retreated from the transport system.
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As a result, not only employment and labour supply leaves the region but also
the indigenous cultural patterns of social interaction are irretrievably destroyed
[Knoflacher, 1997, pp.57-58].
Consequently, rural dwellings have deteriorated from places where people
lived, worked, and socialised to mono-functional residential communities with
little or no horizontal interaction. What is more, local suppliers, and with
them local economic activity, collapse under the pressures of having to compete
with large, centralised economic units. The bottom-line is that, as transport
links enable people to by-pass locations at very high speeds, weaker regions
deteriorate further. In this view, accessibility implies the centralisation and,
more significantly, the homogenisation of human activities; it is, in short, the
exploitation of the weak by the strong.
How could it have come to this? Here, Knoflacher points to a unholy al-
liance of politics, big business, and research. For years, the researchers in this
iron triangle have provided the conceptual tools to hide the special interests
behind transport policy: those of the motor vehicle industry and the construc-
tion industry. Here, laments Knoflacher, logic is turned on its head to suit big
business interests.
An example he cites is the Austrian legal process in disputes over rural land
for prestige transport projects. He recounts how a skewed administrative pro-
cesses, corrupt politicians, and the archaic legal system conspire to force small
land-owners to force sign over their land for transport infrastructure projects.
Public hearings amount to little more than sham democracy since the meth-
ods used to evaluate projects (CBA, MCA) favour those in control of defining
the parameters of the evaluation (these, Knoflacher adds, are exclusively hand-
picked to assure conformity to dominant interests) [Knoflacher, 1997, p.87]. In
court cases, the ‘independent’ evaluations originate from consultants that are
anything but independent [Knoflacher, 1997, p.103].
These developments, however, are symptomatic of wider social develop-
ments. The structure of advanced capitalist societies are failing to meet real
human needs. Indeed, the demand for mobility, argues Knoflacher, is a sign
of unsatisfied need. It is no surprise that people who are cooped up in poorly
planned, dirty, dangerous, and unpleasant cities and towns feel the desire to
leave at the week-end. What is more, the increasing trend of individual atomi-
sation caused by advanced capitalist labour markets exacerbates the desire for
mobility: a person who has a functioning social network and healthy interper-
sonal relations does not need to travel. The demand for increased mobility is a
result of social pathologies such as single-parent families and single households.
These developments, in turn, emerge from a socio-economic system that is
based on morally dubious principles. Knoflacher maintains that the principle
liberal capitalism stands for, factor mobility, in reality legitimates the savage ex-
ploitation of the weak by the strong. Our perception of economic development,
he contends, is dictated by the winners of this unfairly structured game: the
losers, by and large, have little say. What is more, the modern transport system
is the medium with which the fast, strong, and centralised hunt down the slow,
weak, and indigenous. “The price of today’s economic growth”, Knoflacher
avers, “will be paid by the workers, the social system the ‘Third World’ and the
next generation that will have to inherit a destroyed planet” [Knoflacher, 1997,
p.119].
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The Heroes — Policy Solutions
Policy prescriptions within the ecological view concentrate on two levels: the
conceptual level and the policy level. At the conceptual level, this view suggests
we fundamentally alter the way we think about transport. Transport systems
must place the human person into the centre of consideration. Yet, humans are
more than instrumentally rational individuals: they have a right to a healthy so-
cial and natural environment. Thus, the reconceptualisation of transport policy
thinking must aim to harmonise human needs and the natural environment.
On the concrete level, the ecological view suggests radical changes to trans-
port systems. The primary concern here is to radically reduce the volume
of road transport [Knoflacher, 1997, Grünen/Bündnis 90, 1994]. For this pur-
pose, the German Green Parliamentary Party outlines a comprehensive set of
policy proposals that aim to tackle the transport problem from a variety of
angles [Grünen/Bündnis 90, 1994]. In order to favour rail transport, bicycles
and pedestrians the German Greens foresee a number of both supply side and
demand-side measures. On the supply-side, the German Greens believe that
massive investment in public transport as well as improved accessibility (in
terms of price structures) is of eminent importance. Further, they reject prestige
transport projects such as the ‘Transalpin’ in favour of systematically upgrad-
ing of existing systems. Last, land-use policy should, they argue, favour high
density settlements to reduce the need for travel. Add to this the diverse traffic
calming measures Knoflacher suggests and one obtains a fairly comprehensive
restructuring of current transport priorities.
On the demand-side, the German Greens envisage what more conventional
policy-actors would consider as draconian measures. In order to discourage the
use of motor vehicles, the Greens suggests the internalisation of external costs by
drastic increases in fuel taxes and a lifting of the subsidy on diesel fuel. Further,
they intend to lower the legal speed limit on all roads (30km/h in built locations,
80km/h on country roads, and 100 km/h on motorways). Tight regulations on
transit freight traffic will accompany these measures. Last, the Greens foresee
road bans tied to air quality thresholds.
The important aspect of the policy prescriptions of this perspective is that
policy uses a wide spectrum policy instruments. This egalitarian holistic ap-
proach envisages the use of both command and control as well as economic
instruments to curb road transport. In addition, the ecological approach aims
at changing attitudes towards transport and mobility. This approach is exem-
plified in the Guiding Principles of the European Federation of Green Parties’
vision for European transport:
“The environmental impact of transport will be reduced through
investment in clean public transport, sensible land-use planning, and
taxation of fossil fuels in all sectors, including air traffic. Car-free
cities and taxation on fossil fuels will be the rule. Massive motorway
projects designed to facilitate road freight between the regions of
Europe will be abandoned and investment in the reconstruction in
railways preferred” [of Green Parties, 1993, p.4].
In sum, the ecological view of transport policy aims at restructuring both the
central assumptions and tools of transport policy as well as effecting a cultural
change. Transport problems are a symptom of fundamental inequities inherent
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to advanced capitalism. Solving transport problems, advocates of this view
argue, means fundamentally changing inequitable socio-economic structures.
Delimiting the Contested Terrain in Transport Policy
The previous sections demonstrated that contending advocacy coalitions define
accessibility in terms of their respective policy frames. As we have seen, these
policy stories, starting from different initial assumptions, interpret the transport
issue in divergent ways and suggest different policy solutions.
As we argued in Chapter 5, policy frames — rooted in the basic forms of so-
cial organisation identified in the cultural theory’s typology of social solidarities
— provide individual policy actors with interpretive and argumentative tem-
plates for fashioning policy stories. The classical transport planning discourse
is typical for hierarchical advocacy coalitions. Hierarchical actors prefer stable,
orderly and predictable societies. Here, each part has an ascribed role and is
coordinated by the centre. Hence, the hierarchical transport planning argument
champions the type of transport policy solutions that require and strengthen
these social forms: complex, large-scale, capital intensive and maintenance-
heavy infrastructure. Likewise, since markets work best when individual are
free to form contractual relationships and when there is a minimum of social
control, it is not surprising that individualist advocacy coalitions value freedom
from interference. Thus, this policy story urges transport policy-makers to leave
the generation of regional economic growth to those who know how to generate
wealth best: individuals and firms. Last, the ecological view is characteristic
of egalitarian groups. They aims to nurture social and natural environments
that satisfy real human and ecological needs. For this reason, they urge policy-
makers to effectively shut down the present transport system and re-orient its
basic priorities away from needs of big business and towards people and nature.
In the European transport policy debate, then, these three policy belief-
systems make up the cornerstones of the ‘contested terrain’. This ‘contested
terrain’ delineates the internal fault lines of the debate but, more importantly,
it also outlines the external ideational and organisational boundaries of the
transport policy debate. These three policy stories, constantly pulling in op-
posite directions, provide the discursive framework in which any thinking and
policy debate on transport can take place. In this way, they also define the
reservoir of concepts, solutions and strategies policy actors can draw upon for
tackling the European transport issue.
How, then, does this triangular contested terrain structure policy conflict in
the European transport debate?
6.4 The Structure of Policy Conflict in Trans-
port Policy: Agreement and Disagreement
The conceptual framework developed in Chapter 5 suggests that the three types
of inherently antagonistic policy frames also share some concerns across advo-
cacy coalition borders. In terms of the grid/group diagram, each social solidarity
shares the same dimensional space with another social solidarity: hierarchical
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Figure 6.1: The Triangular Policy Space
structure (high group) while egalitarianism and individualism are both char-
acterised by a lack of internal organisational distinction and stratification (low
grid). The conceptual framework would lead us to expect some overlap on basic
principles and general policy measures. This agreement, however, is inherently
fragile because it derives from fundamentally divergent premises.
Areas of Agreement: Broad Principles, Common Policy
Measures and Mutual Rejection
Comparing the contending policy stories reveals areas of pairwise agreement and
disagreement within the triangular policy space. The scope of this agreement
decreases with increasing specificity of the issue in question. While all advo-
cacy coalitions agree that transport policy is in some way crucial for European
societies, more specific policy principles and policy measures are shared by two
of the three contending advocacy coalitions. Furthermore, each advocacy coali-
tion shares a distaste for the specific policy measures with another advocacy
coalition.
Classic Transport Planning and Market-Oriented Perspective Pro-
ponents of the hierarchical transport planning as well as the more individualist
market-oriented perspective agree that transport systems and transport policy
significantly impinges on economic growth. As we have seen, members of these
advocacy coalitions both assume that economic growth is a central, possibly the
central, policy goals for any government. Therefore, both advocacy coalitions
agree on policy measures that increase the efficiency of existing transport net-
works: policies to cut average trip times and costs per trip find the support
of members from both the hierarchical transport planning approach as well as
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from the individualist market-oriented policy perspective. This can, in princi-
ple, include investment in existing and new infrastructure, road pricing schemes
or telemetric traffic management systems. Conversely, both the hierarchical and
individualist advocacy coalition take a dim view of policy proposals aimed at
increasing transport costs in order to restrict accessibility or limit mobility.
Ecological Perspective and Transport Planning View Advocates of
both the egalitarian ecological policy story and the hierarchical classical trans-
port planning view share in common a concern for the integrity of the natural
and social environment. As we have seen, classical transport planners see acces-
sibility as the primary means in which transport systems contribute, through
regional economic growth, to social cohesion. This growth, however, needs to be
tempered by and set in the framework of “sustainable development’ Similarly, re-
call how Knoflacher argues in favour of so-called ‘life-preserving’ micro-mobility:
moving about freely within a community, he contends, is what creates the ties
that make up a social unit. Sustaining and preserving this micro-mobility, in
turn, goes hand-in-hand with preserving and protecting the natural environ-
ment. For this reason, members from both types of advocacy coalitions support
transport policies that protect social and natural environments. By the same
token, both hierarchical and egalitarian advocacy coalitions reject policies that
threaten human and natural habitats. Measures to deregulate and liberalise
of freight and transport markets, then, would attract opprobrium from these
advocacy coalitions.
Market-Oriented View and the Ecological Perspective Last, the in-
dividualist and egalitarian advocacy in the European transport policy debate
share a preference for decentralised transport management. Members of both
advocacy coalitions believe that decision-making in transport policy and trans-
port choices ought to be taken at the most suitable level of governance. For this
reason, members from both the ecological and market-oriented advocacy coali-
tions are favourably disposed to policies such as road pricing. It follows that the
egalitarians and the individualists are united in their opposition to large, cen-
tralised, and inflexible transport systems. Projects such as the Trans-European
Networks or high-tech, prestige projects such as the German Transalpin attract
the criticism from both advocacy coalitions.
Intractable Disagreement
The agreement on basic principles and policy measures in the transport policy
domain evaporates once debate moves away from the general level. While the
advocacy coalitions are clear on what they reject, their rejection is driven by
divergent motivations. At a more concrete level, advocacy coalitions in the
transport debate fail to agree on the definitions of the issue, the causality of
the problem or even the approach for understanding the phenomenon. In short,
what looks like agreement at general level remains intractable at more concrete
levels of analysis.
Classic Transport Planning View vs Market-Oriented Perspective
Although the proponents of the classical transport planning view and the market-
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oriented perspective both argue that transport systems affect economic growth,
they disagree vehemently how the two are related. As we have seen, members
of the hierarchical advocacy coalition see a direct and positive relationship be-
tween infrastructure investment, accessibility and economic growth: more of
one inevitably means more of the others. In contrast, members of the indi-
vidualist advocacy coalition are not so sure. The individualist advocates of
the market-based policy story are highly sceptical of the basic assumptions of
classical transport planning. For example, Peter Hall points out that the rela-
tionship between accessibility and development is ‘one seamless web’. However,
he contends the “. . . trouble is that this combination is so subtle, no one any-
where seems to have completely understood how to make it work at a fine-tuned
level” [Hall, 1995, p.75]. Himanen, Nijkamp and Padjen argue that, like the sor-
cerer’s apprentice, transport experts helplessly face the transport demons they
have summoned [Himanen et al., 1993, p.21]. The uncertainties in transport
planning theory and methodology are so significant, Banister and Lichfield are
forced to admit that the
“. . . precise relationship between transport investment and urban de-
velopment are not well known, even theoretically. There seems to
be no single methodology available to test the relationships, the
counterfactual situation is difficult to determine and the question
of causality not addressed. Decisions have been made based more
of faith than understanding. Even where clear methodological ap-
proaches have been tried, problems arise concerning available data
and the inherent complexity of many relationships. The links be-
tween land use, transport and development are much more profound
than just an examination of the physical, social and economic rela-
tionships might produce” [Banister and Lichfield, 1995, p.15].
Ecological Perspective vs Classic Transport Planning View A similar
picture unfolds on closer inspection of the agreement between the egalitarian
and hierarchical advocacy coalition. Although both advocacy coalitions are in
favour of conserving natural and social environments, they conceive of these
ideas in very different terms. Whereas social cohesion for transport planners is
little more than a statistical indicator of relative regional income levels, egalitar-
ian actors perceive social integration as being the complex web of socio-cultural
interactions. Sustainable development for hierarchical advocacy coalitions in
the transport policy debate is about factoring in sound management and con-
servation principles to transport existing planning paradigms. The egalitarian
policy story contends that the integrity of natural and social environments is a
fragile and priceless thing that, once destroyed, is inordinately difficult to recon-
struct [Knoflacher, 1997]. Hence, transport policy must prevent the destruction
of natural and social habitats at all costs.
The main problem, egalitarian actors argue, is that the transport planners
have no way of even appreciating or understanding the true value of social and
natural environments. The egalitarian policy story discredits the entire concep-
tual edifice as a poorly disguised legitimation for existing inequities. Starting
with the assumptions and ending with the conclusions, so the argument goes, the
entire analytical architecture is rigged to produce the “correct” results — mean-
ing results that objectively prove the inherent superiority of large-scale, com-
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plex, and capital-intensive infrastructure investment. Concerns for the needs
of citizens or the environment are conveniently factored out of the equation.
Reflecting on the use of cost-benefit analysis in the UK, John Adams maintains
that
“In their [the Department of Trnasport’s] cost-benefit analysis of
their road building projects, the principal benefit is time-saving for
motorists. Motorists are wealthier than those without cars and their
time is worth more. Most senior politicians and civil servants are
motorists. People without cars are economically inferior; their con-
cerns barely register in the cost-benefit calculations of the Depart-
ment of Transport. In the formalizing of their decision-making pro-
cedures, both the convenience and the safety of people in cars are
accorded greater significance that the welfare of people outside cars”
[Adams, 1995, p.156].
Market-Oriented Perspective vs Ecological View Last, despite theshared
distaste for unwieldy transport infrastructure projects requiring centralised man-
agement, both the egalitarian and the individualist policy stories provide little
more common ground for contending policy actors. Both advocacy coalitions
favour decentralisation for diametrically opposed reasons. Individualists ad-
vocacy coalitions want to see allocation and supply decisions in the transport
returned to the level of the individual economic agent (i.e. individuals and
firms) in order to maximise accessibility and traffic flow. Conversely, the egali-
tarian policy story maintains that decision-making needs to be returned to the
local and community level in order to restrict accessibility and flow of traffic
through the system. On closer inspection, the basic agreement on policy instru-
ments such as road pricing seems rather shaky. Members from both advocacy
coalitions agree that road pricing is an appropriate policy tool for internalising
the external costs of road use. However, market-oriented policy actors believe
these costs to be reasonable but inequitably distributed: road pricing leads to a
fairer distribution of costs and therefore to more efficient road use. Egalitarian
advocacy coalitions see the true social and environmental cost of road transport
to be prohibitively high: charging users the real costs would reduce road traffic
to a fraction of its present volume.
In sum, a ‘contested terrain’ featuring hierarchical, individualist and egali-
tarian types of advocacy coalitions from the cultural theory-typology of social
solidarities will give rise to endemic policy conflict. This is, in part, due to the
structure of policy conflict, that is the way contending policy frames carve out
areas of agreement and disagreement. In the European transport policy debate,
agreement on basic principles and general policy measures as well as mutual re-
jection spans two of the three contending advocacy coalitions. However, since all
three policy frames discussed are grounded in fundamentally divergent forms of
organisation, they converge towards the areas of agreement from opposite direc-
tions. Divergent issue definitions and underlying theories of causality mean that
agreement is limited and restricted to a highly general level of analysis: debate
of more concrete type unearths more fundamental and intractable differences.
Table 6.2 summarises areas of agreement and disagreement between advo-
cacy coalitions.
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Table 6.2: Areas of Agreement and Disagreement in the Transport Policy Debate
6.5 The Potential Impacts of Policy Conflict:
Weaknesses and Conceptual Blindness
The fact that all policy knowledge is contextual and that transport policy de-
bate is inherently conflictual does not mean that constructive policy debate is
impossible. Policy frames are not irrational nor are policy stories inaccurate:
each policy frame merely foregrounds certain issues and backgrounds others.7
It follows that each particular policy frame captured by the cultural theory
typology has its strengths and weaknesses.
This is not to say, however, that the road to effective transport policy-making
lies in uncritically accepting any form of analysis. Just because we cannot con-
clusively prove any one policy frame to be ‘wrong’ does not mean that all diag-
noses and policy recommendations must be ‘right’. Since we must distinguish
frames and policy stories not by what they include into their analytic frame-
works but by what they exclude or filter out, policy frames create cognitive and
perceptual ‘shutters’ or ‘conceptual blindness’. Policy processes that rely on
one frame alone (or, alternatively, do not encourage serious criticism from pro-
ponents of contending advocacy coalitions) will introduce a systematic bias into
their analysis of transport problems: this, as Collingridge8 has demonstrated,
can lead to myopia, poor analysis, and, ultimately, poor policy decisions.
We can tentatively point to the problems of each policy frame in the trans-
port debate. The discourse with most to answer for is the hierarchical transport
planning approach. Having dominated transport policy-making for nearly three
decades, classical planning has not succeeded in coping with ever-increasing
traffic volumes. Arguably, transport modellers and planners have exacerbated
transport problems by clinging to the central assumption that accessibility
means economic growth. Yet, as we have seen above, there is very little empiri-
cal evidence that increasing accessibility has any noticeable impact on regional
7In fact, policy frames, if they are to survive scrutiny, must be credible. Credibility, in
turn, has a lot to do with the predictive and explanatory powers of a particular approach, see
[Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998].
8Collingridge reviews cases such as the Space Shuttle disaster, high rise building schemes
in the United Kingdom, and nuclear power. Unfortunately, he does not address transport
although the analysis and conclusions of his case studies equally apply to transport policy-
making [Collingridge, 1992].
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economic development [Banister and Lichfield, 1995]. Rather than abandoning
or even reformulating the basic assumptions in the light of empirical evidence,9
the classical transport planning view stubbornly maintains that it is not the
central assumptions that are incorrect, but the means of measurement need
refinement and improvement. This invariably leads to the search for an ever
bigger and technically sophisticated transport model with which to measure
socio-economic impacts of transport infrastructure investments.
But what are transport planners measuring? To take the SASI transport
model as one example of many, the model purports to provide indicators for
regional cohesion and thus allows policy-makers to assess the socio-economic
impacts of transport investments. However, the model reduces regional develop-
ment and cohesion to GDP per capita and regional unemployment respectively:
as we have seen, Bökemann, Hackl and Kamar seem to believe that this covers
economic as well as social impacts. At best, however, these indicators measure
an economic impact of transport infrastructure investment: there is no social
dimension to these indicators whatsoever. The indicators leave income distri-
bution, the access to public and private services, the socio-cultural fabric, to
say nothing of social exclusion, ethnic, and gender issues completely untouched.
Surely, indicators of regional cohesion should have something to say about hori-
zontal social, cultural, and political ties between two locations. Yet all the SASI
indicators tell us is whether transport infrastructure investment has succeeded
in harmonising regional unemployment rates which really indicate the degree of
social exclusion within a community.
The strength of the classical planning approach is also its greatest weakness.
Transport planners are very adept at formalising, quantifying, and modelling
certain transport processes. However, the strictures formal models impose on
researchers causes transport planners to spectacularly miss the point. By ex-
cluding all factors not amenable to exact and objective measurement, transport
planners invariably fail to grasp the inherent complexity of transport policy
processes. As a result, most transport models fail to produce conclusive results
even within their highly restricted analytical scope.
Last, and most significantly, the classical transport planning approaches sys-
tematically deny the political nature of transport models. Cloaked in the veil of
science and objectivity, transport planners maintain the illusion that they stand
aloof from the political fray of transport decision-making. Rigid methodology,
strict quantification, and hard data ensure, so the story goes, that research is
objective. Transport planning methods do not explicitly provide policy options:
they merely provide the ‘facts’ and let these speak for themselves. Yet, as we
saw in Chapter 3, these underlying assumptions themselves are a political act.
By insisting that policy be informed by ‘objective’ analysis and then proceeding
to define what ‘objective analysis’ entails, the transport planning approaches a
priori disqualify any alternative form of analysis. Defining the transport policy
issue as a technical problem amenable to technical solutions precludes any other
approaches.
Similarly, individualist market-based approaches also have decisive weak-
nesses. The entire market argument is based on the assumption that markets
9Which of course would be very difficult because a change in the assumption that economic
growth is a function of accessibility would question the role of planners in the transport policy
process. If transport policy does not affect regional economic growth, what do we need
transport planners for?
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are efficient in allocating resources. This assumption is problematic for a va-
riety of reasons. First, the concept of a perfectly competitive market is an
ideal-type model: there are no perfectly efficient markets in the real world. Sec-
ond, although neo-classical economics would readily agree that markets always
are imperfect, the causes for market failure the discourse identifies is either too
one dimensional or too general. There are many reasons apart from govern-
ment interference that may cause markets to fail. Like all other forms of social
co-operation, markets depend on a favourable institutional and environmen-
tal framework. Markets may fail because prevailing socio-cultural values are
unfavourable to market-type transactions (for example, the belief in equivalent
exchange values). Alternatively, markets may collapse because transaction costs
unrelated to production or marketing costs are prohibitively high.10 Another
reason for market failure may be an insufficient legal and administrative frame-
work that can effectively implement sanctions. There are, in short, a plethora
of cultural, social, and political reasons for market failure: the catch-all phrase
of ‘government interference’ is either too all-inclusive to provide an adequate
grasp of all possible sources of market failure or it is too limited if it refers to
government intervention alone.
More significantly, the market-oriented approaches to transport policy-making
are grounded in some very strong assumptions about human behaviour. The
conception of Economic Man, the rational utility maximiser who not only knows
but also can rank his preferences, is also an ideal-type. Assuming markets are
efficient in order to analyse distributive efficiency of transport policy is one
matter; asserting that market-oriented policies will actually change individual
transport behaviour is quite another. Although cost and prices certainly influ-
ence human behaviour, they are by far not the only factors likely to influence
an individual’s or a firm’s transport decisions.11 Further, it is not at all clear
that internalising the external transport costs will lead to a reduction in road
transport: individuals and firms may simply reallocate resources from other ar-
eas to accommodate the higher costs of road transport. In this case, economic
measures aimed at relieving congestion and reducing carbon dioxide emissions
would clearly fail.
Last, the individualist market-based approaches have little to say about eq-
uity. As Himanen, Nijkamp and Padjen point out, an efficient distribution of
mobility may not necessarily be equitable. The market-based approaches avoid
the issue of what happens to those individuals unable to pay for the full costs
of their mobility. Given that there are, as yet, no financially viable alterna-
tives to road transport, the question arises of who will shoulder the burdens
of adaptation. One is left to suspect that those who are already economically
disadvantaged will be disproportionately hit by increased road prices while they
shift from one mode to the other.
The egalitarian ecological view, like the other policy frames, also has serious
deficiencies. In particular, the ecological approaches have rather low tolerance
for other modes of thought. First, the advocates of the egalitarian ecological
10See the literature on common pool resource (CPRs). Here, transaction and monitoring
costs are sufficiently high, as are the incentives to renege on contracts, that efficient market
transactions are impossible [Ostrom, 1991].
11Christopher Pollitt discusses incentive structures in public management [Pollitt, 1990].
Arguing against the Public Choice approach, he point out that monetary incentives are one
of a wide range of motivations for public servants.
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approach claims to understand peoples’ real human needs better than individ-
uals do themselves. Rather than the false needs the corrupt system imposes on
humans, such as a desire material goods, striving for status, or conforming to
social pressures, the ecological view points to real human needs: life in harmony
with the natural and the social world. Unlike the other approaches, the egal-
itarian ecological perspective aims not only to change societal structures but
also to alter the way individuals think. Within the ecological view there is a
definite moral ‘right path’: all other modes of thinking are polluted, corrupt,
and immoral.
Second, the egalitarian ecological approach has little respect for the civil
liberties that uphold a morally corrosive political and economic structure. Knof-
lacher states that the freedom of mobility as well as the freedom of settlement
contravene real human needs such as a right to a healthy life, a right to personal
development and a right to a home (“Recht auf Heimat”) [Knoflacher, 1997,
p.126]. Additionally, Knoflacher introduces a virulent strain of xenophobia into
his argumentation. Transit traffic through the Austrian alpine regions, he avers,
is little more than “. . . an alien body in the organism of the state. A healthy body
will, if it is to survive, will reject all alien bodies” [Knoflacher, 1997, p.121]. The
upshot of his argument is that regional and local freight and passenger transport
is justified because it is ‘life-sustaining’ to a particular community. Conversely,
transit transport, which benefits those outside a community, is an evil to be
eradicated.
This is not to say that all proponents of the egalitarian ecological view are
inherently xenophobic. Appendix D shows how a different national policy con-
text, namely that of the United Kingdom transport policy-making, gives rise to
different articulations of the same fundamental principles and beliefs. However,
many advocates of this policy story are obsessed with moral pollution from a
corrupt outside world. This is reflected in the elaborate and indiscriminate con-
spiracy theories this view constructs to explain transport policy problems. The
unholy alliance of big business, corrupt government, and dishonest researchers
conspires to maintain adequate profit levels at the cost of human well-being
[Knoflacher, 1997]. What is more, not only has big business captured govern-
ment agencies and university departments, it also has succeeded in poisoning
the minds of most people.
Although there can be no doubt that transport policy-making in the past and
at the moment is significantly, and perhaps unduly, influenced by commercial
interests,12 sweeping generalisations of the Knoflacherian type are inaccurate.
Closer inspection of transport policy-making reveals that, like all policy spheres
in advanced capitalist states, the state is fragmented, fissiparous, and highly
specialised. In short, transport policy-making also takes place in the “differen-
tiated polity”. The sheer number and variety of policy actors in these networks
(including Mr. Knoflacher) undermines the credibility of any general conspiracy
theory. Often, government agencies in different policy networks will pursue con-
tradictory policy goals. What is more, presently there is little evidence of iron
triangles in transport policy-making. For example, the European Commission,
often regarded as the lackey of big business interests by the ecological views, is
forcefully pushing road pricing policy options [Commission, 1995b] which run
12For an enlightening, if frustrating, insight into the relationship between stakeholder
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Table 6.3: Potential Impacts of Policy Arguments in the Transport Policy Debate
counter to the economic interests of large scale commercial enterprises.
We can see that if policy-making were left in the metaphorical hands of one
advocacy coalition alone, we would be left with rather one-sided policy solutions.
The hierarchical planning approaches would continue to construct transport in-
frastructure without regard to social or environmental effects. The individualist
market-based approaches would let market mechanisms allocate resources with-
out regard to the potential social exclusionary effects thus creating a ‘transport
underclass’. Last, the egalitarian ecological approach would implement policy
solutions that favour small-scale local activity regardless of the wider economic
and social implications.
Table 6.3 summarises the potential impacts of each policy story.
6.6 Conclusion
The concept of accessibility is defined in many different way by different types
of policy actors. These divergent definitions, however, are not random or ir-
rational, they merely reflect the differing policy frames through which policy
actors interpret transport phenomena. In order to explore these policy frames
and their significance for European transport policy-making, this chapter has
applied the conceptual framework for policy-oriented discourse analysis devel-
oped in Chapter 5 to the transport policy debate.
Using cultural theory’s typology of social solidarities, the chapter sounded
out the scope of policy conflict in the ‘contested terrain’ of transport policy in
Europe. The analysis revealed three competing policy stories in the transport
debate. The first, the hierarchical transport planning story, defines accessibility
as economic growth: in order to promote regional development, it argues, policy-
makers need to provide more infrastructure investment. The second story points
to the inherent inefficiencies of planning and regulation. Instead, it favours a
more individualist and market-based approach to solving transport problems:
accessibility here is a function of efficient market transactions. Last, the egal-
itarian ecological policy story rails against both systemic views: both state
and market have conspired to provide social and natural environments that no
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longer satisfy real human needs. What is more, present transport dilemmas
are merely a symptom of a fundamentally flawed, inequitable, and misanthropic
socio-economic system: here, accessibility stands for the exploitation of the weak
by the strong.
These three policy stories delineate the boundaries of the contested terrain in
the European transport policy debate: they both enable and constrain thinking
and argument about transport policy. Since policy frames are inherently norma-
tive (they legitimate fundamentally divergent forms of social organisation), and
since transport is a complex, uncertain and transversal policy domain, conflict in
transport policy debates is inevitable and endemic. The contending policy sto-
ries set up the structure of this policy conflict by carving out areas of agreement
and disagreement between the advocacy coalitions. In a triangular ‘contested
terrain’ like the European transport policy domain, agreement is likely to be
fragile because, on the one hand, it fails to hold beyond basic principles and
general policy measures and, on the other hand, is fundamentally limited since
common ground is accessible to only two advocacy coalitions. At more concrete
levels, agreement collapses under the weight of the incommensurable assump-
tions and modes of perception that divergent advocacy coalitions bring to the
debate. Science, research and ‘technical knowledge’ are unlikely to help resolve
this conflict: as we have seen advocacy coalitions also fundamentally disagree
about what is to count as a fact and what is to count as legitimate knowledge.
Given this constellation of discourses and advocacy coalitions in the contested
terrain, a policy subsystem featuring two or more advocacy coalitions would be
likely to give rise to an ‘intractable policy controversy’.
Thus, the discourse analysis would seem to suggest that inaccessible policy
subsystems are more effective in producing policy outputs than accessible policy
subsystems. However, since each policy frame is informed by a specific cultural
bias, policy stories invariably tell an incomplete and selective tale. Each type
of advocacy coalition and corresponding policy frame modelled by cultural the-
ory’s typology of social solidarities is characterised by specific weaknesses and
strengths. Epistemic sovereignty and dominance of the policy subsystem, then,
may lead to policy failure and unanticipated consequences. Although a wide
scope of policy conflict increases the likelihood of a “dialogue of the deaf”, the
triangular policy space also generates the widest reservoir of ideas, concepts and
strategies for tackling the European transport policy issue.
What, then, are the implications of this analysis for the European transport
policy debate?
First, policy conflict in an triangular contested terrain is endemic. Policy
actors rely incommensurable policy frames based on contending forms of
social organisation to perceive, define and understand the accessibility and
transport policy problems. The contending policy stories about transport
start from divergent assumptions, identify different causes and propose
conflicting policy solutions. This policy conflict unlikely to resolve in the
face of facts and objective knowledge because the transport debate the-
matises the validity and legitimacy of different forms of knowledge about
transport policy-making.
Second, the contending policy stories set-up tenuous spaces of agreement on
general principles and policy measures limited to pair-wise alliances of
advocacy coalitions. This agreement is fragile for two reasons. On the
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one hand, the imbalanced structure of agreement implies that a advocacy
coalition is always excluded from consensus. On the other hand, pairwise
agreement is limited to general principles and policy measures; it breaks
down into an intractable controversy at more concrete levels.
Third, since the likelihood of unanticipated consequences and policy failure in-
crease with decreasing accessibility of the policy subsystem, policy-makers
should enable a lively policy debate with as many advocacy coalitions as
possible. However, given that accessibility inevitably leads to value-driven
policy conflict, policy-makers need to ensure that the quality of commu-
nication and the responsiveness of the debate do not deteriorate in the






The past decade has been characterised by increasing fluidity in economic, social
and political life. Old certainties, such as the desirability of full-employment or,
for us in the West, the communist threat, have been spectacularly swept away.
In their stead we now find a whole host of ill-defined and ambiguous policy
challenges with a distinctly international flavour, such as the globalisation of
national economies, rapid technological change, social transformation, and, not
least, the environment. As we have noted in previous chapters, policy problems
have become messy.
It is probably not surprising, then, that growing uncertainty in economic,
political and social life is reflected in the ideas and concepts we use to describe
and make sense of the world. Social scientists are finding that their old tools
are becoming blunt in the face of new policy challenges. More precisely, social
scientists are becoming increasingly impatient with conventional tools because
they seem to merely scratch the surface of what appear to be highly complex
global problems. In an effort to find means of making sense of this increasingly
complex and uncertain world, social scientists are casting about for new ideas
and concepts.
The concept of environmental security has emerged precisely from within
this context. At first glance, the idea appears to be the logical consequence of
events in the past two decades. The end of the Cold War has, at least in the
minds of the tax-paying public, meant that the Soviet (or capitalist, depending
on where you stand) threat no longer legitimises social mobilisation on all levels.
Simultaneously, environmental degradation, beginning with local rubbish tips
and ending with the warming of global atmosphere, has, at least in the mind of
some of the public and various policy-makers, become a risk that can no longer
be ignored. By default, it would seem, the new threat to not only life and
limb, but also to institutions, our way of life and our culture, is environmental
degradation. It is in this field, the argument goes, polities ought to provide their
citizens with security from this global menace.
Yet, how useful is the notion of environmental security? This chapter applies
the discourse-analytical framework developed in Chapter 5 to evaluate three dif-
ferent streams in the environmental security literature: on centred on the idea
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of “environmental scarcity”, another that concentrates on the notion of “eco-
system, security” and a third concerned with “human security” [Shaw, 1997].
While not exhaustive, the selection of approaches covers the three main strands
of argumentation in the field of environmental security.1 At face value, these
approaches seem to vary widely in terms of their explanatory power, their ambi-
tions, the images they produce, and their political implications. Closer examina-
tion within the policy stories framework, however, reveals the close theoretical
and normative proximity of the different streams. What at first looks like a
wide scope of policy conflict is in fact nuanced difference situated along a con-
tinuum that trades-off analytical rigour for normative clout. In other words,
the concepts that aim to restructure international politics often do very little
to enlighten us about the actual interrelation of the environment and security.
Conversely, approaches that analytically pinpoint the relationship between en-
vironmental degradation and violent conflict, may deflate the case for urgent
political action. However, in either case, the three different streams are based
on shared model of resource depletion itself centred on a frame-specific and
therefore contestable perception of human needs. The circumstance that all
of the approaches uncritically accept the imputed relationship between human
needs, resource depletion and violent conflict disqualifies the idea of environmen-
tal security as a reliable model for policy-making. Based essentially in only one
of the possible policy frames identified by the cultural theory-inspired typology
of advocacy coalitions — hierarchy tempered with some egalitarian aspirations
at the “human security” end of the spectrum — policy-making based on the en-
vironmental security paradigm(s) is highly vulnerable to conceptual blindness.
What follows, then, is necessarily theoretical and somewhat abstract. First,
we will assess the scope of policy conflict by dissecting and comparing at the
internal logic of different models of environmental security. Then, section 7.2
explores the structure of policy conflict by evaluating the normative aspirations
of the different streams. Evaluating a concept always involves a degree of de-
construction: in the last section, we will perform the ‘archaeological task of
unearthing the assumptions that underpin the general approach to environmen-
tal security. This section also presents an alternative framework in which the
underlying question, that of human well-being, can be meaningfully addressed.
The following sections will apply the conceptual framework for policy-oriented
discourse analysis to evaluate different streams in the environmental security lit-
erature. The use of the discourse-analytical framework here differs from Chapter
6 and Chapter 8. Whereas these reconstruct policy stories of advocacy coali-
tions in terms of coherent narratives, the following analysis will use the policy
stories approach in its ‘elemental form’ to dissect and compare the different pol-
icy arguments. The aim is to compare the individual assumptions, inferences
and arguments rather than the policy stories in their entirety.
The chapter will evaluate the different streams of environmental security in
two stages. First, the chapter will examine the internal logic of the approaches.
Here, the analysis will isolate and compare the various component parts of the
approaches within the different streams. This, then, involves comparing
• the respective definitions of environmental security (the basic assumptions
or the setting);
1When the field first started emerging in the mid-1990s, which is also when the data for
this chapter was collected as part of a study funded by the Norwegian Research Council.
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• the causes and effects of environmental insecurity or environmental vul-
nerability (the problems or the villains);
• the policy recommendations (the policy solutions or the heroes).
In this way, this stage of analysis gauges the scope of potential policy conflict
between the different conceptual strands of the environmental security conver-
sation.
In the second stage — Section 7.2 — the analysis focuses on the normative
ambitions of the environmental security debate. Here, the chapter focuses on
the policy-relevant objectives that motivate the different strands of the environ-
mental security approach.
7.1 The Scope of Policy Conflict: Three Streams
of Thought about Environmental Security
Environmental security is an elusive concept. Theorists use different terms to
describe to similar phenomena and the field is still far from reaching a consensus
regarding the definition of environmental security. Since the idea of explicitly
linking environmental stress to security considerations (of any hue) is fairly
new with many contributors to the conversation “. . . the discourse about envi-
ronmental security is consequently unclear, exhibiting sometimes contradictory
and mixed metaphors” [Dyer, 1996, p.25]. There is no consensus on what ex-
actly is to be secured, or, in other words, what is at risk. “At present,”, Ekko
C. Van Ierland, Marcel G. Klaasen, Tom Nierop and Herman van der Wusten
maintain,
“environmental security is a fuzzy concept. It is apparently often
used as a cover term for discussing all kinds of phenomena and prob-
lems that are in one way or another related to the deterioration of
the environment. While initially encompassing the risk of violent
conflict or at least serious political destabilisation, the link between
environmental deterioration and potential conflict is in most of the
present ‘environmental security’–discussions lost or at best very par-
tial” [Ierland et al., 1996, p.3].
At the moment, they continue, the term “security” refers to either the security
of nation-states or the security of the social (and biological) existence of human
beings [Ierland et al., 1996, p.5].
There is, it would seem, some variance and scope in the way different theo-
rists have defined the idea of environmental security. The following sections will
apply the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 5 in order to explore this
definitional variance and its implications for policy-making. In particular, the
chapter uses the policy stories method to compare and analyse three different
streams in the environmental security literature.2 The basic purpose of all three
streams is to convince policy-makers to expand conventional ideas and defini-
tions of what security means, how security is to be brought about and what is to
2Here, the analysis relies on Brian Shaw’s typology of approaches in the environmental
security debate [Shaw, 1997].
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be secured. The first stream, closest to conventional notions of socio-political se-
curity, looks at the environmental factors that impinge on the security of nation
states. The second stream aims to expand the notion of security to include fun-
damental eco-systems that sustain all human communities. The third stream
of theorising suggests widening the purview of security to include ecological,
socio-political, cultural and economic determinants of well-being in an inclusive
notion of human security.
Reconstructing policy stories of the different theoretical streams means ex-
amining and comparing the underlying policy frames using the cultural theory-
inspired typology of policy frames introduced in Chapter 5. By identifying and
classifying the arguments according to contending cultural biases, the following
section hopes to gauge the theoretical and conceptual distance between the dif-
ferent streams. This, then, provides some indication of the scope of potential
conflict in the debate about environmental security.
Socio-Political Security: The Environment and Nation-States
The first policy story provides rigorously argued account of the way environmen-
tal degradation contributes to the eruption of violent conflict in nation states.
Centred on Thomas Homer-Dixon’s work, this stream of the environmental se-
curity literature examines how environmental issues catalyse the erosion of au-
thority, legitimacy and control in nation-states.
The Setting — Basic Assumptions
Homer-Dixon, probably the most prominent scholar in the field, generally avoids
the term “environmental security” in favour of environmental scarcity
[Homer-Dixon, 1994]. It is the scarcity of renewable resources, so the argu-
ment goes, that place stress on socio-political systems and, given the ‘right’
social conditions (such as inequitable access to resources, a lack in social capi-
tal, or ethnic conflict), will erupt into sub-national violence and strife. Security
is primarily a problem for socio-political systems:
“Civil violence is a reflection of troubled relations between state and
society. Peaceful state-society relations rest on the ability of the
state to respond to the needs of society — to provide, in other words,
key components of the survival strategy of the society’s members —
and on the ability of the state to maintain its dominance over groups
and institutions in society” [Homer-Dixon and Percival, 1995, p.5].
Yet socio-political systems crucially depend on a material basis that is, argues
Homer-Dixon, eroded by environmental degradation. Thus, Homer-Dixon’s idea
of security, which is never explicitly stated, is complex: security is something
that is affected by social, economic, political, and ecological factors. The latter
affect security by creating environmental scarcity that can lead to violent con-
flict. What is not clear, at least to the present reader, is whether environmental
scarcity is the primary cause of social unrest, whether conditions of environ-
mental scarcity merely add to and exacerbate existing grievances, whether envi-
ronmental scarcity acts as a catalyst for civil unrest, or whether environmental
factors are the detonator that push social tensions beyond the critical mass.
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The Villains — Policy Problems
How, then, does environmental scarcity lead to violence and strife within a
nation-state?
Homer-Dixon lists three types of environmental scarcity. First, “supply in-
duced scarcity is caused by the degradation and depletion of an environmental
resource, for example, the erosion of cropland” [Homer-Dixon and Percival, 1995,
p.6]. Second, demand induced scarcity “. . . results from population growth
within and a region or increased per capita consumption of a resource, either of
which increase the demand for the resource” [Homer-Dixon and Percival, 1995,
p.6]. Last, structural scarcity “. . . arises from the unequal social distribution of
a resource that concentrates it in the hands of relatively few people while the re-
maining population suffers from serious shortages”
[Homer-Dixon and Percival, 1995, p.6]. Homer-Dixon, in keeping with his gen-
eral approach, understands environmental insecurity as a result of socio-economic
forces.
In terms of impacts, Homer-Dixon maintains that the three forms of scarcity
interact to produce two distinct effects. In cases where rapid population growth
(demand-induced scarcity) is coupled with intensive resource degradation (supply-
induced scarcity), a situation he calls “resource capture” arises. As resources
decline, powerful groups, usually aided by misguided economic policies, secure
their inequitable share of the remaining resources thereby exacerbating the ex-
isting scarcities for the remaining population. When rapid population growth
is coupled with inequitable access to resources (such as land tenure patterns)
then “environmental marginalisation” sets in. The already disadvantaged pop-
ulation is forced, in an attempt to sustain itself, onto ecologically fragile and
economically unproductive land.
Homer-Dixon clearly spells out the consequences of both effects. Both re-
source capture and environmental marginalisation lead to lower agricultural
productivity and economic decline. As economies decline, the demands on the
state increase. At the same time, however, increasing environmental insecu-
rity undermines the capability of the state to meet these demands: tax rev-
enues decrease and powerful elites, Homer-Dixon argues, exhibit rent-seeking
behaviour to secure their share of inequitably distributed resources. This leads
to two proximate effects: environmental migration and a general weakening of
the state. This, in turn, means that a
“. . . widening gap between state capacity and demands on the state,
along with the misguided economic interventions such a gap often
provokes, aggravate popular and elite grievances, increases rivalry
between elite factions, and erodes the state’s legitimacy”
[Homer-Dixon, 1994, p.251].
Such a scenario, Homer-Dixon concludes, is conducive to deprivation conflicts
at the sub-national level.
However, internal civil unrest has international repercussions. Sub-national
violence further undermines the already badly bruised legitimacy of states. The
country in question then becomes prone to anarchic rule by warlords or it
becomes vulnerable to “strong man” politics. Authoritarian regimes, Homer-
Dixon contends, in turn are more likely to wage inter-state war on neighbouring
states in order to distract the population from domestic political problems.
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The Heroes — Policy Solutions
Security, Homer-Dixon and Percival somewhat tautologically propose, will be
best served by reducing environmental scarcity. Thus, they propose that tra-
ditional security concerns are best addressed in terms of environmental policy:
green policies mean security from violent conflict.
When, however, it comes to outlining the measures necessary to reduce envi-
ronmental scarcity, Homer-Dixon and Percival are remarkably bland. Keeping
“strife and turmoil” at bay means that
“. . . rich and poor countries alike must cooperate to restrain popu-
lation growth, to implement a more equitable distribution of wealth
within and among their societies, and provide for sustainable devel-
opment” [Homer-Dixon et al., 1993, p.45].
Sustainable development necessitates technical innovation in less developed coun-
tries. In order to achieve this, Homer-Dixon and Percival suggest that
“An intricate and stable system of markets, legal regimes, financial
agencies and educational and research institutions is a prerequisite
for the development and distribution of many new technologies . . . ”
[Homer-Dixon et al., 1993, p.45].
The environmental scarcity approach is a rigorous analytical framework
for understanding the relationship between environmental degradation and the
breakdown of civil order in nation states. This analytical precision, however,
comes at the price of prescriptive imagination: the policy solutions remain cau-
tiously general and commonplace.
Eco-System Security
The second stream of approaches in the environmental security literature urges
analysts and policy-makers to widen security to include fundamental biological
and ecological imperatives. Here, security of nation states in particular and
human communities in general is subsumed in and grounded on the security of
the underlying eco-system that support them. Ensuring the stability and safety
of these systems, then, is the most fundamental task of any security-oriented
policy.
The Setting — Basic Assumptions
In the eco-system security approach, environmental degradation threatens se-
curity by undermining our means of subsistence. Ecological security, surmises
Katrina Rogers, encompasses “. . . the goal of stakeholders to create a condition
where the physical surroundings of a community provide for the needs of its
inhabitants without diminishing its natural stock” [Rogers, 1997, p.29]. Secu-
rity is not primarily a function of stable macro-social processes (such as socio-
political, economic or even military systems). Rather, security is something to
be achieved, quite literally, at the micro-level of human existence. “Ecological
security”, Pirages asserts,
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“moves beyond the preparations to repel military assaults from en-
emy states to ensuring safety from other kinds of ecological and eco-
nomic challenges. These threats can include attacks by other species
(ranging from locusts to micro-organisms), redistribution from na-
ture (including floods, droughts, and famines), and economic failures
associated with ecosystem mismanagement” [Pirages, 1997, p.37].
In short, at the base of security stands a biological imperative that we can ig-
nore only at considerable peril. This imperative, argues Pirages, consists of four
equilibria: between demands of human populations and the sustaining capac-
ities of environmental systems; between the size and growth rates of various
human populations; between the demand of human populations and those of
other species; and, between human populations and pathogenic micro-organisms
[Pirages, 1997, p.38]. To maintain these equilibria means to ensure eco-system
security. Social factors, such as stable governments, democratic structures, etc.
are, at least for Pirages,3 incidental to achieving a more fundamental form of
security: they are no more than a means to a larger ecological end.
The Villains — Policy Problems
What, then, gives undermines the ability of eco-systems to sustain life?
Pirages pegs ecological insecurity firmly onto demographic factors.4 Four
demographic issues, Pirages contends, contribute to ecological insecurity. First,
population growth creates demand for resources that, sooner or later, must
strain natural environments beyond their carrying capacities. Pirages cites wa-
ter wars in the Middle East as evidence that unchecked population growth
threatens security. Second, population movements, or environmental refugees,
pose a further threat to ecological security. On the one hand, increasing rural-
urban migration in the developing world, leads slum creation in ever expanding
mega-cities. Miserable living conditions in these slums, in turn, give rise to the
spread of disease, the mutation of new pathogens, and generally foster human
vulnerability to micro-organisms. On the other hand, increasing South-North
migration, argues Pirages, has led to increasing recalcitrance in industrialised
host countries which harbours the potential for future ethnic conflict. Third,
population greying, more commonly referred to as population ageing, is en-
dangering the social (but not ecological!) security of workers in the industri-
alised North. The growing tension between the retired and ever decreasing base
of contribution payers will increasingly lead to “inter-generational skirmishes”
[Pirages, 1997, p.41]. Last, Pirages outlines differential population growth rates
as a potential geo-political problem in the future. Differential population growth
rates, the example used is the difference between population growth in Islamic
and non-Islamic countries, will, in the future, reshape the geo-political map.
Pirages identifies distinct effects for each demographic issue that currently
threatens eco-system security. First, rapid population growth leads to environ-
mental degradation in Homer-Dixon’s sense. The more population increases,
the less the land can sustain its population leading to economic decline and
political instability. Internal civil war and even inter-state war are the logical
3Katrina Rogers speaks of the need for communicative ecological cooperation, see below.
4In fairness, Pirages maintains that demographic variables are one of the many reasons for
ecological insecurity but unfortunately leaves us in the dark about what the other factors may
be [Pirages, 1997].
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consequences.5 Second, environmental migration, particularly southern rural-
urban migration, results in the establishment of inhumane urban slums. Here,
Pirages maintains, humans become particularly vulnerable to attacks by micro-
organisms. Not only do the incidences of diseases such as malaria, cholera, HIV,
etc. increase, they are likely to mutate into new, potentially more lethal strains.
What is more, urban areas are large resource sinks leaving an “ecological foot-
print” on the surrounding areas adding to the already considerable ecological
insecurity. Third, population greying, will invariably lead to intergenerational
conflict in the industrialised North. Overly generous social security arrange-
ments, established in times of full-employment and stable population growth,
will become an intolerable burden for the remaining workforce as populations in
the North grow older. Pirages notes that demographic forecasts “. . . conjure up
visions of a new proletariat toiling long hours in order to pay taxes necessary
to keep politically organised retirees in the style to which they have become ac-
customed” [Pirages, 1997, p.41]. The result, Pirages surmises, will be “political
turmoil”.6 Last, differential population growth rates between different countries,
Pirages argues, will shift the geopolitical balance. Yet, “. . . although violent con-
flict based on differential population growth is unlikely, it will be an important
force in reshaping the political map over the next decades” [Pirages, 1997, p.41].
What this exactly means for ecological security remains unclear.
The Solutions — Policy Solutions
The eco-system security approach, in particular Pirages, proposes a detailed cat-
alogue of policy recommendations which centre on slowing population growth.
Pirages suggests that international family planning policy ought to re-emphasise
individual responsibilities. Present population policies, argues Pirages, are in-
sufficient because the biological imperative is consistently ignored in favour of
short-term political interests. Pirages laments that
“. . . at the Rio de Janeiro ‘Earth Summit’ of 1992 and the 1994 Cairo
conference, the core population issue was very much ignored be-
cause of pressure from religious institutions, various women’s groups,
and politicians from the poor countries who blamed the bulk of the
world’s environmental ills on the industrialised world” [Pirages, 1997,
p.43].
In terms of environmental migration, Pirages proposes an intensification of fam-
ily planning in rural areas of less developed countries. Further, he sees a strong
role for education (presumably because there is a positive correlation between
fertility rates and education) and proposes that economic growth be redirected
to smaller cities in less developed countries. Last, he proposes a system of
incentives to convince farmers to remain in rural areas.
Interestingly, Pirages does not have any solutions for the problems asso-
ciated with ageing populations in industrialised North. Pirages suggests that
“[n]ew definitions of and requirements for retirement are needed as well as a
greater understanding of the burdens to be shouldered by coming generations”
5Unfortunately, Pirages leaves us in the dark why these are logical consequences.
6Unfortunately, Pirages again does not go on to explain what precise form this turmoil will
take. We are left to expect the worst. Chapters 8 and 9 provide a more differentiated view.
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[Pirages, 1997, p.44] but then leaves us in the dark how these definitions and
this understanding is to be achieved.
Thus, the stream emphasising eco-system security aims to expand the policy
focus to a more basal notion of what needs to be secured: the fundamental
ecological life-support systems of human communities. On this view, securing
eco-systems from population pressures and environmental degradation is the
basic prerequisite for any type of security policy.
Human Security
The third stream in the environmental security literature — the human se-
curity7 approach — suggests expanding the idea of security beyond both the
socio-political or the eco-system security view. Although the precise terminol-
ogy varies,8 security becomes an all-encompassing term relating to the social,
economic, political, and ecological well-being of individual human beings.
The Setting — Basic Assumptions
What constitutes such a expansive concept of security? Environmental security,
contends Norman Myers,
“. . . amounts to human well-being: not only protection from harm
and injury but access to water, food, shelter, health, employment,
and other basic requisites that are the due of every person on Earth.
It is the collectivity of these citizen’s needs — overall safety and
quality of life — that should figure prominently in the nation’s view
of security” (Myers quoted in [Conca et al., 1995, p.262]).
Thus, security becomes the freedom to satisfy human needs (both biological
and social). Similarly, Tuchman-Matthews understands environmental secu-
rity in terms of two aspects: first, the security from violent conflict (both
national and sub-national) and, second, security to meet one’s basic needs
[Tuchman-Matthews, 1993]. Westing provides the most inclusive definition: en-
vironmental security, he holds, “can only be attained and sustained within the
framework of comprehensive human security, of which the former is an inextrica-
ble component” [Westing, 1994, p.113]. Human security, he continues, consists
of six elements: democracy, education, health, old-age security, security from
violence, and international security.
Defined as human well-being, environmental security transcends, or at least
is designed to transcend, other conceptions of security. Environmental secu-
rity becomes the master concept from which all other notions of security flow
[Dyer, 1996, p.28]. Thus, in comparison to the socio-political and biological im-
perative positions, the well-being argument is more explicitly normative: human
well-being, as defined in terms of environmental security, is less of description
of a particular social or biological state than a value to which human societies
ought to aspire.
7Following Brian Shaw’s typology of security discourses [Shaw, 1997].
8Norman Myers speaks of “environmental security” [Myers, 1993b, Myers, 1993a], Jessica
Tuchman-Matthews describes “global environmental security” [Tuchman-Matthews, 1993],
and Arthur H. Westing contemplates “human security”
citeWes94.
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The Villains — Policy Problems
The human security approach outlines both natural and social sources of en-
vironmental insecurity. Myers lists five types of environmental stress as the
cause for insecurity: sea-level rise, salination of croplands, shrinking of water re-
sources, storm damage, and drought. However, social factors equally contribute
to individual insecurity: these “. . . include faulty economic policies, inflexible
political structures, oligarchical regimes, oppressive governments and other ad-
verse factors that have nothing directly to do with the environment” (Myers
in [Conca et al., 1995, p.258]). True to the universalist stance in the human
security approach, Myers also points to the wasteful consumption habits in the
North. Yet, the “. . . biggest factor of all in many developing countries is the pop-
ulation explosion, still to enter its most explosive phase” [Conca et al., 1995,
p.258]. Population pressure, he continues, “. . . generate discord and strife of
multiple form, often erupting in violence” [Conca et al., 1995, p.258].
In a similar vein, Jessica Tuchman-Mattews contends that there are two vari-
ants of environmental degradation. First, micro-level resource degradation, such
as deforestation or desertification, renders individuals environmentally insecure.
The root cause for resource degradation is population growth: in fact, Tuchman-
Matthews argues, population growth “. . . lies at the core of most environmental
trends” [Tuchman-Matthews, 1993, p.275]. The impacts of population growth
are mediated, she continues, through institutions. There are, then, additional
factors that can exacerbate (or ameliorate) rapid population growth such as pat-
terns of land tenure and resource mismanagement. Second, Tuchman-Matthews
identifies global climate change as the other source of individual insecurity. The
prime culprits here are fossil fuel use and deforestation.
Westing singles out desertification as the prime cause of environmental inse-
curity. This, in turn, is caused by two interrelated factors: population increases
(straining the carrying capacity of natural resources) and poor policy. The lat-
ter Westing specifies as detrimental livestock policies as well as the introduction
of mechanised agriculture in developing countries. Desertification occurs, he
surmises, via soil erosion and nutrient dumping.
The human security approaches only vaguely link causes and effects of envi-
ronmental insecurity. Tuchman-Matthews outlines the potential effects for the
two causes of environmental insecurity. Resource degradation leads to economic
decline which in turn causes political instability and internal violent conflict. As
a result, individuals flee creating socio-political as well as ecological strains in
the host countries. Tuchman-Matthews observes that “. . . where refugees set-
tle, they add to the local demand for food and put new burdens on the land,
spreading like a disease the environmental stress that forced them from their
homes” [Tuchman-Matthews, 1993, p.30]. Not unlike Homer-Dixon’s line of
argument, Tuchman-Matthews maintains that internal civil war increases the
socio-political system’s vulnerability to authoritarian regimes and external sub-
version.
global climate change, the second cause of environmental insecurity, will
have, contends Tuchman-Matthews, three broad effects. First, global climate
change will imply huge adjustment costs as economies adapt to new climatic
conditions. Second, the economic capacities of national economies will severely
suffer from the imputed effects of global climate change. Last, the effects of
climate change will adversely affect the health of citizens in a particular polity.
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Westing, who specifically focuses on environmental migration, specifies the
effects of environmental insecurity more precisely. The impacts of environmental
migration, argues Westing, can be differentiated according to different sites.
Westing lists five categories of impacts. First, environmental migration affects
the site of origin. The remaining population, which usually consists of the most
vulnerable (the elderly, women and children), must rely on a depleted resource
base. Second, if migrants move to domestic rural sites, the encroachment on
traditional lands causes friction that may lead to violent conflict. The danger of
civil war is particularly acute when governments of less developed countries force
relocations and latifundations that encroach on traditional land use patterns.
Third, Westing argues, like Pirages, that domestic rural-urban migration leads
to slum creation in the cities. This, in turn, may create an army of disaffected
and disgruntled squatters whose potential for violence is considerable. Fourth,
if environmental refugees cross national borders into other non-industrialised
countries, this, maintains Westing, increases the economic and political strains
within and between the affected nations and can, in some circumstances, lead to
interstate war. Last, migration to foreign industrial sites increases xenophobia
which, in turn, leads to stricter immigration policies.
The links in the human security approaches thus are rather tenuous and con-
tingent on many socio-economic conditions. These, however, are rarely specified:
one is left with the impression that environmental stress leads directly to violent
conflict.
The Solution — Policy Solutions
The universalist human security positions are most ambitious in terms of policy
proposals. Although Myers is unclear about what concrete measures govern-
ments ought to adopt, he is adamant that environmental security be included
in national security policy formulation. The aim, he argues, must be the foster-
ing of international co-operation to face the problems of environmental security.
International relations has changed to such an extent that nationally oriented
policy is wholly inappropriate:
“Hitherto we have adopted a stance that essentially says that what
I gain must be what you lose, and vice versa. Today, for the first
time and for all times henceforth, we face situations where we shall
all win together or we shall all lose together” [Myers, 1993a, p.259].
Similarly, Tuchman-Matthews suggests a radical re-thinking of security pol-
icy. She envisages a two-pronged strategy: one the one hand, security policy
must focus on combating population grow and environmental degradation; on
the other hand, policy must break down the institutional barriers to interna-
tional co-operation and technological innovation. The former strategy includes
an intensification of family planning policies for the South and a reduction in en-
ergy consumption in the North. Overcoming institutional barriers, she surmises,
will be the greatest challenge: new forms of international co-operation (meaning
involving Non-Governmental Organisations or NGOs in policy-making), a reori-
entation of the market to reflect environmental costs, and new forms of national
accounts will be necessary to secure environmental security.
Westing, in turn, presents a concise set of policy recommendations that
ought to integrated in a policy to secure human security. He proposes six policy
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options:
1. curtail population growth
2. support environmental education
3. provide for protection of biodiversity
4. encourage participatory forms of local and national government
5. provide opportunities for income generation outside the livestock sector
6. foster political security and facilitate ecogeographical (subregional) co-
operation
In sum, the “human security” strand of thinking in the environmental secu-
rity debate aims to expand the issue of security to include all possible dimensions
that contribute to human well-being. Unlike Homer-Dixon’s more disciplined
analytical exercise, the “human security” approaches are content to paint rather
broad-brush picture of how a wide spectrum of components and their relation-
ships contribute to security (or insecurity).
Delimiting the Contested Terrain in Environmental Secu-
rity
What, then, is the scope of potential conflict in policy debates about environ-
mental security?
Using the bootstrapped conceptual framework for discourse analysis reveals
the conceptual and theoretical proximity of the three streams in the environmen-
tal security literature. Essentially, the streams share a basic hierarchical policy
frame. Each of the approaches points to uncontrolled population growth in the
developing world as the fundamental cause of environmental insecurity. More-
over, each of the approaches links population growth to environmental degra-
dation and violent conflict in terms of a similar mechanism: socio-ecological
carrying capacity. Here, a eco-system will be able to support human activ-
ity up to a certain limit but will collapse precipitously when these limits are
overstepped. This, then, conforms to the hierarchical ‘myth of nature’ used to
socially construct nature as a place that tolerant within specific bounds but
unforgivingly turbulent beyond these bounds (see Chapter4. While the differ-
ent policy stories link causes (population growth) with effects in a more or less
specific and rigorous way, the conclusions and policy recommendations point in
the same direction: policy-makers must create governance structures capable of
steering human communities and human behaviour clear of activity that, in the
long-run, will overburden the carrying capacity of eco-systems.
This is not to say that there are no differences between the streams. The
most prominent discrepancy between the streams is in reach on the one hand
and analytical rigour on the other. In general, the closer a theory is to conven-
tional ideas of security, the more coherent and comprehensible the link between
environmental degradation and security. The cost of analytical rigour, however,
is a loss of rhetorical power: approaches where environmental degradation is one
of many factors leading to violence, internal strife and war (e.g. Homer-Dixon)







Figure 7.1: The Continuum of Streams in the Environmental Security Debate
by population growth) is portrayed as a direct cause of violent conflict. Not
surprisingly, the loudest calls for social, political and institutional change can
be heard from those theorists who depart furthest from conventional security
concepts. It is in these calls that the discourse-analytical framework recognises
elements and aspirations of a contending policy frame: the ‘egalitarian’ policy
frame that suggests constructing inclusive societies based on a view of nature as
fragile and ephemeral [Douglas, 1992, Thompson et al., 1990]. Policy proposals
demanding the empowerment of local communities in the developing world or
the tempering of profligate consumption habits in the developed countries (see
the Introduction) indicate the influence of the egalitarian cultural bias in the
human security policy story.
Therefore the three policy stories of the different streams in the environ-
mental security discourse are situated along a continuum. In terms of policy
demands, Dyer describes this continuum as follows:
“At one end of the spectrum are proposals which advocate adding
selected parts of the environmental agenda to the list of things to be
secured militarily . . . At the other end of the spectrum are proposals
for restructuring the entire political order in such a way as to allow
an effective response to a perceived environmental crisis of immense
proportions” [Dyer, 1996, p.25].
Unlike the transport policy stories discussed in Chaper 6, the policy arguments
for environmental security are not fundamentally incompatible. Rather, they
represent variations and extension of the same basic policy theme: causes of
environmental degradation undermine security but can be controlled by appro-
priate governance structures. This also restricts the reservoir of ideas, strategies
and concepts available for addressing the issue of environmental security.
Figure 7.1 depicts the shape of the contested terrain in the environmental
security debate.
7.2 The Basis of Agreement: The Normative
Ambitions of Environmental Security
In the previous section we have seen that the different approaches to conceptu-
alising environmental security vary along a continuum based on a shared basic
policy frame. At one end of this spectrum, the approaches that adhere more
closely to the traditional concept of security are more cautious both in terms of
analytical rigour and policy proposals. At the other end, the approaches that
depart from current security thinking tend to favour broad generalisations in
order to highlight the relationship between the environment and security.
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Thus, the shared policy frame effectively limits the scope of policy conflict
to issues of strategy. The fundamental issue between the different streams is
where to situate policy demands along the continuum. The basic thrust and
direction of policy, however, is common to all approaches.
How, then, is this basic thrust articulated? Broadly speaking, the environ-
mental security approaches share four normative aims:
1. To elevate the environmental issue into the sphere of ‘high politics’
2. To re-conceptualise the notion of security
3. To reconceptualise the idea of the nation state
4. To redefine the nature of international co-operation
Promotion of the Environmental Issue into the Realm of
‘High Politics’
Many political scientists conveniently distinguish so-called “high politics” from
“low politics”. The former category, populated with grand issues of importance
to the nation state, requires savvy statesmanship and competent leadership:
the issues include economic policy, defence policy, and, of course, foreign policy.
The more mundane, less glamorous matters are, maintains Hoffmann, a matter
for low politics: issues such as social policy, health policy, and environmental
policy fall into this category.
By explicitly relating environmental factors with traditional safety concerns,
proponents of the environmental security approach are attempting to promote
the environmental issue from the nether regions of low politics to the lofty
peaks of high politics. Presumably, the aim is to have nations pursue environ-
mental policy with the same vigour (and expenditure) with which they pursue
national security. Linking the environment to national security issues, Myers
argues, will force nations to “. . . recognise that many forms of environmental
impoverishment constitute a distinctive category of international problems . . . ”
[Myers, 1993a, p.259].
Although there have been responses at political level indicating that envi-
ronmental concerns may in future become part of security policy deliberation,
some proponents of the environmental security approach envisage a broader
role for environmental security. Pirages notes that the greening’ of standard
operating procedures in the defence and security sector is not enough. He con-
tends that “. . . as yet there has been little effort to move beyond cosmetics and
use ecological perspectives to re-orient long-term foreign policy planning and
security thinking” [Pirages, 1997, p.37]. Thus, depending of course on the par-
ticular environmental security school, the aim of the advocates of environmental
security is to place the environmental issue at the top of the political agenda
internationally.
Reconceptualising the Notion of Security
A more obvious ambition the advocates of environmental security pursue, which
of course is not unrelated to the promotion of the environmental cause, is to
redefine the idea of security. Since World War II, and arguably even since the
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French Revolution, security has referred to the political and military security of
nation states: security has meant the safety of nation states’ sovereignty from ex-
ternal attack or internal subversion. However, Emma Rothschild maintains, the
notion of security has been extended in the last two decades [Rothschild, 1995].
Specifically, she continues, the idea of security, or more precisely what is to
be secured as well as who is responsible for securing it, has been extended in
four directions: upwards from the nation-state to the international community;
downwards form the state to the individual citizen, and side-wards from the
state to organisations that work in an international context (such as NGOs).9
The origins of this development date back to the 1970s and 1980s. The oil
shocks of 1973 and 1978 vividly demonstrated that national security was not
simply a matter of superior weaponry and strategy: nation-states were also
economically vulnerable. In the 1980s, the increasing importance of environ-
mental groups and parties, not to mention environmental catastrophes such as
Bhopal, Sandoz, and Chernobyl, brought the environmental threat to the at-
tention of both policy-makers and the general public. Increasingly, theorists
began to question the suitability of conventional security concepts: present na-
tional security policy can only provide security from a fraction of all the threats
that face individuals and nation states. Dyer summarises the bankruptcy of the
conventional security ideas as follows:
“A continuing dependence on the troubled concepts of sovereignty,
national interest and (state) foreign policy, which have historically
provided the framework and rationale for military threats and ac-
tions, suggests that the notion of ‘security’ does not lend itself well to
the project of conceptualising a response to emerging global changes
— not least global environmental change”[Dyer, 1996, p.23].
The environmental security concept is an attempt to rise to these challenges.
Security should no longer be seen as an exclusively military matter: Myers
contends that
“. . . national security is no longer about fighting forces and weaponry
alone. It relates increasingly to watersheds, croplands, forests, ge-
netic resources, climate, and all other factors rarely considered by
military experts and political leaders, but that taken together de-
serve to be viewed as equally crucial to a nations security as military
prowess” [Myers, 1993a, p.258].
What is more, environmental security implies transcending national boundaries.
The traditional introspective approach, whereby concern for security ends at
the national boundary (or the sphere of influence), no longer suffices. Whereas
conventional security meant that “. . . national security was a zero-sum concept:
the greater one nation’s security, the less another’s”, nowadays national security
“. . . depends increasingly on global security” [Tuchman-Matthews, 1993, p.34].
Dyer locates this change in theoretical perspective in the broader context
of international relations theory. In the past, the field has been dominated by
two schools of thought: the Neo-Realist approach and the Neo-Liberal schools
9Rothschild’s excellent article goes on to argue that many of the ‘new’ ideas currently
informing debate can be traced back to liberal thinkers of the 17th and 18th century (such as
Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, and Marquis de Condorcet).
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of thought. Currently, many students of international relations are becoming
increasingly dissatisfied with the paucity of theoretical choice. Dyer observes
that “. . . the theories of inter-state relations (whether they involve state-centric
Realism or liberal internationalism) are no longer tenable — at least for explain-
ing environmental politics in particular, but also generally as well” [Dyer, 1996,
p.30]. Not only does the concept of security need to be rethought, but also the
way in which theorists conceptualise international relations in general is in dire
need of repair. Dyer muses that
“. . . international theory must become the theory of international
processes, incorporating multiple actors and considering global, re-
gional and local relations as aspects of the whole. It is precisely this
aspect of considering the world as a whole which characterises the
global approach. Globalisation, as a central concept, indicates the
relative autonomy and distinct logic of the global, as opposed to the
national or international” [Dyer, 1996, p.30].
Redefining the Nation-State
The logical consequence of the environmental security concept (although by no
means a consequence that all advocates of the concept vocalise) is the redefi-
nition, or rather dilution and dissolution, of the idea of a nation state. Again,
theorists vary considerably in this respect.
Some theorists, most notably Thomas Homer-Dixon, are content with just
pointing out that there is a relationship between environmental degradation,
socio-political imbalance and violent conflict. The implication here is that the
security policy community will no longer be able to ‘do its job’ effectively, namely
protect the state from harm, if they continue to ignore environmental factors
in the security equation. Other theorists, those at the universalist or human
security end of the spectrum, argue that the concept of environmental security
is meaningful only if the theoretical as well as political context within which
the concept of security is used radically changes. A new, more inclusive (or,
depending on the particular approach, all-encompassing) concept of security
needs a new global socio-political environment in which it can be applied to
ensure the ‘right’ policy outcomes.
For Myers, global environmental interdependence challenges the concept of
the sovereign nation-state. He contends that
“[n]o nation can meet the challenges of global change on its own.
Nor can any nation protect itself from the actions — or inactions
— of others . . . It postulates as big a change for the nation-state as
any since the emergence of the nation-state four hundred years ago”
[Myers, 1993a, p.259].
The general line of argument is that the community of nation states is poorly
equipped, both in terms of ideas as well as institutions, to tackle global envi-
ronmental problems. Ecology “. . . is about interconnections and circular cau-
sation, indirect effects and long time scales . . . ,” Simon Dalby argues; that is
why “. . . the political mechanisms that have traditionally dealt with decision-
making in the state system are often not adequate. Conventional geopolitical
reasoning is not appropriate for dealing with environmental issues on a global
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scale” [Dalby, 1996, p. 469]. He warns against merely tacking environmen-
tal concerns onto traditional ideas of security: the new concept of environ-
mental security in old geo-political ideological and structures would do more
harm than good. Similarly, since the “. . . traditional prerogatives are poorly
matched with the needs for regional co-operation and decision-making”, Jessica
Tuchman-Matthews concludes, “. . . our accepted definitions of the limits of na-
tional sovereignty as coinciding with national borders is obsolete”
[Tuchman-Matthews, 1993, pp.285–286].
Reconceptualising the Nature of International Co-operation:
Global Interdependency
What is to take the place of nation-states? The case for environmental security
implies a commitment to international (or global) co-operation. Dyer notes that
“. . . the developing logic of international environmental relations points
to regional and local actors rather than to traditional inter-state re-
lations. Global relations can be seen as succeeding what was begun
by the phenomenon of transnational relations by further condition-
ing, if not eliminating, the role of nation states” [Dyer, 1996, p.23].
Environmental threats to security, so the argument goes, do not respect national
borders: it follows that co-operation at trans- and international level is needed
to face the security challenges posed by, say, global climate change.
Yet, the theorists are not very clear on the form this co-operation should take.
On a theoretical level, Dyer suggests that environmental security become a ‘uni-
versal value’ which would replace the interest based theories of Realpolitik with
normative approaches. Tuchman-Matthews, in turn, emphasises that, since the
world is becoming economically, politically and ecologically interdependent, en-
vironmental problems demand local action. Such action, she continues, presup-
poses multi-lateral diplomacy. What is more, since nation states are ill-equipped
to deal with global challenges, implementation of policy must be devolved to
NGOs. Yet, Tuchman-Matthews maintains that present institutional structures
are the problem: “But if the technological opportunities are boundless, the so-
cial, political and institutional barriers are huge” [Tuchman-Matthews, 1993,
p.285]. Here she somewhat vaguely suggests a form of world government which,
guided by science, would re-install international law.10
Katrina Rogers suggests that increasing international co-operation is not
merely about constructing institutions. Rather, ecological security “. . .must
also be about initiating and maintaining sustained communicative mechanisms
for cooperation in a number of political, social, and economic areas that include
environmental issues” [Rogers, 1997, p.31]. This, in turn, implies that
“. . . the environment and conflict research lends empirical power to
the idea that states should support multilateral cooperation in de-
velopment programmes, such as family planning, encourage local
communities to initiate or continue the slow, laborious process of
building multi-partnership arrangements and improving communi-
cation” [Rogers, 1997, p.31].
10This, of course, corresponds to the Enlightenment idea of the world citoyen (Weltbürger)
as Emma Rothschild rightly points out.
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She then goes on to suggest that different state and non-state players, such as
NGOs and Multi National Corporations (MNCs), be involved in the process
for constructing better communications. Yet, it is unclear what Rogers means
when she refers to ‘communicative mechanisms’: are they institutions (such as
parliaments or soviets) or are they the linguistic and pragmatic preconditions of
human communication à la Habermas? We are given no indication either way.
In sum, the normative aspirations of environmental security approaches play
a fundamental role in the functioning of these approaches. The environmental
security idea, in any of its guises, aims at restructuring both the discourse and
practise of international relations. Again, theorists differ in the degree to which
they advocate socio-political and ideological change. This, however, may have
more to do with differing rhetorical strategies than with basic differences in
opinion between the thinkers: the overall aim is to bring about a paradigm
shift in order to place the environment on the top of the political agenda, the
differences merely reflect various strategies of pursuing this end. For this rea-
son, proponents of the different streams in the environmental security debate
are highly likely to agree on fundamental principles as well as concrete policy
measures. Disagreement, in turn, is likely to be limited to strategic issues of
policy purview.
Table 7.1 summarised the three schools of thought in environmental security.
7.3 Potential Impacts: Why Environmental Se-
curity is not a Useful Concept
The previous sections have outlined three streams in the environmental security
debate. But is the idea of environmental security useful for identifying problems
concerning the environment and security, on the one hand, and will application
of the model suggest the policy responses that will ameliorate these problems,
on the other? In other words, what are the potential policy impacts of the
environmental security debate?
In order to answer this question, we have to unearth the underlying assump-
tions of the environmental security discourse and test their plausibility. Recall
that although the different schools of thought vary somewhat with respect to
the definition of environmental security, the observed effects of environmental
insecurity, and the policy action recommended, the approaches are fairly unan-
imous on the causes of environmental insecurity: population growth. This is no
coincidence but rather the logical consequence of the fundamental assumptions
made by different thinkers that place them into the same broad hierarchical
policy frame. In particular, each stream assumes that environmental degrada-
tion is inextricably connected to population growth by the idea of human needs.
This model, in turn, leaves the policies to bring about environmental security
vulnerable to conceptual blindness and unanticipated consequences.
Environmental Security, the Homogenised Individual, and
Rapid Population Growth
The conceptual centrepiece of all environmental security approaches is the ra-
tional, atomised, and acultural individual. Unlike, however, the Homo Eco-
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rational individual is hopelessly short-sighted. The individuals that populate
a world characterised by environmental insecurity are rational when it comes
to their own immediate utility, but woefully ignorant when it comes to societal
well-being. Thus, the sum of individual actions that may seems rational in the
short-run, so the argument goes, can lead to detrimental outcomes in the long-
run. The problem here is that these detrimental outcomes remain hidden to
each individual actor until revealed by experts. Although the proponents of en-
vironmental security are not very explicit on what exactly their unit of analysis
is, a careful reading of the different churches shows that the rational individual
is the conceptual motor that drives all three approaches. The fuel that feeds
the conceptual logic of the argument is rapid population growth.
Taken at face-value, Homer-Dixon’s model seemingly locates the sources of
environmental scarcity at three analytically distinct levels. Structural scarcity is
brought about by socio-economic factors (unequal access to resources), supply-
side scarcity is caused by poor management of renewable resources, and demand-
induced scarcity originates in individual household fertility decisions (rapid pop-
ulation growth). It would seem that Homer-Dixon has struck an impressive bal-
ance between structural determinants, discursive determinants (poor resource
management as a result of inferior technical knowledge), and individual choice.
This is indeed what he has in mind when he contends that a
“. . . reduction in the quantity or quality of a resource shrinks the re-
source pie, while population growth divides the pie into smaller slices
for each individual, and unequal resource distribution means that
some groups get disproportionally larger slices” [Homer-Dixon, 1994,
p.247].
Yet, on closer inspection, the social and discursive elements of Homer-Dixon’s
model are little more than the supporting cast for the ‘real’ cause of civil un-
rest: individual (and asocial) rational responses to population growth. There
are three parts to this argument. First, although Homer-Dixon goes to great
lengths to explain that environmental scarcity only indirectly causes civil unrest
and violent conflict [Homer-Dixon and Percival, 1995], he implies that individ-
ual rational responses to environmental scarcity undermine the legitimacy of
states in the long run. Homer-Dixon observes that the
“. . . likelihood of civil strife is greatest when multiple pressures at dif-
ferent levels in society interact to increase grievance and opportunity
[for violent conflict] simultaneously. Our third hypothesis says that
environmental scarcity will change both variables, by contributing
to economic crisis and by weakening institutions such as the state”
(quoted in [Conca et al., 1995, p.251]).
In the model, economic crisis in and of itself does not lead to a political crisis
and violent conflict. It is rather the rational responses of individuals attempting
to maximise their self-interest, such as the rent-seeking behaviour of the elites
on the one hand and migration of the poor on the other, that put pressure on
the state. So although violence will erupt only if there are attenuating social
conditions (for example a decline in social capital), Homer-Dixon implies that
these conditions will sooner or later be brought about by the rational individ-
ual responses to environmental scarcity. In short, social coping mechanisms,
218
such as parliaments, regional governments, but also village level informal insti-
tutions, will, in the long-run, not be able to contain the individual’s self-seeking
behaviour which boils down to essentially two strategies: fight or flight.
Second, it is highly questionable whether the three causes of environmental
scarcity are of equal importance to the functioning of the model. This becomes
clear when Homer-Dixon discusses the interaction of the different factors. Recall
that if resource degradation is combined with population growth, a situation of
“resource capture” evolves (see above). Likewise, persons become “ecologically
marginalised” if consumption of a resource increases within the context of un-
equal access to resources. The common denominator here is a net increase in per
capita consumption, i.e. population growth. Thus, it appears that population
growth is a more fundamental source of environmental scarcity.
Third, this suspicion is confirmed when we apply the idea of environmental
scarcity to advanced capitalist states. Homer-Dixon claims to have uncovered
a set of relationships of universal validity. Environmental scarcity potentially
undermines the legitimacy of all states: the reason he concentrates on less devel-
oped countries in his analysis is that “[p]oor societies will be particularly affected
since they are less able to buffer themselves from environmental scarcities and
the social crises they cause” [Homer-Dixon, 1994, pp.245-246] and will, presum-
ably, provide more vivid illustrations of scarcity-induced civil unrest. Yet, the
industrialised North is not experiencing deprivation conflicts, civil unrest, or
even violent conflict.11 The question is: why?
Unfortunately we are left to reconstruct the argument ourselves. One expla-
nation may be that the social preconditions of violent scarcity-induced conflict
are not given in the industrialised North. Generally, the governments of the in-
dustrialised North function within the context of stable socio-political structures
generally perceived to be legitimate by most of the citizenry. This explanation
would, however, undermine Homer-Dixon’s entire theoretical edifice: if violent
conflict is primarily a function of social and political factors, then what is the
attraction of a model centred on environmental scarcity? If we can quell civil
unrest and violent conflict by applying the standard tools of political science,
economics, and policy-making, why complicate matters by incorporating envi-
ronmental factors into an already complex equation? In any case, Homer-Dixon
implies that environmental scarcities will deplete stocks of social capital and
undermine state legitimacy in the long-run.
Another possible explanation is that there is no environmental scarcity in
Northern countries that could lead to grievances among the citizens. But is
this the case? Clearly there is structural scarcity in industrialised countries.
Access to renewable resources (to all resources for that matter) are unequally
distributed in most northern polities. Open any study on income and poverty in
the developed world and note that structural inequalities are preventing people
from obtaining minimal levels of goods such as food, shelter, education, and
basic health. Admittedly, poverty in the North is not as crass as in some de-
veloping countries, yet the levels of deprivation, say of the homeless in major
northern cities, can be considerable [UNDP, 1991]. Yet, there is no indication
11Unless, of course, one counts terrorism as a kind of deprivation conflict. The suggestion,
however, that the Provisional IRA, ETA, Le Brigate Rosse, and the Rote Armee Fraktion
(let alone the violent right-wing extremists) are motivated by environmental scarcity seems
absurd.
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of civil unrest and deprivation conflicts.12
Further, there is wide-spread environmental degradation in northern in-
dustrialised societies. The “. . . decline in the quantity and quality of a re-
newable resource that occurs faster than it is renewed by natural processes”
[Homer-Dixon, 1994] quoted in [Conca et al., 1995, p.247] is a common feature
across the industrialised world. Depleted fishing stocks in Canada and Europe,
the acidification of central and northern European forests, the nitrate loading
of arable land, the poisoning of waterways (such as the Rhine) by industrial
effluents, as well as the poisoning of food with heavy metals, radioactive ma-
terial (particularly in the Ukraine), and anti-biotics, paint an bleak picture. If
rapid anthropogenic environmental change is taking place anywhere, it is in
the industrialised countries. What is more, this process dates back at least to
the mid-19th century. Yet, despite structural and supply-induced scarcity, the
legitimacy of northern states has not been significantly undermined. In fact,
the opposite seems to be true: the more industrialised societies pollute the nat-
ural environment and sharper the income inequalities become, the more the
advanced capitalist state strengthens its ideological and structural grip.13
What, then, in terms of Homer-Dixon’s model, distinguishes the industri-
alised North from the less developed countries? The answer is rapid population
growth. Whereas Southern countries are experiencing population growth rates
of up to 3% per annum, population growth in the industrialised North has slowed
to a halt and is, in some European countries, declining. In terms of the logic
of the approach, it is only when unequal access to resources or environmental
degradation are driven by rapid per capita increases in consumption that vio-
lent conflict is even possible. Thus population growth is the most fundamental
driving force in the environmental scarcity approach.
The human security approach is unashamedly based on the concept of a
universal and essentially asocial human individual. Here human security and
well-being is a concept that knows no national boundaries and, for that matter,
no cultural differentiation: human security means the same for men, women,
northern citizens and those of the less developed world, black and white. My-
ers contends that in “. . . essence and little though this is generally recognised
by governments, security applies most at the level of the individual citizen”.
Similarly, Westing’s account of environmental migration clearly is in the indi-
vidualistic vein. Westing argues that
“[p]ersons become more or less permanently displaced from their ar-
eas of habitual residence for various reasons, among them especially:
(a) to escape persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
12Again, pointing to unrest such as the Los Angeles riots after the brutal beating of Rodney
King or to the riots in Brixton in 1995 would further undermine Homer-Dixon’s argument.
These riots were primarily socio-political.
13At this point, I would like to point out another similarity between Homer-Dixon and
Marx. It would seem that Homer-Dixon has adopted Marx idea of revolutionary conscious-
ness. Marx argued that the ever-increasing ferocity of market competition forced capitalists
to constantly cut operation costs. As wages fall below the subsistence level, the immiseration
of the proletariat sets in. At this point, the proletariat spontaneously develops a revolutionary
consciousness and installs the dictatorship of the proletariat. Homer-Dixon argues similarly:
as environmental scarcity increases and the means of subsistence progressively wane, individ-
uals will be driven to civil unrest and violent conflict. Yet one of the major weaknesses of
Marx original idea is that, historically, no matter how immiserated the proletariat, there is
little revolutionary consciousness let alone a socialist revolution.
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their membership in a particular social group, or their political opin-
ion; (b) to escape the dangers of armed conflict, including massacres
and other severe internal upheavals; and (c) to escape inadequate
means of subsistence” [Westing, 1994, p.110].
Again these are rational individual responses to social change and upheaval:
note that persons, not groups or people, become displaced. The implicit as-
sumption Westing makes is that either social coping mechanisms have broken
down (which is a reasonable assumption in a situation of civil war) and there
is a Hobbesian war of all against all or social coping strategies are of negligi-
ble importance (which is not such a reasonable assumption). Yet what causes
social coping mechanisms to break down? Population growth, Jessica Tuchman-
Matthews readily informs us and goes on to argue that
“[a] government that is fully capable of providing food, housing,
jobs, and health care for a population growing at 1 percent per year
. . . , might be completely overwhelmed by an annual growth rate of
3 percent, which would double the population in twenty-four years”
[Tuchman-Matthews, 1993, p.276].14
The argument of the eco-system security approach, while primarily concerned
with the security of impersonal natural systems, derives its explanatory force
from a similar concept of the homogenised individual. Katrina Rogers defines
ecological security as the “creation of a condition where the physical surround-
ings of a community provide for the needs of its inhabitants without diminishing
its natural stock” [Rogers, 1997, p30]. Similarly, Pirages, as we have seen, iden-
tifies the threat to ecological security in four imbalances between humans and
nature that are, significantly, induced by population growth.
What’s Wrong with Population Growth? Human Needs as
the Missing Link
The explanatory power of the environmental security approaches hinge on the
assumption that increased population growth inevitably leads to (further) envi-
ronmental degradation. Yet this argument is based on some strong assumptions
about how individual consumption patterns are structured.
In order for increases in population to cause environmental degradation, the
advocates of the environmental security concept have to assume that there is a
level of consumption that is fixed for each individual. In other words, the advo-
cates of the environmental security approach must assume that each individual
has a set of basic needs. These needs, so the argument goes, must be satisfied if
the individual is to survive. Satisfying needs, in turn, implies the consumption
of resources. If, however, resources are fixed, say at the replenishment level
if they are renewable resources, then an increase in the population size, other
things being equal, will increase the consumption of the resource over and above
the sustainable level.
Such a concept of basic human needs assumes that these needs are defined
independently of social interaction and social structures. For set of human
needs to be basic, it must be universally applicable: needs are necessities that,
14But what government provides all of its population, regardless of the rate at which it is
growing, with food, housing, jobs, and health care?
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in Maureen Ramsey’s words “. . . all human beings by virtue of their nature must
share . . . ” [Ramsey, 1992, p.13].
There are conceptual and practical problems with this approach to human
needs.15 While the concept of universal basic needs represents an attractive
idea as a yardstick for minimum conditions of human wellbeing, the opera-
tionalisation of the term is fraught with difficulty. First, finding a compelling
social scientific definition of human needs is extremely problematic. Within
the social sciences, there is no consensus on what human needs actually are
[Douglas et al., 1998]. Needs, as Katrin Lederer points out, are theoretical con-
structs and are not open to direct observation [Lederer, 1980].
Definitions range from Katrin Gillwald’s all-embracing statement that hu-
man needs “. . . are all the exigencies of human existence and are an important
driving force thereof” [Gillwald, 1990, p.115] to Len Doyal and Ian Gough’s
more abstract notion that needs are “. . . those goals which must be achieved if
any individual is to achieve any other goal . . . ” [Doyal and Gough, 1991, p.10].
Other theorists assign a more dynamic role to human needs. Christian Bay un-
derstands needs as “. . . inferred objective requirements . . . for individual safety,
wellbeing and growth” [Bay, 1968, emphasis added]. Similarly, Dennis Sandole
refers to basic needs as “necessary conditions to basic survival and further phys-
ical and psychological development” [Sandole, 1990, p.60]. Not only do needs
point out what is necessary for maintaining humans in some stable state, but
they also show the way for further development.
Yet for the environmental security concept to hold water analytically, it is
essential that there is a clear definition of basic human needs. Since the concept
of environmental security implies that population growth leads to a higher level
of consumption, the advocates of the idea must be able to point to a bundle
of commodities that will satisfy basic human needs. Without this bundle of
commodities, the individuals will not be able to sustain themselves and if the
environment cannot provide these commodities, they migrate or they take up
arms.
Myers hints at what this bundle of commodities might look like when he
states that security “. . . amounts to human well-being: not only protection from
harm and injury but access to water, food, shelter, health, employment and
other basic requisites that are the due of every person on Earth” (quoted in
[Conca et al., 1995]). However, he fails to specify how much shelter and of type
of house, how much food and what kind of food, how much employment and
what kind job, and how much water and what quality of water is required to
fulfil basic human needs.
The reason Myers does not exactly specify the commodities necessary to sat-
isfy basic needs is because he cannot. The goods and services that satisfy basic
needs, the so-called satisfiers, are culturally and socially determined. What
counts as a nutritious meal, an adequate house, clean drinking water, and a de-
cent job are defined and delineated by the cultural context in which individuals
find themselves. By rejecting the Basic Material Needs approaches, that aimed
at improving economic development in the South by specifying commodity bas-
kets that would satisfy the basic needs of the poorest in the 1960s and 1970s,
contemporary needs theorists, such as Johan Galtung, have acknowledged the
15For a more detailed analysis of the human needs and wants discourse, see
[Douglas et al., 1998] as well as [Douglas and Ney, 1998].
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socio-cultural origin of consumption patterns. Rather than attempting to com-
pile a list of commodities that satisfy basic human needs, contemporary needs
theorists aim to construct parsimonious models of universal human needs. By
arguing that certain categories of human needs apply to everyone, while their
satisfiers, i.e. the goods that fulfil needs, are culturally determined, Basic Human
Needs theorists avoid the problems that confounded earlier approaches. Gal-
tung argues that it is futile to determine beforehand what commodities satisfy
basic needs. However, he continues
“. . . it does make sense to talk about certain classes of needs...and to
postulate that in one way or the other human beings everywhere and
at all times have tried and will try to come to grips with something
of that kind, in very different ways” [Galtung, 1990, p.303].
This effectively deflates the environmental security argument. If needs are
no more than abstract categories that describe the human condition in general,
the attainment of the categories, however, is culturally determined, then there
is no self-evident connection between population growth, environmental degra-
dation, and violent conflict. Put differently, there is a rich plurality of cultural
strategies to satisfy human needs. By extension, there are also diverse social
and cultural strategies for coping with population growth and environmental
stress (c.f. [Thompson et al., 1986]).
Conceptual Blindness and Unanticipated Consequences
By focusing on individual rational responses to environmental degradation, con-
cepts of environmental security hide from analytical view those mediating social
institutions that determine whether environmental stress turns into violent con-
flict. On this view, violent conflict and environmental migration are a result
of socio-institutional failure, not the knee-jerk reaction of an asocial individual
that has but two strategies to cope with environmental stress: flight or fight.
For this reason, the different streams of the environmental security literature
are highly vulnerable to conceptual blindness thereby exposing policy to unan-
ticipated consequences.
The rigid model of human needs that relates population growth to environ-
mental degradation and violent conflict ignores the possibility that individuals
and local communities adapt to changes in their natural and social environ-
ments. In essence, environmental security approaches characterise individuals
as little more than automatons mindlessly playing their part in a gloomy play
scripted by population growth and human needs. Change from inside this situ-
ation is impossible, so the argument goes, since only an expert can appreciate
the real underlying processes.
An alternative view of the relationship between humans and their environ-
ment — based on an individualist policy frame — grants individuals more re-
silience and adaptability. Instead of blaming environmental degradation on the
irrational behaviour of people in the developing world, this approach views this
behaviour as an invaluable resource for innovation and adaptation. Such an
individualist policy story would ascribe any long-term negative effects to well-
meaning but misguided policy that disrupts individual and collective coping
mechanisms. Environmental security approaches, then, are blind to the poten-
tial benefits of individual adaptation to environmental issues.
223
Yet another approach — an egalitarian policy frame — would draw atten-
tion to the considerable capacities of local communities in the developing world
to manage their resources sustainably. Here, it is not the irrational behaviour
of the poor but the irresponsible greed of the rich that makes the world an
insecure place. Local communities of indigenous people in the developing world
have lived in harmony with nature for centuries until the global capitalist system
emasculated and enslaved them. Granting real social, political and economic
autonomy to these communities by dismantling an inequitable and unfair global
system of exploitation would remove the root cause of environmental insecurity.
Despite some egalitarian traces in the “human security” story, the hierarchi-
cal basic consensus blinds the environmental security approaches to the value
of local socio-cultural mechanisms for dealing with social and environmental
change.
Ignoring these individual and collective capacities for adaptation is likely to
leave policy open to two related types of unanticipated consequences. First,
since policy recommendations outlined in the previous sections assume a self-
interested but short-sighted individual, policies to avoid environmental inse-
curity may fail because rational and adaptive individuals find ways to work
around irrelevant and misguided policy imposed by a central authority.16 Pol-
icy to control population growth or to arrest rural-urban migration may simply
not achieve its objectives. Second, and more significantly, incapable of under-
standing the significance of social coping mechanisms at local level, hierarchical
policy-makers guided by environmental security paradigms may erode the social
capital enabling individuals to adapt to environmental stress without resorting
to violence. The potential policy outcome here is the eruption of violent conflict
as policy fails to address the real source of environmental insecurity.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter has applied the discourse-analytic framework developed in Chap-
ter 5 to the three different streams in the environmental security literature.
Reconstruction and comparison of the different policy stories has revealed the
conceptual and theoretical proximity of the three approaches. Each of the ap-
proaches is situated on a continuum on which analytical rigour is traded off for
rhetorical impact. However, the analysis has also shown that all three streams
share a similar policy frame. Essentially, approaches in all three streams base
their conceptual edifice on a model of environmental security that singles out
population growth as the main determinant of environmental degradation via
the notion of human needs. Thus, the three streams of environmental security
define a relatively narrow scope of policy conflict.
Consequently, the structure of policy conflict is characterised by broad agree-
ment on the fundamental normative aspirations of the environmental security
concept. Theorists in all three streams share a normative project aimed to
push the environmental issue up the policy agenda by demonstrating a rela-
tionship between traditional security concerns and environmental degradation.
This implies reconceptualising the idea of security, the nation state, as well as
international cooperation. Essentially, policy conflict among different streams
16In developed countries, this phenomenon is described by the idea of ‘street-level bureau-
crats’ [Lipsky, 1980].
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of environmental security is limited to strategic rather than fundamental issues
of where to best locate policy-making on the continuum.
Last, the chapter has assessed the idea of environmental security as a guide
to analysis and policy. By unearthing and analysing the underlying assump-
tions, the chapter has shown that all three streams of the environmental secu-
rity literature provide an unbalanced account of the relationship between the
environment, human needs and violent conflict. Based on a rigid model that
directly links environmental degradation to population growth via the concept
of human needs, the environmental security debate loses sight of social and
individual capacities to adapt to changing socio-economic and ecological condi-
tions. Not only does this undermine the authority of the environmental security
approaches, it also leaves these notions open to conceptual blindness. Policy
advice flowing from these paradigms is likely to systematically underestimate
the significance of individual resilience as well as local socio-cultural capaci-
ties. This, in turn, may lead to policy failure as individuals adapt to policies or
policies erode socio-cultural coping mechanisms at local level.
In sum, while proponents of the different streams in the environmental se-
curity debate can probably avoid policy debate degenerating into an intractable
policy controversy, this debate lacks the plurality that would produce robust
policy advice. The narrow scope of policy conflict also constrict the pool of
concepts and strategies available to tackling environmental insecurity to gover-
nance and population measures. Thus, in order to avoid conceptual blindness
and reduce the risk of unanticipated consequences, the three streams need to be
challenged by policy arguments from an individualist policy frame as well as a
truly egalitarian policy story.
What, then, are the implications of this analysis for the environmental se-
curity debate:
• First, conflict between theorists and advocates within the three streams is
likely to be narrowly circumscribed to predominantly strategic issues. All
approaches agree on the underlying hierarchical model of environmental
security but (ostensibly) disagree on the size of the catalogue of resultant
policy recommendations. Conflict is thus likely to centre on issues of policy
strategy and practicality of policy demands.
• Second, the analysis reveals a large area of agreement concerning the nor-
mative ambitions of the environmental security policy project. This area
of agreement is likely to be robust since each approach shares the same ba-
sic policy frame. Although the “human security” story includes a number
of typically egalitarian elements, the agreement on fundamental issues has
meant that these principles have been translated into hierarchical terms.
• Third, the limited scope of policy conflict has meant that all three streams
of the environmental security discourse have bought into a rigid model of
environmental security based on contestable assumptions about individual
rationality and human needs. This would leave policy based on these
approaches vulnerable to conceptual blindness as well as unanticipated
consequences. Avoiding potential policy failure requires exposing these










Pension reform has proved to be a persistent policy issue across Europe. No
matter where one looks, all European countries, small or large, rich or poor, Eu-
ropean Union Member State or Accession Country, have addressed the issue of
reforming old age pensions at some point during the 1990s. While policy-makers
in some countries, particularly in central and Eastern Europe, have radically re-
formed their old systems, others, typically those in affluent continental Europe,
have been far more cautious opting instead for incremental changes to existing
pension systems. Others still have managed to implement fairly broad changes
without making pension reform an explicit policy issue.
Not only has pension reform been a persistent feature across different po-
litical systems, it has also shown incredible resistance to resolution over time.
Just as policy-makers seemingly despatch the problem, pension reform worms
its way back onto the policy agenda giving rise to a new round of what is, more
often than not, a politically divisive and conflict-ridden policy debate. No mat-
ter whether the particular country reforming old age pensions is affluent or in
transition, corporatist or market-oriented, a net European Union contributor or
a net European Union beneficiary, pension reform is difficult. In short, pension
reform is also a complex, uncertain and transversal policy problems.
This chapter suggests a possible reason why pension reform in Europe is so
difficult. Whereas social science conventionally concentrates on the technical
aspects of how to optimally, efficiently and effectively reform old age pension
systems, the focus of this chapter will be how policy stories about pension
reform affect reform debates themselves. How, in other words, does the way
policy actors think about pension reform lead to a specific set of institutional
reform practises? In order to answer this question, we will apply the analytical
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framework developed in Chapter 5 to pension reform discourses. Here, the
underlying hypothesis stipulates that it is precisely these institutional practises
that make pension reform so difficult.
Understanding the way systematic sets of ideas impact on pension reform
policy implies that we need to know what ideas are ‘in the market’. Section
8.1 will briefly outline the way economists typically think about reforming old
age security systems. Here, we will look at both the basic rationale underlying
pension systems as well as different pension design options.
Section 8.2 will review recent ideas and policy stories concerning pension
reform. By applying the analytical framework developed in Chapter 5, this sec-
tion gauges the scope of policy conflict about pension reform at international
level.1 Rather than focusing on the more scientific literature, this section will
look at the way international organisations, such as the World Bank, the ILO,
or the European Commission have defined the challenges of pension reform. By
analysing these policy documents in terms of the cultural theory-inspired typol-
ogy of advocacy coalitions and their policy frames, this chapter reconstructs the
policy stories told by the actors in the narrative form. Section 8.3, in turn, uses
the conceptual framework to explore the areas of agreement and disagreement
generated by the contending policy stories. The final section, then, examines
the potential impacts of the policy frames on pension policy-making.
8.1 Issues and Concepts
Pension systems are very complicated financial, legal and administrative ani-
mals. To add insult to injury (from the view of the researcher at least), pen-
sion systems have developed differently in different economies: no one pension
system is exactly the same. Yet, in order to think about reforming old age re-
tirement systems, researchers need a language or a set of ideas that allows them
to compare and assess different pension designs. In this section, then, we will
briefly review the language and the ideas researchers and policy-makers use to
understand pension systems.
What Should Pensions Do?
It is fair to say that the dominant language in which policy actors discuss pen-
sions issues is standard economics. Here, the world, or at least the facet of the
world we are interested in, consists of rational economic agents that need to
consume in order to live. These rational economic agents meet their consump-
tion needs via claims on current income. When working, this income derives
from paid labour or production. Yet when economic agents no longer work
(by choice or by compulsion), they can rely either on time-consistent individual
actions of the past (savings), informal group action (informal transfers from
family or community), and collective action (formal public pension systems)
[James, 1994, p.2]. From the vantage point of the individual, old age security
systems enable consumption even though this individual, for whatever reasons,
has left the labour force. In terms of the economy as a whole, pension systems
transfer income from the working to the retired.
1In the next chapter, we shall see how these policy stories also shape pension reform at the
national level
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More specifically, and here international organisations agree, pension sys-
tems should fulfil three interrelated functions: they should enable savings, they
should protect against old age poverty by redistributing income, and they should
insure against the risks of ageing.
Savings
One way for economic agents to provide for their old age income is to forego
consumption now in order to consume after retirement. In other words, indi-
viduals can save. Yet, economists point out that individuals tend to heavily
discount the future, meaning they do not save enough to provide them with an
adequate income in old age [Willmore, 1999, p.7].
There are several reasons why individuals do not save enough for their retire-
ment. First, individuals may be myopic, or short-sighted. Although the term
“short-sightedness” implies a lack of judgement on part of the individual, peo-
ple may choose not to save for very good reasons. Informational asymmetries,
fundamental uncertainties concerning future health, income capacities, the cost
of living at the point of retirement, the financial stability of savings products
confound any attempt at rationally assessing when and how much to save.
Second, pension insurance markets are subject to well-known market fail-
ures. In particular, insurance companies are prone to so-called adverse selection
problems. These arise when insurers have less information about life-expectancy
than the insured. As a result, “good” risks (somewhat tastelessly referring to
those who die young) and “bad” risks are pooled which drives up the premiums.
This, in turn, deters good risks: premiums continue to spiral until they become
financially prohibitive [James, 1994, p.37] [Willmore, 1999, p.7]. Another in-
surance market failure is so-called “creaming”. This occurs when regulators
prohibit insurance companies from differentiating risks in any other form ex-
cept age. When insurers have to offer the same price to everyone in a particular
age cohort, insurers will attempt to cream the good risks (chain smokers, stunt
men, miners, etc. ) [Willmore, 1999, p.7].
Third, market structures themselves may not provide the appropriate finan-
cial instruments for saving. This may be due to underdeveloped capital markets
and insecure financial institutions often resulting in insecurity and lack of credi-
bility with economic agents [James, 1994, Gillion et al., 1999, Gillion et al., 2000].
Last, and most importantly, poverty may effectively inhibit individuals from
saving. Many may simply not be in the position to forego present consumption
for consumption later in life [James, 1994, p.38]. Since individuals are not likely
to save at all or not save enough for their retirement, pension systems should
encourage or mandate individual savings.
Redistribution
As we have see, individuals may not save enough for their retirement simply
because they are too poor. Perhaps not surprisingly, the ILO elaborates this
aspect in detail. The ILO argues that redistribution, that is the transfer of
income from life-time rich to life-time poor, has been and will continue to be an
important objective of any pension system [Gillion et al., 2000].
The legitimisation for redistributing income may vary. People who experi-
ence a life-time of low-income labour or infrequent employment may barely be
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able to meet current consumption from their income, let alone save for old age.
Apart from unemployment, other factors such as disability or family responsibil-
ities (affecting mostly women) may hinder individuals from accruing sufficient
pension benefits or savings. Another justification for redistributing income, the
ILO maintains, is to compensate that generation who experienced low incomes,
poor working conditions, and much diminished career options during times of
depression and war [Gillion et al., 1999, p.10].
In order to avoid poverty in old age, the World Bank, ILO, and the European
Commission agree, pension systems should progressively redistribute income.
Insurance
Planning for ageing and retirement involves making judgements about the fu-
ture. However, many aspects of both an individual’s and society’s future are
inherently imponderable and uncertain. Uncertainty, in turn, implies risk.
What, then, are the risks of ageing? The World Bank provides a set of four
risks:
Investment Risks. Retirees or their pension fund managers may make poor
choices in investing pension funds. This may lead to a lower level of bene-
fits than a more prudent investment would have made possible [James, 1994,
p.83].
Disability Risks. Individuals’ earning careers may be disrupted due to illness
or disability.
Longevity Risk. Individuals may outlive their savings.
Political Risk. The political framework in which individuals accrue pension
benefits or savings may change. At worst, this may mean that the entire
governmental edifice collapses (as, for example, in some republics of the
former Soviet Union, notably the Ukraine). Commonly, however, political
risk refers to “. . . the possibility that the rules of the game will change in
such a way that income in retirement turns out to be much less than was
promised” [Willmore, 1999, p.3].
Company Insolvency Risk. Private insurance companies may simply go bust.
The ILO expands this risk to include the break down of government regu-
lation and the collapse of public pension management [Gillion et al., 1999,
p.11]
Inflation Risk. Pension wealth may be insufficiently protected from price in-
stability. In this case, the real value or purchasing power of retirement
incomes may decline.
Larry Willmore adds another type of risk:
Volatile Investment Returns: Although investment returns may be adequate on
average in the long-term, retirement income may be subject to consider-
able and protracted fluctuations in the rate of return. This is what Landis
MacKellar means when he points to the possibility of people retiring into
a bear market: adverse market conditions may force pensioners to sell as-
sets they purchased dearly at a relatively low price [MacKellar, 2000]. The
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ILO refers to this risk as economic risk and includes unexpected changes
in the rate of real wage growth [Gillion et al., 1999].
The ILO proposes two more risk categories:
Demographic Risks: Unexpected changes in demographic developments (such
as population ageing) may exert downward pressure on pension benefits.
Individual Risks: These risks refer to the uncertainties inherent in an individ-
ual’s career path (promotions, redundancy, etc.) (p.11).
These risks are inherently imponderable and may quite severely affect an indi-
vidual’s retirement income. In addition to ensuring a sufficient level of savings
and redistributing income to the life-time poor, pension systems also need to
co-insure against the risks of ageing.
Types of Pension Systems
What is the shape of old age security systems? Informal old age security ar-
rangements, including family and community structures, are, the World Bank
contends, an effective way of caring for the old [James, 1994]. However, as
societies become more complex, more impersonal, formal systems of societal
interaction, such as the market, erode the functionality of personal, informal
structures. Thus, the more economies modernise, the less policy-makers can
rely on family and community structures to care for the aged.
An alternative to informal community and family transfers are formal pen-
sion systems. Willmore suggests that we distinguish different types of formal
systems within two dimension [Willmore, 1999]. The first dimension refers to
the way pension systems are financed: a pension system can either be funded
or unfunded.2 In a funded pension scheme, also referred to as a Capital-Reserve
or advance-funded pension system, individual contributions accumulate in a
capital fund which later provides the basis for pension benefits. Conversely,
an unfunded system, commonly known as a Pay-As-You-Go scheme, finances
current pension benefits with current contributions. The second dimension de-
scribes the way benefits are calculated: pensions may be a defined benefit or
defined contribution. In defined benefit schemes, pension managers define and,
in theory, guarantee the level of pensions benefit in advance and vary the con-
tribution rate. In contrast, defined contribution plans fix a certain amount of
contributions and vary the benefit level. These two dimensions provide a simple
2x2 matrix as in Table 8.1.
An additional question, one that, as we shall see below, certainly inflames
policy debate, is whether these systems should be managed in the public or the
private sector.3
2This is, of course, jargon. All pension systems are funded in the sense that money flows
in and out of them. What this term refers to is the way in which pension systems manage
these flows of funds.
3Willmore rightly claims that there is little in economic theory that would suggest private
management is more efficient than public management. Whether a policy actor comes down on
the side of public or private sector management, he concludes, has more to do with ideological
commitment than economics [Willmore, 1999].
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Defined Contribution Notional Accounts Mandatory and Volun-
tary Savings Plans
Table 8.1: Willmore’s Typology of Pension Systems
Traditional Pay-As-You-Go Systems
The first type, the publicly managed Pay-As-You-Go system, is by far the most
common formal pension arrangement in Europe. Public Pay-As-You-Go system
come in many different guises. In general, Pay-As-You-Go systems define the
level of benefits in advance (hence the term defined-benefit). This implies that
there is no actuarial relationship between contributions and benefits.4 Yet, the
precise way systems define benefit varies widely. Some systems (e.g. Australia)
provide a flat, universal benefit regardless of income or employment history.
Others also provide a universal flat benefit but tie them to a certain number of
contribution years (as in, for example, the United Kingdom). Defined-benefit
systems can also pay means-tested benefits or minimal pension guarantees. Yet
other Pay-As-You-Go systems peg benefits to earnings: this system, common in
continental Europe, provides higher benefits for those workers with previously
higher incomes [James, 1994, p.114].
Most often, contributions to defined-benefit public Pay-As-You-Go systems
take the form of payroll taxes. Here, employees pay part of their wages into
the pension fund and employers contribute an equal part from profits.5 Alter-
natively, policy-makers can partially fund public Pay-As-You-Go systems from
general revenues, thereby relieving the upward pressure on unit labour costs.
The advantages of such a system are that it can easily and fairly efficiently
redistribute pension income across different income classes. What is more, a
public Pay-As-You-Go system creates an intergenerational contract since cur-
rent pension contributions resemble future pension claims. In this way, younger
generations are not only persuaded to forfeit consumption now for the prospect
of consuming when they retire but also have a vested interest in the stability
of the system. Additionally, public Pay-As-You-Go systems protect individu-
als from those risks relating to investment and market fluctuations as well as
disability, longevity and individual risks. They remain, however, vulnerable to
demographic risks and political risks.
4Meaning what an individual pays into the fund need not have any actuarial relation to
what they receive in terms of pension benefits.
5However, employers will try to pass on the additional costs to workers in form of lower




The second type of formal system is the occupational pension. Here, individ-
ual firms or entire industrial sectors institute a pension fund for employees.
Occupational pension have the advantage that they involve relatively little ad-
ministration costs. Moreover, firms can easily set up occupational pensions
without much help (or, depending on your point of view, interference) from the
public sector. Here, the World Bank argues that, in contrast to Pay-As-You-
Go pensions contributions, workers will tend not to perceive contributions to
occupational pensions as a tax.
In general, the private sector is responsible for managing occupational pen-
sions. The particular management forms of occupational pensions vary widely.
Occupational pensions are traditionally defined-benefit plans (although defined-
contribution occupational schemes are becoming increasingly popular); they can
be fully funded, partially funded, or completely unfunded; occupational pensions
can be tied to one particular firm or to a industrial sector. In any case, occupa-
tional pension are subject to heavy regulation
[James, 1994, OECD, 1998, Gillion et al., 1999]. Accordingly, the risks these
schemes are vulnerable to depends on the precise set-up of the plan.6
Mandatory and Voluntary Savings Plans
Whereas the previous two types of pension systems are well established, the
latter two are forms are relatively new and not common. This type of pen-
sion scheme takes the form of occupational pensions (only if they are defined-
contribution), personal saving plans and annuities. These can be either man-
dated by the government (as in many newly reformed Latin American countries,
most notably Chile) or voluntary schemes where the government often offers fi-
nancial incentives (such as preferential tax treatment as in the United States).
Essentially products purchased from financial institution, these plans pro-
vide individuals with a means of saving income for retirement. These defined-
contribution plans are, by definition, fully funded meaning that benefits related
directly to contributions plus any capital gains. Here, individuals bear the in-
vestment risk and the risk of volatile returns inherent in market operations.
Although there is no reason why public sector institutions should not manage
these types of plans, advocates of mandatory and voluntary savings plans argue
that the private sector is best equipped to manage these plans.7 This would
insulate pensions against the risk of political manipulation and the associated
risk of imprudent investment [James, 1994].
Notional Accounts
An alternative to funded defined contribution savings accounts is the idea of
notional defined contribution accounts. Here, workers accumulate pensions con-
tributions based on a contribution and a notional interest rate (which can be
the market interest rate or, as in Sweden, an alternative indicator reflecting
economic growth). At retirement, pension managers transform the account into
6The World Bank provides an overview of how different design characteristics affect differ-
ent types of risk [James, 1994, pp. 83-87].
7Although this may have more to do with the inherent distrust of public sector institutions
of public choice approaches. See Section 8.2.
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annuitised8 benefits. The scheme, however, is not funded: no actual capital
reserves back up the accounts meaning that current contributions continue to
finance current pensions.
The advantages of this approach, very recently introduced in Sweden, are to
make the pension system more transparent by more closely relating benefits to
contributions. Since the system is not funded in advance, the individual bears
the longevity risks while society bears demographic risks and economic risks.
The Pensions System Mix
Although Willmore’s matrix provides a neat classification of pension types, the
reality of actual pension regimes is far more complex. Pension systems contain
a complicated and highly variegated combination of defined contribution and
defined benefit, funded and unfunded as well as private or public sector elements.
The precise mix of private and public sector management, the ILO argues,
depends on government policy. In particular, they continue, it will depend on
six factors:
1. The generosity of public sector Pay-As-You-Go benefits: the smaller the
public sector benefits, the larger the incentive to make alternative arrange-
ment for retirement income;9.
2. Allowing for opting out or contracting out of the public system;
3. Mandating employer-provided benefits (as in Switzerland);
4. Mandating contracts with private fund managers (as in Chile);
5. Providing incentives for private sector provision, such as preferential tax
treatment of retirement income accounts (as in the United States or Canada);
6. the way in which the government regulates private sector pensions
[Gillion et al., 1999, p.5].
The real world of pension systems, then, depends on the interaction of govern-
ment policy, individual behaviour and organisational policies. For this reason,
it is very difficult to make any general observations of the distribution of public
and private, unfunded or funded, or defined-contribution and defined benefit
schemes in any given polity.
However, the ILO maintains, that in developed countries, about 40% of the
elderly population lives off public transfers exclusively. The majority supple-
ments their public pensions by either savings, occupational pensions, or work.
8To annuitise an account means to transform the funds in a pension account into annual
cash benefits. In order to avoid longevity risks, pension managers pool the capital reserves
and calculate benefits according to a fixed age of death, say 85. The assets of those that die
relatively young finance those that live longer.
9The OECD makes a very similar point when they observe that the level of public pension
benefits has little impact on the disposable income of households: “. . . on average, households
in many OECD countries set targets for income just after retirement that are about 80% of
income just before retiring. For most families, that amount does not depend directly on the
generosity of public pensions benefits levels. People simply make other arrangements such
as increasing private pensions contributions, saving more or working longer” [OECD, 1998,
pp.56–58].
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The typical dominant system in developed countries is a defined benefit, pub-
lic Pay-As-You-Go system. The state also provides additional benefits to re-
tirees including disability benefits, survivors pension, unemployment benefits,
and early retirement pensions. In order to prevent old age poverty among the
life-time poor, governments often provide social assistance in the form of cash
benefits, subsidies on basic goods and services, and preferential tax treatment
[Gillion et al., 1999, p.4].
Why, then, has the reform of these social security systems topped the social
policy agenda for the past decade?
The Challenges and Uncertainties of Demographic Ageing
For many policy actors, demographic ageing is the single most important chal-
lenge for contemporary social policy-makers
[James, 1994, OECD, 1998, Commission, 1999]. Across the globe, populations
are ageing. Essentially, this means two things. First, due to improvements in
medical care, nutrition, income, and working conditions, people are living far
longer than their parents and their grand-parents. While this is true for popu-
lations everywhere, these benefits of what was used to be called ‘social progress’
are unequally distributed across the globe with populations in the affluent North
enjoying disproportionately larger share of good health than populations in the
developing world. Since 1960, the average male life-expectancy has increased
by eight years form 68 to 76 [OECD, 1998, p.10]. Second, due to less apparent
reasons such as increased female education, fertility rates in the North declined
dramatically about 30 years ago. This has resulted in an decrease in the so-
called support ratio (population aged 15-59 divided by population aged 60+).
In other words, less young people have to support more old people that live
longer lives. While in 1960 there was one retiree for every four employees, the
OECD maintains that this ratio currently stands at three employees to every
retired person [OECD, 1998, p.11].
Yet, ageing in itself is not the problem in the industrialised North. MacKel-
lar points out that the age structure in northern countries will lead to an
“ageing from the middle” of the age pyramid (which is beginning to resem-
ble an ‘age-cube‘). Starting about 2010, the large age cohort, commonly re-
ferred to as the baby-boom generation, will begin to retire from the labour
market [James, 1994, OECD, 1998, MacKellar, 2000]. Thus, labour market
growth rates are set not only to decline but turn negative around about 2010
[OECD, 1998, MacKellar, 2000] leaving a relatively small cohort responsible for
a large retired population.
The European Commission has calculated that the share of the younger
cohorts in the population will drastically fall. By 2015, the cohort of 0-14 year
olds will fall from 17,6% of the population (1995) to only 15,7%. The decline in
the 15-29 year olds, that is those that feed the labour market, will be about 16%
[Commission, 1999, pp.7–8]. Contrast this to the rapid growth of older cohorts.
Starting in 2010, the 60-64 age cohorts will grow by 26% which corresponds
to 16 million people across the European Union. The predicted growth rates
of the aged and very old are particularly impressive: the 65+ age group will
increase by 30% and the 80+ group will grow by 40% [Commission, 1999, p.8]. If
productivity gains do not rise dramatically from their post-1973 annual average
of 1,5%, and there are no compelling reasons to think that they will, then
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higher dependency ratios and lower labour market participation mean reduced
economic output and a loss of material living standards [OECD, 1998, p.10].
What is more, if we assume that real disposable income affects fertility decisions,
then, other things being equal, falling real incomes are likely to depress fertility
rates even further.
Thus, whatever the particular modalities of the pension system, demographic
changes have thrown down the gauntlet: how can the product of a relatively
small group of workers finance incomes of a large group of retirees?
Yet, although there is broad agreement among experts that demographic
ageing poses a threat to social security systems, a consensus on the development
and trends of basic demographic variables is conspicuous in its absence. For
instance, while some biomedical researchers in the United States, particularly
the United States Pension Administration, believe there is a practical ceiling to
human longevity at about 85, others are predicting that a child born today may
reach the age 95 or even 100 with no theoretical upper limit [Roush, 1996, p.4].
Moreover, it is commonly assumed that health care needs increase over the
age of 80. Yet, Abel-Smith points to a study that shows that “contrary to
common belief, the costs of those who die aged 80 or over are about 80 percent
of the costs for those who die aged 65 to 79” [Abel-Smith, 1993, p.261]. The
OECD Bulletin reports, however, that before the age of 80, the health differences
across different age groups are not so marked. In fact, they argue that the
health differences within a particular age group are “. . . usually more marked
than across different age groups” [Hicks, 1997, p.19]. Add to this that life-style
changes will affect the health of the future aged and it becomes clear that these
factors are very difficult to predict with any certainty.
Abel-Smith stresses the role of immigration: the developed countries’ un-
favourable age structure could be balanced by an influx of tax-paying immi-
grants. Once again, the direction of this variable is difficult to predict. On the
one hand, streams of immigrants from developing countries to industrialised na-
tions have been steadily increasing in the last two decades. On the other hand,
immigration policies in the industrialised countries have become increasingly
restrictive. The net effect of these two countervailing forces is hard to foresee
[Abel-Smith, 1993].
Precise long-run economic predictions needed for policy-making are equally
difficult to obtain. Abel-Smith observes that the pension reform debate has
fed on the decline of economic growth and the institutionalization of structural
unemployment evident in industrialised countries since the early 70s: “It was
only when economic growth faltered that people began to write about the ‘crisis’
in the welfare and a period of modest retrenchment began” [Abel-Smith, 1993,
p.265]. A return to a tight labour market, he continues, would appease the
present climate of crisis. However, whether labour markets in Europe will return
to full-employment and under what conditions is difficult to foresee. Global
markets are becoming increasingly interdependent which means that domestic
economic performance may have little to do with domestic economic policy.
The more complex and interdependent the markets become, the higher the
uncertainties of key economic variables.
In sum, the entire pension reform issue is messy: it is subject to so many
‘imponderables’ that social scientists are not able to “. . . predict the future
with all its complex and economic and political dimensions” [Abel-Smith, 1993,
p.265]. In effect, expert projections “. . . amount to no more than possible future
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scenarios. They are no more robust than the assumptions underlying them.”
[Abel-Smith, 1993, p.260].
How are policy-actors responding to the messy policy challenges laid down
by demographic ageing?
8.2 The Scope of the Pension Reform Debate
The discourse-analytical toolbox assembled in Chapter 5 would lead us to expect
policy debate surrounding such a complex, uncertain and transversal problem
to be characterised by frame-based policy conflict. In this section, the chapter
uses the bootstrapped discourse-analytical framework developed in Chapter 5
to determine the boundaries and scope of this policy conflict in the contested
terrain of pension reform. Like in the Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, the analysis
reconstructs contending arguments in terms of policy stories in the narrative
form and compares them using the typology of policy frames inspired by cultural
theory.
In laying out the policy stories that policy actors tell about pension reform,
the discussion will draw from the publications of four major international or-
ganisations: the World Bank, the ILO, the European Commission, and, to a
lesser extent, the OECD.10 As we shall see in Chapter 9, these policy stories
encapsulate the basic arguments of contending advocacy coalitions in the pen-
sion debate at international and national level. Like any good yarn, policy
stories have settings (the basic assumptions), villains (the policy problem and
who or what is causing them), and heroes (the policy solution and who or what
should be responsible). As in the discourse analysis in the previous chapters,
each contribution tells a slightly different story of the same issue: each identi-
fies problems, apportions blame, and claims to provide solutions. Each story
combines factual observation with fundamental beliefs about how to best man-
age pension systems. In short, each policy story frames the pension issue in a
particular and conflicting way.
In Times of Crisis, You Can’t Have Your Cake and Eat It
— an Individualist’s Tale Told By the World Bank
World Bank’s approach to pension reform has been hugely influential in setting
pension reform agendas across the globe. The impact of both the publication
Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth
(1994) and the World Bank’s policy activity on policy agendas have been, of
course, by no means uniform: whereas the World Bank undoubtedly exerted
very direct influence on the pension reforms in Eastern Europe, the republics of
the former Soviet Union, and, most notably, Latin America, the Bank’s influence
on pension reform in EU Members States has been far more indirect, opaque,
and ‘atmospheric’.
This is not to say that the World Bank’s ideas have found ready accep-
tance by policy-makers eager to reform old age security systems. The 1994
publication has been subject to harsh criticism by researcher and policy-actors
10The OECD does not make such a strong case for one type of reform rather than the other.
The OECD position represents a hybrid between an individualist type of policy argument and
a hierarchical policy story [OECD, 1998].
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alike; some of the most vociferous critics were voices in the World Bank itself
[Orzag and Stiglitz, 2001]. Nonetheless, the World Bank’s ideas, as well as the
terminology and language in which they present them, have become a discursive
focal point for policy debate on pension reform anywhere.
The Setting — Basic Assumptions
The World Bank, perhaps unsurprisingly, emphatically represents what MacKel-
lar calls “Establishment” economic thinking. The most fundamental underlying
belief guiding the World Bank is that economic growth is the basic precondi-
tion for anything else governments or individuals may want to do: everyone,
the World Bank argues, “. . . old and young, depends on the current output of
the economy to meet current consumption needs, so everybody is better off
when the economy is growing — and in trouble when it’s not” [James, 1994,
p.3]. Consequently, the World Bank assesses pension systems according to two
criteria:
1. Is the pension system good for the economy (since economic growth is the
basis of all prosperity)? This means
• does the system reduce hidden costs including reduced national sav-
ings, reduced employment, misallocation of labour and capital, eva-
sion, heavy fiscal burdens, high administrative costs?
• is the system financially sustainable?
• is the system simple and transparent?
2. Is the pension system good for the old? This means
• does the system encourage savings?
• does the system insure against the risks of ageing?
• does the system redistribute to life-time poor?
[James, 1994, p.98]
Moreover, the World Bank thinks in terms of trade-offs: more of this in-
variably means less of that, achieving this with a particular policy instrument
means not being able to pursue that with the same instrument. The World Bank
repeatedly contends that setting up or reforming pension systems involves “cru-
cial” and “tough” choices: within each mandatory scheme, the World Bank
claims, there “. . . are numerous policy options - some of which are much better
than others” [James, 1994, p.17]. Unfunded systems have different impact on
the economy than funded systems; defined contribution schemes affect labour
markets in one way and defined benefit schemes distort labour supply decisions
in another; public management has different economic implications to private
management. Whatever the policy choice, it comes with a price tag: in short,
the World Bank reminds policy actors that they can’t have their cake and eat
it.
Last, the World Bank’s mode of thought betrays a deep suspicion of the pub-
lic sector. Although never explicit, the World Bank paints a none too flattering
image of public officials. Since public officials and politicians are sheltered from
the stark and disciplining winds of market competition, there are few effective
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checks on rent-seeking behaviour, fraud and corruption. As a rule, politicians
will promise anything to be re-elected and public officials will not shy away from
misallocating pension funds to increase the power of their bureaus.11 Through-
out the publication, the World Bank regales the reader with stories of political
skulduggery and public sector malfeasance that have, the World Bank claims,
undermined the confidence in publicly managed pension arrangements. Some of
the wrong-doings include preferential treatment of social groups (such as, say,
civil servants) in benefit provision, investing public pension funds in projects
that yield a below-market rates of return, and reneging on pension promises by
directly or indirectly reducing pension benefits.
The Villains — Policy Problem
The villains of the World Bank tale are both public Pay-As-You-Go defined
benefit systems and the socio-political support structures. Although, the World
Bank maintains, existing pension systems (which tend to be public Pay-As-You-
Go defined-benefits systems) have managed to alleviate old age poverty, they
have done so at an increasingly unacceptable price to the economy. The price,
the World Bank contends, have been market distortions and inequities.
Market Distortions Public unfunded defined-benefit systems introduce in-
efficiencies and distort markets. These effects basically work through four in-
terrelated mechanisms:
• the distortion of labour markets,
• negative impacts on labour market participation,
• negative impacts on savings and capital markets,
• adverse effects on the fiscal balance.
First, since defined-benefit systems sever the actuarial relation between con-
tributions and benefits, rational economic actors perceive pay-roll pension con-
tributions as a tax (vicious) rather than as a price (virtuous). Unless labour
supply is inelastic to real wage, workers will try to evade the tax by withdrawing
their labour supply (preferring leisure over income) or transferring their labour
into the informal sector. What is more, unless employers can pass on the pay-
roll tax to workers in the form of lower wages, employers will reduce labour
demand [James, 1994, p.120] [James, 1997, p.2].
Second, the World Bank (as well as the OECD and the European Commis-
sion ) argue that public Pay-As-You-Go systems have encouraged early retire-
ment from the labour force. Not only does early retirement increase the burden
on the active labour force, it also starves the economy of experienced workers
[James, 1997, pp.2–3]. The reasons for promoting early retirement are, Estelle
James maintains, less than public spirited: early retirement promises “. . . are
tempting to policy-makers because they hide unemployment or constitute a
give-away to special groups” [James, 1997, p.2].
Third, when thinking about how an individual saves and consumes through-
out a life-time, economists refer to the Life-Cycle-Hypothesis (LCH). Put simply,
11This is, of course, the basic depiction of the public sector in the Public Choice literature
[Downs, 1967, Tullock, 1976].
239
the Life-Cycle-Hypothesis states that individuals will save when young, peaking
at middle ages, and will draw on their savings in old age. Theoretical and em-
pirical problems aside (see [MacKellar, 2000, p.8]), the Life-Cycle-Hypothesis
predicts that an ageing society, particularly one in which a small working age
cohort supports a large retired cohort, will save less on aggregate. In terms
of standard economics, other things being equal, this will lead to a lower level
of aggregate investment (since Savings ≡ Investment) and a lower level of eco-
nomic growth. Whereas even the World Bank admits that empirical evidence
does not conclusively show that unfunded pension systems lead to a lower level
of national savings [James, 1994, p.125] [James, 1997, p.3], they do claim that
funded systems (particularly if they are of the mandatory type) will increase
savings.
Moreover, while the impact of public Pay-As-You-Go systems on national
savings may be unclear, the impact on the development of financial markets
is not. Unfunded public pension arrangements are “lost opportunities” for so-
called capital deepening. This means that if pension contributions were to flow
into capital markets rather than public coffers, these markets would expand,
grow, and professionalise [James, 1994, p.126].12
Last, the World Bank emphatically argues that public Pay-As-You-Go sys-
tems almost invariably lead to a misallocation of public funds. When Pay-As-
You-Go systems are young, meaning that a large group of workers supports
a relatively small group of retirees, they tend to accumulate pension reserves.
States use these reserves to purchases public goods. Since pension contributions
are a hidden tax, that is this type of public spending is less accountable than
official public expenditure, states will often invest the funds in public goods with
little social value [James, 1994, p.128]. When mature, meaning that a large num-
ber of retirees depends on a relatively small number of workers, pension deficits
(the difference between legitimate pension claims and available pension funds)
drains public resources. As a result, pensions deficits crowd out other valuable
public investments (into, say, education or the environment) [James, 1997, p.3].
Inequities Apart from distorting markets, public defined-benefit Pay-As-You-
Go systems also create inequities within and across generations. An objective of
pension systems, as we have seen, is intragenerational transfers or progressive
redistribution. Policy-makers have, the World Bank claims, repeatedly justi-
fied public pension systems on grounds that the system transfers income from
life-time rich to life-time poor. However, the World Bank contends, there are
little intragenerational income transfers from rich to poor. On the one hand,
affluent workers both live longer and enter the labour market at a later age:
this means that they contribute less and receive more [James, 1994, p.131]. On
the other hand, structural arrangements, such as earnings-related benefits or
income ceilings on pension contributions (both common in continental Europe,
12The question that invariably arises is: why should workers trust underdeveloped capital
markets with their retirement income? Unfortunately, the World Bank does not provide us
with an answer. Larry Willmore, however, does. He points out that many developed countries
with mandatory saving plans regulate investment to avoid capital market risks. This may
take the form of restricting investment in private funds or mandating international diversity
in portfolio investment. Where does this leave capital deepening? Willmore concludes: “Of
course, investment in London and New York does nothing to develop local equity markets. But
should forced [mandatory] savings of workers be put at risk in this manner?” [Willmore, 1999,
p.6].
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see Chapter 9), exacerbate potential intra-cohort inequities. Moreover, argues
the World Bank, public Pay-As-You-Go systems also feature many hidden and
“capricious” redistributions: examples include transfers from dual- to single-
wage households and from working women to housewives [James, 1994, p.131].
Inequitable redistribution of income across generations, that is from young
to old, is, according to the World Bank, a characteristic of all unfunded schemes.
In Pay-As-You-Go schemes, rates of return on pensions contributions fall as the
system matures: the first generation of retirees in unfunded systems collects
a windfall gain by receiving a pension without having to pay contributions.13
Once these windfall gains cease, intergenerational transfers need not necessarily
be inequitable if younger generation have a higher income than retirees. Since,
the World Bank contends, net wages have not grown rapidly in the past two
decades, Pay-As-You-Go systems force younger workers to subsidise wealthy
retirees [James, 1994, p.134].
The World Bank bases these arguments on quantitative socio-demographic
and economic indicators from a wide variety of sources. Evidence for economic
inefficiencies emerges from looking at labour market participation rates (partic-
ularly estimates for informal sector participation), the increase in pay-roll taxes
over time, national savings rates, early retirement trends (where data is avail-
able) and actual as well as projected public sector debt. In turn, the World Bank
points to household- and age-specific income patterns as well as to falling rates
of return on public pension contributions underline how public Pay-As-You-Go
defined-benefit systems redistribute income inequitably both within and across
generations.
The Heroes — Policy Solutions
How, then, can pension systems fulfil the dual objectives of providing retirement
income (by enabling savings, redistributing to the poor, and insuring against
risks) while promoting economic growth.
At least two of the objectives, the World Bank argues, contradict one an-
other. In order to encourage savings, a pension system must be actuarially fair
or actuarially neutral: people ought receive at least what they contributed into
the system. Yet, if the system is to redistribute income, it has to divorce con-
tributions from benefits so that those who are poor can draw more than they
contributed. Any pension system, then, that relies of one type of pension ar-
rangement (Pay-As-You-Go, occupational, or savings plans) will invariably fail
to fulfil one of the objectives.
As a result, the World Bank suggests that objectives be separately ascribed
to different types of pension arrangements. These different pension arrange-
ments form the “pillars” of the pension system. In particular, the World Bank
urges policy-makers to separate the savings from the redistributive functions. A
mandatory public Pay-As-You-Go pillar, financed by taxes, should take care of
redistribution of income from lifetime rich to lifetime poor. The particular form
of financing pensions, the World Bank argues, will depend on the socio-economic
and political context of the specific polity in question. Either policy-makers in-
troduce means-tested benefits, a minimum pension guarantee, or a universal
13This, incidentally, is one of the theoretical arguments showing that Pay-As-You-Go pen-
sion systems reduce the level of national savings. The first generation of pensioners can
consume without having saved.
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or employment related flat rate [James, 1994, p.16].14 Last, the World Bank
suggests that benefits be kept fairly low in order to stimulate demand for other
pillars of the pension system.
In order to encourage and maintain an adequate level of savings, the World
Bank suggests that policy-makers institute a second pillar. This pillar would
take the form of a mandatory savings plan managed by the private sector. To
be able to secure an appropriate level of savings, these schemes, which could
be occupational pensions or personal savings plans, need to be fully funded
and defined-contribution plans. Since they are privately managed, second pillar
instruments would not be subject to political manipulation. Further, privately
managed savings plans would not introduce the market distortions associated
with public Pay-As-You-Go plans and would contribute to capital deepening.
Last, a functioning second pillar would greatly reduce the demand for benefits
from the public Pay-As-You-Go system: not only would contribution rates fall,
public pension managers can also more accurately target benefits [James, 1994,
p.16].
The last pillar consists of voluntary savings plans, i.e. financial products
offered by money markets. This pillar, the World Bank contends, provides
extra income to those individuals who desire more protection in their old age.
Clearly geared towards higher income workers, this pillar is supposed to relieve
the other two mandatory pillars: rather than the rich draining scarce funds from
beleaguered public Pay-As-You-Go systems (as they do in earnings-related Pay-
As-You-Go schemes), this pillar would provide market returns on investments
from private capital markets.
What about insuring against the risks associated with ageing? In order
to diversify pensioners’ risk portfolio, each of the three pillars should assume
insurance functions. The first pillar insures against disability, longevity, and
investment risks: should individual workers not be able to save enough for
retirement due to bad health or bad luck, modest but sufficient public benefits
would prevent an individual falling into poverty. Similarly, should an individual
workers outlive their accumulated savings, the public system would provide a
social safety-net. The second and third pillars, depending on the particular
modalities of the financial products, can insure against political and inflation
risks.
Yet, how should policy-maker go about these reforms? Reform in the pub-
lic Pay-As-You-Go pillar is the precondition for erecting alternative forms of
pension finance. Here the World Bank provides a catalogue of policy recom-
mendations. First, policy-makers must encourage labour participation of older
workers by raising actual retirement ages and eliminating incentives for early
retirement [James, 1994, p.21]. Second, where pensions benefits are “overgen-
erous”,15 reforms should aim to reduce pension benefits, flatten the benefit
structure and thereby reduce inequities. In terms of taxation, policy-makers
should aim to reduce the payroll tax rate and, wherever possible, broaden the
tax base to relieve existing contributors.
In order to counter the shortfall from cuts in the public scheme, the World
Bank argues, policy-makers must establish a second mandatory savings pillar.
Preferably managed by the private sector, this pillar should tie benefits closely
14Note that earnings-related benefits, the most common pension formula in continental
Europe, is conspicuous in its absence.
15Unfortunately, we are left to wonder what an overly generous pension benefit may be.
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to contributions (thus providing an incentive to save). Where suitable finan-
cial institutions are absent (mostly in the developing world but also in part of
Eastern Europe), reforms should establish functioning capital markets.
The problem here is the transition period. Here the World Bank suggests
following a three step reform strategy. Policy-makers should
• gradually downsize the public Pay-As-You-Go pillar;
• hold benefits constant where they are modest, cut them where they are
overly generous, and increase contributions in order to finance the second
pillar;
• recognise and pay accrued pensions entitlements while launching a new
system [James, 1994, p.22].
All these steps, the World Bank suggests, should be accompanied by a “ex-
tensive” public information campaign.Whereas, the World Bank concludes, the
first two steps are incremental, the last step is a radical departure from pensions
policy practise.
In sum, the World Bank perceives great and urgent need for reform in the
face of demographic changes. The confluence of adverse environmental factors
and inherent design flaws has thrown social security institutions into a deep and
acute crisis. Moreover, apart from distorting markets and jeopardising economic
growth, the modalities of existing pension systems are blatantly unfair. Not only
do they provide pay-offs for privileged and wealthy groups within age cohorts,
they also redistribute from the relatively poor young workers to wealthy retirees.
The solution to the pension problem is fairly simple: if current public pension
systems are overburdened by attempting to fulfil both the savings and redistri-
bution objectives, policy-makers should institutionally separate these functions.
This implies a shift from a single pillar system to a multi-pillar system.
Crisis? What Crisis? Pensions Are About Social Stability
— A Hierarchical Tale Told By the ILO
The ILO approach to pension reform is altogether less alarmist than the World
Bank approach. While demography certainly is a challenge to current pension
systems, policy makers should be careful not to throw the baby out with the
bath-water. The last century has witnessed staggering increases in the standard
of living. These improvements, the ILO argues, “. . . can be attributed to the
creation of social security pensions which must be considered as one of the
greatest social developments of the last hundred years” [Gillion et al., 1999, p.1].
Before the introduction of pension systems, life of older workers was “. . . nasty,
brutish and short” [Gillion et al., 1999].16 The aim of pension reform, then,
cannot be to limit social security pensions but to expand them.
16Whether conscious or not, Hobbes’ quote paints some very interesting images. Hobbes,
who wrote the Leviathan during the English civil war, depicted a state of nature, that is a
fictitious state in which there is no government, as a “war of all against all”. In short, unlike
Locke, Hobbes’ state of nature was thoroughly unpleasant and uncivilised. The implication
seems to be that dismantling pension systems is a return to barbarism.
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The Setting — Basic Assumptions
In contrast to the World Bank’s technical view of pension systems, the IlO sees
social security as having a much wider socio-economic, political and cultural
significance. Social security, the ILO argues,
“is very important for the well-being of workers, their families and
the entire community. It is a basic human right and a fundamental
means for creating social cohesion, thereby helping to ensure social
peace and social inclusion. It is an indispensable part of govern-
ment social policy and an important tool to prevent and alleviate
poverty. It can, through national solidarity and fair burden sharing,
contribute to human dignity, equity, and social justice. It is also im-
portant for political inclusion, empowerment and the development
of democracy” [Office, 2001, pp.1-2].
For these reasons, the ILO orients pension policy-making along the following
normative objectives: policy should
• extend pension coverage to all people;
• protect against poverty in old age, during disability, or after death of the
main wage earner;
• provide an income as a replacement for voluntary or involuntary loss of
income for all contributors;
• adjust income to take into account inflation or the general increase in
living standards;
• create a favourable environment for developing additional voluntary pro-
visions for retirement income [Gillion et al., 1999, p.13].
While these points provide the normative core of the ILO’s approach, they list
further important considerations. These include
• the principle of compulsory affiliation;
• the equality of treatment (women and men, nationals and non-nationals);
• the provision of guaranteed, predictable benefits up to a certain level;
• democratic management of pension schemes (implying that worker’s and
employer’s be represented in pension fund management);
• that the state needs to ensure that conditions for effective service delivery
are met;
• the establishment of benefit and contribution ceilings to limit the state’s
obligation to high income workers [Gillion et al., 1999, p.14].
Yet, what about economic growth? Social security, the ILO contends,
“if properly managed, enhances productivity by providing health
care, income security and social services. In conjunction with a grow-
ing economy and active labour market policies, it is an instrument
for sustainable social and economic development . . . ” [Office, 2001,
p.2].
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On this view, social security and pension systems play a pivotal social, political
and economic role. On the one hand, social security institution impose order
and stability on the chaos that is the free market. On the other hand, this
stability fosters economic growth and development. This, however, presupposes
competent and capable management and steering of pensions institutions.
The Villains — Policy Problems
While the ILO concedes that population ageing poses a serious challenge to
pension systems, the main pension issue is not financial sustainability or labour
market distortions. Rather, the ILO points to two fundamental problems. First,
most of the world’s workers and dependants are not covered by any form of
old age social security system. Second, where workers are covered, pension
management, or, to use the ILO’s terms, governance has been poor. While
these may not be a pressing problem in the industrialised North, it affects a
vast number of workers in developing countries.
Typically, workers in the informal sector, in agriculture, household workers
(mostly women), and the self-employed have no entitlements to retirement in-
come. Coverage, the ILO argues, usually depends on several factors. These
include the level of economic development and the age of the pension systems:
the richer the country and the older the pension system, the higher the coverage
is likely to be. Further, the way in which governments finance pensions as well
as the capacity of the social security administration have an impact on cover-
age: defining the contributions base as well as enforcing contributions payments
significantly affect the level of coverage policy-makers can realistically achieve.
Last, the ILO argues that government policy, that is to what extent pensions
are a policy priority, will significantly affect coverage [Gillion et al., 1999, p.8].
The second major pension issue, the ILO contends, is the governance of
pension schemes. In the past, public and private management of pensions, at
least for the vast majority of workers, has been poor. The reasons for bad pen-
sions management are manifold. Often pension systems have been politicised
and abused to achieve short-term political aims. Many pension systems suffer
from inherent design faults and badly conceived administrative procedures. In
general, this has resulted in high administrative costs coupled with poor ser-
vices [Gillion et al., 1999, pp.8–9]. The implication here is that poor manage-
ment, rather than inherent pension scheme design, makes pension unattractive
to workers who then withdraw to the informal sector.
Pay-As-You-Go vs. Credit-Reserve? Defined-Benefit vs. Defined-
Contribution? Coverage and governance, however, are issues affecting mostly
developing economies. What story does the ILO tell about pension reform in
industrialised countries? The basic, albeit implicit, message is: yes, ageing will
create problems for defined-benefit public Pay-As-You-Go systems
[Gillion et al., 1999, p.21], but, no, that is no reason to scrap these tried-and-
tested systems for private sector mandatory defined-contribution arrangements.
Most of the problems commonly associated with public defined-benefit Pay-As-
You-Go systems, the ILO contends, equally apply to private mandatory defined-
contribution saving plans. Shifting to private defined-contribution mandatory
savings plans will not solve the problem.
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First, the alleged economic impact of public defined-benefit Pay-As-You-Go
systems on labour markets and savings is subject to considerable uncertainty.
“In most cases”, the ILO argues,
“. . . theory yields ambiguous predictions concerning these effects,
empirical studies have failed to resolve the issues and controversy
remains. However, there is little support for large effects of re-
tirement benefit programmes in either labour and capital markets”
[Gillion et al., 1999, p.12].
Moreover, studies suggest that even large cuts in pension benefits are likely to
only bring about an increase of the actual retirement age by a couple of months
[Gillion et al., 1999, p.12]. Research, the ILO concludes, does not provide any
indication unfunded systems have any design-specific negative impacts on the
economy (see appendix E for a brief overview of the debate among pension
economists and also [Orzag and Stiglitz, 2001]).
Second, there is no reason to believe that mandatory defined-contribution
schemes would not distort labour markets, savings and the retirement decision.
Like traditional unfunded schemes, mandatory savings plans seek to change the
behaviour of rational economic agents by coercion. Why, then, should patterns
of evasive behaviour differ for any type of coercive pension plan, defined-benefit
or defined-contribution, private or public, funded or unfunded? Any type of
mandatory scheme “. . . will cause distortions, as individuals act to minimise the
consequences of the programme that is undesired by them” [Gillion et al., 1999,
p.12]. Further, if individuals are risk-averse, then private sector insurers will, if
they are to attract customers, provide features that reduce risks to pensioners.
However, these features, argues the ILO, break the link between contributions
and benefits creating all the distortions usually ascribed to public defined-benefit
Pay-As-You-Go plans [Gillion et al., 1999, p.13]. Indeed, many exiting defined-
contribution schemes contain these elements: these include guaranteed mini-
mum benefits, rate of return guarantees, or benefits based on rates of return
fixed by pension funds. Add to that the fact that private defined-contribution
plans tend to have higher administration costs and are very vulnerable to capital
market risks, and the World Bank reform proposals do not look as attractive.
Third, the management of mandatory defined-contribution savings plans is
as much an issue as the management of unfunded schemes. If management
is left to the private sector, government will have considerable regulation re-
sponsibilities. The opportunities for malfeasance, mismanagement, and private
sector incompetence are, the ILO implies, practically limitless. In short, the
ILO argues that placing responsibility
“. . . for managing the considerable sums of money in mandatory de-
fined contribution pension accounts in the hands of private pension
fund managers requires some mechanism to ensure that those funds
are not stolen or otherwise misused” [Gillion et al., 1999, p.7].
If individuals are responsible for managing their retirement income, then states
have to ensure that workers are properly informed. Finally, if the state is in
charge of managing mandatory defined-contribution savings plans, then pol-
icy actors should avoid the politicisation of pension funds. In either case, the
ILO avers, capital markets will require careful regulation and governance by
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experts. The upshot of the argument is that there are no inherent benefits
in Credit-Reserve, defined-contribution systems that could not be accrued by
careful management and design of Pay-As-You-Go defined-benefit systems.
How, then, does the ILO story assess the proposed shift from public defined-
benefit Pay-As-You-Go systems to private defined-contribution mandatory sav-
ing schemes? Although the ILO concedes that such an assessment is a difficult
and complicated task, they point out two issues. First, most commentators, the
ILO maintains, use a perception of defined-contribution schemes that is “factu-
ally and analytically wrong” [Gillion et al., 1999, p.22]. In particular, would-be
reformers seem to think that funded defined-contribution schemes provide a
once-and-for-all solution to the fundamental problem of population ageing: the
fact that more retirees depend on a smaller number of workers. In order to
relieve the financial burdens of population ageing, the ILO continues, defined-
contribution schemes will have to either reduce the benefits relative to income
from work or increase the retirement age (or both). Yet, these are precisely the
policy options open to Pay-As-You-Go defined-benefit systems: the fundamen-
tal problem of having to transfer more income across generations remains. In
Pay-As-You-Go systems, policy-makers increase contributions to increase trans-
fers; in funded defined-contribution schemes, pensioners must sell their assets
to the working population. For a given level of benefits, the amounts the young
transfer to the old is the same. Thus, the ILO concludes, whether a pension sys-
tems is funded or unfunded makes little difference to the way it has to react to
population ageing (either increasing contributions or reducing benefits). Stated
differently, funded defined-contribution schemes face exactly the same problems
as unfunded defined-benefit plans [Gillion et al., 1999, pp.22–23].
Second, funded mandatory saving schemes conflict with fundamental prin-
ciples of social security. Recall that the ILO mandates that retirement in-
come should be guaranteed and predictable. Whereas this is the case with
traditional Pay-As-You-Go defined-benefit schemes,17 benefits and annuities in
funded defined-contribution schemes depend on variable market rates of return.
Moreover, the ILO holds that retirement incomes should increase to take account
of inflation: again, due to market variability, indexing pensions is very difficult
in the private sector. Further, the principle of democratic management, that
is an active role of workers’ and employers’ representatives in the management
of social security institutions, seems incompatible with the notion board-room
sovereignty common in the private sector. In the absence of real voice, the ILO
maintains, policy-makers should give workers the right to effective exit by pro-
viding a real choice of private sector pension management [Gillion et al., 1999,
p.22–23].
The Heroes — Policy Solutions
How, then, should policy-makers react? The first priority for policy-makers
world-wide, the ILO maintains, should be to extend the coverage of old age
social security and improve the governance of existing schemes.
What types pension systems should policy-makers in both the developing
and the developed world institute? Given that different economies have very
17Which, when looking at the developments of pension systems of the last decade or so,
is blatantly untrue. Policy-makers regularly renege of pension promises by increasing the
retirement age, adjusting with the pension formula, or changing the eligibility criteria.
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different characteristics and that these characteristics are subject to change,
the ILO argues that pension systems need to be flexible and pluralistic: there
is, the ILO avers, “. . . no one universal perfect retirement income scheme”
[Gillion et al., 1999, p.16]. Different models and designs may be more appro-
priate for different places and at different times. Whatever the precise shape of
the system, it must be able to achieve the objectives of pension systems: here,
the ILO particularly stresses, poverty alleviation and the provision of low risk
retirement benefits.18 Whether the pubic or the private sector manage these
systems will depend on
“. . . political philosophies towards individual and private sector re-
sponsibilities versus the role of government and views as to the
relative governance capabilities of the private and public sectors”
[Gillion et al., 1999, p.16].
The best approach to a flexible and pluralistic system, the ILO maintains, is a
multi-tiered system. Each tier features specific risk and redistributive character-
istics. Although the number of tiers is less important than the specific function,
the ILO suggests a four tier pension system. The bottom tier is responsible
for poverty alleviation: here, means-tested benefits, financed from general rev-
enues, ensure that pensioners will not fall into poverty. The second tier, the
ILO continues, consists of a Pay-As-You-Go defined-benefit pension systems:
this provides secure and predictable retirement income relatively insulated from
market risks. The third tier, a mandatory defined contribution plan, provides
security against demographic and political risks. The last tier, consisting of vol-
untary saving plans and other non-pension income, can provide extra income for
those who can afford it without burdening pension systems [Gillion et al., 1999,
p.16].
This approach differs from the World Bank model in two important respects.
First, the ILO model implies that policy-makers really cannot expect any ben-
efits from leaving pension management solely to either the public or private
sector. Both management systems have in-built advantages as well as their
shortcomings: pension systems should be sufficiently flexible (or redundant)
to be able to neutralise these weaknesses. Second, the four-tier model reveals
the ILO’s emphasis on the insurance function of pension systems. The four
tiers provide a solid, predictable and stable bulwark against all possible risks of
ageing.19
Moving towards a multi-tiered system, the ILO argues, requires careful po-
litical management. The basis for any type of incisive reform is a basic political
consensus. For this reason, however, the ILO urges policy-makers to consult
the policy actors (in this case employers’ and workers’ representatives) at all
stages of the process. Moreover, effective pension reform may involve a cam-
paign of public education. Not only will the general public need to be told
by experts about the pension issue, policy actors (such as parliamentarians)
may also need to increase their level of knowledge and awareness about the im-
pacts of ageing [Gillion et al., 1999, p.17]. In this way, then, experts can devise
workable strategies for pension reforms which create real options for workers
[Gillion et al., 1999, p. 16].
18Note that the savings function finds no mention here.
19Note the difference in metaphors: the ILO refers to hierarchically structured tiers while
the World Bank prefers to think of pension systems as individual pillars.
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In sum, population ageing, while without a doubt a challenge to existing
pension systems, is not the main issue. The real problem is that most of the
world’s workers have no type of old age security at all: they suffer from the
instabilities and unpredicatablities of free market anarchy. Moreover, for those
few that are covered, the administration and governance of pension schemes
has left much room for improvement. Population ageing poses a fundamental
problem for pension systems: how to finance the increase in transfers from a
relatively small working population to a relatively large retired cohort. YEt,
this problem is exactly the same for funded defined-contribution schemes and
for unfunded defined-benefit schemes. What is more, there is no reason to be-
lieve that funded defined-contribution schemes will solve the problem in a more
efficient and fair way. The solution, the ILO concludes, is to install flexible and
pluralistic systems that can both adapt to changing socio-economic conditions
while still providing an adequate level of stable and predictable protection.
You’re Barking Up the Wrong Tree: It’s Social Justice We
Need to Worry About — An Egalitarian Tale Told By The
European Commission
The European Commission takes a more holistic and systemic view of the pen-
sions issue. In fact, the Commission understands the pension issue as only
one element in the broader social challenge of ageing. The fact that European
societies will be faced with an ever increasing number of elderly citizens, the
Commission maintains, has repercussions far beyond the pension debate. Demo-
graphic ageing,l they imply, will shake up the very foundations of our societies
leaving no aspect of life unaffected. Policy-makers will have to confront the
impacts of ageing on health care costs, on economic growth, and on social in-
tegration in general. Thinking about reforming pensions means thinking about
ageing in terms of the entire economic, political and socio-cultural system.
The Setting — The Basic Assumptions
In order to meet the challenges of ageing, the Commission argues, European
people will have to fundamentally change their behaviour and European societies
will have to adapt to the changed age structure. A challenge at this scale,
the Commission seems to argue, calls for an equally holistic and encompassing
strategic policy response. Understanding the real issues and policy problems
that issue from demographic ageing requires a radically different, more holistic
approach. Rather than thinking of ageing in terms of discrete and conflicting
generations, this view urges policy-makers to understand ageing issues in the
dynamic context of the ‘life-course’ [Commission, 2005, p.8].
Although pension reform paths in each Member State will differ due to di-
vergent socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions, the Commission outlines a
number of general reform principles. First, pension reforms should aim to secure
the broadest and most equitable revenue base for public pension schemes. Sec-
ond, pension systems should reflect “. . . a sustainable mix of mutually support-
ing pension pillars based on legislation, collective agreement and private con-
tract” [Commission, 1999, p.15]: in this way, the state, social partners and indi-
viduals can share the responsibility for retirement income. Last, pension reforms
should strengthen the intergenerational contract implicit in all forms of pension
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arrangements. In sum, pension reforms, the Commission holds, should strike a
“. . . sound balance between long-term financial sustainability, intergenerational
solidarity, and equity between and within generations”[Commission, 1999, p.15].
The Villains — The Policy Problems
The main problems of ageing, the Commission points out, are its adverse im-
pacts on the labour market. As we have seen, ageing from the middle of the
age pyramid will starve the labour market of new entrants. This implies, the
Commission argues, that labour participation rates will increasingly depend on
the activity patterns of older workers. What is more, in order to make up for
the shortfall in labour force participation and in order to maintain an accept-
able level of economic growth, the European Union Member States will have to
halve their unused employment capacities by 2015. This implies both reducing
the high European rates of unemployment as well as reintegrating older workers
into the workforce. The obstacles here, the Commission implies, emerge less
from design features of pension system than from deep-seated discriminatory
practises towards older workers, the unemployed and women. For example,
older workers tend to be concentrated in declining industries and command less
valuable skills than younger workers. Training, the Commission maintains, so
far concentrates on younger worker thus increasing the risk of labour market
exclusion as their skill depreciate. Major factors for job creation and growth in
the future, the Commission surmises, will be the employability of older workers,
the rules and practises for adapting work-places, as well as promoting equal
opportunities.20 In short, the inequities that lead to discrimination and exclu-
sion of older workers (as well as other marginal groups) from the labour market
are hampering the ability of European societies to deal with the challenges of
demographic ageing.
Early retirement practises, common in Europe, exacerbate labour market
problems. The Commission claims that the labour force participation of 60-64
year old males has fallen from 80% to about 30% in the last two decades. The
trend to early retirement has also begun to erode labour force participation of
males in their 50s [Commission, 1999, p.12]. Whereas the trend towards early
retirement could indicate an increased preference for leisure as real incomes
rise,21 the Commission points to survey findings in which 40% of early retirees
see their retirement as involuntary [Commission, 1999, p.12]. If this is the case,
the Commission concludes, practises concerning early retirement require review.
Many Member States, the Commission argues, have used the pension system as
a labour market tool: the pension system helps ease out older worker while cre-
ating jobs for young labour market entrants. However, the Commission claims,
the link between early retirement and job creation has been rather weak. Thus,
given decreasing labour market participation, the Commission asks whether
• it makes sense for people to retire 8-10 earlier than their parents given
increases in life expectancy and health;
20Here, the Commission observes, increasing female labour market participation rates may
help relieve the decline of the labour supply in general.
21Incidentally, the OECD argues that if the early retirement trend reflects a shift in prefer-
ences, then there is little policy can do [OECD, 1998].
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• access to training would change the retirement decision and early retire-
ment practises;
• the option for gradual retirement would be attractive [Commission, 1999,
p.12].
The time, the Commission urges, to consider these questions is now. Current
patterns and practises of early retirement will become unsustainable when the
baby-boom generation withdraws from the labour market: not only will this
lead to an excessive financial burden on existing pension systems, it will also
lead to labour market scarcities and, thereby, a decline in economic growth
[Commission, 1999, p.12]. What is more, losing the baby boom generation to
the labour supply would represent a missed opportunity: the baby-boomers,
one of the highly skilled and resourceful generation to date,
“. . . are thus ideally positioned to make the best use of the opportu-
nities offered by gains in longevity. To squander their contribution
through the continuation of current labour market practises would
be very wasteful” [Commission, 1999, p.12].
The Heroes — The Policy Solutions
Concentrating on pension reform alone, the Commission argues, will not be
enough to meet the challenges of ageing. Although pension reform is an impor-
tant element in the overall ageing strategy, there is “. . . no design panacea, and
adequate reforms take time and may themselves be painful” [Commission, 1999,
p.13]. Thus, the Commission urges policy-makers to “move beyond the pension
design debate”: no matter what pension system policy-makers adopt, transfers
from old to young will have to increase substantially. Reducing the burden
does not merely mean moving from an unfunded to a funded system. Rather,
the Commission argues, it implies expanding the funding base in all directions:
upward to include older workers and horizontally to include the unemployed
and women. Thus, pension reforms “. . . are an important part of the necessary
adjustments to ageing, but they will only be really effective when backed up
by active ageing and higher employment rates in general” [Commission, 1999,
p.13].
What, then, is active ageing? In essence, active ageing means convincing
people to work longer and providing flexible labour markets arrangements for
gradual retirement. The former, the Commission (and, incidentally, the OECD
[OECD, 1998]) argues, involves providing access to training and new skills as
well as work environments suited to older workers. The latter implies that
pension schemes be adapted to permit part-time work. This, the Commission
continues, will have to take place in close co-operation with the social partners in
Member States. The Commission also foresees the need for collective agreements
and policy that can bridge the gap between the actual and legal retirement age
[Commission, 1999, p.13]. However, policy, the Commission warns, will have to
judiciously balance flexibility with the need for security in old age. Furthermore,
increased female labour market participation, which could offset the fall in male
participation rates, also requires the adjustment of pension contribution and
benefit mechanisms. Nonetheless, all this is predicated on breaking down the
discriminatory practises that have erected insurmountable barriers to the labour
market participation of older workers and other marginalise groups.
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This approach, which the Commission understands to be a more ‘produc-
tive’ approach to ageing than the pension design debate, will affect individual
and collective retirement behaviour. On the one hand, policy-makers will need
to change union and employer practises. On the other hand, policy-makers will
have to change individual behaviour. Here, however, the Commission main-
tains that individuals will change their retirement behaviour when presented
with viable options (such as retraining, gradual retirement, or part-time work)
[Commission, 1999, p.14]. In the short run, the Commission concludes, policy-
makers in the European Commission should aim for raising the actual retirement
age by 2 years. The long-run goal, however, will be to equate actual retirement
ages with legal retirement ages [Commission, 1999, p.14].
What does this mean for pensions? Here, the Commission, like the World
Bank and the ILO, argues for a multi-pillar system. The Commission suggests
that policy-makers expand the savings function of pension systems. In addition
to desensitising public Pay-As-You-Go defined-benefit systems to demographic
changes (by expanding the contributions base and strengthening the intergen-
erational contract), the Commission argues that reforms should introduce more
funded elements: this would not only lead to more savings and a more diversified
risk portfolio, it would also contribute to deepening European capital markets
[Commission, 1999, p.15].
Yet despite the need for more advance funded element, the Commission also
emphasises the redistributive function of pension systems. Pension systems in
Europe must continue to guarantee a minimum income in old age. This is par-
ticularly important in terms of the gender aspects. Women typically live longer
and participate less in the formal labour market. What is more, women are
currently suffering under pension systems designed for single earner households
[Commission, 1999, p.16]. This, the Commission avers, calls for policy both in
the fields of pensions and labour markets: equal opportunities in the labour
market and pension reforms that take account of the gender issue, will allevi-
ate the problem in the long-run. In the short-term, however, the Commission
foresees a greater need for measures that compensate for existing inadequacies
[Commission, 1999, p.15]. However, these measures only make sense as part of a
wider strategy that coordinates reforms in health care provision, social services,
labour market regulation as well as family policy (to name the most important
sectors).
In sum, the Commission story advocates a more holistic and egalitarian ap-
proach to ageing policy. Dealing with ageing is a pan-social task that cannot
be reduced to identity group policy-making for older people. Pension reform
is an important element which, however, is only effective as a part of a com-
prehensive strategy of socio-cultural renewal. In particular, policy-makers will
have to co-ordinate pension reform with policy initiatives in the labour market
(to reduce unemployment) and in the socio-institutional management of ageing
(changing behavioural patterns of institutional and individual policy actors).
Active ageing and options for a gradual withdrawal from the labour market
will play an important role in the future. In terms of actual pension reform,
the Commission remains rather general: reforms should shift towards a multi-
pillar system while ensuring secure minimal incomes in old age and creating a
favourable environment for private sector pensions. The point here is to reduce
the demand for social services rather than have to curtail the supply. Detailed
prescriptions, the Commission avers, are meaningless: systems need to adapt to
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“You Can’t Have Your
Cake and Eat It”
“Crisis? What Crisis?” “You’re Barking Up the
Wrong Tree”




Deep suspicion of probity
and competence of public
sector
social security institutions
are more than technical
implements for transfer-
ring income; social security
brings about stability, or-
der, and predictability; pro-
motes economic growth via
healthy and highly-skilled
workforce
Adapting to an ageing so-
ciety will require funda-
mental change at societal
and individual level; Pen-
sion reforms should secure
broadest and most equi-




Problems Public PAYG, defined-
benefit systems are
inefficient and inequitable
Poor coverage and man-
agement of pension sys-
tems; No panacea or tech-
nical fix to the fundamental
issues of demographic age-
ing
Ageing will lead to squeeze
in European labour sup-
ply; discrimination of older
and marginal workers exac-
erbates this squeeze
Solutions Multi-pillar systems to sep-
arate insurance and savings
functions;
Extend coverage; Pluralis-
tic pension system based in
multiple functional tiers
Embrace an integrate pol-
icy strategy on ageing;
Multi-pillar pension system
which represents a sensi-
ble balance between CR
and PAYG elements as well
as provides a safeguard
against old age poverty.
Table 8.2: Three Policy Stories about Pension Reform
the national conditions of each Member State.
Table 8.2 summarises the three policy stories.
Delimiting the Contested Terrain of the Pension Reform
Debate
Applying the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 5 has unearthed three
distinct policy stories based on contending and incommensurable policy frames.
As we have seen, each of these policy stories identifies a different set of problems
associated with demographic ageing. Consequently, each of the organisations
surveyed champions fundamentally different means of providing social welfare.
These accounts of demographic ageing and proposals for pension reform
emerge from and correspond to the contending types of advocacy coalitions
identified by cultural theory’s typology of social solidarities. The first pol-
icy story tells an individualist tale of impending financial crisis and economic
breakdown. Here, the World Bank points an accusing finger at decades of
bureaucratic, inefficient and inequitable social security stewardship. Existing
Pay-As-You-Go, defined-benefit pension systems, the World Bank argues, are
253
unsalvageably flawed; the only way to reinstate intergenerational fairness (and,
in the process, set economic growth on a sound footing) is to replace public
pension behemoths by competitive, adaptable and market-oriented multi-pillar
pension systems. The second policy story, told by the hierarchical ILO, tries
to relativise the more dramatic claims in the debate by arguing that, unfor-
tunately, there are no quick-fixes or miracle cures for the problems caused by
demographic ageing. Whether public or private, Pay-As-You-Go or Credit-
Reserve, defined-benefit or defined-contribution, all types of pension systems
have to solve the same thorny problem of transferring income from a relatively
small cohort of workers to a larger (and growing) cohort of pensioners. Deal-
ing with these issues successfully is a matter of meticulous system design and
management best left in the safe hands of hierarchical public institutions run
by accredited pensions experts [Reynaud, 2000]. Last, the third policy story
urges us to fundamentally reconsider the way we understand demographic age-
ing. Here, the European Commission takes an egalitarian stand by contending
that only a holistic and integrated policy strategy — of which pension reform
is an integral part — will be able to provide the responses needed to adapt
to the fundamental socio-cultural changes demographic ageing has in store for
our societies. The European Commission aims to redefine the entire concept of
social welfare provision in order to empower citizens and communities.
Similar to the transport policy debate analysed in Chapter 6, three policy
stories create a triangular contested terrain in which the international pension
reform debate takes place (see Figure 8.1. Despite being inherently incompati-
ble, these three policy stories define the outer borders of the ‘policy universe’.
The scope of ideas articulated in all three policy stories constitutes the pool of
concepts, strategies and arguments from which advocacy coalitions define policy
issues, set policy agendas and formulate policy responses in the pension reform
debate.
8.3 The Structure of Policy Conflict in the Pen-
sion Reform Debate: Agreement and Dis-
agreement
How, then, does this triangular policy space structure conflict? The concep-
tual framework for policy-oriented discourse analysis introduced in Chapter 5
suggests that frame-based policy conflict of this type gives rise to asymmetric
patterns of agreement and disagreement across advocacy coalition boundaries.
Using the grid/group diagram to analyse these patterns shows that policy sto-
ries open up discursive spaces for potential agreement along either of the two
dimensions. Thus, probing the areas of agreement and disagreement means scru-
tinising the potential for pairwise alliances across the cultural theory-inspired
typology of advocacy coalitions.
Areas of Agreement: Broad Principles, Common Policy
Measures and Mutual Rejection
How do the affinities and mutually held disaffinities between the World Bank,





































Figure 8.1: The Triangular Policy Space of the Pension Debate at International
Level
tested terrain of pension reform?
Crisis and Social Stability As we saw in the previous sections, the consider-
able uncertainties concerning crucial demographic and socio-economic variables
has given rise to significant disagreement among pension economists from con-
tending advocacy coalitions. However, economists from both the World Bank
and ILO agree that pension systems have a considerable impact on labour mar-
kets and, therefore, on economic growth. Moreover, economists from either the
hierarchical or more individualist advocacy coalition agree that pension systems
should promote rather than hinder economic growth and development.
For this reason, economists advocating both the individualist Crisis Story
and the hierarchical Social Stability Story agree on the necessity of a number
of general pension reform measures. Since both argue that labour market dis-
tortions and labour supply disincentives hinder economic growth, economists
from both the World Bank and the ILO agree on measures to dampen any
possible labour supply disincentives within the pension system; these typically
include measures to tie benefits more closely to contributions (by retrenching
redistributive elements in the benefit structure, by rigging the growth of ben-
efits to to demographic developments, etc. ). Moreover, since spreading one’s
pension risks across a wide range of instruments makes good economic sense
to proponents of either the Crisis Story and the Stability Story, neither the
World Bank nor the ILO has any principled objection to private sector Credit-
Reserve, defined-contribution pension schemes. Further, since proponents of
both the hierarchical and individualist policy stories perceive early retirement
as a core policy problem, they can also (in principle) agree on statutory and
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socio-economic measures to raise the actual retirement age.
As a result, both the hierarchical Social Stability Story and the individu-
alistic Crisis Story are lukewarm about the egalitarian’s preferred pension re-
form strategy: relocating the provision of income and services for older peo-
ple into civil society. For the World Bank Story, this policy option is simply
anachronistic: economic modernisation is synonymous with the decline and dis-
mantling of so-called ‘informal’ systems of provision [James, 1994]. Although
the ILO sees a role for both civil society organisations and so-called ‘micro-
insurance’ schemes in the provision of social welfare, these remain second or
third choice policy options. Social welfare provision from civil society organi-
sations — patchy and uncoordinated as it is — is a sign of decay its increase
“. . . owing to spreading marginalisation and to the growing gaps in statutory so-
cial protection”[Office, 2001, p.95]. Micro-insurance (e.g. schemes such as the
Grameen Bank), in turn, are only suitable for workers in the developing world
as a stop-gap since “. . . the level of resources generated is low and only limited
social protection is provided” [Office, 2001, p.64].
Social Stability and Social Justice Both the Social Stability Story and the
Social Justice Story emphasise the need for pension reform to strengthen ‘social
solidarity’ and ‘ intergenerational solidarity’ [Gillion et al., 2000, Office, 2001,
Commission, 1999, Commission, 2005].22 For members of both types of advo-
cacy coalition, social policy in general and pension reform in particular must
aim to strengthen the elements of collective action and social responsibility.
While both the Social Stability and Social Justice policy stories do not discount
the possibility of introducing market-oriented elements into the provision of old
age income, this should not interfere with the task of generating and fostering
solidarity between old an young, rich and poor, men and women as well as the
healthy and disabled [Gillion et al., 2000, Commission, 1999, Commission, 2005].
Pension reform measures that find principled support from both the ILO
and the European Commission tend to strengthen social solidarity and social
cohesion. In particular, these measures and reforms aim to support a specific
target group believed to be at risk of “social exclusion”. In current pension
debates, women and workers with discontinuous employment histories make up
the marginal groups that constitute the focus for both egalitarian and hierarchi-
cal advocacy coalitions (these two categories overlap to a considerable degree).
Hence, redistributive measures to boost pension claims for women who drop
out of the labour market to provide care (either for children or older family
members) are championed by both the proponents of the Social Stability and
Social Justice policy stories.
For this reason, advocates of both stories view pension reform proposals that
threaten to embrittle these bands of social solidarity and social cohesion with the
utmost suspicion. While the European Commission contends that market-based
approaches to social security have a place (albeit not a terribly prominent one)
in an overall strategy of active ageing, the ILO argues that the implementation
of individual savings accounts “. . . should not weaken solidarity systems which
spread risks throughout the whole scheme membership” [Office, 2001, p.4].
22This is what we would expect since cultural theory’s typology of advocacy coalitions
suggests that the hierarchical and the egalitarian positions on pension reform would prefer
policies that foster and support collectives over the rights of individuals.
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Social Justice and Crisis Last, advocates of the individualistic Crisis and
egalitarian Social Justice tales are likely to agree that pension systems need to
promote choice and equality.23 For both the World Bank and the European
Commission, pension systems and social policy should be about creating the
opportunities and the autonomy for individual self-determination.
That is why both would argue that reforms need to rid existing systems of
old-age income provision of in-built inequities and unjust privileges. One way
of doing this, proponents of either story argue, is to institute pension systems
that provide universal flat-rate pension benefits independent of prior contribu-
tions [James, 1994, Commission, 1999, Commission, 2005]. Further, both the
World Bank and the European Commission are strongly in favour of labour
market flexibilisation. Only flexible and efficient labour markets can provide
the autonomy and choice for individuals to pursue their objectives.
Thus, advocates of the Crisis and the Social Justice stories are both suspi-
cious of highly stratified, complex and centralised pension systems. Calling for
‘intergenerational fairness’, both advocacy coalitions see these types of social
security institutions as means of handing out favours to privileged minorities
close to the centres of power (such as civil servants or male industrial workers)
[James, 1994].
Intractable Disagreement
Despite some overlap in principles and animosity, policy conflict in a triangular
contested terrain is likely to be fundamentally intractable. Although members
of contending advocacy coalitions may occasionally agree to disagree with the
pension policy proposals of the third advocacy coalition in the debate, their
disagreement feeds on opposing sources. In the context of the international
pension reform debate, this means that areas of broad agreement between the
World Bank, the ILO and the European Commission collapse when debate
moves from general principles to more specific and practical policy implications.
Crisis vs Social Stability As we have seen, economists championing both
the individualist and hierarchical stories readily agree that pension systems
significantly affect economic growth. This, however, is where agreement ends.
While advocates of the Crisis Story blame poor economic performance on the in-
herently distorting effects of Pay-As-You-Go, defined-benefit systems, economists
in the hierarchical advocacy coalition deny that there is anything inherently
wrong with the design of public pension provision [Orzag and Stiglitz, 2001,
MacKellar, 2000]. The only issue that is inherently problematic, they counter,
is the inability of the Crisis Story advocates to produce any serious empirical
evidence to back up their claims [MacKellar, 2000].24 Significantly, advocates
of contending policy stories not only question the findings of their rival policy
stories, they question the very legitimacy and validity of the research and data
itself. For example, Landis MacKellar argues that much of the empirical research
23This is what we would expect from social solidarities situated in the lower half of the
cultural theory’s grid/group diagram — both advocacy coalitions score low on the “grid”
dimension.
24Even the World Bank acknowledges that the empirical evidence — particularly on
the relationship between pension systems and the national savings rate — is inconclusive
[James, 1994].
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into the comparative savings effect of different pension system designs misses
the point: even if it were to overcome the considerable uncertainties (such as an
absent counterfactual), a purely comparative analysis “. . .may not tell us very
much about the impacts of moving from an existing PAYG-financed system to
a CR-financed one” [MacKellar, 2000, p.12], see also [Orzag and Stiglitz, 2001].
What seems like agreement on policy implications soon disintegrates into
principled conflict when contending policy actors begin to discuss detailed mea-
sures. While there may be general agreement that cuts to benefits are necessary,
what needs cutting by how much and when remains a hotly contested issue. The
IlO and hierarchical advocacy coalitions25 prefer cuts to maintain the institu-
tional integrity of the pension system. Significantly, this involves maintaining
public trust in the welfare state institutions; cuts, then, must be phased in
gradually and managed judiciously by the experts. The World Bank and in-
dividualist advocacy coalitions, in turn, point to the institutional integrity of
current public pension systems as the root of all problems. The aim of any
cuts and adjustments therefore is what the World Bank refers to as “structural
reform”: a fundamental change of the nature of existing public Pay-As-You-Go,
defined-benefit systems. This transition to multi-pillar pension systems, as the
World Bank Story demonstrates, needs to be as rapid as possible to reap the
economic benefits.
Social Stability and Social Justice The hierarchical and egalitarian pen-
sion policy stories express widely diverging definitions of the term “social soli-
darity”. In general, the proponents of the Social Stability Story take the idea of
social solidarity to mean the patterns of institutionalised and managed transac-
tions between and within generations. These transactions have been pared down
to simple and manageable flows of financial resources: here, solidarity is mea-
sured and expressed in monetary terms. Higher value transfers equate to more
social solidarity. In contrast, advocates of the egalitarian Social Justice story
perceive social solidarity in a far more essentialist and holistic manner. Although
monetary transfers are one way of articulating social solidarity, the egalitarian
story implies that true social solidarity requires real engagement in schools, in
nursing homes, in individual households, in hospitals, at play grounds, and on
the street (to mention a few). Social solidarity is not only about the quantity of
transactions that make up society but also about the quality of these exchanges.
For this reason, the ILO and the European Commission are split on how
best to build and foster social solidarity. In the language of the hierarchical
Social Stability story, strengthening social solidarity means deepening and ex-
tending the implicit social commitments codified in the transfer structures of
formal social security institutions. Thus, countering the threat of social exclu-
sion for women and workers with discontinuous employment histories is a matter
of extending coverage to unprotected workers and, if necessary, reconfiguring
the transfer flows in existing social security machineries [Gillion et al., 2000,
Office, 2001]. For members of egalitarian advocacy coalitions in the pension
debate, in turn, dealing with demographic ageing requires more than simply
expanding and fine-tuning impersonal social security machinery. Rather, build-
ing and maintaining social solidarity, the European Commission argues, means
adopting a broad based and integrated strategy in which income maintenance is
25As we shall see in Chapter 9.
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one (albeit rather important) element. However, tackling demographic change
will require addressing and solving the deeper socio-cultural problems that rele-
gate a large number of citizens (women, the old, the young, the disabled, ethnic
minorities, etc.) to the margins of society. In short, Europeans will need to do
more than fine-tune large bureaucratic machines for transferring money: they
will
“. . . have to invent new ways of liberating the potential of young
people and older citizens. Dealing with these changes will require
the contribution of all those involved: new forms of solidarity must
be developed between the generations, based on mutual support and
the transfer of skills and experience” [Commission, 2005, p.6].
Social Justice and Crisis Last, although both the individualist and egali-
tarian policy stories define large, centralised pension systems as a threat, the
underlying perceptions of equality and choice in each account diverge sharply.
For the proponents of the Crisis Story, equality refers to the opportunities and
chances available to the individual. Here, the idea of enabling choice means
providing an incentive structure that facilitates economic agents to make the
‘right’ choices, that is choices conforming to market rationality. Such an in-
centive structure is best provided in the private sector. The egalitarian notion
of ‘equality and choice’, in turn, involves providing citizens with the autonomy
to choose their preferred lifestyle at any point in the life-course. Significantly,
this implies being able to freely move in and out of the labour market as life
situations change without having to fear adverse effects on professional, social
or family life. Institutions, particularly the market, ought to be geared to serve
the real needs citizens of all ages, not vice versa.
While individual policy actors from both advocacy coalitions favour flat
rate universal pension systems, their conceptions of the benefit level and role
of these pension systems is very different. For advocates of the individualist
Crisis Story, a flat rate universal system should be designed to alleviate poverty
without distorting labour market supply decisions: that is, the pension benefits
must be rather low to encourage labour market participation. Similarly, labour
market flexibilisation for proponents of the individualist Crisis Story means
breaking down barriers to the movement of labour: in practise, this amounts
to the liberalisation and dismantling of statutory labour protection to facilitate
a more efficient clearing of the labour market. In contrast, proponents of the
egalitarian Social Justice Story see the flat rate universal benefits as a basic
income that severs the individual’s dependence on the labour market. Thus,
such a pension system (ideally an integral part of a basic income system for all
citizens) would provide individuals with autonomy to choose to participate in the
labour market or to pursue other socially valuable but consistently undervalued
activities (such as child rearing or care-giving). The flat-rate universal pension,
then, is to provide all citizens with a basic level of material security that enables
them to take an active part in socio-cultural life. On this view, labour market
flexibilisation aims to re-shape the labour market to empower individuals to
enter or leave the labour market when they wish. Rather than adapting the life-
course to the requirements of work and career, egalitarian advocacy coalitions
suggest that labour markets be made to adapt and cater for the human life-
course. It is for this reason that the European Commission asks:
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Stability – Crisis Justice – Crisis Stability – Justice
Agreement Pension systems and
economic growth
Social solidarity Equality, choice and
autonomy













versus equality of op-
portunity
Table 8.3: Areas of Agreement and Disagreement in the Pension Reform Debate
“How can the organisation of work be modernised, to take into ac-
count the specific needs of each age group? How can young couples’
integration in working life be facilitated and how can we help them
to find a balance between flexibility and security to bring up their
children, to train and update their skills to meet the demands of the
labour market” [Commission, 2005].
Table 8.3 summarises the general areas of agreement and disagreement for
the pension debate.
8.4 The Potential Impacts of Policy Conflict:
Weaknesses and Conceptual Blindness
The three policy stories express policy frames that originate in the compet-
ing types of advocacy coalitions outlined in Chapter 5. Just like in the other
domains discussed in previous chapters, individual policy actors in the pen-
sion reform debate use these these policy frames to make sense of messy policy
issues. By selectively highlighting specific aspects and backgrounding others,
these frames act as interpretive templates for the construction of plausible and
persuasive policy arguments. Since what is fore- and backgrounded is closely
tied to a corresponding form of social organisation, policy stories necessarily
provide partial accounts of the demographic challenge and the pension reform
issue. Thus, policy frames sharpen advocacy coalition members’ focus for cer-
tain issues and problems while simultaneously placing out of view other potential
threats and vulnerabilities. Each policy frame, then, has its peculiar strengths
and weaknesses.
In the current pension reform debate, the policy-making initiative currently
lies with the individualist advocates of the Crisis Story. The strengths of the
Crisis Story are that it provides a powerful critique of conventional institutions
of old-age income provision. Using demographic ageing as the linchpin, the ad-
vocates of the Crisis Story tell a compelling tale of inherent systemic flaws in
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public pension systems leading inevitably to inefficiency, waste, market distor-
tions and financial collapse. The remarkable thing about this story is that the
World Bank26 has successfully imbued the pension reform issue with a sense
of urgency: although demographic and generational developments among the
slowest of social phenomena, the Crisis Story has successfully convinced policy-
makers that time for reform is running out.
The central and decisive weakness of the Crisis Story is the excessive trust
— bordering on faith — advocates place in the self-regulative forces of the mar-
ket. This fundamental bias ripples through the entire architecture of the policy
story. The Crisis Story’s argument hinges on the belief that markets by defi-
nition outperform public institutions in the provision of old-age income. This
confidence in the market leads the advocates of the Crisis Story to underesti-
mate the real risks and costs involved in multi-pillar pension systems. First, by
shifting the long-term savings function into the private sector, the Crisis Story
is exposing workers to considerable capital market risks [Willmore, 1999]: the
members of the individualist advocacy coalition are assuming that global mar-
kets will continuously perform to provide workers an adequate income in old age.
Second, receipt of a pension above the level of mere poverty alleviation requires
continuous gainful employment in the labour market. For individuals unable
to participate in labour markets (for reasons of illness and disability but also
discrimination and marginalisation), multi-pillar pension systems will mean old-
age poverty. Third, as we have seen, the Crisis Story systematically downplays
the considerable transition costs incurred by the shift from existing public Pay-
As-You-Go to multi-pillar pension systems. These costs could well offset any
benefits expected from the structural pension reforms [Orzag and Stiglitz, 2001].
Last, proponents of the Crisis Story consistently underestimate the importance
of social security institutions for social cohesion and collective identity. In Eu-
rope, welfare states fulfil important socially integrative functions. On the one
hand, the welfare state in general and pension systems in particular have pre-
vented people at the top and the bottom of the income distribution from losing
touch with society as a whole. On the other hand, European welfare states
have become an integral part of national and regional identities in Europe (e.g.
Nordic countries’ identification with Nordic welfare states).
The hierarchical Social Stability Story tells a level-headed and more equiv-
ocal tale. In response to the challenge from the Crisis Story, the ILO and other
organisations in the hierarchical advocacy coalition have tried to assure workers
and citizens that everything is under control.27 The strengths of the hierar-
chical pension policy story lie in the ability to bring a large body of expertise
and technical competence to bear on the pension reform issue. This allows pro-
ponents of the Social Stability story to question, qualify, find caveats, probe
and, ultimately, deflate the more spectacular claims of the Crisis Story (see, for
example, [Orzag and Stiglitz, 2001]). The upshot of their meticulous analysis is
that the demographic and economic pressures on any type of pension systems
are the same: successful old-age income provision, then, remains question of
meticulous design and ongoing management by competent experts.
This confidence in the expertise of a technocratic pension elite is the main
source of weakness in the Stability Story’s vision. Where the Crisis Story over-
26and others, see next chapter
27Arguably with modest success. Pension reform has become a “supercharged” policy issue
[Walker, 2002].
261
estimates the ability of the market, the Stability Story places undue trust in
capabilities of pensions experts to rationally solve the challenges of demographic
ageing. First, the preference for centralised and large pension administration
based on complex statutory foundations makes for a rather unwieldy social pol-
icy instrument. This is even more inappropriate in times that require quick and
effective policy responses. For example, in Europe, many pensions administra-
tions have been sluggish to react to rapidly changing labour market structures
[Ney, 2001]. Second, entrusting pension management entirely to an expertoc-
racy risks detaching pension policy-making from the social and economic real-
ities [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993]. A related point here is that citizens no longer
uncritically accept technical expertise as a legitimate reason for denying them
participation in pension policy-making. Increasing levels of education have made
citizens more discerning of experts and expertise [OECDPUMA, 2001]. The
expert-bias in the hierarchical Stability Story, despite many references to “demo-
cratic management”28 [Gillion et al., 2000, Office, 2001], leaves little room for
meaningful citizen involvement in social policy. Third, complex and highly
stratified social protection systems — such as most continental European so-
cial insurance institutions — perpetuate social inequities and create barriers to
entry into the labour market for marginalised groups.
Last, the egalitarian Social Justice Story urges policy-makers to understand
the challenge of demographic ageing in a holistic and pan-social context. Since
demographic ageing will fundamentally transform all aspects of our societies,
the policy debate about ageing needs to expand from its narrow focus on social
security and health care costs. The Social Justice Story draws its strengths
from understanding and addressing the wider socio-cultural contexts in which
pension reform takes place. By thematising the way demographic ageing will
impact on key social systems, the members of the egalitarian advocacy coalition
show how this fundamentally realigns socio-cultural and socio-economic rela-
tions. Unlike both the Crisis and Social Stability Story, the egalitarian Social
Justice tale understands demographic ageing as historically unique opportunity
for restructuring society to suit real human needs [Walker, 2002].
The weaknesses of the egalitarian Social Justice Story stem from an unwar-
ranted belief in the robustness of community and citizenship. The communitar-
ian bias implicit in the egalitarian policy story leaves the solutions open to a
number of vulnerabilities. First, a comprehensive basic income system without
bureaucratic sanctions or opportunity costs promotes free-riding. This, in turn,
erodes the social capital and trust on which basic income systems are founded.
Second, holistic yet decentralised social policy throws up some rather thorny
public management issues. An integrated ageing strategy requires considerable
coordination. Yet, as Rhodes argues, coordination and management are difficult
in the types of polycentric policy networks envisaged by the egalitarian Social
Justice Story (see Chapter 2. Third, personalising social policy by radically
decentralising provision the communities also re-introduces an element of moral
control and censure. Indeed, Alan Walker suggests that in future the rights to
social services need to be balanced by obligations of citizenship: those who do
28Note that the ILO uses the term “democratic management” not “democratic participa-
tion”. Essentially, the ILO refers to bipartisan (i.e. employers’ and workers’ representatives)
management of social security institutions. How and to what extent these forms of democratic
participation reflect workers and, in turn, workers reflect the society as a whole is an open
question.
262
Stability Crisis Social Justice











Vulnerable to Demographic change Business cycle Free-riding
Table 8.4: Potential Impacts of Policy Arguments in the Pension Debate
not take care of themselves, either in terms of health or education, forfeit their
entitlement to social services when old [Walker, 2002].29
Table 8.4 summarises the frame-specific weaknesses and potential impacts
of policy stories in the pension debate.
8.5 Conclusion
We have seen how three international organisations define the messy pension is-
sue in different ways. By identifying and systematically comparing these policy
stories about pension reform, the conceptual framework for discourse analysis
developed in Chapter 5 helped determine the scope of policy conflict in the con-
tested terrain of pension reform. In essence, all three policy stories tell us about
the impacts of ageing on our societies and suggest ways in which we can best
respond to these challenges. The individualist World Bank is worried about the
effects of ageing on economic growth. Shrinking labour forces and growing num-
bers of retirees will have adverse effects on the functioning of markets. This, the
World Bank contends, is exacerbated by distortionary and inefficient pension
designs. The hierarchical ILO, in turn, tells a different story. The fundamental
problem is that most workers are not covered by old age social security and,
for the few that are, these systems suffer from poor management. What is
more, the structure of a particular pension system is not likely to make much
difference to the impacts of ageing. Both funded and unfunded, defined-benefit
or defined-contribution face similar challenges: how to transfer more income
from a relatively small working cohort to a large retired population. Dealing
with demographic ageing, they contend, is nothing more than an issue of ju-
dicious management best left to pensions experts. The European Commission
takes a more holistic and egalitarian approach. Pension reform, it maintains,
is one element of an integrated policy strategy concerned with ageing popu-
lations. The real problems here are socio-institutional practises and attitudes
29“Thus, the rights to social protection, lifelong education and training and so on may be
accompanied by obligations to take advantage of education and training opportunities and to
remain active in other ways” [Walker, 2002, p.125]. Although Walker immediately points out
that this should not be used as a way to deny rights, it nonetheless implies that someone will
be keeping score throughout the life-course.
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that marginalise older workers and thereby accelerate the decline in the labour
supply: reform in pension systems necessitates coordinated reforms in labour
markets, health care systems, and social service provision. More importantly,
however, Europeans need to break down and transform the discriminatory mis-
perceptions that relegate older people to the margins of European societies.
These three stories, then,
Although all three international organisations advocate multi-pillar pension
systems, each story places a different emphasis on different pillars. If ageing
is not to damage economic growth, the World Bank asserts, then the second
pillar (mandatory defined-contribution savings plans) will have to provide the
bulk of retirement income in the future: the emphasis here is on the savings
function of pension systems. Conversely, the ILO claims that a radical shift to
defined-contribution systems will not solve the ageing problem. On the con-
trary, any funded defined-benefit plan will feature all the distortionary effects
of traditional Pay-As-You-Go systems, with the added disadvantage of expos-
ing retirees to capital market and investment risks. Rather than retrenching
tried-and-tested pension arrangements, the ILO urges policy-makers to expand
and deepen systems in order to ensure that retirement income is secure, pre-
dictable and stable. Last, the European Commission prefers not to think in
terms of trade-offs. All three pensions objectives are important and interde-
pendent: pensions systems should guarantee minimal pensions (redistribution),
need to be secure (insurance), but also need to provide a favourable environ-
ment for investment (savings or capital deepening). These aims, the European
Commission avers, are not contradictory. However, they can only be effective
as part of an integrated policy strategy for facing demographic ageing in a wide
array of different policy domains.
All three policy stories tell us plausible tales about pension reform. They
highlight certain aspects and background others. They set up a problem and
provide the solutions. In doing so, they provide coherent and normative frame-
works for thinking and arguing about pension reform. Together, these three
stories delimit and delineate the contested terrain of pension policy-making:
the scope of the three policy stories contains30 the ideas and arguments that
make up the available pool of knowledge for policy-making.
This chapter has also explored the structure of policy conflict. Despite inher-
ent incommensurability, pairs of advocacy coalitions can agree on select general
principles, general policy measures and common enemies. So, proponents of the
Crisis and Stability Story share the belief in the necessity of economic growth,
the general efficacy of benefit retrenchments, and the suspicion of community-
based provision of social security. The advocates of the Stability and Social
Justice Stories both understand the importance of social solidarity, support re-
distributive measures to strengthen social cohesion and abhor pension reforms
that dissolve the interpersonal ties and obligations in favour or ‘individual re-
sponsibility’. Last, the individualist and egalitarian types of advocacy coalitions
agree on the desirability of choice and autonomy, on reforms that break down
stratification and on the harm of complex, rule-based systems of social provision.
However, these affinities and mutual rejections are not load-bearing structures:
economists in individualist and hierarchical organisations cannot agree on how
exactly pension systems affect economic growth, members of egalitarian and hi-
30in both senses of the word
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erarchical advocacy coalitions have widely different notions of ‘social solidarity’,
and the idea of ‘choice’ has rather different ramifications for individualist than
egalitarian groups.
What is more, the chapter has also shown that policy frames imply concep-
tual blindness. None of the policy stories can legitimately claim the possession
of authoritative knowledge about the pension issue. Moreover, each type of
advocacy coalition (either alone or in concert with another) identifies the in-
herent weaknesses of the others in the course of policy debate. Proponents of
the Crisis Story do not easily perceive the real risks (capital market, disability,
etc.)of shifting to an multi-pillar system. Advocates of the Stability Story are
generally unwilling to see the sluggishness of publicly managed social security
institutions as well as the secular decline in trust for expertise. Last, egalitarian
social policy actors underestimate, simply discount or even welcome the impacts
of free-riding on a system of social provision. Thus, like for the transport policy
debate, a wide scope of policy conflict generates a rich reservoir or pool of ideas,
concepts and strategies for dealing with the challenges of demographic ageing.
What, then, are the implications of this analysis for policy-making?
First, the analysis has shown that policy debate in pension reform is fundamen-
tally frame-based, contentious and intractable. A resolution by recourse
to facts or by bargaining is not likely to be successful. Indeed, as we shall
see in the next chapter, incremental quid pro quo bargaining has not been
terribly successful in continental Europe.
Second, analysing structure of policy conflict shows that there are areas of
agreement between the contending advocacy coalitions. However, agree-
ment among all three advocacy coalitions is at a basic and general level
(i.e. that demographic ageing is a policy challenge calling for policy ac-
tion). Agreement on general principles and policy measures is more se-
lective: here, the analysis shows an affinity between pairs of advocacy
coalitions. Yet, agreement between advocacy coalitions is not particularly
robust since contending policy actors define and understand the underly-
ing issues in fundamentally different ways
Third, like in the transport policy debate, each advocacy coalition, if left
unchecked, would implement pension reforms vulnerable to frame-specific
unanticipated consequences. In a very real sense, Chapter 9 shows how the
present problems of continental European pension systems may have been
the outcome of a single advocacy’s unchallenged epistemic sovereignty over
most of the post-WWII era. Thus, the analysis of this chapter also sug-
gests that a lively policy debate with as many advocacy coalitions as pos-
sible may prevent consistent conceptual blindness. Again, policy-makers
will need to find a way to resolve the dilemma of maintaining both a high
degree of accessibility and a good quality of communication in the policy
debate.
How do the policy stories at international level affect policy debates at na-









When reflecting on pension reform experiences, scholars and policy-makers alike
tend to dwell on the difficulties of reform, the irrationality of policy-making and
the barriers to structural change. In an effort to ascertain why structural pen-
sion reform is so difficult, some scholars concentrate on the fiscal and economic
contexts of reform efforts [James and Brooks, 1999], others analyse individual
political behaviour [Disney, 1996], and others still look at the interaction of po-
litical constraints at different levels of governance [Pierson, 1994, Pierson, 1996,
Pierson and Weaver, 1993, Hinrichs, 2000, Hinrichs, 2001]. Despite this variety
in methods and approaches, the general and somewhat disturbing implication
running through most studies is that democracies create near insurmountable
barriers to structural pension reform. Not only do democratic polities provide
few electoral incentives for embarking upon pension reform, pluralist politics
also create ample opportunities for adversaries to hobble reform efforts. The
common wisdom or rule of thumb emerging from this line of argumentation
is that the best would-be reformers can hope for is an iterative process of in-
cremental and piecemeal change. Since radical or structural pension reform is
politically costly, any attempt to fundamentally restructure pension systems is
tantamount to political suicide and, for all intents and purposes, impossible.
Based on empirical evidence from four continental European countries (Aus-
tria, France Germany, and Italy),1 the following chapter suggests that pluralist
democracies and democratic practises actually have enabled rather than con-
strained structural pension reforms in Europe. Rather than looking to macro-
1The empirical evidence was collected during the first phase of the PEN-REF project,
funded by a research grant in the European Commission’s Fifth Framework Programme. The
project actually analysed pension reform processes in seven European countries (Austria,
France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, and the United Kingdom). Although the main
emphasis here will be on the four continental European social insurance systems, the analysis
will point out interesting differences to the other countries.
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political variables to explain pension reform processes (as the political scientists
reviewed in Section 9.1 do), this chapter will look very closely at the subpol-
itics of European pension policy subsystems. In this sense, the following is
an exploratory application of the discourse-analytical framework developed in
Chapter 5. The aim here is to use the conceptual framework to make sense
of recent reform experiences in continental Europe: that is, to understand how
institutional changes to pension policy-making as well as the provision of old-
age income came about and in what ways pluralist politics contributed to these
processes.
The analysis of pension policy subsystems in continental Europe reveals
that the reluctance to reform has more to do with the epistemic sovereignty
of expert-dominated and hierarchical advocacy coalitions than with pluralist
politics. As we shall see in Section 9.2, these ideologically cohesive and or-
ganisationally integrated advocacy coalitions were very successful at insulating
policy subsystems from both parliamentary and public scrutiny. As a result,
much of pension policy-making prior to the 1990s was incremental and piece-
meal, geared towards maintaining the institutional status quo. From about 1990
onward, however, new policy actors successfully challenged the ideological and
political dominance of established hierarchical advocacy coalitions in continen-
tal Europe. As these actors introduced new ideas and concepts into European
pension reform debates (many of them critical of established pension systems),
they broadened the scope of political conflict: the ‘contested terrain’ in Eu-
ropean pension debates now features all three competing policy stories about
pension reform identified in Chapter 8. As a result, pension policy-making has
become more contentious and conflictual as a far more volatile, “garbage can”
policy process is replacing the predictability of corporatist bargaining. In short,
we will use the discourse-analytical toolbox developed in Chapter 5 to recon-
struct how European pension policy-making has rediscovered pluralist politics.
This rediscovery of principled policy conflict, however, has coincided with struc-
tural reform measures in continental Europe.
9.1 The Politics of Pension Reform
Social policy-making, most commentators and observers agree, isn’t as much fun
as it used to be. Perpetual crises of social security budgets caused by increas-
ingly competitive global markets, persistent unemployment and demographic
ageing remind us that the heady days of welfare state expansion are most defi-
nitely over. Nowadays, social policy seems to be about adapting welfare states,
including pension systems, to harsher economic climates. In practise, this has
meant retrenching and reducing the generosity of welfare state provisions.
Under these new circumstances, as we saw in Chapter 8, pension reform in
democratic polities has become a thorny, politically risky and inherently divisive
policy issue. Despite what seems to be overwhelming evidence in favour of
incisive structural reforms, pension systems have proven remarkably immune to
fundamental change. Finding that theories of welfare state expansion have not
explained welfare state retrenchment2 [Pierson, 1994, Pierson, 1996], political
2Williamson and Pampel identify five different approaches to explaining welfare state ex-
pansion. These include the industrialism perspective, the social democratic perspective, the
neo-Marxist perspective, and the state centred explanations [Williamson and Pampel, 1993]
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scientists have suggested that the observed resilience to retrenchment may be
related to the way contemporary democracies and its institutions are structured.
The very nature of current welfare state reform projects, they argue, goes against
the grain of established democratic institutions and practises.
The Institutional Limits to Welfare State Retrenchment in
Democracies
In terms of the political processes involved, retrenching welfare states is not the
mirror image of expanding them. In fact, the American political scientist Paul
Pierson argues that retrenchment is an altogether more “treacherous” exercise
for two reasons [Pierson, 1994, Pierson, 1996]. On the one hand, the aims of
current retrenchment policies have dramatically different electoral implications
than the expansionary efforts of the past. Retrenchment involves imposing con-
crete losses on a specific group within the electorate. Since this is not likely
to be popular with voters,3 policy-makers anxious about re-election will find
that a “. . . simple ‘redistributive’ transfer of resources from programme benefi-
ciaries to taxpayers, engineered through cuts in social programmes, is generally
a losing proposition” [Pierson, 1996, p.146]. On the other hand, welfare state
retrenchment takes place in different institutional contexts than did welfare
state expansion. Over the past decades, social policy-making has given rise to
networks of professional bodies and advocacy groups that design, administer,
implement and evaluate social policy. Not only may these interest groups be
in the position to mobilise a substantial part of the electorate (e.g. the “grey
lobby” in the United States or unions in continental Europe), they may also be
able to obstruct policy implementation where they have a role in the admin-
istration of welfare state programmes. As a result, rather than policy-makers
attempting to claim credit for expansive welfare state reforms, the “new politics
of the welfare state” [Pierson, 1996] is about shunting and avoiding the blame
for unpopular benefit cuts in order to escape punishment at the hands of the
voter.
Due to the institutional structures of contemporary democracies themselves,
so the argument goes, this type of pension reform is bound to be a thorny
and precarious political project. Political scientists such as Paul Pierson, Kent
Weaver, and Giuliano Bonoli have analysed how patterns of formal and informal
political institutions shape pension reform strategies
[Pierson, 1994, Pierson, 1996, Pierson and Weaver, 1993, Bonoli, 2000]. Demo-
cratic institutions, so the argument goes, regulate political participation and
contestation by defining so-called “veto-points” at which the political opposi-
tion may intervene in the policy process (e.g. parliaments and parliamentary
rules regulate the competition between political parties, etc.) [Bonoli, 2000,
Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000, Müller, 1999]. Bonoli argues that pension reform
will be more difficult, will require more complex governmental strategies and will
for a brief overview, see also [Müller, 1999].
3Voters may “suffer” from Prospect Theory’s “negativity bias” which makes
them fear losses more than they value gains [Pierson, 1994, Pierson, 1996,
Kahnemann and Tversky, 1984, Hinrichs, 2001] or, as Karl Hinrichs points out
[Hinrichs, 2001], the electorate may more readily empathise with pensioners than with
the unemployed or the disabled. Moreover, in many countries of continental Europe, workers
perceive accrued pension claims as earned rights [Hinrichs, 2000]; in many cases, pension
claims have the legal status of quasi-property.
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lead to a qualitatively different reform pathways in polities featuring many veto
points (such as the United States or Switzerland) than in polities that con-
centrate political power in the hands of the government (such as the United
Kingdom) [Bonoli, 2000].
Yet, political institutions do not determine pension reforms in any mechan-
ical sense. Pierson and Weaver argue that political systems that concentrate
power also focus accountability. With few institutional mechanisms for avoiding
the blame available to policy-makers, begrudged voters will know exactly who
is responsible and who to punish at the ballot box [Pierson and Weaver, 1993].
The fate of any particular reform, Pierson argues, will depend on whether the
concentration of power outweighs the concentration of accountability. Formal
political institutions, then, are important in the sense that they frame pol-
icy processes, regulate political contestation and define feasible pension reform
pathways [Pierson, 1994]. Their direct impact on pension reforms, however,
remains ambiguous and complex.
In addition to formal political institutions, the design and structure of the
pension systems themselves create barriers for retrenchment. Here, political sci-
entists point to path dependency and institutional lock-in as one of the key deter-
minants of pension reform options. Whether a pension systems operates along
the lines of the social insurance model or whether pension provisions are based
on Beveridge’s vision of social security makes a substantial difference to available
policy alternatives and policy tools. For example, Bismarckian systems allow
policy-makers to manipulate contribution rates and non-contributory elements
of pension systems whereas in Beveridgian pension systems, policy-makers can
work with means-tested benefits and eligibility criteria [Bonoli, 2000]. More
fundamentally, long-term financial commitments encoded in the institutional
design of pension systems may lock policy-makers into a specific reform trajec-
tory. The most prominent example of institutional lock-in is the Pay-As-You-Go
system. The accrued pension claims of present generations, observers such as the
ILO argue, generally rules out a wholesale shift to fully funded pension schemes
since this implies prohibitively high transition costs for future generations of
workers [Hinrichs, 2001, Pierson, 1994]. Over and above financing mechanisms,
pension system designs also designate who is involved in the running of pension
systems and who has an interest in maintaining or changing the status quo. For
instance, in continental European countries, pension systems are located in a
“social space” shared by governments, labour unions and employer’s associa-
tions [Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000]. Bi- and tri-partite management regimes,
such as in France, Germany, or Italy not only introduce ‘veto-points’ into the
decision-making process but also define stakeholders and their interests in the
pension system.
In sum, the literature tells us that welfare state retrenchment and pension
reform in democracies is difficult because
• retrenchments and pension benefit cuts are likely to be unpopular with
the electorate;
• democratic polities provide ample opportunities for contesting unpopular
policy (via veto-points) or for punishing policy-makers (via elections);
• the structures of welfare state institutions and pension schemes them-
selves rule out certain policy options from the outset thereby disciplining
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the imagination of policy-makers and narrowing the feasible set of policy
alternatives.
How have policy-makers dealt with these institutional constraints? As a rule,
Pierson argues, policy-makers have attempted to mitigate the electoral impacts
of imposing losses by either maximising electoral margins or by minimising
political opposition to the reform [Pierson, 1994, Pierson, 1996]. Basing his ar-
gument on evidence from four countries,4 Pierson maintains policy-makers have
applied any or all of three blame-avoidance strategies. First, policy-makers and
politicians have played off different groups in the policy community. Second,
policy-makers have pursue strategies of compensation by providing financial
benefits to potential losers of retrenchment policies. Third, and most impor-
tantly, would-be reformers have lowered the public visibility of benefit cuts. For
example, one effective way of obfuscating retrenchment, Pierson maintains, is to
formulate highly complicated reforms and bury the potential policy outcomes in
technical jargon. Another strategy for blurring political responsibility, Pierson
points out, is to delegate decisions to ad hoc commissions or to associate political
opposition with retrenchment in consensus-based policy-making [Pierson, 1994].
In Europe, Bonoli maintains, institutional contexts seem to imply specific
political strategies. So unitary systems that centralise power, such as the United
Kingdom, imply a bold political strategy of imposing unpopular pension reforms
and absorbing the electoral impacts.5 [Bonoli, 2000]. Conversely, governments
in polities with many veto-points, such as Switzerland or France, however, have
to adopt more circumspect and inclusive approaches. Here, successful pension
reform strategies are likely to diffuse blame by including political adversaries
(such as labour unions or pro-welfare interest groups) in policy formulation
and by featuring bargained outcomes between contending policy actors. This
process, which Ebbinghaus and Hassel call “concertation” where social partners
trade quid pro quos [Bonoli, 2000], reduces potential opposition to a reform by
implicating political adversaries in the reform itself.
The institutional barriers to pension reform have not meant that there has
been no change. However, changes to pension systems have emerged from pro-
tracted, cumbersome and iterative reform processes. The need to avoid the
blame for unpopular pension reforms, so the argument goes, has made the
adaptation of welfare states into a slow and incremental process [Pierson, 1996,
Bonoli, 2000, Hinrichs, 2001]. Moreover, until very recently (see below), reforms
have moved well within the institutional logic of existing pension provision. In
sum, the institutional realities of representative democracies have constrained,
channelled and structured recent pension reform efforts.
4The USA, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Germany [Pierson, 1996].
5This, Bonoli argues, is indeed how the Thatcher government introduced the 1986 Social
Security Act, although Paul Pierson would probably take issue with this finding [Pierson, 1994]
The Thatcher government, he argues, was not nearly as successful in “rolling back the bound-
aries of the state” as they had claimed to be. Pierson recounts several instances in which the
conservative government shied away from incisive welfare state cuts for fear of the electoral
backlash. Part of the success of British pension reform in the 1980s, both Bonoli and Pierson
agree, is due to the fact that the decision to introduce private pensions went with the grain
of the overall structure of British old age pension provision.
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Democracies and Pension Reform
The most significant aspect about this “new politics of the welfare state”
[Pierson, 1996] is that successful pension reform requires or has required the sus-
pension of democratic mechanisms. Evidence from many European countries6
seems to suggests that policy-makers have used blame avoidance strategies to
pursue unpopular reform agendas. Obfuscation strategies have kept voters and
opposing policy actors in the dark about the impacts reform proposals. Com-
pensation, in turn, has bought acquiescence from powerful groups of voters at
the cost of less concentrated interests. Concertation has effectively banished
choice from the political system: consensual policy-making has implied that
voters have been left with few real alternatives to governmental reform agendas
[Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993]. As Pierson points out, retrenchment is an exercise
in avoiding or even suppressing policy conflict. If, however, we understand
democracy to be a system of political contestation and argument [Dahl, 1971],
then blame-avoidance amounts to circumventing democratic policy-processes.
If true, the implication that democracies and pluralist politics rule out struc-
tural pension reform would indeed be gloomy. Reform-minded policy-makers,
it would seem, are stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand,
pluralist politics condemns them to the pension misery-go-round of frustrating,
never-ending reforms unless they can find ways around the democratic policy
process. On the other hand, alternatives to pluralist democracies are even less
appealing than the pension misery-go-round [Pierson, 1996].
This bleak conclusion, however, emerges from the way the literature em-
phasises the ‘point of decision’ in pension reform processes. This focus on
decision-making is problematic for two reasons. First, pluralist democracies
are specifically designed to diffuse political power at the point of decision. In-
stitutional features such as parliaments, the separation of powers, cyclical and
frequent elections, or an independent judiciary ensure that political power in
democracies diffuses across many policy actors [Dahl, 1961, Polsby, 1981]. Per-
haps, then, it should not come as much of a surprise that imposing unpopular
retrenchments at this point in the policy process is likely to be difficult. Second,
and more significantly, the point of decision in real policy processes may be more
difficult to identify than the literature will have us believe. As Paul Pierson cor-
rectly points out, blame-avoidance is also about breaking down one transparent
point of decision into many less transparent decisions scattered across the policy
process. Significantly, policy actors can affect outcomes by defining pension pol-
icy problems to suit their preferred solutions thereby controlling pension reform
agendas. Applying political power at these earlier stages of policy making is a
far more subtle and less obvious activity.
A related weakness is the focus on behavioural aspects of pension reform.
Pension policy-making is not only about maximising individual or organisa-
tional utility functions. On the one hand, as we saw in Chapter 3, political
conflicts over the welfare state are also conflicts over fundamental ideas and
values. The institutions from which pension reforms emerge give rise to specific
norms, practises and worldviews. When institutions and their members clash,
so do the constitutive values and practises. Using the vocabulary of the con-
6This is both empirical evidence that the different theorists refer to [Pierson, 1994,
Pierson, 1996, Bonoli, 2000, Hinrichs, 2000] as well as evidence from the PEN-REF project
(http://www.iccr-international.org/penref).
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ceptual framework assembled in Chapter 5, these are policy debates in which
conflict is based on policy stories. On the other hand, reforming pension systems
is a communicative process [Rein and Schön, 1994]. Parties in a pension reform
will rely on rhetoric and argument to persuade, cajole and mobilise other policy
actors [Fischer and Forester, 1993, Rein and Schön, 1993].7 The way different
policy actors frame pension reform issues and the extent to which political ad-
versaries can successfully challenge these framings will have a profound impact
on policy outcomes.
9.2 The Subpolitics of Pension Reform
The previous section outlined how the general characteristics of pluralist democ-
racies impose constraints on pension reforms. Yet, this only tells part of the
story. As Paul Pierson points out, analysing welfare state reforms means think-
ing about the consequences of big government. Another development associated
with big government, as discussed in Chapter 2, is the so-called “differentiated
polity” [Rhodes, 1997]. Recall how theorists such as R.A.W. Rhodes or Jeremy
Richardson argue that policy-making in advanced industrialised states has be-
come specialised and fragmented. In nearly all countries, states have taken on
regulative responsibilities for an ever increasing spectrum of social activities. As
the state’s remit has expanded, so too has the demand for specialised knowl-
edge, technical advice, and policy delivery capacities. This development has
given rise to functionally segregated networks of institutions and policy actors
that focus on particular social problems. In these institutional networks, pol-
icy actors define issues, set agendas, formulate policy proposals and implement
policy decisions: in the differentiated polity, policy (including pension reform)
is made in policy subsystems.
Assessing the impact of pluralist democracies on pension reform implies that
we examine these subcutaneous policy processes. Like in any other policy arena,
pension reforms in Europe have emerged from relatively stable networks of ex-
perts, politicians, interest groups, and state agencies. What, then, has been
going on in these policy subsystems to make pension reform so difficult? More-
over, to what extent have these policy subsystems enabled political contestation
and participation in policy-making? In other words, how accessible and respon-
sive have these policy subsystems been.
Pension Policy-making Prior to the 1990s: Consensus, Ex-
clusion and Non-Decisions
European pension policy communities developed in the “golden age of the wel-
fare state” [Pierson, 1994]. In the three decades following the end of World
War II, expansion of European welfare states gave rise to specific structures
and styles of social policy-making. Although the particular institutional set-ups
differed from country to country, many of these decision-making systems have
7Pierson himself hints at these less tangible but nonetheless important aspects of pension
reform: “Far more than in an era of welfare state expansion, struggles over social policy become
struggles over information about causes and consequences of policy change” [Pierson, 1994,
p.8].
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been exclusive institutional networks insulated from both public scrutiny and
other policy subsystems.
Institutional Actors, Network Structures and Agenda-Setting
In Europe, pension system design has determined who participates in pen-
sion policy-making. In general, the more a pension system resembles the so-
cial insurance model, the more pronounced are corporatist decision-making
structures. Whether in the German and Austrian pension carriers (Renten-
versicherungsträger), in the French supplementary pension schemes or in the
governing bodies of the Italian pension system, the administration of pension
schemes in continental Europe has featured some form of bi-or tri-partite man-
agement regime [Linnerooth-Bayer, 2001, Ney, 2001, Anticchi and Pizzuti, 2000].
As a result, continental European pension policy communities before the 1990s
broadly conformed to the corporatist model of interest intermediation
[Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979]. The institutional policy actors within pen-
sion policy subsystems reflected corporatist cleavages: as a rule, pension policy
formulation and decision-making was a bargaining process limited to represen-
tatives from state, capital, and labour.8
A feature common to all European pension policy subsystems is their strong
reliance on expertise. Apart from political elites, the pension policy issue has
been the sovereign province of experts. In corporatist systems, pension exper-
tise has traditionally emerged from the legal profession and, to a lesser but
increasing degree, the economists’ guild. In the United Kingdom and in Nordic
countries, expertise relies more on economic theory and actuarial sciences than
law. In either case, requirements of technical expertise have in the past erected
high barriers to entry for would-be reformers. Consequently, the number of
players has been rather limited: in most countries the wider pension policy
community housed something in the region of 20-30 policy relevant institutions.
When considering institutional actors that actually impinge on pension reforms,
this number falls to the region of 10-15. In short, in the past pension policy
subsystems were not very accessible.
In continental Europe, corporatist policy subsystems featured strong organ-
isational interdependencies between institutional actors [Rhodes, 1997]. A key
resource in pension policy-making was (and continues to be) credible pension
knowledge [Reynaud, 2000]. Before the 1990s, state actors and pension bureau-
cracies (such as the pension carriers in Austria and Germany or the state in
France) operated and controlled all sites producing legitimate pension knowl-
edge. Whether it was pension expenditure statistics, demographic and financial
projections, or forecasts about future developments of benefits and contribu-
tions, the source of credible knowledge resided within corporatist policy sub-
8The more universalist systems in the United Kingdom and Norway, in turn, produced
different kinds policy communities. In the United Kingdom as in Norway, central govern-
ment administers pension provision. Unlike social insurance countries, unions and employers’
representatives do not have a favoured status in policy-making: in effect, they are ‘ordinary’
interest groups. While the (untypically) strong role of the Norwegian parliament in pension
policy-making provides an access point for unions in Norway, British unions have had little in-
fluence on pension reform [Ervik, 2001, Mayhew, 2001]. Further, given sizeable private sector
pension provision in the United Kingdom, the “pension industry” was also an important pol-
icy actor. Consequently, universalist systems have given rise to less rigid and more accessible
decision-making structures.
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systems. In this way, state bureaucracies could tie the corporatist partners
into the bargaining process: impact on pension policy required “credible pen-
sion data” which was available from a limited number of controlled sources
[Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993, Bozec and Mays, 2001]. In return, social partners
provided political co-operation and compliance. A legitimate claim to gover-
nance thus strongly coincided with the control of access to pension knowledge.
These interorganisational resource dependencies gave rise to hierarchically
organised, institutionally interdependent advocacy coalitions. Frequent inter-
action among individual policy actors with shared epistemic commitments and
policy frames led to the emergence of a highly selective, ideologically coherent
and institutionally interdependent group of policy-makers.9 By effectively in-
sulating the subsystem from other policy spheres as well as other policy actors,
hierarchical advocacy coalitions controlled problem definition, agenda-setting
and policy formulation. In this way, these hierarchical, expert-driven advo-
cacy coalitions established epistemic sovereignty over pension policy subsystems
across continental Europe.
Policy change, if it took place at all, occurred within narrowly delimited and
carefully defined boundaries. Epistemic sovereignty implied that the dominant
advocacy coalition tightly circumscribed the scope of policy conflict. The close
correspondence between pension provision and political decision-making implied
that each attempt to reform pension schemes also tested the political viability
of the corporatist bargaining system. In order, then, not to upset the fragile
balance of power between policy actors in the coalition and to substantiate the
claim to superior knowledge to external contenders, policy-making in continental
Europe featured extensive consensus-seeking [Ney, 2001, Bozec and Mays, 2001,
Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993]. One way of achieving consensus was to control the
emergence of policy conflict. Epistemic sovereignty implied that the dominant
advocacy coalition tightly circumscribed the scope of policy conflict. By limiting
the pension reform agenda to relatively innocuous issues, dominant advocacy
coalitions curtailed political conflict by either excluding or co-opting dissenting
voices. What were the innocuous issues? Basically, hierarchical advocacy coali-
tions defined pension problems so that policy solutions exclusively fell within
the institutional logic of existing pension provision: this is what Nullmeier and
Rüb have called a ‘self-referential policy cycle’ [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993] and
see Chapter 5. The coalitions a priori defined pension reform as technical issue
amenable to managerial solutions.10 Typically, pension reforms in these coun-
tries emerged from an intricate bargaining process aimed at achieving consensus
on the basis of expert knowledge across every conceivable political cleavage in
the pension policy community.11 Known as the so-called “social policy con-
sensus”, this ostensibly rational agreement across bi-partite lines justified the
exclusion of contending policy actors.
9see also [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993]
10That is, in a hierarchical way according the cultural theory-inspired typology of advocacy
coalitions
11In fairness, this tendency was less pronounced in different continental European countries.
Whereas consensus politics featured most strongly in German-speaking countries, pension
policy-making in France and Italy was more divisive and aggressive.
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Policy Processes and Democratic Institutions
Unlike Public Choice models and concepts of blame avoidance would have us
believe, democratic institutions have played a marginal role in European pension
reforms. In most European countries (with the exception of Norway), pension
policy-making, even during times of welfare state expansion, was thoroughly
depoliticised and deparliamentarised.
In corporatist policy subsystems as in the British pension policy network,
pension reforms emerged from a myriad of ad hoc committees and commissions.
These committees and commissions, set up by corporatist policy actors, served
three basic political purposes. First, they allowed members of the ruling ad-
vocacy coalition to define the pension issue, set pension reform agendas and
control participation. Second, this ad hocracy provided venues for “partisan
mutual adjustment” [Lindblom, 1958] between corporatist policy actors. Third,
and most importantly, these policy venues created a policy space institutionally
remote from formal democratic institutions and public scrutiny. This, then,
developed into the functionally distinct pension policy subsystem.
On the one hand, the sheer amount of commissions and committees with
varying degree of importance made for a very intransparent and inaccessible
policy process. Unless situated on the inside of the advocacy coalition, it was
difficult for policy actors to reconstruct the origin and evolution of a particular
pension reform.12 On the other hand, since ad hoc commissions and com-
mittees were not subject to the same rules of public disclosure and access as
are, say, parliamentary committees, ruling advocacy coalitions could keep the
public at arms length. In countries such as Germany, Austria, as well as the
United Kingdom,13 there was more than a little truth to the popular image of
decision-making in smoke-filled backrooms. What is more, members of political
parties and the political elite within the corporatist advocacy coalitions (usually
depicted as “social policy experts”) acted as ideological and organisational gate-
keepers. Rather than carrying new ideas into pension policy subsystems, these
politicians often were more effective in keeping new concepts and approaches
out of pension policy-making [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993].
By the time, then, that a particular pension reform reached parliament, there
was little left for parliamentarians to decide. Corporatist partners had closed
the deals in the relatively safe confines of the ad hocracy and senior politicians
relied on party discipline to avoid any embarrassment in parliament. Rather
than acting as an instance of political control, the parliament merely rubber
stamped pension reforms drafted in pension policy subsystem. For example,
the history of the German Pension Reform Act 1992 shows how the hierarchical
advocacy coalition outmanoeuvred the Bundestag.14 Not only did parliament
have little time to process the Pension Reform Act 1992 bill,15 the ad hoc-
racy continued working on details of the pension reform [Pabst, 1999]. Similar
patterns emerge for the Austrian pension reform in 1985: here too, the social
12Which, of course, diffuses and avoids blame.
13Albeit for different reasons. British bureaucracy is notoriously secretive [Rhodes, 1997,
Hennessy, 1989].
14For a more detailed account, see [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993] or [Pabst, 1999].
15The bill was introduced to the Bundestag in October 1989 with a view to passing the bill
well before Christmas. Incidentally, the Bundestag passed the bill on the 9th of November
about an hour before the East German authorities announced the opening of the inner-German
border.
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partnership decided upon the substantive content of the reform and relegated
parliamentary ratification to a mere formality [Linnerooth-Bayer, 2001].
Corporatist Policy Communities, Incremental Pension Reform and
Democracy
A closer look at the subpolitics of pension reform in Europe prior to the 1990s
reveals that there may be a less robust relationship between pluralist democ-
racies and incremental pension reform. Pension policy subsystems in Europe,
the locus of pension policy formulation, have for the most part been anything
but democratic. In continental European countries and, to a lesser extent, in
the United Kingdom, pension policy subsystems have been dominated by small,
selective and highly advocacy coalitions consisting of experts. These coalitions
determined pension policy-making up until (and in some case well into) the
1990s. By monopolising credible expertise and technical knowledge as well as by
institutionally excluding potential contenders, these hierarchical advocacy coali-
tions effectively controlled policy conflict. Moreover, these tightly integrated
policy subsystems insulated themselves from other policy networks, parliament
and public scrutiny. Yet, despite functioning blame-avoidance mechanisms,16
European pension reform before the mid-1990s consisted of cautious and incre-
mental retrenchments to existing pension systems. On the whole, reforms prior
to the 1990s were parametric adjustments of existing institutional arrangements
without seriously challenging the underlying organisational structure of public
pension provision.
The reason why continental European polities in the past have eschewed
structural pension reforms is related not to the structure of pluralist democracies
but rather to the configuration of pension policy subsystems. As we have seen,
pension systems in corporatist polities imply specific decision-making structures.
These structures empower certain social groups at the cost of other groups. In
this sense, pension systems are more than a technical device for transferring
income across generations. Rather, pension systems represent both a modus
operandi and specific distribution of political power within the pension policy
subsystem. Any change to the pension system that moves outside the prevalent
institutional logic of pension provision also challenges the decision-making sys-
tem and the distribution of power. Add to this that any distribution of political
power also encodes a particular set of beliefs and you have the makings of a
fundamental policy conflict. The subpolitics of pension policy-making, then,
suggest that reform efforts prior to the 1990s aimed at securing existing pension
systems and their accompanying distribution of political power in the face of
financial pressures. In order to defend pension systems, hierarchical advocacy
coalitions in continental Europe simply recalibrated tried and tested institu-
tional mechanisms (consensus policy-making, monopoly of knowledge, expert-
driven policy-making, etc.) to suit more austere social policy goals. If we are to
believe sociological systems theory’s claim that political power is the ‘currency’
or, in their parlance, the steering medium of political systems, then there is no
rational reason for any political organisation to relinquish this ‘currency’.17 For
16Functioning with differing degrees of efficiency in different continental European countries.
If pressed, one could rank continental European countries as follows: Austria, Germany, Italy
and France.
17Moreover, contrary to what Public Choice theories assume, there is also no reason to
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this reason, it is in the most fundamental interest of pension policy community
participants to limit pension reform to problems amenable to systemic pallia-
tives. This maintains and reproduces the corporatist decision-making system in
which all participants have a stake. In sum, it is not democratic institutions but
rather the lack of democratic practises within pension policy subsystems dom-
inated by a single, hierarchical advocacy coalition that explains the absence of
structural pension reforms in continental Europe prior to the 1990s.
Pension Policy-Making in the 1990s: Expanding the Scope
of Political Conflict
By the end of the 1990s, the picture had completely changed. Not only had the
governments of the countries in question made decisive cuts to pension benefits,
nearly all countries had sought solutions outside established Pay-As-You-Go,
defined-benefit pension systems.
The leaders of this process have been Poland, Italy, the United Kingdom
and Norway.18 The Polish pension reform of 1997 effectively “terminated” the
Bismarckian-style pension system [Góra, 2001]. Instead, workers under the age
of 40 will have to pay contributions into both an notional-defined contribution
public pillar and fully funded pension schemes [Perek-Bialas et al., 2001]. Sim-
ilarly, Italian policy-makers have established fully funded pension schemes at
firm level [Cioccia, 2001, Reynaud, 2000]. In the United Kingdom, the cuts to
State Earnings Related Pensions Scheme (SERPS) in the mid-1980s and the
tax incentives for private pensions have led to considerable shift towards pri-
vate pension provisions [Mayhew, 2001]. In Norway, despite expansion of the
universalist elements of the pension system, there has been considerable growth
in private pensions: between 1982 and 1996 the proportion of old age income
from private pensions increased from 16,4% to 21,6% [Ervik, 2001].
Yet even in continental European countries, who we could (somewhat un-
fairly) label as relative laggards, policy-makers have implemented alternatives
to established social insurance systems. In Germany, the most recent reforms
have created a voluntary pension pillar based on Credit-Reserve funding and
located in the private sector [Rehfeld, 2001]. Similarly, the Thomas Law of
1997 in France created the legal and organisational framework for private sector
pension provision. In 2003, the Austrian government passed a pension reform
bill that will fundamentally change the character of old-age income provision in
Austria [Linnerooth-Bayer, 2001, Ney, 2004a].
What has brought about these reforms? If the form and practises of pension
subsystems that constrained structural pension reform prior to the 1990s, we
should look for and expect to find changes at the level of European pension
policy subsystems. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, European pension subsystems
have become less cohesive and more diverse in terms of membership, structure,
and practises.
assume that organisations and individual policy actors seek political power for sinister reasons.
Power is a means of getting things done in politics as money is a means to getting things done
in the market.
18Roughly in that order.
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Changing Institutional Contexts: New Policy Actors and the Con-
tested Terrain
The past decade has witnessed an influx of new institutional actors into the
wider organisational environment of most European pension policy subsystems
(the so-called ‘contested terrain’). As the pension issue gains more prominence
and as the issue expands, a wide variety of policy actors is attracted to the policy
subsystem. These new actors have challenged dominant ways of thinking about
pension reform. As a result, the tight webs of institutional ties characteristic of
European pension policy subsystems have begun to show cracks.
At the level of interest groups, the most prominent new arrivals to the con-
tested terrains of European pension reform have been the banking and insurance
industry. This trend is most visible in the United Kingdom and in Poland: here,
pension reforms have created a formal space for increased industry involvement
in policy-making. The same is true, albeit to a lesser extent, in continental
European countries. In Germany, France, and Italy, the private financial sec-
tor has increased its efforts of influencing pension reform outcomes by adopt-
ing more proactive policy strategies and circumventing established corporatist
channels of policy interaction [Ney, 2001, Bozec and Mays, 2001, Ervik, 2001].
Even in Austria, where corporatist interest mediation remains strong, the pri-
vate sector is becoming increasingly active in providing pension-related products
[Linnerooth-Bayer, 2001].
Another significant addition to the contested terrain in many European coun-
tries are the media. Throughout the past decade, all countries show a change
in both the frequency and content of articles about pension reform issues. Me-
dia coverage in all countries tends to describe pensions in terms of impending
financial crisis: the emphasis here is on the inequitable distribution of burdens
across generations. Metaphors such as “the tidal wave of old age” (Norway),
the “struggle of the generations” (Germany), and the “demographic time-bomb”
(ubiquitous) underline the alleged urgency of policy action. In general, the me-
dia is quick to criticise policy-makers for inaction. In continental countries,
the media equate parametric reforms with governmental weakness, agency cap-
ture, and electoral cynicism: the failure to radically reform pension systems
(usually meaning a shift to a fully-funded financing mechanism) reflects the
inability of policy-makers to rid themselves of old fashioned corporatist dog-
mas as well as the unwillingness of policy-makers to jeopardise the “grey vote”
[Bozec and Mays, 2001, Ney, 2001].
At the level of political elites, the 1990s have brought about a reshuffle of
political allegiances. Political parties no longer mirror corporatist cleavages.
Rather, many major political parties in Europe are split internally along the
lines of competing approaches to pension reform outlined in Chapter 8. More-
over, in continental European polities, supporters of the conventional social
policy-making are rapidly disappearing from the political map. In Germany,
the purge of old-style social policy experts from both the major parties (but
specifically from the German Social Democratic Party) has been particularly
noticeable. Similarly, an entire generation of politicians in Italy was wiped out
by the Mani Pulite enquiries. The same process has occurred, albeit to a lesser
degree, in France and Austria. In the latter two cases, traditional social demo-
cratic values weathered the ideological upheavals of the 1990s far better than
in Germany or the United Kingdom. The shift the union’s traditional allies
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towards the centre of the political spectrum has, especially in continental coun-
tries but also in Britain, left the unionised labour movement on high and dry
ground: in terms of pension policy-making, unions can no longer count on the
uncompromising political support from socialist or social-democratic parties.
The new policy actors have come replete with new ideas, approaches and
frames about pension policy-making. In many cases, new actors to the policy
communities have established competing sites of knowledge production. For ex-
ample, the significance of think-tanks has increased throughout the 1990s. The
independence of these think-tanks varies. Most independent think tanks are
‘close’ to a particular policy position or political party: for example, Demos in
the United Kingdom is (somewhat unfairly) said to be close to “New Labour”,
the Copernic Foundation in France leads the intellectual charge on the neo-
liberal “culture of Bercy”, and the ZeS (Germany) is close to a conventional
German social policy approach. Other think-tanks have more concrete insti-
tutional ties to policy actors: the Deutsches Institut für Altersvorsorge (DIA)
in Germany is nominally independent but receives funding from the Deutsche
Bank Group and Deutsche Bank Research is a department of the banking cor-
poration whose mission is to inform the Deutsche Bank ’s Board Of Directors
[Ney, 2001].
How have these changes affected pension policy-making in continental Eu-
rope? The diversification of participants in the contested terrain of European
pension policy-making has helped loosen formerly cohesive interorganisational
ties at two levels. First, the new entrants to the contested terrain have chal-
lenged the epistemic sovereignty of conventional pension knowledge. Not only
are the new sites of knowledge production in a position to interpret pension
data within the conventional pension paradigms,19 they have also brought new
approaches to bear on the pension issue. In many European countries, gen-
erational accounting and internal rate of return comparisons have questioned
conventional pension policy lore throughout the 1990s [Ervik, 2001, Ney, 2001,
Bozec and Mays, 2001]. In short, there no longer is one dominant pension
“truth” but several alternative and competing pension “truths” based on con-
tending policy frames. In a very real sense, contending policy frames and advo-
cacy coalitions have unearthed the inherent and problematised underlying un-
certainty surrounding pension reform issues. Plurality at both conceptual and
methodological levels implies that policy actors will come to different conclu-
sions about the efficacy and impacts of pension reform. Increasingly, then, what
policy actors choose to believe depends on where they stand in the pension pol-
icy subsystem. The growing plurality of policy frames, then, has (re)politicised
pension knowledge and thereby created the potential for an ‘intractable policy
controversy’.
Second, both the expansion of the contested terrain of pension reform and
the changing socio-economic conditions of the 1990s have fractured the web
of corporatist interaction within the dominant advocacy coalitions. Increasing
19A very simple explanation here may be the increased accessibility to computing power.
For Germany, Nullmeier and Rüb point out that in the 1980s, the German Labour Ministry
(Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung) was the only location with sufficient com-
puting power to crunch credible numbers. In the 1980s, the ministry performed all calculations
of alternative pension reform plans. While this is still nominally the case — see [Ney, 2001]
— credible (if not necessarily legitimate) projections now emerge from a number of different
sources.
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international competition as well as changing forms of accumulation and em-
ployment have transformed the political outlook of pension policy actors. In
general, employers and employer’s organisations have become decidedly indif-
ferent towards national social policy-making [Ney, 2001]. Tight labour markets,
perceived global competitive pressures, and access to global markets imply that
employers and enterprises no longer rely as strongly on co-operation and compli-
ance from other social partners, specifically the unions. Consequently, private
sector policy actors throughout the 1990s have become increasingly assertive
in terms of their own perceived interests and increasingly recalcitrant vis-à-
vis union demands. This tendency is most marked in Germany, and, less so, in
France and Italy. In Austria, however, employers are still relatively co-operative
but have become far more proactive [Linnerooth-Bayer, 2001]. In sum, the em-
ployers’ representatives in continental European countries are drifting away and
even defecting from the hierarchical advocacy coalition [Ney, 2001].
The Scope of Policy Conflict: Advocacy Coalitions and Policy Stories
The influx of new members and ideas into the contested terrain has widened the
scope of political conflict for pension policy-making in continental Europe. As a
result, pension policy debates and agenda-setting have become more polarised
and divisive. Formerly cohesive pension policy subsystems dominated by a
single advocacy coalition now feature several advocacy coalitions contending for
epistemic sovereignty.
The discourse analysis of policy documents, academic literature and qualita-
tive expert interviews shows that policy debate at national level in continental
European countries breaks down into similar policy positions found at interna-
tional level in Chapter 8.20 Similar to the international level, the wider policy
debate in the contested terrain of national pension reform features three types of
advocacy coalitions and their distinctive policy frames. Using both the cultural
theory-inspired typology of advocacy coalitions and the policy-stories instru-
ment, we can reconstruct three contending and irreducible policy arguments.
First, the individualist Crisis Story that thematises intergenerational fairness
and economic efficiency. Second, the analysis unearthed evidence of the hierar-
chical Stability Story which places value on social peace and intergenerational
solidarity. Last, and somewhat marginal, continental European policy debates
about pension reform feature the egalitarian Social Justice Story that urges
policy to apply a holistic approach to the ageing issue.
Before discussing the policy stories in more detail, what are contending ad-
vocacy coalitons telling stories about?
Common Challenges
Despite ideational diversity within and across national policy environments deal-
ing with pension issues, policy-makers in most European countries perceive
general policy challenges similarly.21 First, policy-makers and experts in all
20The interviews were conducted in 2000 and 2001 in seven different European countries
(Austria, France, Germany, , Italy, Norway, Poland, and the UK) in the context of the PEN-
REF project.
21One explanation may be that the definition of current pension problems emerged from
cohesive policy subsystems in the past. This would also dispel the idea that current reforms are
issue-driven in any way. The problems for which current reforms are supposedly the solution
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countries understand demographic ageing to be the root cause of the pension
problem. Demographic imbalances, policy-makers in all countries point out,
will place considerable financial strain on existing pension systems in the fu-
ture. Second, policy-makers in all countries point to the set of social, economic
and political developments commonly referred to as ‘globalisation’. Increasingly,
economic agents, whether these are enterprises or individual workers, compete in
global markets: for many policy-makers, this implies that future societal wealth
will depend on costs and competitiveness. Moreover, European policy-makers
point to changes in household structures and employment patterns: increas-
ingly, the male bread-winner model and life-time employment are becoming the
exception rather than the rule. In the future, pension systems will have to cope
with issues such as discontinuous employment histories, whether for spells of
unemployment, training or maternity/ paternity leave.
Although there is rough agreement about general problems within and across
different national pension policy subsystems, the interpretation of policy chal-
lenges has given rise to conflicting policy stories. Differing constructions of the
pension issue have divided national policy environments in similar ways.
The Crisis Story: An Individualist Tale of Intergenerational Fairness
and Efficiency
In general, advocacy coalitions emphasising intergenerational fairness seek to
expand the pension issue just enough to allow them to enter the agenda-setting
process. The fundamental problem, advocates here argue, is that defined-benefit
Pay-As-You-Go systems are in dire financial straits.
The socio-economic and demographic development so the past 20 years
have squeezed public Pay-As-You-Go pension systems in three ways. The first
squeeze on pension systems finances emerges from demographic ageing. In-
creasing longevity and falling fertility rates mean that the dependency ratio in
most European countries will increase sharply after about 2010 [OECD, 1998].
This, proponents of the Crisis Story contend, will invariably lead to an steep
and unsustainable increase in social security costs for workers and firms. Glob-
alisation of goods and financial markets provides the second squeeze on pen-
sion systems. In the future, global markets will reward those economies with
low production costs. However, present public Pay-As-You-Go systems, replete
with generous pension benefits, are likely to drive production cost to unsustain-
able levels. This, proponents of the Crisis Story maintain, inevitably leads to
unemployment, contribution evasion by younger workers and a loss of interna-
tional competitiveness. In all three cases, pension systems will lose revenues.
The third squeeze originates in fundamental flaws of existing European public
pension systems. Nearly all European countries, so the argument goes, feature
generous provisions for early retirement. Falling labour market participation
rates show that European workers are eager to take advantage of early retire-
ment provisions [Gruber and Wise, 1997]. However, given increasing longevity
and demographic ageing, early retirement adds to the already daunting financial
burdens of public PAYG systems. The crisis, advocates emphatically conclude,
is upon us now and the need for decisive policy action is acute.
What, then, should policy-makers do? The advocates of the Crisis Story
have been known in the pension policy communities for a long time [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993]
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favour pension reforms that reduce social insurance costs and urge policy-makers
to look for alternatives to public Pay-As-You-Go systems. Policy actors have
suggested diverse ways for reducing the expenditure of public Pay-As-You-Go
schemes including increasing the retirement age, abolishing early retirement,
reducing replacement rates, and cutting redistributive elements within pension
systems. Significantly, advocates of this policy story suggest that pension pro-
vision be made more transparent by erecting institutionally distinct pension
pillars. These pillars would fulfil different functions of old age protection (i.e.
poverty alleviation, long-term savings, and co-insurance). Ideally, pension pil-
lars should be located in institutions best suited to fulfil the different function;
i.e. redistribution would be a public task while long-term savings is best man-
aged by the private sector [James, 1994]. Pension reforms, advocates of the
Crisis Story maintain, should aim to diversify old age income provision.
The institutional location of this advocacy coalition differs in European coun-
tries. The most obvious raconteurs of the Crisis Story are “Washington con-
sensus” economists, the banking and insurance industries and well as market-
oriented politicians (such as Silvio Berlusconi in Italy or Guido Westerwelle in
Germany). Less obvious, but far more politically significant, is the growing
support for the Crisis Story line in social-democratic parties across Europe.
Arguably, one of the defining features of “New Labour” in Britain, Germany
and France is that left-wing politicians are taking the Crisis Story seriously.
Moreover, throughout Europe, the media has been particularly receptive to ar-
guments about intergenerational equity: this trend is probably most pronounced
in Germany and Italy where the media have more or less subscribed to the cri-
sis scenario [Cioccia, 2001, Ney, 2001]. Yet, even in France and Austria, the
media have, albeit somewhat more cautiously, taken on board the Crisis Story
[Bozec and Mays, 2001, Linnerooth-Bayer, 2001].
The Social Stability Story: Social Peace and Intergenerational Soli-
darity
Advocacy coalitions focusing on social stability generally limit the pension is-
sue to technical problems. Here, the issue is how to best adapt and fine-tune
existing systems to demographic and socio-economic challenges. Demographic
ageing and socio-economic change, so the argument goes, requires judicious and
measured social management by competent experts. Given the central role and
proven track-record of existing pension systems in securing social stability and
intergenerational solidarity, the main challenge is to keep those institutional
mechanisms intact. This, advocates argue, includes securing the public’s trust
in the pension system by providing stable and reasonable replacement rates.
The real problem, proponents of the Stability Story suggest, is that particu-
lar policy actors have systematically undermined the trust in existing pension
systems.
The advocacy coalition arguing for social stability emphasises the need for
judiciously balanced fine-tuning and adaptation. The aim here is to secure
the long-term viability of existing pension systems. Not only is a wholesale
transition to a multi-pillar system too costly, there is no evidence to suggest that
Credit-Reserve, defined-contribution systems could stand up to the challenges of
demographic ageing any more effectively than Pay-As-You-Go, defined-benefit
schemes. The catalogue of proposed reform measures is extensive and differs
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widely between countries and even within countries at different points in time.
The leitmotif of reforms in this vein is to rely on the organisational resources
of established Pay-As-You-Go systems without changing the basic institutional
identity of the pension system. In general, reform proposals have suggested
increases in contributions, retrenchment of benefits and reductions redistributive
elements in public Pay-As-You-Go pension schemes. However, unlike advocates
of the Crisis Story, the aim of reform options here is to obviate the need for
substantial private sector involvement in pension provision. Private pension
provision should be no more than a supplement to public provisions.
In continental European countries, advocates for the Stability Story still
represent the pension policy establishment. Typically located in key positions
within the administrative structure of the Pay-As-You-Go pension system, pro-
ponents of the rational management approach still command considerable in-
fluence over pension policy debates. However, in several continental European
countries, the epistemic sovereignty of the pension expertocracy has become
shaky. Particularly in Italy and, to a lesser extent, in Germany, France and
Austria market-oriented discourses have undermined the cognitive and policy-
making status of the established pension policy community: here, policy com-
munities have not been able to avert partial or total shifts towards private sector
provision.
The Social Justice Story: Equity and the Life-Course
The advocacy coalition stressing social justice and equality applies a holistic
view to expand the pension issue beyond economic or technical considerations.
Here, pension schemes are a part of a socio-economic system that, in general,
is highly inequitable. By relying on standard, male-dominated patterns of em-
ployment, existing public and emergent private sector pension schemes penalise
marginal and vulnerable social groups: these include, most prominently, the
working poor, families, women, foreigners, people with special needs, as well as
persons adopting alternative life-styles. Demographic ageing and globalisation
is likely to exacerbate existing social problems of inequality. Pension reforms,
the argument goes, need to be a part of general societal reform agenda centred
on active and autonomous ageing.
The policy options proposed by advocates of social justice and equality aim
at levelling inherent social inequities. Pension reforms, they argue, need to recal-
ibrate old age income provision so that they allow individuals to fully determine
their own destinies. This means that pension benefits should free the aged from
both patriarchal state intervention as well as the vagaries of capital markets.
In order to allow this degree of individual self-determination, pension benefits
should provide an adequate level of old age income to all citizens, regardless
of labour market participation or nationality. Thus, advocates of social justice
and equality propose to increase redistribution among different social groups:
high pensions need to fall so that low pensions can increase. Moreover, pro-
ponents of this policy story urge policy-makers to harmonise different pension
systems (thereby abolishing occupational privileges) and to increase coverage
of the pension scheme to all citizens (regardless of national or labour market
status).
The policy story about social justice and equality languishes at the margins
of most European pension policy debates. In continental countries, the most
284
vociferous proponents of this policy story are the German and Austrian Green
Parties. However, despite the German Green Party’s government participation,
proponents of the social justice and equality discourse have only had a limited
impact on current German pension reforms plans. In Austria, in turn, the
Greens are consigned to an opposition role at both governmental and policy
subsystem level: their impact on pension reform has been negligible. In France,
Italy, and Poland policy arguments about social justice are conspicuous in their
absence.22 This is partly due to the dispersed and disjointed organisational
composition of this advocacy coalition: since a holistic concern for the life-course
is inherently transversal, the members of this advocacy coalition are scattered
across a wide range of different policy domains (such as health, care provision,
social services, the labour market, occupational rehabilitation, and, not least,
social insurance) [Ney, 2005]. This has hampered effective policy mobilisation
and advocacy.
The Constested Terrain in Continental European Pension Reform
The policy stories outlined in the previous sections provide principled narratives
that help policy-actors make sense of the pension issue. By providing policy
actors with cognitive and normative maps, the conflicting policy stories define
and delimit a discursive sphere in which policy debate takes place. This space
outlines the borders of legitimate argument in the policy community: policy
stories determine what is to count as a fact and what types of arguments are
‘out of bounds’. We can visualise this in terms of a triangular contested terrain:
The relationship between contending advocacy coalitions is one of inherent
conflict [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993a, Rayner, 1991]. Within the con-
tested terrain, advocacy coalitions will clash over ‘correct’ definitions of the
pension issue, ‘appropriate’ policy responses and ‘suitable’ policy instruments.
In order to have their case heard, members of advocacy coalitions will argue,
persuade and beseech other policy actors and the public. Agenda-setting within
the policy subsystem, then, becomes an argumentative process refracted through
institutional factors such as the distribution of power and resources in policy
communities.
The Structure of Policy Conflict
How has policy conflict developed in continental European pension debates?
In continental pension systems, the main fault line runs between the propo-
nents of the Crisis Story and the Social Stability Story. Policy-makers and
experts in continental European countries stylise the conflict as a struggle of
economic policy against social policy; it is a clash between Credit-Reserve
defined-contribution and Pay-As-You-Go defined-benefit; between the ideals of
22The Norwegian and British pension systems, however, institutionalise egalitarian princi-
ples, albeit to considerably different degrees. In Britain, the basic state pension provides equal
benefits to all contributors at comparatively low rates of wage replacement. In Norway, in
turn, the basic universal pension benefits are more generous and eligibility is independent of
labour market participation. Consequently, policy arguments in the social justice and equality
vein have more of an impact on policy debates than in continental countries. Whereas, how-
ever, the British debate is about ameliorating old age poverty in an essentially market-oriented



































Figure 9.1: The Triangular Policy Space of the Pension Debate at National Level
liberal markets and rational social management. In continental Europe, dom-
inant policy actors have either co-opted the third policy story (as in Germany
and Austria) or have stonewalled it completely (Italy, France).
As we saw at international level in Chapter 8, contending advocacy coali-
tions agree on selected general principles and policy measures. In continental
European countries, advocates of the Crisis Story and Social Stability Story find
themselves agreeing on the basic problem and general solutions to the pension
issue. For both advocacy coalitions, securing economic growth at national and
European level is a central prerequisite for facing these challenges. What is
more, contending coalitions in the pension policy subsystems understand social
protection systems to have an significant impact on economic growth. At a
general level, both the hierarchical and individualist advocacy coalitions in con-
tinental Europe agree on a reform strategy: existing benefits structures need to
change, workers need to retire later, and policy-makers should introduce some
private provision.
Beyond the general framework of reform, however, contending advocacy
coalitions in continental Europe fundamentally disagree on how to tackle these
issues. Proponents argue over the dimensions and technicalities of benefit cuts
(e.g. the debate about the demographic factor in the Germany or the issue
of increasing qualifying periods in France), the timing and phasing in of the
reforms (e.g. the debate about the stepwise abolition of early retirement in
Austria or the discussion about the reduction of disability pensions in Ger-
many), the role and significance of private provisions (e.g. the controversy over
the so-called “Riester Rente” in Germany). In these conflicts, the contending
advocacy coalitions question the fundamental legitimacy of pension knowledge
and expertise. For example, in the German pension debate, an expert from
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the Stability advocacy coalition maintains that there is no objective or dis-
interested expertise in the debate: for any given study “. . . it is always clear
to an expert, from what corner these research results originate” [Ney, 2001].
Similarly, Bozec and Mays see the clash between contending French advocacy
coalitions in terms of an “intractable policy controversy” between the divergent
interpretations of the Fondation Copernic and the neo-liberal culture of Bercy
[Bozec and Mays, 2001].
What is more, in all social insurance countries, this conflict flares intermit-
tently to fever-pitch. In these countries, the pension reform debate has become
a proxy for more fundamental governance issues. The clash between the ad-
vocacy coalitions addresses the fundamental principles of the contending policy
frames: the way pension schemes create institutional structures and practises
preferred by the rival social solidarities. With decision-stakes as high as this,
the current debate in these countries has deteriorated into a “dialogue of the
deaf” [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993a]. Here, pension knowledge has be-
come a rhetorical resource: policy actors can no longer solve disagreements
by recourse to ‘facts’ because the ‘facts’ have become an integral part of an
advocacy coalition’s rhetorical strategy. This, then, is the repoliticisation of
pension knowledge: what seemed ‘objective fact’ a decade ago now reveals a
fundamental political bias. Indeed, the form of political interaction has become
less than genteel: in policy debates, mutual recriminations and accusations fly
thick and fast. Each side accuses each other of irresponsibility and dubious ul-
terior motives. On the one side, policy actors point to unions and governments
merely wanting to save their own political necks by burdening young workers
[Ney, 2001, Cioccia, 2001, Bozec and Mays, 2001, Linnerooth-Bayer, 2001]. On
the other side, contending policy-makers conjure up images of destitute pen-
sioners and class warfare all for the sake of short-term profits that line fat-cat
employers’ pockets. In short, agreement, let alone consensus, is unlikely.
The imbalanced structure of policy conflict is also reflected in the policy out-
puts of recent pension reform experiences. Although pension reforms in all conti-
nental European countries feature elements of all three policy stories, egalitarian
element is consistently marginal compared to systemic retrenchments and the
introduction of private sector pension provision. In both Austria and Germany,
recent reforms have included measures to promote life-long learning and flexible
retirement [Ney, 2001, Ney, 2004b, Linnerooth-Bayer, 2001, Heuberger, 2004].
However, both Hinrichs and Aleksandrowics as well as Heuberger report that
flexible retirement provisions in Germany and Austria have been abused by firms
to circumvent policy measures designed to curtail early retirement
[Hinrichs and Aleksandrowicz, 2005, Heuberger, 2004]. Moreover, despite pub-
lic proclamations of government and EU support for the life-long learning mea-
sures included in recent reforms across continental Europe, policy actors on
have yet to translate these concepts into concrete and coherent policy at soci-
etal level [Ney, 2005]. In general, however, pension reform policy outputs in all
continental European countries centre on adjustments of the benefit formula and
the introduction of private sector pension schemes. Policy debate and agenda-
setting has concentrated on issues such as the introduction of a mechanism to
adjust pension benefits to changes in demography in Germany, the increase of
qualification period in France, or the increase of employment years considered
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in the pension calculation in Austria.23 Similarly, the implementation of private
sector pension schemes (such as the German “Riesterrente”)
How does this analysis of the scope and structure of policy conflict in con-
tinental European pension reform debates help us understand the changes to
pension provision and pension policy-making? In other words, how can un-
derstanding the change in the way policy actors collectively make sense of the
messy policy problem of old-age income help us analyse reforms of continental
European pension systems?
Impacts: Making Sense of Penions Reform in Continental
Europe
The 1990s have witnessed the partial break-up of corporatist pension policy
subsystems. Due to shifts at political level and general socio-economic changes,
pension policy subsystems and the wider contested terrain of pension reform
have become more diverse in terms of membership (i.e. advocacy coalitions)
and in terms of ideas (i.e. policy frames). As a result, pension policy-making
in Europe has become a more contentious, conflictual and pluralist activity.
How can we explain these developments in terms of the conceptual tool-box
for discourse analysis developed in Chapter 5 and how has this affected pension
systems?
Social insurance systems in continental Europe were set onto a hierarchi-
cal institutionalization trajectory in the immediate post-war period. On the
one hand, fledgling European economies did not seem sufficiently robust to
support old-age income provision. On the other, the war had ravaged continen-
tal European civil society, so communal forms of old-age income provision did
not seem feasible. As a result, hierarchical types of advocacy coalitions dom-
inated the management of social insurance institutions in continental Europe
for much of the post-war era. While pension systems and other forms of social
protection in continental Europe incorporate policy principles originating from
all three advocacy coalitions captured by the cultural theory-inspired typol-
ogy [Hinrichs, 1998, Hinrichs, 2000, Schmähl, 1999, Tálos and Kittel, 2001], the
structures and practises of social insurance governance have been unambiguously
hierarchical [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993, Lamping and Rüb, 2002, Pabst, 1999].
Indeed, for much of the 1950s and 1960s, the hierarchical advocacy coalition
established and deepened its epistemic sovereignty over pension policy-making.
Hierarchical pension system management drew its strength from the control
over production, dissemination as well as the definition of what was to count as
credible pension knowledge. This provided a powerful means of forging social
cohesion among individual policy actors. Thus, solidarity among experts in the
policy subsystem trumped any organisational allegiances of individual pension
policy-makers. The so-called bi- or tripartite “social policy consensus”, then,
was little more than agreement on the shared policy frame between members of
an advocacy coalition.
On this view, cohesion and consensus among pension policy-makers was
predicated on the exclusion of contending policy actors from pension policy
23Much of these changes in the pension benefit formulas across continental Europe amount
to a stealthy shift from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution system. For example, the
German pension reform of 2001 has placed a statutory cap on pension system contributions
at about 20% of the gross wage.
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subsystems. As policy subsystems in continental Europe became increasingly
inaccessible to rival advocacy coalitions and unresponsive to contending policy
stories, members of the hierarchical advocacy coalition were free to shape pen-
sion systems without confronting frame-based and principled criticism. While
public coffers were aflush with funds — that is during the so-called “Golden
Era of the Welfare State” — dominant advocacy coalitions across continen-
tal Europe could satisfy egalitarian demands for more redistribution while not
compromising labour market supply decisions dear to individualist policy actors
[Hinrichs, 2001]. By the end of the 1960s, pension policy-making had become
restricted to an exclusive policy subsystem.
Yet, from the early to mid-1970s onwards, European economic growth con-
siderably slowed never to return to the high levels of the immediate post-war
era. The world economy exerted financial pressures on pension systems and
forced ruling hierarchical advocacy coalitions to decide on the allocation of de-
creasing funds. This, then, sparked a debate in the contested terrain as to
how best distribute the shrinking pie. Given that hierarchical advocacy coali-
tions shared areas of agreement with the two rival perspectives, the hierarchical
policy-makers found it difficult to deflect calls for tighter cost control on the one
hand and more redistribution in the name of social solidarity on the other. Here,
the bi-partite management structure acted and still acts as a conduit for these
demands into the policy subsystem. However, epistemic sovereignty of the hi-
erarchical Social Stability Story meant that policy actors recast these demands
into the mould of the “social policy consensus”: practical policy responses to
perceived problems, then, were forged solely from the reservoir of arguments,
concepts and tools associated with the hierarchical advocacy coalition. Eventu-
ally, then, epistemic sovereignty and the monopoly over policy-making it implied
led to the iterative and incremental reform process characteristic of social in-
surance systems in continental Europe [Bonoli, 2000, Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993,
Lamping and Rüb, 2002, Tálos and Kittel, 2001]. Ironically, the demands for
change addressed to the hierarchical advocacy community from the contested
terrain had the effect of purging continental European pension systems of what
little systemic plurality they had left: by retrenching redistribution on the
one hand and by concentrating pension provision in a single, monolithical and
income-related pension pillar on the other, the dominant advocacy coalitions
successively pared down pension systems to the basic hierarchical framework.
As a result, the inherent vulnerabilities of the hierarchical pension system de-
sign become increasingly apparent. This is partly due the inability of incremen-
tal reforms within the institutional logic of social insurance provision to do more
than alleviate the symptoms rather than address the causes (which would mean
undermining the epistemic sovereignty of the dominant advocacy coalition). In
all social insurance countries, pension reform becomes a permanent feature of
the policy agenda. However, contending advocacy coalitions — particularly the
proponents of the Crisis Story — picked up on and publicly thematised these
shortcomings. After all, steadily increasing pay-roll taxes, persistently poor eco-
nomic performance, structural unemployment and increasing social disparities
were providing either rival advocacy coalitions in the contested terrain with an
abundance of argumentative ammunition. By the early to mid-1990s, hierar-
chical advocacy coalitions in charge of pension policy subsystems were running
out of options [Lamping and Rüb, 2002] or the options they proposed no longer
seemed credible [Hinrichs, 2001]. In either case, growing opposition from dis-
289
placed advocacy coalitions in the contested terrain of pension policy-making
as well as mounting signs that the hierarchical management regime had hit
the buffers created a favourable climate or basic receptiveness for institutional
change within the pension policy subsystem.
The confluence of these systemic developments with events external to the
pension policy domain24 jolted continental European pension systems onto a
trajectory of deinstitutionalisation. The influx of new policy actors (think-
tanks and the media) and the transformation of political elites led to cracks in
structural and ideational cohesion of the hierarchical advocacy coalition: this
is probably best symbolised by the drift and defection of the employers’ rep-
resentatives to the individualist Crisis advocacy coalitions. As a result, the
‘social policy consensus’ dissolved thereby deflating the hierarchical advocacy
coalition’s central claim to authority. More importantly, however, changes at
the level of political elites in all continental European countries had undermined
the political support for the hierarchical Social Stability coalition. In short, the
epistemic sovereignty of the hierarchical advocacy coalition evaporated with the
breakdown of the ‘social policy consensus’ on the one hand, and a waning of
enthusiasm for social insurance at elite level on the other.
As a consequence, the formerly tightly sealed pension policy subsystem have
become accessible to proponents of the Crisis Story. Although the precise
processes differ from country to country, the Crisis advocacy coalitions have
successfully infiltrated pension policy subsystems via the new constellation of
political elites. In a very real sense, political elites went from being gatekeep-
ers ensuring new ideas remained outside the policy subsystem to gateways that
actively encouraged the entry of fresh concepts. For example, policy actors at
elite level have created new organisational venues such as the Rürup Kommis-
sion in Germany or the Pensionsreformkommission in Austria alongside corpo-
ratist institutions with the expressed purpose of introducing new ideas into the
pension policy subsystem [Linnerooth-Bayer, 2001, Anticchi and Pizzuti, 2000,
Lamping and Rüb, 2002]. Comparatively tepid political commitment to social
insurance institutions have given advocates of the Crisis Story a significant voice
in the agenda-setting and policy formation processes within pension policy sub-
systems. Consequently, pension policy subsystems have transformed from uni-
tary containing only one type of advocacy coalitions tobi-polar systems that pit
two advocacy coalitions against one another. Thus, pension policy subsystems
in continental Europe have transformed from exclusive subsystems dominated
by a hierarchical advocacy coalition to partially inclusive policy subsystems
featuring stiff opposition from the advocates of the Crisis Story.
How has this affected pension policy processes?
Conflictual bi-polar pension subsystems have made policy processes less pre-
dictable and more volatile. Intractable policy conflict has successively eroded
those policy norms that secured consensual decision-making in pension policy
subsystems. As yet policy actors in continental European countries have not
agreed on a new set of rules that could regulate the more conflictual policy
sphere: indeed, in countries such as Austria, Germany and France, these rules
24Most notable and dramatic is the fall of the Berlin Wall that ended the Cold War era
(more or less) overnight. However, less precipitous but nonetheless important changes include
the political reforms at European level such as the creation of the Single European Market
in 1987, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, or the process leading up to the single
European currency.
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are an integral part of heated policy conflict.
Rather than conforming to rational models of policy-making, pension pol-
icy processes are becoming more akin to ‘Garbage Cans’ [Cohen et al., 1972,
Kingdon, 1984].25 Whereas corporatist policy subsystems tightly regulated pol-
icy streams, the influx of new members and new ideas has allowed the policy
streams to drift. As a result, European pension policy-making has become far
more vulnerable to forces beyond the immediate control of policy actors. For
example, although overall pension reforms in the 1990s have generally moved
systems away from single-pillar provision towards more diversity, the decade is
also littered with spectacular examples of policy failures. In Austria, failure of
the 1995 pension reforms led to the collapse of the coalition government. The
German Pension Reform Act 1999 (Rentenreformgesetz 1999 ), overturned by
the incoming social democrat/ Green coalition government only a year after it
was adopted, arguably hastened the demise of the Kohl era. In Italy, the Berlus-
coni government failed to implement planned reforms due to the defection of the
ultra-right wing coalition partner, the Lega Nord. The pension policy process in
Europe, it would seem, has become more competitive and volatile. This should
come as no surprise: while the policy frames of hierarchical advocacy coalitions
value predictability and stability, individualist proponents of the Crisis Story
prefer to let market forces create opportunities.
In continental European countries, the development of a more unpredictable
and conflictual policy processes has culminated in a spate of reforms that chal-
lenged the institutional logic of pension provision. In all social insurance coun-
tries, reforms have created the legal and organisational basis for fully funded
private sector old age income provision. Although these fully funded pillars are
relatively modest compared to private provision in, say, the United Kingdom,
Norway or Poland, they nonetheless mark a departure from established pension
reform policy patterns.
Arguably, the expansion of pension policy subsystems and the widening of
the scope of policy conflict have enabled policy actors to place structural reform
proposals on European policy agendas. Moreover, these types of changes, which
Paul Pierson calls “systemic retrenchments”, are likely to have a significant
impact on future pension reforms[Pierson, 1994, Pierson, 1996]. If institutional
path-dependency structures pension reform options, then the changes to policy
subsystems in the 1990s are likely influence pension policy-making in the future.
Pluralisation of pension policy subsystems has created a new type of playing
field for European social policy-making; significantly, structural pension reform
is an integral part of this new field.
Given the informal and ad hoc nature of pension policy processes, changes
25Briefly, the “Garbage Can” or “Multiple Streams” approach, claims that policy-making
emerges from a highly complex and chaotic process. At any one time, so the argument goes,
three independent streams run through the political system. The first stream contains all
the potential policy problems that rattle around in a polity. The second stream consists of
policy solutions to a host of existing and putative policy problems. The last stream, the
political stream, determines the status of a policy issue. Its components are the national
mood, the constellation of organised political forces, the make-up of government, and the
drive for consensus-building (bandwaggoning, bargaining, etc. ). The upshot of the argument
is that an issue can only reach the policy agenda when all three streams ‘meet’. This not only
depends on the activity of policy entrepreneurs that try to link solutions to problems (or vice
versa) but on a host of unpredictable factors (such as catastrophes, crises, swings in public
opinion, etc. ). When the streams meet, this opens a “policy window” for a limited amount of
time in which policy actors can launch a particular policy, see [Kingdon, 1984, Kingdon, 1995].
291
in the 1990s have introduced political uncertainty into pension policy-making.
Conflict in pension policy communities not used to political confrontation has
made pension reform a politically more precarious affair. Whereas the cor-
poratist system of interest mediation carefully regulated who interacted with
whom, where, when, and, most importantly, about what, policy interaction in
the past decade has occurred in increasingly unpredictable ways.
On the one hand, pension policy communities, particularly in continental
European polities have not kept pace with the shifting and uncertain alliances
at policy elite level. In Austria and Germany, both present government coali-
tions (social democrats and Greens in Germany, conservative and ultra-right
in Austria) would have been unthinkable only a few years ago. In both poli-
ties, governments have circumvented corporatist decision-making structures. In
Germany, the present government has kept the traditional pension policy es-
tablishment at arms length [Ney, 2001]. In Austria, in turn, policy-makers
simply invented new policy venues to keep pension reform from the sway of
the powerful Austrian social partnership [Linnerooth-Bayer, 2001]. In Italy, the
replacement of the entire post-war party system has given rise to vulnerable
and volatile new political alliances on both the right and left of the political
spectrum [Cioccia, 2001, Anticchi and Pizzuti, 2000]. The result of these de-
velopments has been the emergence of a structural disparity between political
elites and the pension policy community: with the former, we find a more fluid
configuration that rapidly adjusts to changes while the latter features relatively
inflexible structures geared towards securing continuity.
On the other hand, the expanding the scope of political and ideational con-
flict has suspended the implicit ‘rules’ of policy engagement in pension policy
communities.
9.3 Conclusion: Democracy and Structural Pen-
sion Reform
Pension reforms in the past decade and a half have introduced diversity to both
pension systems as well as pension policy-making. In terms of reforming actual
pension systems, differing initial conditions and institutional path-dependency
have led to a host of different pension reform measures across Europe. However,
two general reform trends emerge from nearly all European countries:
• reforms have streamlined public pension systems by tying benefits closer
to contributions
• reforms provided space for the development of private sector forms of old
age income provision
This has implied a shift in responsibility for old age security. Increasingly,
European states are divesting themselves of pension provision obligations. What
is more, the decreasing willingness of states to shoulder all of the responsibility
for old age income has met with enthusiasm on part of private sector providers
to take up the slack. In a very real sense, pension reforms are creating a viable
role for private sector pension provisions by lowering expectations concerning
the level of future public pension benefits.
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These developments should come as a bit of a surprise. Analyses of pension
reform politics generally point out that structural and radical pension reforms in
mature democracies is improbable bordering on the impossible. The structures
and practises of democratic institutions, so the argument goes, inherently mili-
tate against departures from the status quo. Since the electorate fears losses (the
“negativity bias”) and politicians seek re-election (the vote-motive), any form of
welfare state retrenchment, let alone structural pension reform, is likely to be a
rather unattractive political proposition. In order to cut welfare state benefits,
then, democratic structures and practises (i.e. majority voting) force policy-
makers to avoid political responsibility by diffusing blame. Whether through
obfuscation, compensation or concertation, pension reforms imply suspending
democratic practises in one way or another. The best would-be reformers can
hope for, so the argument goes, are incremental, piece-meal, and iterative re-
forms of the ‘pension misery-go-round’.
However, a closer look at the subpolitics of pension policy-making tells a
different story. By applying the conceptual tool-box developed in Chapter 5,
the preceding analysis has explored the relationship between changes in pension
provision and changes in the composition of and interaction between collective
policy actors in pension policy domain. In the past, social insurance pension
systems gave rise ideologically coherent, tightly integrated and highly cohesive
policy subsystems dominated by a single, hierarchical advocacy coalition. Based
on claims to superior expert knowledge and legitimated in terms of the ‘social
policy consensus’, these policy communities successfully insulated themselves
from democratic institutions (such as parliaments), public scrutiny and other
policy subsystems. They did so by erecting high barrier of entry for individualist
or egalitarian advocacy coalitions in terms of expertise and knowledge. In this
way, the hierarchical advocacy coalition controlled the agenda-setting and policy
formation processes in pension policy subsystems. Consequently, debate on
reform efforts remained well within the social insurance paradigm.
Throughout the 1990s, the predictability associated with the
epistemic sovereignty of hierarchical advocacy coalitions has given way to a
more complex and more conflictual policy process. Throughout Europe, the
contested terrain of pension policy-making has become more populous and the
scope of policy conflict has widened. New policy actors, such as the banking and
insurance sector but also personnel changes at the level of political elites, have
introduced contending policy stories into the debate. At the same time, the
patent solutions to pension policy issues of the hierarchical advocacy coalition
were beginning to appear rather threadbare. Contending advocacy coalitions —
particularly proponents of the individualist Crisis Story — have challenged the
epistemic sovereignty of the ruling hierarchical advocacy coalition byt pointing
to the shortcomings of social insurance pension systems. The transformation of
political elites in most continental European countries as well as wider socio-
economic developments at national and European level helped the Crisis Story
advocacy coalition enter continental European pension policy subsystems. By
the beginning of the new millennium, the individualist advocacy coalition is
significantly implicated in pension reform agenda-setting and policy formation.
However, increasing plurality has been synonymous with increasing policy
conflict. Whereas pension policy-making before the 1990s was based on con-
sensus across corporatist and political cleavages, pension reform in the 1990s
is characterised by increasingly hostile political conflict. In many countries,
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pension reform debates have become “intractable policy controversies” in which
knowledge and “credible pension data” are merely rhetorical resources.
Significantly, however, this (partial) breakdown of corporatist policy sub-
systems has created space for alternative pension reform ideas. By the end of
the 1990s, nearly all continental European countries have taken first steps down
the road of fully funded, private sector pension provision. The pluralisation
of political contestation, the expansion of the scope of political conflict as well
as widening policy participation (democratisation in short) have enabled, not
constrained structural pension reforms in continental Europe.
Does this mean that European pension policy-making is now happily demo-
cratic? Not necessarily. At present, European pension policy subsystems and
policy processes are in a state of flux. Although, in terms of political contesta-
tion and inclusion, European pension policy communities have moved a towards
“polyarchy” [Dahl, 1971], there is still a considerable “democratic deficit”.
First, the beneficiaries of changes in policy-making structures and styles
have been governments and state bureaucracies. In a very real sense, increasing
diversity of actors and ideas has increased the strategic options open to gov-
ernments. The break-down of corporatist consensual policy-making has eman-
cipated governments from the strictures of epistemically uniform pension policy
experts. Rather than one ‘pension truth’, governmental policy-makers now have
the choice of several plausible policy stories. Since the sites of credible pension
knowledge no longer reside solely within the corporatist pension policy commu-
nity, there are far more ‘scientifically sound’ pension policy options to choose
from. For governments with vague and broad ideological commitments (such
as most major European parties), more ideational and institutional diversity
means an increase in potential strategic alliances. This, in turn means more
governmental leverage on potential partners since governments are less con-
strained (ideologically and in terms of credible pension knowledge) by policy
actor demands. Increasing governmental autonomy in agenda-setting and pol-
icy formulation, in turn, is not necessarily the same thing as increasing popular
control over pension policy-making.
Second, pension policy-making still predominantly takes place in the front-
yard of the parliamentary process by pension experts (who now tend to dis-
agree more than they agree). Although an increase in diversity and conflict
is desirable from a democratic perspective, democracy also implies the exis-
tence of institutional mechanisms for peacefully resolving policy conflict. As
evidence shows, the parliamentary front-yard is far more suitable to corporatist
consensus-seeking than to the resolution of intense and fundamental policy con-
flicts. If the pension policy process in Europe is to be democratically account-
able, policy-makers will have to design a suitable political venues equipped with
the institutional means for resolving fundamental policy conflict.
Third, the presently high level of divisive policy conflict, as is evident in
many continental European countries, is probably not conducive to pension
policy-making. The risk here is creating policy deadlock (where policy conflict
gets in the way of necessary reform) or vicious policy cycles (in which successive
new governments overturn pension reforms of their predecessors). Moreover,
deadlock at the level of the policy community empowers state bureaucracies
and central government by suspending the ‘regulatory’ function of policy sub-
systems: here, decisions emerge not from an argumentative policy processes
but are instead based on “raw” or “despotic” power. Again, this is likely to
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undermine the legitimacy of both decisions and decision-making processes.
Fourth, the Social Justice Story is still excluded from the pension policy sub-
system. The application of the conceptual framework for discourse analysis re-
veals that recent developments in continental European pension policy processes
amount to a partial pluralisation of pension policy subsystems. Although the
evidence suggests that corporatist pension policy subsystems have become both
more accessible (to individualist advocacy coalitions) and responsive (to rival
policy stories), the egalitarian advocacy coalition is still excluded and egalitar-
ian policy arguments remain marginal. Whether hierarchical and individualist
policy actors can keep egalitarian advocacy coalitions out of policy subsystems
in the medium and long-run is an open question. On the one hand, the areas
of agreement (i.e. social solidarity) and mutual rejection (i.e. rampant market)
between the hierarchical and egalitarian pension advocacy coalitions provide an
opportunity for a policy alliance. Indeed, there is some evidence that alliances of
this kind are forming at national and European level.26 Further, cultural theory
suggests that policy-making in bi-polar policy subsystems will be vulnerable to
conceptual blindness and policy failure: over time, hierarchical and individual-
ist policy actors will fail to appreciate or anticipate the equity implications of
their social policy. On the other hand, the disparate nature of the egalitarian
ageing advocacy coalition will significantly hamper any directed policy effort.
Moreover, so far the active ageing paradigm is not proving to be the strong
integrative force its proponents have envisaged [Ney, 2005].
In essence, policy-makers face two general options:
First, policy-makers could remove the pension issue from the public sphere.
Here, policy-makers can institutionally ring-fence the pension policy issue.
Institutionally insulating the pension issue from policy conflict would im-
ply creating an independent pension institution that credibly stands above
the political fray (like, for example, the Polish Office of the Plenipoten-
tiary). This strategy is, however, problematic for several reasons. First,
the credibility of the institution will depend on finding a common prob-
lem definition that all actors can agree on. Yet, the 1990s have been
about dismantling common and consensual definitions of the pension is-
sue. Moreover, the expansion of pension policy subsystems has in a very
real sense institutionalised policy conflict. Second, this strategy implies
a return exclusionary and democratically unaccountable pension policy-
making. Apart from being undesirable from a democratic point of view,
the strategy assumes that actors can agree on whom to exclude from
policy-making: again, recent developments provide no indication that
such a consensus is emerging. Proponents of the hierarchical Stability
Story hold on to their authoritative claim to pensions governance; the in-
dividualist Crisis Story still feels that there is a lot of workd to be done;
the advocates of the egalitarian Social Justice Story want to break open
the pension policy community to a wider group of policy actors. An-
other related way of removing the pension reform from political conflict
is to ‘privatise’ the issue. By shifting the management of pensions into
26At national level, the hierarchical advocacy coalitions are reaching out to their erstwhile
allies in the labour union movements while the labour movements themselves seem to be
losing patience with social democratic parties. At European level, as we saw in Chapter 8,
the European Commission has adopted the active ageing policy agenda
295
the private sector, commercial secrecy would replace public accountabil-
ity. Again, this strategy is likely to prove difficult. On the one hand, the
transition is likely to be subject of heated political conflict causing pol-
icy deadlock: in short, policy-makers may never reach their goal. On the
other hand, given that private sector pension providers are not interested
in providing redistributive benefits, even the most sweeping privatisation
(see, for example, proposals by the United States-based Cato Institute)
would leave a residual element in the public sphere.
The second option comprises further expanding the scope of conflict. An al-
ternative strategy for policy-makers is to shift the pension issue from the
informal expert-dominated grey-area it now inhabits into the full glare
of public scrutiny. This would imply expanding the accessibility of pen-
sion policy subsystems to egalitarian advocacy coalitions. While opening
present pension policy-making to more socio-cultural and political plural-
ity would enhance democratic decision-making, this policy option would
inevitably decelerate pension policy processes. Moreover, creating a more
open and, necessarily, more conflictual policy sphere requires an institu-
tional framework that constructively channels ideological policy conflict.
Traditionally, parliaments have provided the institutional framework for
peacefully resolving policy conflicts in democracies. However, given the
current suspicion many citizens in Europe harbour towards parliamentary
processes, this strategy may need to more directly include the citizen in
pension reform policy. Again, the implications of the analysis suggest that
policy-makers increase accessibility while preserving responsiveness
Whatever policy-makers choose to do, pension reform in continental coun-
tries is unlikely to fade from the agenda in the near or even medium-term.
Neither, I suspect, is policy conflict. The dangers that the way policy-makers
presently go about pension reform will alienate citizens from pension policy-
making and, by extension, politics in general are real. Avoiding the breakdown
of trust in pension policy-making will mean thinking about reforms to pension
policy-processes as much as reforms to pension systems. This, in turn, may
imply bringing the citizen into pension policy-making. In short, policy-makers




This thesis set out to understand and analyse policy conflict about complex,
uncertain and transversal policy problems. Far from being a question of mere
academic interest, this thesis has tried to respond to the wide-spread argument
that Europeans are failing to tackle urgent policy challenges and are falling
behind in an increasingly competitive global race. Part of the reason, so the
argument goes, is the very nature of policy challenges that face European politi-
cians, policy-makers and citizens. Today’s policy challenges are messy: underly-
ing causes are rarely known in full, the impacts are complex, and repercussions
are unlikely to remain within policy domains or national boundaries. As a re-
sult, messy policy problems have given rise to divisive and protracted policy
conflicts in polities across the European continent.
Many thinkers in the social sciences explain policy conflict about messy prob-
lems in terms of the interests of contending policy actors. Since interest-based
approaches to policy conflict tell only part of the story, this thesis has developed
a framework for analysing policy conflict in terms ideas and institutions. In the
preceding chapters, the thesis has attempted to reconstruct policy conflict as a
confrontation between contending ideas and knowledge set in, indeed is shaped
by, socio-institutional structures.
How, then, has the thesis addressed the central research questions outlined
in the introduction? The following sections will briefly recapitulate the main
argument of the thesis by showing how the theoretical exploration of Part I and
the empirical application of Part II have responded to the research questions
of the thesis. On the basis of this review, the conclusion will investigate the
implications of this thesis’ analysis for pluralist democracy in Europe. The final
section applies the bootstrapped conceptual framework for policy-oriented dis-
course analysis to pluralist theory. In this way, the conclusion outlines an agenda
for future research into the nature of pluralist democracy in the differentiated
polity.
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10.1 Is There a Way of Systematically Analysing
Policy Conflict that Takes Account of the
Role of Ideas in European Policy Processes?
Part I answered this question by devising a conceptual framework for policy-
oriented discourse analysis. “Ideas matter”, the thesis contends, because “in-
stitutions matter”. The chapters of Part I, then, provide an overview of the
approaches and theories that relate the institutional reality of contemporary
policy-processes to ideational structures. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 provided both
the conceptual background as well as the reservoir of tools and concepts from
which the “bootstrapped conceptual framework for policy-oriented discourse
analysis” emerged. Chapter 2 furnished the backdrop for understanding organ-
isational and institutional contexts of contemporary policy-making. Chapter 3,
in turn, provided tools for understanding the way ideas, knowledge and world-
views shape policy processes. Chapter ??, in turn, reviewed approaches that
explicitly explain policy processes in terms of ideas and institutions.
The purpose of this conceptual framework is twofold. First, the aim was
to exploit the many synergies and complementarities between contemporary
meso-level theories of the policy process [Parsons, 1995]. Bootstrapping the
conceptual framework in this pluralist manner was supposed to overcome per-
ceived and identified weaknesses of individual approaches. Second, and more
importantly, the framework aims to show how ideas, knowledge and worldviews
give rise to policy conflict in European policy domains.
Can We Devise a Conceptual Framework that Shows How
Ideas and Knowledge Generate Intractable and Persistent
Policy Conflict?
The main features of the bootstrapped conceptual framework for policy-oriented
discourse analysis are as follows:
• The discourse-analytical conceptual framework assumes the institutional
locus of policy-making to be the so-called contested terrain. What goes
on in these institutional and ideational policy spaces is an argumentative
process about the naming and labelling of messy policy problems.
• In the contested terrain, policy actors rely on policy frames to make sense
of messy policy issues. Facing complex, uncertain and transversal policy
issues in real institutional setting means that facts never ‘speak for them-
selves’. Rather, policy actors need to interpret data and events. Policy
frames are interpretive templates or ‘perceptual lenses’ that help policy
actors impose meaning onto a seemingly anarchic stream of events and
slew of activity within contested terrains.
• Policy frames are shaped by the social commitments defining the political
communities in which actors operate. We can think of political communi-
ties in terms of informal networks of policy actors that share a policy frame
and coalesce around a specific policy project. These advocacy coalitions
are the basic actors of the bootstrapped conceptual framework. The way
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members of an advocacy coalition coordinate and organise their coopera-
tion affects the policy frame. On this view, we would expect an advocacy
coalition consisting of loosely coordinated individuals working largely on
their own to share a fundamentally different frame from members of a
tightly centralised and stratified advocacy coalition.
• Using the typology of social contexts outlined by cultural theory, we can
identify four basic types of advocacy coalitions and their archetypal pol-
icy frames: hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism and fatalism. These
fundamental forms of social organisation give rise to coherent sets of val-
ues and ideas that legitimate and reproduce their distinctive patterns of
transactions. Policy actors will refract events and data through these
perceptual lenses and thereby socially construct messy policy problems.
Since, however, the lenses are designed to justify fundamentally divergent
forms of social organisations, respective social constructions — formulated
as policy arguments — will frame and define the policy issue in fundamen-
tally incompatible ways.
Advocacy coalitions aim to enshrine their values in policy outputs: in short,
they aspire to establishing ‘epistemic sovereignty’ over a policy space. In an
argumentative policy process, this demands vying for legitimacy and credibil-
ity against other advocacy coalitions in the contested terrain. Thus, members
of advocacy coalitions pit their (fundamentally incompatible) policy arguments
against those of rival advocacy coalitions in policy debates. The incompati-
bility of different framings of messy policy problems (as well as the claim to
authoritative knowledge from each contending advocacy coalition) gives rise to
intractable and persistent conflict in the contested terrain.
Can We Devise a Conceptual Framework that Allows Us to
Investigate and Depict the Characteristics of Policy Con-
flict?
As we have seen, the concept of advocacy coalitions gives more institutional
shape to cultural theory’s social solidarities. By the same token, using cultural
theory’s typology of social contexts and cosmologies provides more substance
to the idea of advocacy coalitions. In this way, the bootstrapped conceptual
framework helps map the characteristics of conflict in policy domains.
The thesis has developed policy stories as the principal methodological tool
for dissecting and comparing contending policy arguments in debates about
messy issues. Policy stories reconstruct and compare of contending policy ar-
guments in terms of coherent narratives. Policy stories articulate the particular
underlying policy frame used in the formulation of any policy argument. These
narratives tell stories of cause and effect, culpability and blame, as well as reso-
lution and redemption. They explicate policy problems by implicating rivals in
the cause of problems and proposing preferred policy solutions.
Using the policy stories method, the conceptual framework identifies and
juxtaposes contending policy arguments in the contested terrain. The analysis
describes the characteristics of policy conflict in terms of two dimensions:
Scope: Reconstructing policy stories allows the analysis to classify and com-
pare policy arguments in terms of the cultural theory-inspired typology of
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advocacy coalitions and policy frames. In this way, the cultural theory-
inspired typology provides a measure of the scope of policy conflict as
well as the ‘discursive distance’ between contending policy arguments. A
contested terrain that contains policy stories from all three active forms of
advocacy coalitions (hierarchy, egalitarianism and individualism) features
the most expansive scope of policy conflict. What is more, policy debate
in a policy space with such a triangular constellation is likely to be an
“intractable policy controversy” since contending policy argument emerge
from fundamentally incompatible policy frames. Similarly, a contested
terrain containing only one of the so-called active advocacy coalitions fea-
tures the narrowest scope of policy conflict. In a policy space populated
by a single advocacy coalition, policy conflict is likely to be limited to
disagreement of an essentially technical nature.
Structure: The cultural theory-inspired typology of advocacy coalitions also
enables the exploration of potential agreement and disagreement between
contending advocacy coalitions and their policy arguments. The grid/group
diagram suggests that each advocacy coalitions (as an articulation of a so-
cial solidarity) shares an area of broad agreement with at least two of the
other advocacy coalition. Thus, pairs of advocacy coalitions can agree on
some fundamental principles, general policy measures and mutual rejec-
tion of contending policy proposals. Since, however, members of advocacy
coalitions enter the area of agreement from different premises, agreement
on basic principles, mutual dislikes and general policy measures is likely
to be brittle.
Can we devise a conceptual framework that provides a way
of identifying and understanding the role of policy conflict
in processes of institutional and policy change?
Last, the bootstrapped conceptual framework has also endeavoured to explain
the impact of frame-based policy conflict on policy domains. This has been
an exploratory and more tentative application of the bootstrapped discourse-
analytical framework.
Two properties of argumentative policy processes in contested terrains give
rise to a cyclical evolutionary dynamic within policy domains. First, fundamen-
tally incompatible policy frames render relations between; advocacy coalitions
inherently adversarial. What is more, this conflict is immune to resolution by
recourse to facts or bargaining. Second, the in-built selectivity of policy frames
means that any particular framing of messy policy problems is likely to be bi-
ased. As we have seen, policy frames highlighting certain aspects of an issue
as salient while backgrounding others as irrelevant. This selectivity in the per-
ception of policy problems inevitably leads to conceptual blind-spots which, in
turn, leave policy-making vulnerable to “unanticipated consequences”.
How does the evolutionary cycle play out?
Intractable policy conflict implies that policy debate in triangular policy
spaces is vulnerable to deadlock and policy impasse. When intractable conflict
transforms policy debate into a “dialogue of the deaf”, policy processes are in
danger of developing into a Reformstau. This then, is akin to Tsebelis notion
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of “policy stability” [Tsebelis, 2002]. At this point, policy debate is highly re-
ceptive to external stimuli from the public sphere; in Kingdon’s terminology,
intractable policy conflict and Reformstau set up and open a policy launch
window [Kingdon, 1984]. As we have seen, these stimuli can take many forms
ranging from focusing events such as catastrophes over innovation in other pol-
icy domains to shifts in macro-political structures. Such an external stimulus
(or a combination of external stimuli) may precipitate a process of institutional-
ization. Here, an advocacy coalition manages to use the launch window to wrest
policy-making autonomy from the other contending advocacy coalitions in the
contested terrain. In order to enshrine values in policy outputs, members of ad-
vocacy coalitions use their policy-making autonomy to establish their epistemic
sovereignty over a policy subsystem. This means that advocacy coalitions will,
if possible, exclude contending policy actors from policy processes.
Successful institutionalization of policy solution provides advocacy coalitions
with the opportunity for extending their epistemic sovereignty over the policy
subsystem. As ruling advocacy coalitions banish contenders from the policy
process into the contested terrain, policy-making becomes increasingly vulner-
able to conceptual blindness and policy failure due to “unanticipated conse-
quences”. Displaced policy actors in the contested terrain will thematise and
focus on policy failure thereby increasing pressures on the ruling advocacy coali-
tion. Mounting pressure from the contested terrain and repeated policy failure
will make policy debate receptive to external stimuli and change. Once again a
“policy launch window” opens and, given the right stimulus, policy actors can
initiate a process of de-institutionalization in which the scope of policy conflict
in the policy subsystem expands to include a wider set of policy actors.
In this way, the conceptual framework models how policy conflict can con-
tribute to institutional and policy change in policy domains. In a very real
sense, the dynamic model shows how policy conflict helps set up and open so-
called policy launch windows. The two fundamental characteristics of contested
terrains suggest that policy-making never permanently settles at equilibrium.
Instead, policy conflict contributes to the cyclically expansion and contraction
of policy spaces.
10.2 What Insights into Conflict in Contempo-
rary European Policy Domains Does such
an Approach Offer?
Part II of the thesis applied the bootstrapped conceptual framework for policy-
oriented discourse analysis to three different policy domains: European trans-
port policy-making, environmental security and pension reform. Chapters 6, 7
and 8 apply the framework to gauge the scope and structure of policy conflict
in all three policy domains. This analysis shows that intractable and persistent
policy conflict is a inevitable and inextricable aspect of argumentative policy
processes. Conflict, the chapters demonstrate, ineluctably arises from the way
contending policy actors make sense of messy policy issues. In this way, the
chapters of Part II set out to highlight the value of an ideas-based explanatory
strategy. Chapter 9, in turn, is an exploratory application of the dynamic model
of policy conflict and subsystem evolution to recent pension reform experiences
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in continental Europe.
How Do Different Framings of Messy Policy Problems Lead
to Policy Conflict?
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 use the discourse-analytical framework to explore the scope,
structure and potential impact of conflict about messy policy problems in three
policy domains. Applying the policy-stories method, the chapters reconstruct
and systematically compare policy arguments used to vie for legitimacy and
credibility in the contested terrain. Each chapter analyses, classifies and jux-
taposes policy stories using the cultural theory-inspired typology of advocacy
coalitions and policy frames.
Chapter 6 shows how contending advocacy coalitions frame the issue of ac-
cessibility in the wider transport policy debate. An analysis of policy documents
and research literature reveals three basic policy stories about the transport is-
sue in Europe. The “classical transport planning” policy story tells a hierarchi-
cal tale of the relationship between the transport infrastructure and economic
growth: here, better quality transport infrastructure and transport manage-
ment improve accessibility of firms and regions thus oiling the cogs of economic
growth. Conversely, the individualist market-oriented tale points out that in-
frastructure investments produce congestion rather than lower average journey
times. The problem here, argue proponents of this story, is that underlying
transport costs are distorted: this leads to a relative overconsumption of road
transport which, in turn, leads to congestion. Overcoming this problem means
“getting the prices right”. Last, the ecological policy story tells an holistic
egalitarian yarn of how modern transport systems corrode local communities,
degrade the environment and undermine human well-being. Designed to serve a
socio-economic regime in which the strong and rich exploit the weak and poor,
modern transport systems unequally distribute the costs and benefits of mo-
bility. Rectifying this, the advocates of the ecological story maintain, requires
nothing less than comprehensive socio-cultural renewal.
The three policy stories are based on contending policy frames associated
with the three active social solidarities identified by cultural theory. None of the
three approaches is reducible to one another nor are they close substitutes: one
calls for more centralised management of transport systems, the other demands
that individual choice be allowed to allocate transport resources and the third
wants to see contemporary transport systems (as well as the morally corrupt
capitalist system that they sustain) dismantled in favour of localised mobility.
The unbridgeable ideational disjunctures between contending policy frames in
the European transport debate generate a wide scope of policy conflict. Since
we can also think of the contested terrain as a reservoir of ideas and policy
solutions, the three policy stories define and delineate the boundaries of this
ideational space. Since a triangular contested terrain features all three ‘active’
advocacy coalitions, it creates the widest possible reservoir of ideas, beliefs and
solutions. While this increases the potential for institutional innovation and
policy choice, it also increases the sources of dissent and conflict.
Chapter 7 analyses the nascent debate about environmental security in the
mid-1990s. The debate relates environmental degradation to traditional military
and security concerns: increasingly, so the argument goes, security of individu-
als and nations will depend on a far wider set of factors than those conventional
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security concepts currently focus on. The policy stories method uncovers three
streams in the environmental security literature. The first stream, associated
with the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon, systematically explicates the socio-
economic and demographic mechanisms that link environmental degradation to
violence and civil unrest: this approach, then, explains how environmental stress
undermines the socio-political security of states. The second stream suggests
that security policy concentrate on eco-system security rather than focussing on
the security of human societies alone. Without security of ecological systems
that sustain human communities, thinkers such as Dennis Pirages maintain,
security in the conventional sense is impossible. The third stream advocates
including all socio-economic, cultural, political, and ecological determinants of
human well-being in the idea of security. This comprehensive approach of hu-
man security suggests that neglecting determinants of well-being necessarily
jeopardises security in the conventional sense.
Systematic comparison of the streams reveals the significant ideational prox-
imity of the different arguments. Although the streams seem to diverge on basic
definitional issues as well as policy recommendations, all accounts single out
population growth in the developing world as the underlying cause of environ-
mental insecurity. Essentially, the three policy streams provide variations on a
hierarchical theme: here, population growth is associated with environmental
degradation and violent conflict via the concept of basic human needs. That
is why, unlike the transport policy debate, the three streams are situated on a
continuum. At one end of the spectrum we find elaborate and rigorous models
of socio-political security detailing the mechanisms that lead from environmen-
tal stress to violent conflict. Here, policy prescriptions are relatively modest,
suggesting that security policy be expanded to include a range of environmental
issues. At the other end of the continuum, human security approaches list a
comprehensive catalogue of reforms to national and global governance struc-
tures that, they contend, are direct ramifications of environmental insecurity.
However, the conceptual mechanisms and processes that link environmental
degradation to human security are far more vague and equivocal. Somewhere
in between these extremes sits the eco-system security approach: proponents
derive a battery of policy measures (mostly aimed at controlling population
growth in the developing world) based on a model that links violent conflict to
the overburdening of eco-systems’ “carrying capacity”.
Chapter 8 analyses policy stories about pension reform. The first policy
story — told by the World Bank — is an individualist’s tale of impending fi-
nancial and economic crisis. Not only will demographic ageing drive existing
public pension systems beyond the point of financial viability, the increasing
tax burdens on smaller cohorts of younger workers will hamper much needed
economic growth. Since this is inefficient and, more importantly, unfair, the
World Bank envisages as shift to multi-pillar pension systems with a consider-
able role for private sector provisions. In contrast, the ILO tells the hierarchists’
more equivocal policy story of stability. While it is undoubtedly true that demo-
graphic ageing will generate considerable challenges for pension provision, they
argue, demographic issues adversely impinge on any form institutional old-age
income provision. Abandoning tried-and-tested means of social protection is not
only unnecessary, it also puts old and young workers at considerable (and wholly
avoidable) risk. Instead, the ILO proposes to extend and deepen existing public
pension systems. The European Commission, in turn, recounts an egalitarian
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story of social justice. Policy debate about how best to design pension systems
to withstand demographic changes is but one small part of a much larger and
more urgent socio-cultural challenge. Ageing, the Commission points out, will
affect every aspect of our lives, not merely institutions of social protection. Such
a momentous challenge requires a policy response at the same scale. For this
reason, the European Commission suggests a holistic policy strategy of active
ageing: this involves measures designed to break down the barriers that hinder
older people from participating in economic, political and socio-cultural life.
Despite the considerable institutional path-dependencies associated with
pension systems, the analysis unearths fundamentally incompatible policy frames
underlying the narratives. Like in the transport policy debate, the assumptions
and aims of the policy stories about pension reform are not reducible to one
another. The individualist World Bank sees the road to pension salvation in
a significant involvement of the private sector and global markets in pension
provision. The hierarchical ILO emphatically warns of any erosion of the public
sector’s role in the provision of old-age income preferring instead to strengthen
public provision. The European Commission, in turn, seeks to redefine the en-
tire ageing issue: in place of a narrow debate on pension reform, the Commission
wants to see a transversal strategy for making European societies more inclusive
and accessible to people of all ages. Not only would this create a more just and
equal society, it would also obviate the need for expensive social and health care
services.
These three fundamentally conflicting policy arguments give rise to a wide
and expansive scope of policy conflict. The policy stories shape the contested
terrain of the pension reform into a triangular space. Unlike the environmen-
tal security debate, the triangular contested terrain of pension reform is a rich
reservoir of ideas, concepts and solutions. This reservoir provides the poten-
tial for institutional and policy innovation. However, such a triangular policy
space and the concomitant scope of policy conflict also give rise to considerable
disagreement.
In sum, the chapters of Part II demonstrate how the naming and labelling of
messy policy issues in terms of fundamentally incompatible policy frames gen-
erates conflict between contending advocacy coalitions. The application of the
discourse-analytical framework to transport policy and pension reform shows
how contending policy arguments create a wide and expansive scope of policy
conflict. In both cases, the contending policy arguments set out from different
assumptions, point to incompatible causes, and reach incongruent policy recom-
mendations. The same analysis of the environmental security debate, however,
brings to light the conceptual affinity of ostensibly contending streams in the
environmental security literature. Here, the assumptions of all approaches are
based in a specific conception of human needs. This, then, harmonises the
thrust, logic and direction of each policy argument.
What is the Nature of Policy Conflict in these Policy Do-
mains?
The chapters of Part II also examined the structure of policy conflict for the
different policy domains. For each policy debate, the analysis probed into areas
of agreement and disagreement across advocacy coalition boundaries. In this
way, the conceptual framework for policy-oriented discourse analysis enables
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the investigation into the constellation and strength of potential alliances in
the debate. The grid/group diagram suggests that ‘neighbouring’ advocacy
coalitions hold certain basic principles in common1, will agree on some broad
policy measures and share mutual disaffinities.
In the European transport policy debate, areas of agreement open the poten-
tial for pair-wise alliances between rival advocacy coalitions. Advocates of the
hierarchical classical planning view and proponents of the individualist market-
based approach agree on the desirability of economic growth and the impor-
tance of transport systems in producing it. Policies that increase the efficiency
of transportation and reduce transport costs, then, attract the support of both
advocacy coalitions. For this reason, both reject policy proposals that call for
decreasing speeds in transport systems thus jeopardising economic growth. The
egalitarian ecological perspective and the classical transport planning view share
a concern for the integrity of natural and social environments. Both can agree
on general policy measures aiming to conserve these natural and social envi-
ronments (e.g. speed limits, night-drive bans, protection for areas of natural or
social significance from transport infrastructure development). Consequently,
both hierarchy and egalitarians in the transport policy debate are highly sus-
picious of policies that flatten social and natural landscapes for profit-motive
alone. Both the individualists and the egalitarians share a preference for decen-
tralised transport systems that provide individuals and local communities with
real choice and autonomy. Therefore, both advocacy coalitions prefer policies
that enable flexible responses to transport demands at the local level. That is
why the individualist market-oriented approach and egalitarian ecological view
are equally suspicious of large, centralised and inflexible transport management
systems.
On closer inspection, however, the chapter shows that potential alliances
may be rather fragile. Since members of contending advocacy coalitions enter
the areas of agreement from fundamentally opposing premises, attempts deepen
accord over principles and policy measures is likely to precipitate intractable
policy conflict. While hierarchy and individualists may agree on the importance
of transport efficiency for economic growth, they are deeply split on how to
bring this about. Similarly, while egalitarians and hierarchy can agree on the
importance of natural and social environments, chapter 6 demonstrates that
both have very different ideas of what these environments are and how best
to preserve them. The egalitarian advocates of the ecological view and the
individualist champions of market-based transport solutions disagree on the
fundamental aims and purposes of a decentralised transport system: while the
former wants them to replace capitalist forms of interaction, the latter sees them
as ways to promote market efficiency.
Analysing the structure of policy conflict between the streams of environ-
mental security offers an altogether different picture. The ideational closeness of
the different streams implies a large potential for policy consensus. Indeed, the
analysis shows how all streams in the environmental security literature share a
fundamental normative policy project. As we have seen in chapter 7, all streams
of environmental security seek to promote the environment from the regions of
‘low politics’ to ‘high politics’. Further, the approaches aim to redefine and
extend the idea of security. More ambitiously, proponents of environmental se-
1On the basis of a shared dimension, either grid or group
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curity seek to redefine the concept of the nation state and, as a consequence re-
configure the system of international governance. Given the depth of agreement
between environmental security approaches on the continuum, disagreement is
likely to be limited to strategic issues concerning the nature and extent of policy
recommendations: the further toward the “human security” end of the contin-
uum, the more elaborate and demanding policy recommendations are likely to
be.
Conflict in the pension reform debate features a pattern of potential pair-
wise alliances similar to the one identified in the transport policy debate. Pro-
ponents of the individualist Crisis Story and hierarchical Stability Story broadly
agree that social protection systems in general and pension systems in particular
significantly impinge on economic growth. Therefore, members of both advo-
cacy coalitions agree on avoiding possible labour market distortions by bringing
benefits of public Pay-As-You-Go, defined-benefit systems into line with contri-
butions. Both the adherents of the Crisis and Stability Stories take a dim view
of egalitarian proposals to place social protection into the hands of civil society
actors at local level. Proponents of the Social Stability and the Social Justice
Stories, in turn, agree on the importance of maintaining and fostering social
solidarity across and within generations. Redistributive measures to strengthen
collective action and social responsibility, then, find supporters in either camp.
By the same token, neither advocates of the Stability Story nor the Social Justice
Story can muster much enthusiasm for policy proposals that promote individual
responsibility for one’s old-age income at the expense of collective obligations.
Finally, proponents of the individualist Crisis Story and champions of the egal-
itarian Social Justice Story both contend that pension systems should promote
choice and equality. Consequently, egalitarian and individualist actors both
agree in principle on pension reforms that do away with in-built privileges and
inequities. Members of both advocacy coalitions reject hierarchical proposals
for highly centralised and stratified forms of old-age income provisions.
Yet, similar to the transport policy debate discussed in chapter 6, agreement
is unlikely to prevail beyond basic principles and general policy measures. While
hierarchical proponents of the Stability Story may agree with individualist advo-
cates that pension systems are important for economic growth, Chapter 8 shows
that there is little agreement among contending advocacy coalitions beyond this
point. Similarly, while hierarchical and egalitarian actors seem to agree on the
value of solidarity between and within generations, members of the contend-
ing advocacy coalitions hold sharply diverging views on what social solidarity
means and how best to promote it: for hierarchical actors, social solidarity is
best calibrated and articulated in formal institutional structures; egalitarians
see inter- and intragenerational solidarity as things that require real social com-
mitments and interaction. Likewise, while advocates of the Social Justice Story
and the Crisis Story both seem to agree that systems ought to promote equality
and choice, members of the rival advocacy coalitions have very different ideas
of what this means in practice: whereas the egalitarian actors see the role of so-
cial protection systems to emancipate individuals from dependency on markets
and hierarchies, individualist actors understand choice and equality to mean full
immersion in market competition.
Analysing the structure of policy conflict in three policy domains suggests
that interaction between advocacy coalitions become more complex and involved
the wider the scope of policy conflict. As we have seen, a policy debate centred
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on a single definition of a messy policy problem — such as the environmental
security debate — permits the reduction of policy conflict to a dispute about
strategic issues. These disputes are amenable to resolution by recourse to facts
and, given the assumptional shared base, enable bargaining. A triangular con-
stellation of advocacy coalitions and policy arguments in the contested terrain,
in turn, generates a more complex argumentative environment. Here, agree-
ment and disagreement fragment ‘horizontally’ across different types of advo-
cacy coalitions and ‘vertically’ across different levels of substantive specificity.
In a triangular contested terrain, each advocacy coalition shares a potential area
of agreement with a rival. At the horizontal level, then, agreement and alliances
are volatile since each advocacy coalition has the choice to ‘defect’ into another
area of agreement and mutual rejection. Additionally, agreement and alliances
do not remain uncontested by the third rival advocacy coalition in triangular
contested terrains: therefore pair-wise alliances based on general agreement are
always in need of defence, justification and legitimation. However, since advo-
cacy coalitions enter areas of agreement from fundamentally different premises,
this agreement between pairs of advocacy coalitions is too brittle to withstand
contention and reflection: as we have seen, at ‘deeper’ levels of analysis, pair-
wise agreement disintegrates into intractable conflict. For these reasons, policy
conflict in a triangular contested terrain is endemic, inevitable and intractable.
In sum, outlining scope and structure of conflict in three policy debates high-
lights the potentially turbulent quality of argument between advocacy coalitions.
Since policy conflict in a triangular contested terrain is about basic norms and
since consensus across advocacy coalitions is too brittle to bring about social in-
tegration, policy debate is in constant danger of deteriorating into a “dialogue of
the deaf” [Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993b]. Here, constructive engagement
and policy-oriented learning between contending advocacy coalitions is not pos-
sible because policy debate focuses on and revolves around the fundamental
incompatibilities between contending policy arguments. Avoiding the degener-
ation of policy debate in triangular contested terrains into a “dialogue of the
deaf” calls for policy processes that ensure a sufficient degree of responsiveness
between contending advocacy coalitions.
How do the Framings Affect Potential Solutions for Messy
Policy Problems?
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 also employed the discourse-analytical framework to inves-
tigate the potential impacts of contending definitions of messy policy problems.
As we have seen, policy frames help policy actors understand messy policy prob-
lems by foregrounding specific aspects and backgrounding others. This leads to
conceptual blindness as the perceptual filters sharpen policy actors’ analytical
view of some issues while blunting their perception of others. In Chapters 6, 7
and 8, the thesis analyses the way inherent blindspots can lead to unanticipated
consequences and frame-specific policy failure.
In the European transport policy debate, all three policy stories exhibit char-
acteristic weaknesses. Chapter 6 shows that the hierarchical “classical transport
planning view” focuses on a narrow definition of accessibility that equates trans-
port infrastructure with economic growth. In this way, members of the hierarchi-
cal advocacy coalition lose sight of the inherent complexities involved in accessi-
bility. The blind-spots of the individualist market-based approach emerge from
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strong assumptions about human behaviour: advocates of the market-based
policy story believe that the price mechanism alone efficiently regulates individ-
ual transport choices. Thus, members of the market-based advocacy coalition
tend to ignore equity issues concerning the distribution of costs and benefits
of mobility. Last, the emphasis on localised forms of micro-mobility as well as
the strong moral overtones of the policy argument renders the ecological view
rather intolerant of contending views. Since misguided transport systems of a
corrupt and oppressive economic order threaten the very survival life-sustaining
social and natural environment, so the egalitarian argument goes, there can be
no room for compromise.
In the environmental security debate, in turn, reliance on a rigid model of
human needs, population growth and violent conflict leaves the three streams
analysed in Chapter 7 open to unanticipated consequences. All three approaches
discount the ability of individuals and local communities to adapt to the envi-
ronmental and socio-economic pressures that emanate from rapid demographic
change. By reducing human reactions to environmental and socio-economic
stress to a fight/flight dualism, the different streams in the environmental secu-
rity literature are unable to account for the way individuals seize these challenges
as opportunities for innovation. Similarly, the hierarchical bias in the three
policy stories about environmental security precludes and ignores both tradi-
tional local socio-cultural coping mechanism as well as the capacity for strongly
bounded groups to devise new coping mechanisms. Policy guided by the envi-
ronmental security paradigm is vulnerable to failure for two reasons. On the
one hand, population control and governance measures proposed by advocates
of the environmental security approach may be circumvented or undermined by
innovative and adaptive individuals. On the other hand, the measures may fail
because they ignore the crucial role of local institutions and coping mechanism
in the implementation of any policy.
Likewise, the policy stories told in the pension reform debate at interna-
tional level exhibit frame-specific vulnerabilities. The individualist Crisis Story
tells a powerful tale of demographic ageing, skyrocketing social spending and
impending financial collapse. However, the central weakness of the Crisis Story
is the trust it places in the efficiency of global markets to provide adequate
old-age income to an increasing number of retirees. The hierarchical Stability
Story, in turn, relies on established institutions and expertise to deal with de-
mographic change. The vulnerabilities emerge from unwarranted confidence in
the capability of large, public Pay-As-You-Go pension systems to adapt to new
socio-economic and demographic realities: merely tinkering with the top-down,
centralised and technocratic provision of old-age income may fail to address
some of the pension reform debate. Last, the egalitarian Social Justice Story
urges policy-makers to include wider socio-cultural considerations into policy
responses to demographic ageing. The blind-spot of this policy story are an
overly optimistic outlook on individual behaviour: the decentralisation of social
policy not only incurs a number of intricate public management challenges, it
also invites free-riding and implies coercive implementation.
The analysis of Part II suggests that epistemic sovereignty of a single advo-
cacy coalition potentially leads to the institutionalization of imbalanced policy
solutions. However, these adverse consequences are only “unanticipated” due to
the perceptual blind-spots created by specific policy frames. As we have seen,
members of contending advocacy coalitions deploy their policy frames to pick up
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on the inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities of their contenders. Egalitarian
advocacy coalitions pick up on equity implications of policy. Thus, for transport
policy they would look closely at the impacts on equity and the environment of
hierarchical transport infrastructure projects as well as the individualist road
pricing schemes. In the pension debate, egalitarian advocacy coalitions criti-
cise income-related pension systems for perpetuating labour market inequities
while pointing out that markets are unable to offer minimal pension benefits for
marginal workers. Individualist advocacy coalitions have a keen perception of ef-
ficiency. Therefore, members of individualist of advocacy coalitions would point
to the inefficiencies of large and centralised transport infrastructure projects as
well as adverse economic consequences of policies aimed at promoting localised
micro-mobility. As we have seen in Chapter 8, the proponents of the Crisis
Story point to the distorting effects of overly generous public pension systems.
Hierarchical policy frames equip members of respective advocacy coalitions to
recognise problems of management and control. Hierarchical advocacy coali-
tions object to decentralised transport and social protection systems due to the
thorny public management issues they throw up.
In sum, applying the discourse-analytical framework to the three policy do-
mains outlines the potential costs of epistemic sovereignty and policy-making
autonomy. The way advocacy coalitions define messy policy issues gives rise to
characteristic vulnerabilities that leave policy-making open to frame-specific pol-
icy failure. However, as we have seen, the application of the discourse-analytical
framework suggests that a wide scope of policy conflict can help avoid unan-
ticipated consequences and policy failure. Since relations between contending
advocacy coalitions are innately adversarial,2 members of advocacy coalitions
can be counted on to look for faults and blind-spots in rival policy arguments.
The conceptual framework implies that specific policy frames sharpen percep-
tion for specific problems and issues. Therefore, based on the cultural theory-
inspired typology of advocacy coalitions and their policy frames, policy debates
in triangular policy spaces where all three active types of advocacy coalitions
are represented are more likely to prevent unanticipated consequences caused
by conceptual blindness than less accessible policy spaces. This suggests that
the higher the degree of accessibility into a policy subsystems, the lower the
likelihood of unanticipated consequences and policy failure.
10.3 What Can the Analysis of Frame-Based Pol-
icy Conflict Tell Us About Governance in
European Policy Domains?
The main emphasis of applying the discourse-analytical framework in Part II
has been descriptive. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 have mapped and dissected the land-
scapes of policy conflict in the different policy domains. However, description
always implies (or should imply) prescription: the motivation for the discourse-
analytical framework is to understand policy conflict about messy policy prob-
lems in order to generate insights into the underlying governance issues. Chapter
9, then, was to lead the descriptive approach into a more policy- and governance-
relevant analysis.
2Since each aims to establish epistemic sovereignty and policy-making autonomy
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Chapter 9 uses the dynamic framework of conflict and policy change devel-
oped in Chapter 5 to reflect on pension reform processes in continental Europe.
The aims of the chapter are twofold. First, the chapter examines the role of
policy conflict — a marginal explanatory variable in most existing accounts —
in recent European pension reform experiences [Pierson, 1996, Pierson, 2001,
Bonoli, 2000]. Second, the discussion also aims to shed light on the relation-
ship between policy conflict, policy change and pluralism. The application of
the dynamic approach in Chapter 9 is of an exploratory and illustrative nature.
Since there is only a single case study,3 the thesis does not claim to have tested
the dynamic model in any rigorous sense. However, the application of the dy-
namic framework to continental pension reform raises questions concerning the
relationship between policy conflict, policy change and pluralism. In this sense,
Chapter 9 is not so much about hypothesis-testing as it is about the generation
of questions and tasks for future research.
The following briefly summarises the case study and then explores how the
implications for governance contribute to a future research agenda. This fu-
ture research will centre on using the cultural theory-inspired conceptual frame-
work to refurbish and adapt pluralist theory for application in the differentiated
polity.
How does Policy Conflict Impinge on Institutional and Pol-
icy Change in Europe?
An analysis of the contested terrain of pension reform in continental Europe
shows how policy conflict brought about significant institutional change. Chap-
ter 9 recounts how reforms of continental European pension systems in the
1990s have diversified old-age income provision. As a result of these reforms,
future European pensioners will rely on a mix of income sources, including remu-
nerated work and private sectors savings schemes, to finance their retirement.
In countries such as Austria, France, Germany and Italy, these changes have
amounted to a significant departure from the underlying institutional logic of
public pension provision.
This is all the more remarkable as continental European pension systems
were generally believed to be immune to reform. Indeed, for many policy
commentators, such as the World Bank or Deutsche Bank Research, social
policy-making in continental Europe epitomises the irrationalities of interest-
driven policy conflict [James, 1994, Bergheim et al., 2003]. These irrationali-
ties emerge because of three structural features of European pension policy-
making. First, European politicians fear retribution at the ballot box by an
electorate collectively afflicted with the so-called “negativity bias”. Second,
the macro- and meso-political structures in continental Europe provide am-
ple opportunities for the political opposition to contest and scupper reform
attempts. Third, policy decisions of the past constrain the imagination of
world-be reformers of the present: institutional path dependencies, so the ar-
gument goes, delimit the policy options on the reform agenda. To the ex-
tent that it occurs at all, thinkers such as Paul Pierson, Giuliano Bonoli or
Stephan Leibfried conclude, the practises of pluralist democracy direct pension
3This case study, however, emerged from seven coordinated country case studies
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reform into predictable trajectories determined by existing institutional struc-
tures [Pierson, 1994, Pierson, 1996, Bonoli, 2000, Leibfried, 2001].
However, applying the dynamic model of frame-based policy conflict to conti-
nental European pension reform tells a different story. Institutional path depen-
dencies in continental Europe, thought to be the outcomes of pluralist politics,
emerged because of the absence of effective political contestation and conflict.
Continental European social insurance systems prior to the 1990s featured closed
and tightly-knit expert communities well insulated from public or parliamentary
scrutiny [Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993, Pabst, 1999, Tálos and Kittel, 2001]. By
controlling the production and dissemination of policy-relevant knowledge, these
cohesive communities of like-minded experts, politicians and administrators de-
fined pension policy issues to suit the institutional solutions provided by so-
cial insurance-type pension systems [Lamping and Rüb, 2002, Reynaud, 2000].
This, then, resulted in pension reforms designed to uphold existing institutional
arrangements, not least policy network constellations. In the terminology of
the discourse-analytical framework, this was a stage in which the hierarchical
advocacy coalition commanded epistemic sovereignty over the pension policy
subsystem.
Throughout the 1990s, however, cohesive pension policy communities began
to crumble in the face of a sustained challenge from excluded individualist pol-
icy actors. These displaced actors told a vivid story of how welfare states have
become a millstone around the neck of European economies. Barred from pen-
sion policy communities, individualist actors successfully used informal channels
to target the political elite in continental European countries. What is more,
the advocates of the Crisis Story deftly thematised and exploited rising social
insurance contributions as an inherent system flaw. Additionally, the Stability
Story faced another (albeit far less influential) challenge from egalitarians ar-
guing that social protection systems should level not exacerbate inequities. It
was this heightened level of contention that cleared the pension policy-making
thicket. Path departing institutional reform in continental Europe, then, was
predicated on exposing cohesive and closed policy communities to policy con-
flict.
Thus, Chapter 9 shows that widening the scope of policy conflict injected
movement into sclerotic and tightly controlled pension reform processes. Path
departure in continental European pension systems was not the result of re-
stricting but rather of rediscovering pluralist politics.
What are the Implications of a Frame-Based Analysis for
the Structures and Processes of Policy-Making in European
Policy Domains?
Conventional wisdom in the policy sciences and political science understands
policy conflict as a distraction to effective policy-making. As we saw in Chapter
3, champions of the “rationality project” perceive rational policy-making to
be fundamentally anathema to politics. On this view, policy-making is about
deploying rational scientific methods to solve objective social problems. Politics,
in turn, is about mediating contending opinions, perceptions and world-views.
While the former conquers social problems by marshalling the relevant facts, the
latter creates democratic legitimacy by negotiating conflicts about values. It is
311
precisely this value-based conflict, so the argument goes, that gets in the way
of rational policy-making. At best, deliberation and argument inconveniently
slow down policy processes. At worst, pluralist forms of conflict resolution yield
politically acceptable compromises rather than rational policy solutions.
On this view, “veto-players” use policy conflict to obstruct and scupper pol-
icy change perceived to threaten their organisational or individual self-interest.
Thus, Tsebelis argues, a policy domain featuring many veto-players with suf-
ficiently diverse policy positions will inevitably generate “policy stability”; a
state of affairs characterised by the inability to change the existing policy status
quo. Increasingly, European political commentators are using this type of logic
to equate pluralist democracy in Europe at any level with the perceived in-
ability to tackle urgent policy challenges. For example, the German think-tank
Deutsche Bank Research4 argues that in Germany
“. . . rules and checks and balances that are supposed to bring about
stability have altered the whole system in a way that it has become
increasingly ‘change-resistant’, exactly at a time when the global
environment (globalisation, fall of the iron curtain) and some of
the system’s internal parameters (demography) are going through
massive structural change” [Bergheim et al., 2003, p.9].
The upshot of the argument is that structures and practises of pluralism are pre-
venting European policy-makers from formulating swift and decisive responses
to urgent policy problems. In order to restore policy-making capacity, so the
argument goes, European polities need to narrow the scope of policy conflict by
scaling back on pluralism at all levels.
As we have seen, the governance implications that flow from a frame-based
discourse analysis of policy conflict are somewhat equivocal and ambivalent. On
the one hand, the chapters of Part II have argued that a wide scope of value-
driven policy conflict may cause a policy debate to deteriorate into a “dialogue
of the deaf”. Here, policy change is unlikely since policy debate focuses ex-
clusively on the inherent incompatibility between contending policy arguments.
On the other hand, narrowing the scope of policy conflict by establishing epis-
temic sovereignty over a policy subsystem may lead to frame-specific policy
failure. In this situation, policy change is equally unlikely since there are no
real alternatives to the dominant (and flawed) policy solution.
It would seem, then, as if complex, uncertain and transversal policy problems
pose a dilemma for policy-making in European policy domains: a wide scope
of policy conflict may lead to an divisive policy brawl while a narrow scope
of policy conflict could lead to frame-specific policy failure. In either case,
policy processes are paralysed and policy-makers cannot address urgent policy
challenges.
However, Chapter 9 shows how path-departing pension reforms were pred-
icated on widening the scope of policy conflict. By undermining the epistemic
sovereignty of hierarchical Stability Story advocates, individualist actors across
Europe expanded an exclusive policy subsystem to a partially inclusive sys-
tem. This, then, broadened the reservoir of policy solutions and strategies to
deal with demographic ageing in continental European policy subsystems. The
4The Deutsche Bank Research is a think-tank explicitly serving the knowledge needs of
the Deutsche Bank Group, see http://www.dbresearch.com.
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chapter also indicates that the practises of pluralism and policy change are not
necessarily anathema. Rather than being merely an obstacle course for reform-
minded policy actors, the conflictual practises of pluralism were a decisive factor
in the success of pension reform in continental Europe.
What, then, does this imply for the governance of European policy domains?
The frame-based discourse analysis of three policy domains suggests the follow-
ing:
Policy conflict is a potential yet volatile resource for addressing
messy policy problems. When faced with complex, uncertain and
transversal policy challenges, frame-based policy conflict is endemic and
inevitable. However, this frame-based policy conflict is ambiguous. On
the one hand, conflict is invariably intractable: contending policy frames
are based on fundamentally incompatible forms of social organisation. On
the other hand, frame-based policy conflict is both a critical and construc-
tive resource. First, conflict is the medium that contending policy actors
use to scrutinise rival policy arguments for mistakes, faults and omissions.
Second, this conflict also generates a reservoir of contending policy so-
lutions within the contested terrain. Thus, policy conflict is a volatile
‘resource’ in the policy process: too little of it (in terms of the scope) and
the policy-making risks failure, too much of it (in terms of intensity or
responsiveness) and debate degenerates into an unsightly policy brawl.
Effective policy-making for messy policy problems entails harnessing
the critical and constructive force of policy conflict. First, in order
to avoid frame-specific policy failure, policy-makers need to ensure a wide
scope of policy conflict. Ideally, inclusive policy subsystems should feature
a triangular constellation of advocacy coalitions and policy arguments. A
triangular policy subsystem maximises the reservoir of policy solutions
and policy strategies available and mobilises the full critical attention of
all advocacy coalitions. This, then, implies a high degree of accessibility.
Second, in order to utilise the constructive and critical potential, policy-
makers need to ensure a high quality of communication in the debate.
Such a policy debate maximises the potential for learning across advocacy
coalitions. This also increases the likelihood of innovation as policy actors
recombine and adapt approaches in the reservoir of policy solutions. Ful-
filling the potential of high degrees of accessibility, then, requires a high
level of responsiveness in the debate.
In sum, it would seem as if a frame-based strategy for understanding the
way policy actors make sense of messy policy problems points to a positive rela-
tionship between policy conflict, policy change and pluralist democracy. This,
then, is the point from which a future research agenda centred on exploring two
central questions should set out:
• How can the cultural theory-inspired discourse-analytical framework de-
veloped in Chapter 5 re-equip the theory pluralist democracy for applica-
tion to the policy domains of the differentiated polity?
• How could such a refurbished theory of pluralism help understand, analyse
and resolve frame-based conflict in the differentiated polity?
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The final section of this conclusion, then, outlines the basic structure of such
a research agenda.
10.4 Cultural Theory, Policy Conflict and Plu-
ralist Democracy: a Research Agenda
The following section outlines a theoretical scaffolding to guide future research
into the nature of pluralist democracy in the differentiated polity. Based on
the cultural theory-inspired conceptual framework for policy-oriented discourse
analysis developed in Chapter 5, the section will tentatively outline concepts
and tools for defining, determining and assessing pluralist democracy within
specific policy domains.
Before, however, outlining a possible future research agenda on pluralist
democracy in the differentiated polity, it makes sense to reflect on the policy-
relevance of such research by way of an example.
But Why Bother? Global Climate Change, Pluralist Democ-
racy and Cultural Theory
In order to explore the benefits of refurbishing pluralism using the cultural
theory-inspired framework, let us revisit the global climate change debate briefly
touched upon in the introduction of this thesis.5
Despite more than a decade of negotiation at intergovernmental level, com-
mentators agree that the key policy output to date — the Kyoto Protocol
— is disappointing [Verweij and Thompson, 2006, Luterbach and Sprinz, 2001].
Years of unsightly horsetrading have produced a tepid commitment from govern-
ments in industrial countries to cut greenhouse gas emissions by a miserly 5%.
Even if the US government, representing the country with the largest carbon
dioxide emissions, had not unilaterally withdrawn from the protocol in 2001, the
reduction targets are far below what the voice of scientific authority in the cli-
mate change debate, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
considers necessary for stabilising atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations
[IPCC, 2001]. At this rate, it would require another 30 Kyoto Protocols to even
get close [Verweij and Thompson, 2006].
Yet, even within its own rather modest terms, the Kyoto Protocol stands
little chance of succeeding. Of the countries that have ratified the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, few are actually implementing measures to cut emissions. Those few
are unlikely to fulfil their greenhouse gas reduction commitments. The Euro-
pean Environmental Agency [Gardiner et al., 2003] projects that existing cli-
mate change policies in EU Member States will only be able to cut a projected
1% of their greenhouse gas emissions. While additional policy measures may
bring the reductions up to 7,7% [Gardiner et al., 2003], it is far from certain that
EU Member States will implement these carbon dioxide reductions. Given the
difficulties in getting the Kyoto Protocol up and hobbling, insiders are less than
optimistic about the future of the Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) policy process [Verweij and Thompson, 2006].
5This section relies on Marco Verweij and Michael Thompson’s work in
[Verweij and Thompson, 2006]
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Why have citizens around the globe been lumbered with climate change
agreements that, even if governments were to respect them, would do very little
to curb global warming?
Verweij and Thompson argue that the Kyoto Protocol was “doomed” from
the very beginning because it is based on only one policy frame: the hierarchical
Population Story (see Box ?? in the Introduction). Instead of drawing on the
plurality of interpretations and potential solutions and instead of promoting
policy innovation by encouraging conflict and debate among contending policy
actors across the globe, hierarchical state actors have attempted to occupy and
control the climate change policy process by clamping down on principled dissent
[Verweij and Thompson, 2006].
First, by the late 1980s, traditional state actors — governments, diplomats
and their negotiators — had taken over the climate change debate from the
entrepreneurial scientists who had placed global warming on the international
policy agenda (most notably the Villach Conferences in 1985). The creation of
the IPCC in 1988, Bodansky argues, symbolises the reassertion of governmental
authority over the policy agenda [Bodansky, 2001]. The status of the IPCC as
ultimate arbiter of what is to count as legitimate knowledge articulates in terms
of institutions the hierarchical bid for epistemic sovereignty over the global cli-
mate change issue. Second, Verweij argues that fierce and consistent resistance
by individualist policy actors, most prominently US negotiators, has sunk global
climate change policy. Yet the reason why actors championing the individualist
story have so vehemently resisted the Kyoto Protocol is the stranglehold of hier-
archical discourse on the climate change debate.6 Third, Verweij argues that the
Kyoto Protocol limits institutional practises for combating global warming to
the tools of classical diplomacy. These unwieldy top-down policy instruments,
however, are wholly inappropriate for tackling a global issue that requires on-
going adaptation and mitigation at individual, firm and household level.
Petrification of policy-making structures, discourses, and practises has ma-
noeuvred the entire intergovernmental negotiation process into an impasse. The
policy space as it was set up in the late 1980s has simply left no room for ap-
proaches to climate change mitigation that do not entail planning, control and
oversight. Unable to provide space for contending policy solutions and unable
to completely exclude disruptive actors from policy-making, the FCCC process
has set contending actors onto a collision course. Narrowing the scope of policy
conflict, then, has left policy to curb global climate change brittle and vulner-
able. Instead of using the inevitable policy conflict as a fast breeder for ideas,
current climate change policy outputs are so delicate that even the smallest of
disagreements throws the entire policy edifice out of kilter.
Rather than locking the policy process into one policy story at the level of in-
tergovernmental policy-making, a cultural theory-inspired frame-based analysis
suggests that robust climate change policy should be more flexible and accom-
modating across all levels of policy-making. Flexibility, Verweij and Thompson
argue, involves global climate change policy becoming more “clumsy”, meaning
that policy-makers begin to appreciate policy conflict as a volatile but construc-
tive resource. Clumsy climate change measures draw on the specific strengths of
6For many individualist actors — British Petroleum (BP), for instance — it is the imposi-
tion of greenhouse gas targets, rather than the targets themselves, that is the source of their
resistance. Indeed, some are now setting themselves targets that are more stringent than the
government-imposed ones they are resisting.
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all the active advocacy coalitions. Policy conflict, in turn, allows policy-makers
to identify the relative weaknesses of contending solutions to global warming.
In the place of carbon dioxide reduction targets, clumsy solutions enable policy-
makers to recognise local vulnerabilities, tailor policy responses, as well as mo-
bilise existing resources for climate change mitigation: “. . . sustainability”, Steve
Rayner and Elizabeth Malone conclude, “is about being nimble, not being right”
[Rayner and Malone, 1998, p.2].
Shifting from an elegantly designed but ineffective climate change policy to
a clumsy set of measures that actually reduce carbon dioxide emissions, Ver-
weij and Thompson argue, will require the development of renewable energy
resources [Verweij and Thompson, 2006]. Technological development in decen-
tralised renewable energy sources has progressed considerably. Despite the in-
grained suspicion of state actors to decentralised energy technologies (European
financial support for research into nuclear power still is considerably higher
than all renewable energy sources), the costs for renewable energy resources have
plummeted over the last 20 years. Wind, water, geothermal and solar energy are
beginning to compete in terms of costs with fossil [Verweij and Thompson, 2006].
Egalitarians would also stress the “fifth fuel” — conservation — and some indi-
vidualist actors would seek to extend the fossil contribution (and ease the tran-
sition to renewables) by developing the technologies for Carbon Capture and Se-
questration (CCS). All this, Verweij argues, despite the widespread disinterest in
and general neglect of research into renewable energy sources
[Verweij and Thompson, 2006]. What is more, institutional and technological
innovations that are emerging from within climate-change-relevant sectors (such
as transport with cleaner motors running on alternative fuels such as hydrogen
or bio-mass) may, within a fertile environment, become reality within years
rather than decades. Policy-makers should therefore concentrate on creating
fertile environments for, on the one hand, research and development of renew-
able energy sources and, on the other, the introduction of these technologies into
the market and other economic sectors (such as transport). A clumsy policy
framework would accommodate and utilise contending policy approaches, along
with their cultural biases and accompanying institutional practises to global cli-
mate change. Apart from Research and Development expenditure, Verweij and
Thompson contends, clumsy climate change policy
“. . . requires numerous activities: enterprises to undertake risky in-
vestments; governments to adapt infrastructure, change tax sys-
tems, and provide financial incentives; universities to update cur-
ricula; engineers and architects to familiarise themselves with new
processes and materials; consumers to get informed about new prod-
ucts; grid operators to find solutions to the problems caused by the
intermittency of some renewables; and environmental groups to re-
main vigilant about the ecological downsides of renewable energy”
[Verweij and Thompson, 2006, pp.25-26].
In sum, the cultural theory-inspired frame-based analysis shows it is too little
democracy and pluralism that has led to policy deadlock and congestion. First,
mapping the global climate change policy debate shows that disagreement about
climate change policy reaches beyond mere self-interest (see the Introduction).
Although short-term economic interests undoubtedly play an important part,
they are not the only factors driving policy-making. Rather, policy conflict
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in global climate change reflects fundamental socio-institutional and normative
cleavages. Since these differences are not readily reconcilable, this implies that
no amount of scientific evidence or economic compensation will resolve policy
conflict. Second, the analysis of climate change policy-making suggests that it
is the absence of pluralist policy conflict that has stranded the Kyoto Protocol.
Instead of further closing down the space for policy conflict, policy-makers would
do well to do the exact opposite: open up that space to contending policy
arguments and solutions.
How could these insights be generalised and applied to other policy domains?
The answer to this questions lies in adapting classical pluralist theory to the
realities of policy-making in the differentiated polity.
Yet, for what reasons does classical pluralist theory need adapting and re-
furbishing?
Putting the Plurality into Pluralist Theory
Democracy, the pluralists argued, is a function of the distribution of power in a
given polity. A system is democratic if:
1. political power is sufficiently diffused so that no single group or individual
can exercise systematic and pervasive power over more than one issue,
2. the state is the neutral arbiter of social conflict,
3. individuals can voice their views through interest groups,
4. decision-making is limited to small, incremental steps because decisions
depend on consent from a plurality of policy actors.
The image evoked is of a marketplace in which political groups compete for
the attention of policy-makers and politicians compete for votes. No one says
that perfect competition prevails, but fairness would seem to be the outcome,
in the same way that a fair price emerges from market competition. Since some
distributions of power, on this formulation, are fairer than others, pluralism
offered a way of evaluating the degree of democracy in a given political sys-
tem. Robert Dahl, for instance, assessed the distribution of political power by
focusing on what he called ‘key issues’ [Dahl, 1971]. These are policy problems
where ‘political actors’ — interest groups and politicians — are in open and
observable conflict. The relative power of these policy actors was then gauged
by the proportion of actual policy decisions that went in their various favours.
Political groups, it was assumed, acted and interacted as coherent entities.
The pressure groups that constituted the political system were seen as analo-
gous to the rational individuals in the civil society of classic liberal philosophy.
Unsurprisingly, the same epistemological scepticism that liberal theory had ap-
plied to individuals, and that realist theory had applied to nation states, was
applied to the actors — the political groups — at this in-between level. Only
the political group could know its specific needs, and it would pursue these by
articulating its preferences and interests on policy issues. Pluralism, therefore,
made no attempt to break out of the ‘politics of interest’ tautology: actors act
the way they do because of their interests, and if we want to know what their
interests are we have to look at the way they act. The question of origins —
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how actors who act in their interests come to know where the interests they act
in lie — went unposed, see [Schwarz and Thompson, 1990, chapter 4].
How each of these actors came to cohere, similarly, elicited little interest
among the pluralists: a ‘hidden hand’ — the inevitable consequence of myriad
acts of maximising within an overall setting that contained just one equilibrium
— could be counted on to see to that. That the political actors were there,
and coherent, was proof of that! The pluralist model was thus methodologically
committed to an abstract and stylised concept of the person: the rational actor.
Where, the sceptic might well ask, is the plurality in that?
Though pluralism claimed to provide three crucial desiderata — an accurate
description of Western democracies, a prescription for less democratic systems,
and a method by which to assess the level of pluralism in the policy process —
it has not lived up to expectations on any of them.
• Changes in the role and nature of the advanced capitalist state have carried
it further and further from the pluralist’s account. As we saw in Chapter 2
policy-making takes place in functionally segregated institutional networks
of the ‘differentiated polity’.
• Civil society, for its part, has become distinctly heterogeneous. Globali-
sation, and the socio-economic transformations that accompany it, have
generated new ‘total system’ stresses which, in many instances, have ex-
acerbated differences of national identity, life-style and religion that had
previously been muted. As a result, the pluralist interest group model is
becoming increasingly irrelevant as new policy issues (in particular, the
environment, animal welfare and gender) enter the public sphere.
• Nor, amid all these changes within the state and civil society, have the
problems they address remained the same, as the preceding chapters have
shown. Where policy problems used to be so clear-cut that it was not
difficult for all the actors to arrive at agreed definitions of what those
problems were (their differences emerging only in relation to their pre-
ferred solutions) many issues now are so intangible, so complex and so
inherently uncertain that agreement on the base — the pre-requisite for
incrementalism — is no longer attainable. In short, policy problems have
become increasingly complex, uncertain and transversal.
Nor should we assume that, because things have got worse for pluralist the-
ory over the years, it was working well to begin with. It was beset with
methodological problems from the very beginning [Bachrach and Baratz, 1962,
Wolfinger, 1971, Galbraith, 1969, Lukes, 1974, Polsby, 1963].
• In focusing on the overt exercise of power in the decision-making pro-
cess, the pluralists were unable to recognise the more subtle, more perfid-
ious, and quite possibly more important ways in which policy actors can
set about getting what they want. Power, the critics of pluralist theory
pointed out, can be exercised by ensuring that only certain issues get onto
the policy agenda. On top of that, the way in which a problem is defined,
before it even reaches the agenda, may foreclose certain policy solutions
from the outset. In short, the method could not say very much about the
distribution of power in a polity because it was capable of analysing only
one sort of power.
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• Pluralism’s blindness to other, less overt, forms of power meant that it
could not distinguish between those situations in which there was full
agreement on the base and those in which those who did not agree with
a particular framing of the problem had been excluded. However, this
sort of frame-based intractable policy conflict has been the focus of the
chapters in Part II.
• Last, a closer inspection of classical pluralism reveals that it is based
entirely on one type of rationality originating in a single policy frame
[Wildavsky, 1976]. Like Henry Ford and his all-black cars, pluralism, said
“you can have any rationality you like so long as it’s that of the atomised
utility maximiser”. But if pluralism is all about the different ways in which
we want to live together (one of which is in the sort of market solidarity
which is supported by the idea of the person as a freely choosing maximiser
of his or her unique set of preferences) then it must cast its net wide enough
to take in all these different ways. We can now see that this is something
pluralism did not do.
Yet, despite all these shortcomings, pluralism brought with it a normative di-
mension that cannot easily be discarded. Democracies, pluralism tells us, ought
to value concepts such as effective citizen input, consensual policy-making and
power-sharing, and even the most vociferous of its critics would think twice
before turning their backs on these sorts of commitments. So, rather than
just throwing it away, we should ask ourselves whether pluralist theory can be
re-stated in such a way that it retains (strengthens, even) its normative dimen-
sion, while providing a method that is better suited to the task of evaluating
the differentiated polity. No easy undertaking, we concede, but one that, we
believe, can be achieved by way of cultural theory and the discourse-analytical
framework.
Political Equality and Self-Determination
What about pluralist democracy deserves preserving for future research and
how can we use the cultural theory-inspired discourse-analytical framework to
preserve it?
David Beetham neatly distills the main traits of democratic polities from
nearly a millennium of literature as follows: democracy is
“. . . a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and
policies over which the people exercise control, and the most demo-
cratic arrangement [Beetham takes] to be that where all members
of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such
decision-making directly — one, that is to say, which realises to
the greatest conceivable degree the principles of popular control and
equality in its exercise” [Beetham, 1993, emphasis added, p.55].
How can we tell polities that maximise equality and popular control apart from
those that do not? Following Robert Dahl’s work on polyarchy [Dahl, 1971], we
can think of pluralist democracy in terms of two basic principles or measures:
inclusion and public contestation. The degree to which polities include citi-
zens or stakeholders in political processes reflects the level of political equality
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among policy actors. By determining the accessibility and openness of political
systems, inclusion helps determine the level of pluralism in a political system.
The more inclusive, the more pluralist is a polity and, consequently, the higher
the level of political equality. Public contestation, in turn, indicates the level
of popular control over policy-making in a polity. By measuring the degree to
which polities enable control and influence over policy-making, public contes-
tation points to the degree of democracy in a polity. The higher the degree
of political contestation, the more effective is self-determination and, therefore,
the more democratic the polity. By casting pluralist democracy in terms of
these two variables, Dahl implies that not every democratic polity is pluralist
and that not every pluralist polity is democratic.
On their own, these two measures say little about pluralist democracy in the
differentiated polity. In terms of the level of governance, this conceptual scaf-
folding requires more conceptual clout to identify and describe socio-cultural
plurality in contemporary policy processes. In terms of the levels of analy-
sis, Chapter 3 has shown that classical pluralist theory is poorly equipped for
analysing infrastructural or discursive power. Yet, as Chapter 9 outlines, advo-
cacy coalitions use a wide variety of overt and covert means to establish their
epistemic sovereignty over a policy subsystem.
Linking Pluralist Democracy to Policy-Making: Cultural
Theory and Requisite Variety
The cultural theory-inspired conceptual framework has applied the concepts of
political equality and popular control to contemporary policy-making. The key
to reconfiguring pluralist concepts for use in contemporary subpolitics lies in the
inherently ambivalent relationship between the advocacy coalitions (quasocial
solidarities). On the one hand, cultural theory postulates that mutual antag-
onism between different types of advocacy coalitions gives rise to conflict. On
the other hand, the reproduction of each advocacy coalitions (and thereby the
larger social unit) depends on contention from rival advocacy coalitions. As we
have seen in Chapter ??, cultural theorists think of this dialectic relationship
in terms of ‘requisite variety’. Recall that Michael Thompson formulates this
principle in terms of inter-organisational dependencies:
“. . . the basic idea is that each way of organising ultimately needs
the others, because they do something vital for it that it could never
do for itself. Indeed, this sort of dependency does not have to be
mutual; it is enough if each way does something vital for just one of
the others and no one of them is left out” [Thompson, 1996, original
emphasis, p.16].
In this way, the requisite variety condition links pluralist democracy to the
idea of socio-institutional viability. On this view, including all stakeholders in
effective participation is not only a good idea because it appeals to our sense
of fairness, pluralist democracy also produces better and more robust policy
because it prevents conceptual blindness.
On the basis of this relationship between pluralism and policy-making, we
can mobilise two features of cultural theory for re-tooling pluralist democratic
theory for future research at the level of policy domains. First, the cultural
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theory-inspired typology of advocacy coalitions provides a standard for calibrat-
ing and examining the degree of pluralism in a policy subsystem by measuring
the level of accessibility (see Chapter 5). Second, two of the distinct dimen-
sions of analysis (structural, discursive) provide a means for spotting the differ-
ent ‘faces of power’ that are at work [Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, Lukes, 1974].
Whereas classical pluralist theorists were content (adamant, in fact,) to assess
pluralist democracy in terms of one face of power, the cultural theory-inspired
conceptual framework extends the possible analysis of political power to the
levels of discourse and institutional practises.
Pluralism: Accessibility as a Measure of Political Equality
A contested terrain or policy subsystem endorses the principle of political equal-
ity if it is accessible to all stakeholders and citizens. Assessing the degree of
openness and accessibility implies examining to whom policy subsystems grant
and deny access. By mapping policy conflict, analysis can discover whether
policy subsystems consist of
• triangular policy spaces consisting of all three active social solidarities; we
have called this an inclusive policy subsystem,
• bi-polar policy spaces7 made up of only two of the active social solidarities;
we have called this a partially inclusive policy subsystem.
• monocentric policy spaces8 dominated by a single social solidarity; we
have called this an exclusive policy subsystem.
The analysis of Part II of this thesis provides an indication of how future
research would go about gauging and calibrating accessibility. By assessing the
scope of policy conflict using the discourse-analytical framework and, in par-
ticular, the cultural theory-inspired typology of advocacy coalitions and policy
frames, a future analysis would be able to gauge and measure the accessibility of
a policy subsystem. Discovering evidence of only a single policy story would in-
dicate that the policy subsystem is characterised by a monocentric policy space
and is therefore exclusive. For example, the analysis of continental European
pension policy communities prior to the 1990s in Chapter 9 suggests that this
was the case. Finding traces of two contending policy stories suggests a bi-polar
space that is partially inclusive. In continental European pension governance,
the analysis of the thesis suggests, this seems to be the situation at present: in-
dividualist proponents of the Crisis Story have muscled their way into pension
policy subsystems while egalitarian advocates of Social Justice still languish on
the sidelines of policy-making. Last, the presence of policy stories representing
all three ‘active’ types of advocacy coalitions would indicate an inclusive policy
subsystem consisting of a triangular policy space. For example (a hypothetical
one in this case), should the European Commission’s ageing policy strategy be
successful, we may very well find evidence of an inclusive policy subsystem for
ageing issues at European level in the future.9
7Strictly speaking a line, not a space
8Strictly speaking a point, not a space or a line
9Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that for the wider policy debate on demographic
ageing (i.e. the debate that explicitly addresses issues pertaining to care, discrimination,
service provision, life-long learning, etc.) there is a far more diverse of participants than the
welfare state reform discussion [Ney, 2005].
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The shape of policy spaces indicates the distribution and concentration of
power in the policy subsystem. As we have seen, each type of advocacy coali-
tion strives to establish their epistemic sovereignty over the policy subsystem.
Thus, a triangular policy space indicates the widest possible diffusion of political
power. Bi-polar policy spaces consisting of only two active social solidarities, in
turn, suggest that political power is less diffuse, yet not sufficiently concentrated
for a single social solidarity to exert epistemic sovereignty. Last, in monocentric
policy spaces, political power is most concentrated: here, members of a single
social solidarity have total policy-making autonomy in the policy subsystem.
The cultural theory-inspired conceptual scaffolding will enable an analysis
of political power at the level of policy subsystems. Exclusion, an indicator of
political power, can occur at two different levels. First, at the level of structural
power, citizens are explicitly included or excluded from a policy subsystem.
This is an exercise of what Bachratz and Baratz as well as Lukes have called the
“first face of power”: an overt exercise of power directly measurable in terms
of policy actors’ observed behaviour [Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, Lukes, 1974].
In terms of the cultural theory-inspired framework, the absence of a particular
active type of advocacy coalition in a policy subsystem alerts us to a (potential)
abuse of structural power. Exclusion at this level points to a violation of basic
civil rights, such as freedom of assembly, freedom of speech or freedom from
persecution.
Second, the exercise of discursive power consists of erecting less visible but
nonetheless significant barriers to entry into policy subsystems. Discursive
power describes the ability to control the ‘naming and labelling of policy prob-
lems by strategically deploying knowledge. Here, advocacy coalitions may be
present in the policy subsystem, but have no say in the shaping of the policy
agenda. This corresponds to the “second face of power”
[Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, Lukes, 1974]: a covert exercise of political power
over problem-definition and agenda-setting in terms of so-called “non-decisions”.
The antagonism between contending social solidarities (or, rather, the lack of
it) provides an effective measure of discursive power: the absence of conflict-
ual engagement between social solidarities points to a discursive exclusion of
stakeholders in a policy subsystem.
How would this relate to policy-making? Moving rightwards along the ac-
cessibility dimension means a policy subsystem features policy actors from an
increasing number of social solidarities. As we have seen, the more social soli-
darities are present in a policy subsystem, the larger is the pool of the organisa-
tional, cognitive and practical resources available for dealing with complex and
uncertain policy issues. The larger the pool of cognitive and epistemic resources,
in turn, the larger the potential for policy innovation, adaptation, and strategy
switching. Moreover, as accessibility increases, the risk of conceptual blindness,
surprises and policy failure decreases. In short, the higher the accessibility and
the scope of policy conflict, the higher the potential for robust policy outputs
and policy outcomes. However, the wider the scope of policy conflict, the higher
the likelihood of policy debate degenerating into a “dialogue of the deaf”.
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Democracy: Responsiveness as a Measure of Popular Con-
trol
While accessibility tells us about who participates in the policy process, it says
little about how policy is made. In addition to accessibility, then, pluralist
democracy is about the way policy subsystems structure and regulate interaction
between policy actors. In a very real sense, policy actors’ capacity to influence
policy-making depends on the way policy subsystems configure policy debate.
At the subpolitical level, the quality of deliberation in a policy subsystem
determines the degree of popular control over policy-making. Policy deliberation
that enables all participants in policy subsystems to influence policy-making10
maximises popular control and self-determination. For all actors in a policy
subsystem to shape policy-making, policy deliberation needs to be responsive:
that is, policy debate must enable all voices to be heard and responded to.
Policy outputs may offer a means of gauging responsiveness in policy debates.
Cultural theorists refer to policy outputs that reflect elements of all contending
policy stories as ‘clumsy solutions’. Apart from accessibility to the policy sub-
system (the necessary condition or input), clumsy policy solutions depend on
the quality of deliberation within a policy subsystem (the sufficient condition):
the more responsive policy deliberation is, the more likely policy actors will end
up with clumsy policy solutions. Thus, the composition and shape of policy
outputs reflect the level of popular control over policy-making within a policy
community. This suggests three types of deliberation and public contestation:
• Assertive Deliberation, where policy actors aim to assert their particular
policy story over rival policy stories.
• Strategic Deliberation, where policy actors interact in order to more ef-
fectively pursue their divergent policy goals.
• Reflexive Deliberation, where policy actors critically scrutinise and reflect
on both the means and the ends of policy-making.
The analysis of the preceding chapters using cultural theory-inspired discourse-
analytical framework also provides some guidance to the way a future research
programme may determine the responsiveness of policy subsystems. By as-
certaining the structure of policy debate and using this structure to reflect on
actual policy interaction, the analysis can get an impression of the degree of
responsiveness. Assertive deliberation between two advocacy coalitions means
that neither side is sensitive to potential areas of agreement and, instead, fo-
cus exclusively on areas of intractable disagreement. Strategic deliberation, in
turn, implies that contending advocacy coalitions will constructively interact on
general policy measures as long as fundamental principles are not thematised.
For example, individualists and egalitarians in the European transport policy
debate agree on the basic idea of road pricing as long as the underlying moti-
vations for pursuing road pricing are not explicit. Last, reflexive deliberation
10Classical pluralist theory, in line with the basic precepts of Anglo-American social science,
has conceived of this capacity in negative and reactive terms: basically policy deliberation is
about blocking and amending governmental proposals to protect preferences and interests.
Taking the insights of the Argumentative Turn into account calls for the inclusion of the
positive and productive aspects of policy deliberation [Elster, 1998]: interaction within a
policy subsystem between policy actors is about creating choices by collective action.
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involves advocacy engagement on basic principles (such as social solidarity for
hierarchists and egalitarians in the pension debate) as well as on general policy
measures.
Appendix F provides an more detailed discussion of the different types of
deliberation.
Reflexive deliberation maximises popular control by empowering all policy
actors in a subsystem to contribute to common policy responses. Strategic
deliberation, in turn, limits popular control by delimiting the scope of policy
debate to means rather than ends. Assertive deliberation provides least popular
control over policy-making since it does not promote interaction.
Like accessibility, responsiveness is sensitive to all three faces or dimensions
of power. Responsiveness promotes policy outputs that reflect the inputs of all
social solidarities included in any particular policy subsystem. Policy responses
missing any of the forms of social organisation point to an exercise of structural
power. Policy outputs reflecting less than all the diagnoses of the policy issue
by all participating social solidarities indicate that discursive power is at work.
Last, policy failing to make use of all institutional strategies available in a policy
subsystem suggests that the inertial power of behavioural practice has rendered
deliberation less than reflexive.
In terms of policy-making, increasing responsiveness translates into more ef-
fective policy outputs. As deliberation becomes more responsive, each voice in
the policy debate becomes more ‘audible’, clearer and more sensible to contend-
ing policy actors. First, this reduces the incentive to ‘shout’, thus preventing
the decline of debate into a dialogue of the deaf. Second, responsive deliberation
lowers the level of frustration with a policy process, thereby avoids displacement
of policy conflict. The higher responsiveness of deliberation, then, the higher
the ability to constructively use policy conflict for dealing with complex and
uncertain policy issues.
The Regions of Pluralist Democracy
On the basis of these adaptations to the bootstrapped conceptual framework,
we can formulate a set of hypotheses about
• the way differing degrees of accessibility (pluralism) and responsiveness
(democracy) give rise to different types of policy subsystems;
• the way different types of policy subsystems produce divergent means of
resolving frame-based policy conflict;
• way policy conflict may bring about change within different types of policy
subsystems.
These hypotheses relate to the way different combinations of accessibility and
responsiveness (calibrated in terms of the cultural theory-inspired conceptual
typology of advocacy coalitions) generate different types of policy subsystems.
Plotting accessibility and self-determination in a graph (such as Figure 10.1)
gives us a space with three basic provinces each consisting of three regions. In
this terrain, increasing openness broadens the potential for robust policy-making
and growing responsiveness determines whether policy actors can make use of
this potential. As we move through this terrain from the bottom-left to the
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top-right, the conceptual framework suggests that policy subsystems become
increasingly accessible (meaning pluralist) and increasingly responsive (meaning
democratic). Policy subsystems found in regions near the origin — the Lowlands
— are least democratic and least pluralist. Networks along the negative diagonal
— the Midlands — implement a limited degree of political equality and popular
control. Last, regions in the upper-right hand province — the Highlands — are
most accessible and responsive.
The Lowlands Hypotheses
The lowlands contain policy subsystems that are barely pluralist or democratic.
Tightly circumscribed access and unresponsive policy deliberation leave these
types of policy subsystems with a shallow and confined form democracy.
The Closed Hegemony of the lower left-hand corner is a policy space in which
a single advocacy coalition has established epistemic sovereignty: here, might
makes right. Policy-makers in Rational Management networks know what is
best for their citizens and will seek expert advice in how to pursue these policy
goals. Vacillating Dyad, in turn, features two social solidarities locked in fierce
and aggressive policy contention.
Lack of contestation and policy conflict mean that decision-making is as-
sertive, authoritative and relatively speedy. However, because effective contes-
tation and deliberation are missing or, if present, are ignored, policy-makers
are prone to unpleasant surprises and policy failures resulting from conceptual
blindness. At the same time, displacement of policy conflict undermines what
little democratic legitimacy these systems possess.
Policy subsystems in lowland regions of the pluralist democratic map provide
policy actors with no institutional means for adaptation and change. Here, the
framework hypothesises that the lowlands combine the worst of both worlds: in
policy subsystems where access is slightly less restrictive, policy debate is fiercely
competitive; in networks where deliberation allows single-loop learning, mono-
centric dominance of a single social advocacy coalition constricts the potential
pool of policy solutions. Consequently, policy networks in any of the three low-
land regions are static, inflexible and brittle: the small pool of policy strategies
and the low level of responsiveness in deliberation, the framework predicts, offer
few options for reacting to socio-economic and political change. In the absence
of internal means of strategy switching and adaptation, the framework suggests
that change, when it comes, is always traumatic and revolutionary. For Closed
Hegemonies, change inevitably means complete collapse. Vacillating Dyads, in
turn, lead to vacillating policy cycles. Rational Management subsystems try to
use strategic deliberation to adapt but ineluctably trip up on the narrow scope
of policy conflict.
The Midlands Hypotheses
The midland regions describe policy subsystems that are either more permeable
or more responsive than lowland policy communities. In terms of structural
features, the midlands encompass somewhat disparate policy subsystems. These











Closed Hegemony Vacillating Dyad Issue Network
Rational Management Colluding Dyad Strategic Pluralism
Ivory Tower Learning Dyad Clumsy Institution
Figure 10.1: The Regions of Pluralist Democracy
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The cultural theory-inspired conceptual framework suggests that the mid-
lands host the two corner-solutions of the top-left to bottom-right — or nega-
tive11 — diagonal: the Issue Network and the Ivory Towers. While the openness
of the former provides the largest possible pool of policy stories, the nature of
policy deliberation transforms this potential into a cacophony of voices, each
trying to outdo the other in terms of volume if not substance.12 It is here, then,
that policy debate is most in danger of degenerating into a “dialogue of the
deaf”. In contrast, the Ivory Tower possibly features a highly sophisticated and
reflexive policy debate without, however, having much to discuss: aspirations
to innovation and reform are starved of ideas. The Colluding Dyad represents
the most workable of the midland models since it enables some learning at the
strategic level.
Despite divergent structural features, the model predicts that midland pol-
icy subsystems are all prone to inertia. Unlike the lowland regions, policy sub-
systems in the midlands supply policy actors with institutional and ideational
provisions for change and adaptation. However, due to structural and discursive
features, policy networks found in midland regions can make little use of these
institutional capabilities. While the ivory tower goes around in deliberative cir-
cles, policy-making in the issue network gets lost in the shouting. Unable to
thematise fundamental policy goals since areas of agreement across advocacy
coalitions are brittle, the colluding dyad collapses into intractability when faced
with uncertain policy problems: instead of changing course and adapting pol-
icy goals, policy-makers in bi-polar cooperative systems apply tried-and-tested
policy strategies to new (and essentially unknown) policy problems.
The Highlands Hypotheses
The highland regions form a crest along the upper right hand corner of Figure
10.1 The highlands comprise policy subsystems that score highest in terms of
both political equality and popular control: they feature the deepest and most
expansive forms of democracy. For this reason, any process of democratisation
should aim to end up in one of the three highland regions.
Highland policy subsystems offer a number of advantages for policy-making.
First, policy actors in the highlands of pluralist democracy can draw from a
rich stock of potential policy solutions and strategies. Second, responsive pol-
icy debate supplies the tools for exploiting these organisational, cognitive and
practical resources to the full. In other words, the highland regions most ef-
fectively avoid conceptual blindness and displacement by enabling full strategy
switching.
Clumsy Institutions avoid displacement and conceptual blindness altogether.
Here, policy-making is at its most dynamic and adaptive as policy actors engage
in contentious but constructive interaction. The triangular policy space ensures
that slip-ups and developments in the wider policy environment do not go un-
11Negative in the sense that it is orthogonal to the one that carries us from Closed Hegemony
to Clumsy Institution
12Think of a busy market place (real not metaphorical) in which market criers try to outdo
their neighbours in advertising their goods. While the knowledge in policy stories is not a
tradeable good, issue networks force policy actors to reduce ideas and policy stories to goods
that can be marketed. This implies simplification and standardisation. In a tight market, this
considerably erodes the value of policy stories. This also goes to show that the market is a
poor metaphor for contemporary pluralist democracy.
327
noticed. The high degree of responsiveness in the policy debate ensures that
these insights (and suggestions on what to do about them) do not go unheeded.
Like Colluding Dyad, the strategic nature of policy deliberation in Strategic
Pluralist policy subsystems limits debate to policy means. Yet, unlike bi-polar
spaces, agreement is far more difficult to achieve and sustain within triangular
policy spaces. The inevitable three-way policy conflict injects movement into
strategic policy processes thereby reducing the risk of policy deadlock. Given
this inherently dynamic constellation, these policy subsystems rapidly reach the
limits of strategic deliberation.
The Learning Dyad, the conceptual framework hypothesises, also generates
a strong current towards clumsy institutions. Reflexive deliberation enables
policy actors to explore all aspects of policy issues. Significantly, this includes
the reasons why policy-making keeps getting caught out by unexpected conse-
quences despite wide consultation and deliberation. What is more, deliberation
in Learning Dyads prevents contending policy actors from rejecting out of hand
competing and seemingly counterintuitive explanations, solutions and strate-
gies. Policy actors in learning partnerships, we would expect, are more likely
than their lowland and midland neighbours to deduce that ‘something is miss-
ing’. The search for the missing element, then, leads to the extension of the
policy subsystem to a Clumsy Institution.
Unlike policy subsystems in other provinces, policy communities found in the
highlands of pluralist democracy all feature institutional mechanisms and norms
for adaptation and strategy switching. While the Learning Dyad is limited in
terms of the scope of policy conflict, Strategic Pluralism is limited in terms
of deliberation. Clumsy Institutions, however, overcome both limitations by
obviating incentives for displacement behaviour and maximising the scope of
policy conflict.
Appendix G discusses each region in more detail.
Democratisation and Counter-Democratisation Hypothe-
ses
In sum, applying the cultural theory-inspired conceptual framework to pluralist
democracy provides a set of hypotheses that relate political equality and popular
control to contemporary policy-making processes. The typology of advocacy
coalitions provides measures for assessing the accessibility of policy subsystems.
Clumsy policy solutions, in turn, furnish indicators for gauging the level of
responsiveness in policy deliberation. Together, both dimensions describe a
socio-institutional space in which we would expect policy subsystems with high
levels of pluralism (measured in terms of accessibility) and democracy (measured
in terms of responsiveness) are more likely to produce robust and sustainable
policy outputs. At the lower end of the map, where pluralist democracy is
shallow and confined, the approach hypothesises that policy-making is fragile
and permanently at risk of failure. Between the extremes of Closed Hegemonies
and Clumsy Institutions, the cultural theory-inspired map of policy subsystems
suggests there to be a range of distinct subsystem types. These subsystem types
or regions arise from partial implementations of political equality and popular
control.
By providing a language to articulate political equality and popular control
in the differentiated polity, the cultural theory-inspired conceptual framework
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will enable analysts to chart pathways of democratisation. The framework inti-
mates that we can trace institutional change in terms of movement across the re-
gions of pluralist democracy. On this view, democratisation is any institutional
change that causes a policy subsystem to ‘move’ away from the origin. The map
of pluralist democracy hypothesises that there is both an absolute and a relative
aspect to democratisation. Absolute democratisation describes any journey of
change that terminates in the region of Clumsy Institutions. Relative or par-
tial democratisation, in turn, depicts reforms or developments that shift policy
subsystems towards Clumsy Institutions. Processes of partial democratisation
can either move a policy subsystem along one of the two dimensions only or can
shift policy subsystems incrementally along both dimensions.
This, however, is not to suggest that movement across the terrain of plural-
ist democracy is linear, unidirectional or deterministic: as Chapter 5 indicates,
not all conflict-driven institutional change makes policy subsystems more demo-
cratic or pluralist. For that reason, the cultural theory-inspired framework for
analysing pluralist democracy also provides a way for identifying institutional
changes that undermine pluralist democracy. Correspondingly, any movement
towards the bottom-left hand corner of the pluralist democratic map depicts
a process of counter-democratisation.13 Again, counter-democratisation can be
both absolute or partial: in the case of the former, institutional change cat-
apults policy subsystems from anywhere in the space to the region of closed
hegemonies; in the case of the latter, counter-democratic change moves policy
subsystems towards closed hegemony.
Messy Policy Problems, Policy Conflict and Frame-Based
Discourse Analysis
This thesis has tried to make sense of the way policy actors in Europe respond
to argue about, and disagree over messy policy problems. The key to under-
standing these processes of public reasoning and public argument has been a
frame-based approach to policy conflict. By integrating a number of contempo-
rary approaches in the policy sciences, the thesis has constructed a conceptual
framework for policy-oriented discourse analysis.
Part II applied the discourse-analytical framework to three distinct policy
domains. The upshot of the analysis is that robust policy responses are most
likely to emerge from an inherently conflictual and fundamentally intractable
policy process. However, the analysis suggests that intractable conflict can
also degenerate into a “dialogue of the deaf”. On this view, dealing effectively
with messy policy problems requires a high degree of accessibility to policy
subsystems on the one hand, and a responsive policy debate on the other.
Thus, the bootstrapped discourse-analytical framework, it would seem, posits
a relationship between frame-based conflict about messy policy problems and
pluralist democracy. By extending and applying the conceptual framework to
pluralist democracy, this chapter has generated a set of hypotheses for future
research. This investigation will look at the ways different types of policy sub-
system structures and processes give rise to different patterns of policy-making.
Not only will this future research be strongly comparative approach across pol-
13Interestingly, there does not seem to be an accepted term to denote the opposite of
democratisation [Pelizzo, 2005], hence the somewhat awkward word.
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icy domains and national borders, the framework also provides means of tracing
and classifying changes to structures and processes in policy subsystems.
In this way, the cultural theory-inspired discourse-analytical framework de-
veloped and explored in this thesis can hopefully contribute to a practical and
policy-oriented analysis of how ideas shape policy processes and policy outcomes
in the differentiated polity. The cultural theory-inspired typology of advocacy
coalitions and policy frames as well as the policy stories method provide the
analyst with a compact and (relatively) user-friendly set of tools for identifying
and comparing contending policy arguments. Armed with this approach, the
policy analyst can
• Identify and classify collective policy actors arguing about messy policy
problems in any given policy domain;
• Gauge and assess the conflictual scope and ideational distance between
policy actors;
• Reconstruct, compare and dissect the different policy arguments within
the contested terrain thereby understanding the nature of policy conflict;
• Examine the role of conflict in policy change thereby identifying further
areas of enquiry into to the governance structures of policy domains.
More importantly, however, the discourse-analytical framework urges us to
reassess the role of frame-based conflict in contemporary policy-processes. Con-
ventional policy sciences have tended to view frame-based policy conflict as an
aberration or pathology of the rational policy process. Such thinking has led
to an unwarranted scepticism among policy analysts and policy-makers of argu-
mentative practises in subpolitical policy-making: democracy and pluralism, it
is argued, are to be confined to the ‘proper’ institutional environments so as not
to infect rational policy-making with its quarrelsome and corrosive bug of frame-
based conflict. However, even if divorcing democratic politics from rational
policy-making were feasible, keeping sub-political policy-processes conflict-free
is problematic as long as policy issues are complex, uncertain and transversal.
Thus, contemporary policy-making in the differentiated polity, it would seem,
cannot avoid, indeed must embrace, frame-based conflict if it is to tackle the
urgent policy challenges of our times. On the approach that has guided this
thesis, frame-based policy conflict is an inextricable part of the institutional
backdrop to any policy debate. Just like the other constitutive parts of the
institutional background (people, things, organisations, money, power, knowl-
edge, ideas, etc.) frame-based policy-conflict is a resource to be mobilised for
constructive policy-making: its constructive and critical functions are crucial
assets in portfolios of contemporary policy-makers. Mobilisation of this volatile
resource, however, requires reliable knowledge about its nature. The conceptual
framework developed and explored in this thesis supplies just that. By enabling
analysts to chart the scope, structure, and impact of frame-based policy con-
flict in any policy domain, the cultural theory-inspired framework for discourse
analysis creates maps of policy conflict that can help policy-makers navigate the
increasingly turbulent waters of contemporary policy-making.
Embracing frame-based policy conflict undoubtedly will make policy pro-
cesses less harmonious or elegant than what we European have been used to in
the past. Yet, the policy problems Europe faces have also become less orderly
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and disciplined. R.A.W. Rhodes maintains — rightly, I believe — that messy
policy problems require messy policy solutions [Rhodes, 1997]. The cultural
theory-inspired conceptual framework for discourse analysis developed and ap-
plied in this thesis could contribute to understanding, accepting and dealing
with messiness in contemporary policy-making. This, then, may help building
untidy (but more resilient) policy processes that yield clumsy (but more robust)




The Myths of Nature
Policy debates about uncertain environmental policy problems such as global
climate change involve making implicit and explicit ontological claims about the
natural world. After all, policy measures that ignore fundamental realities of
nature are unlikely to be terribly effective. The thing about uncertainty though
is that people disagree about the nature of nature. In fact, cultural theory argues
that people will disagree about nature according to their particular cultural
bias. Each social solidarities furnishes individuals with a specific account of
the natural world called “myths of nature”. The term myths does not imply
that these depictions of nature are inaccurate, irrational or unscientific. Rather,
myths of nature — in line with the usage in social anthropology — help stabilise
and reproduce social structures and normative order.
For the individualists, nature is a robust and bountiful place teeming with
opportunities, a lot like the free market. The natural world, much like rugged
individualists themselves, can look after itself: no matter what innovative and
enterprising individuals may do to the environment, nature will always return to
an equilibrium [Thompson and Rayner, 1998a, p.284]. In terms of Figure A.1,
the ball may rock around in the trough but always returns to its initial position.
In contrast, egalitarians believe that nature is ephemeral and fragile. Just
like the ball precariously balanced on the hilltop in Figure A.1, nature is per-
manently teetering at the edge of an abyss. The slightest perturbation caused
by humans could have catastrophic consequences for the natural world. For
this reason, we all must “tread lightly on mother earth” avoiding at all costs be-
haviour that may lead to environmental apocalypse
[Schwarz and Thompson, 1990].
In hierarchical social solidarities, nature is tolerant of human behaviour
within limit (see Figure A.1). Beyond these limits, however, the effect of human
behaviour becomes perverse and nature descends into disorder and chaos. Mem-
bers of hierarchies firmly believe that, after the appropriate experts have de-
termined these limits, rational management can contain human activity within
these boundaries.
Last, fatalists experience nature as something capricious and whimsical. Es-
sentially unknowable and unpredictable, nature, like the ball in Figure A.1, will
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Egalitarian groups, who tend to frequently find themselves outside the policy
process in advanced industrial societies, will choose to intensify opposition ac-
tivity at the grass-roots or street-level. Arguing that the street-level, rather
than the elitist, oppressive and exclusive ‘political system’, is where real politi-
cal legitimacy resides, egalitarians will organise vociferous protest and resistance
outside established institutions. For example, up until very recently, egalitarian
policy actors operated on the margins of the transport policy sector at both na-
tional and European level. Consequently, some egalitarian policy stories, such as
Hermann Knoflacher’s argumentation reviewed in Chapter 6, vehemently con-
test the legitimacy of formal institutions at national and (particularly) Euro-
pean level for local transport planning. However, intensified opposition outside
regulating institutions risks degenerating into violence.
Excluded individualists, in turn, will shun publicity (initially at least) in
favour of mobilising the resources in their networks. Working predominantly
through informal channels (via mutual membership in clubs, organisations, so-
cieties, friends-of-friends, etc.), excluded individualists will try manoeuvre their
way back into the policy process. While protesting egalitarian groups have set
up camp outside the intergovernmental policy process on global climate change
debate, individualist industry lobbies have predominantly operated behind the
scenes putting pressure on policy actors and politicians through network chan-
nels [Luterbach and Sprinz, 2001]. Since what counts is the bottom-line, in-
dividualists are not squeamish about the means of getting close to the policy
action: legitimate negotiation and trade risks decaying into corruption and illicit
back-room dealing.
When hierarchists find themselves excluded from policy-making (admittedly
a relatively infrequent occurrence in predominantly hierarchical policy environ-
ments), they will strategically deploy formal rules and regulations to either
muscle in on or close down the debate. By strategically bringing the wide range
of formal and legalistic strategies at their disposal to bear (including invent-
ing new rules and regulations), hierarchical actors will try to force their way
into or co-opt a policy process. The early stages of the international debate on
climate change offer an example of hierarchical displacement behaviour. Dan
Bodansky argues that entrepreneurial climate scientists initiated the policy de-
bate on climate change without much involvement of hierarchical state actors
[Bodansky, 2001]. However, as it became apparent that the climate change de-
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bate was taking off without them, they created a set of formal institutions (the
IPCC and the FCCC) to place them firmly in the driving seat and relinquish





OPTIONAL INTRO: Thank you very much for agreeing to help us
with our research. The PEN-REF project is an international research
endeavour of seven European research organisations. The project is
funded by European Commission in terms of the Fifth Framework
Programme. Our research, which covers six European countries, aims
to understand the policy processes and the policy debates related to
public pension reform in Europe.
I would like to take this opportunity to point out that all your responses
will be treated with the strictest of confidence. None of your responses will be
directly attributed to either you or your institution.
Warm-Up
1. What policy-areas do you deal with or are you responsible for?
2. How did you get to be in this position
• academic/professional background
• career path
The Pension Policy Community and the Pension Policy Process
1. Who are the main policy actors responsible for formulating and imple-
menting pensions policy?
• state actors (ministries, civil servants, executive agencies, etc.)
• political actors (ministers,advisers, spokespersons of political parties)
• interest representation and NGOs (trade unions, employer’s associa-
tions, specialised interest groups, etc.)
• private sector actors (insurance companies, banks, firms, etc.)
• research actors (universities, think-tanks, research organisations, etc.)
2. What do these actors have in common and what makes them different
from one another?
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• commitment to common/divergent policy goals
• commitment to common/divergent political programmes
• commitment to common/ divergent paradigms
• professional affiliations
• institutional affiliations
• political affiliations/ political patronage
• resource dependencies
3. With what institutions and policy actors do you most frequently co-
operate when formulating pension policy?
4. In what ways has the community of institutional actors concerned with
pension issues changed in the past 10-15 years?
• changes in personnel in existing institutions
• new institutions have joined the community / old institutions have
left the community
• balance of power within the policy community
• more or less public exposure
5. In terms of policy-making, have these changes been for the better?
• PROBE: FOR WHAT REASONS




7. Do you think the process of pensions policy formulation is different from
policy-making in other fields?
• PROBE: IN WHAT WAYS IS IT DIFFERENT
The Pension Problem:
1. What are the current and future challenges facing public pension systems
in Europe?
• population ageing
• the changing nature of employment and the labour market
• new labour market participants (e.g. women)
• equity issues (intergenerational, gender, etc.)
• efficiency issues
• PROBE: WHAT ELSE?




• the changing nature of employment and the labour market
• new labour market participants (e.g. women)
• equity issues (intergenerational, gender, etc.)
• efficiency issues
• PROBE: WHAT ELSE?
3. Do you think public pension systems will be able to face up to these
challenges?
• PROBE: FOR WHAT REASONS?
4. In what areas, if any, do you think the current pension system is unfair?
• PROBE: FOR WHAT REASONS? FOR WHOM IS IT UNFAIR?
5. In what areas, if any, do you think the current pension system is inefficient?
• PROBE: FOR WHAT REASONS? FOR WHOM IS IT UNFAIR?
The Development of the Pension Policy Issue
OPTIONAL TEXT: I would now like to talk a little bit about the
way the pension policy issue has developed in [insert country] in the
past 10-15 years. We are particularly interested in the way different
institutional players interact, whether in a consensual or conflictual
manner, to produce pensions policy.
1. What issues have dominated the policy debate on pensions in [insert coun-
try] over the past 10-15 years?
• expert/ technocratic level (independent and civil service experts)
• political level (politicians and interest representation)
• public/ media
2. What have been the points of broad consensus and what have been the
points of conflict among the community of institutional actors?
3. To what extent was there a public debate?
• degree of interest mobilisation
• the role of the media
• openness of the debate
4. How different, if at all, was the public/ media debate from the debate
among the institutional actors?
5. To what type of changes in the public pension system, if any, did these
debates lead?
• statutory changes to the public pension systems
• incremental changes vs radical changes
339
• changes in the expert/ public perceptions of pension systems
6. What was the objective of these changes? Were these objectives adequate?
• PROBE: FOR WHAT REASONS WERE THE OBJECTIVES AD-
EQUATE/ INADEQUATE?
7. Did the changes or reforms fulfil their objectives?
• PROBE: FOR WHAT REASONS?
8. Who, if anyone, opposed these changes?
• PROBE: FOR WHAT REASONS?
9. How were the conflicts solved?
• by compromise
• by ignoring conflict
• by learning
The Current Pension Reform Debate
1. What are the pension reform proposals currently on the political agenda?
2. What are the objectives of these reforms?
3. In what ways do these reforms address the challenges facing public pen-
sions systems?
• PROBE: IN WHAT WAYS?
4. What triggered these reforms?
5. How have these pension reform proposals come about?
• type of actors involved
• level of policy-making
6. Is this process adequate?
• PROBE: FOR WHAT REASONS IS THIS PROCESS ADEQUATE/
INADEQUATE?
7. To what extent have the present reform proposals given rise to policy
conflict?
8. In your opinion, how will this conflict be dealt with?
• PROBE: FOR WHAT REASONS?
9. Compared to previous pension reforms or pension reform debates, in what
ways is the present pension debate different?
• PROBE: FOR WHAT REASONS IS THE PRESENT DEBATE
DIFFERENT?
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10. How likely, do you think, is it for the current policy debate to lead to
concrete changes in the public pension system





Hypermobility and the Fear
of the Unknown
Hermann Knoflacher’s line of argumentation is representative of the way many
Austrian egalitarian policy actors interpret and express the ecological approach
to transport policy-making. This is particularly true for egalitarians cam-
paigning against the heavy transit traffic in the alpine regions of Austria (such
as, most prominently, theTransitforum Austria-Tirol1). It would be, however,
somewhat misleading to assume that the ecological refusal to believe in the (as-
sumed) equation of mobility with wealth, wellbeing and progress is inherently
xenophobic.
Indeed, Mayer Hillman and John Adams see contemporary mobility patterns
as the root cause of xenophobia (in the literal sense of the word) [Hillman, 1999,
Adams, 2005]. Hillman embeds this insight in his general argument about
threats to child development. The increasingly dispersed and high-speed pat-
terns of mobility that characterise life in the United Kingdom, he argues, deprive
children of the type of local mobility crucial for their physical and mental devel-
opment. Road traffic has made the local neighbourhood, traditionally a place
where children acquired crucial interpersonal and social skills, inhospitable and
dangerous environments. As a result, unsupervised journeys by children have
substantially decreased: while not even 20 years ago, British children were regu-
larly walking or cycling to school, to sports activities or to friends, these journeys
have dramatically decreased or been replaced by journeys in the parental car.
Children, John Adams observes, have become “. . . captives of the family chauf-
feur” [Adams, 2005, p.4]. The local public space, both Hillman and Adams
contend, have evolved into socially arid places which are “full of strangers”
[Adams, 2005]. This unfamiliarity and, sociologically speaking, anomie has fu-
elled in parents largely unfounded perceptions of the risks to their children.
Compounded by one-sided media coverage of violent crimes against children by
strangers as well as government policies that stress the dangerous nature of pub-
lic spaces (such as stranger/danger information campaigns or the night curfew
enforced in many British cities), the fear of strangers, or xenophobia, has driven
parents to restrict children’s’ access to the local neighbourhood and, thereby,
to each other. This, in turn, strengthens the malign force driving fear and
1see http://www.transitforum.at
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paranoia of the unknown and foreign. “Children’s detention in their homes,”
Hillman contends,
“inculcates in their impressionable minds a grossly misleading per-
ception of the world outside as hostile — a world in which we, as
experienced and responsible adults, consider that people one does
not know could well be up to no good and that their locality may
contain within it elements of danger to which they should not be
exposed” [Hillman, 1999, p.6].
Yet, it is not only children and their parents into whom unsustainable pat-
terns of “hypermobility” [Adams, 2005] have instilled a fear of strangers. Hy-
permobility produces a particularly unpleasant mixture of fear and rejection of
strangers at a global scale. The crux of the issue, egalitarians argue, is that
benefits and costs of hypermobility are inequitably distributed. While the rich
enjoy all the benefits of fast, convenient and continent-spanning travel, the poor
become increasingly confined in spatial and social ‘glass cages’. But the ideol-
ogy underpinning the hypermobile society promises mobility, social as well as
spatial, for all. Yet, as the poor and immobile try harder and harder to (quite
literally) break into the world of the rich, these erect increasingly higher barriers
to protect themselves from potentially harmful strangers. Just like parents at
the local level are locking themselves and their children away from real and al-
leged threats in public space, whole societies are seeking to insulate themselves
from potential and imaginary external risks. With notions such as the ’Fortress
Europe’ in mind, Adams argues that wealthy countries
“. . . previously protected by distance from mass invasion by the indi-
gent are increasingly resorting to restrictive prohibitions and force.
Barriers — in the form of stringent visa requirements, difficult-to-
obtain work permits, and obstructive immigration requirements —
are being raised to contain the numbers who seek to take advantage
of the mobility afforded by technology” [Adams, 2005, p.13].
So, on this view, hypermobility creates xenophobia and racism not because
of some woolly concept of Lebensraum (see http://www.transitforum.at) that
drives people to be inherently distrustful of difference and diversity. Rather,
argue Hillman and Adams, hypermobility is in the process of destroying the
socio-institutional and cultural mechanisms that people use to, quite literally,
get to know and respect each other. Instead of confronting diversity in terms
of common local interests (as well as common local problems and conflicts),
hypermobility forces us to confront each other as strangers with neither the
means nor the space to overcome our fear and ignorance.
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Who are we to believe? The World Bank who suggests a radical departure from
existing social insurance practises? The ILO who claims that expansion rather
than retrenchment of pension systems is the key to solving the ageing prob-
lem? Or the Commission who tells us that overcoming the ageing challenge will
involve careful policy co-ordination and integration? Typically, (post) modern
societies refer contentious policy issues to ‘the experts’. Yet, both the basic
variables as well as the economic impacts of ageing are subject to considerable
uncertainty. What, then, do the experts have to say about ageing and pension
systems?1
The Economic Impacts of Ageing? Well, it all Depends . . .
How have economists assessed the impact of ageing and pensions systems on
the economy?
Labour Markets Recall that pensions contributions are pay-roll taxes that
may distort labour markets. The effects of these payroll tax on employment
rates are, however, ambiguous. Standard economic wisdom, which the World
Bank applies aggressively and the OECD more carefully, tells us that the impact
of payroll taxes depends on the degree of flexibility in labour markets and the
elasticity of labour supply to the real wage. MacKellar argues that in
“. . . a world of immobile labour and mobile capital, it is fair to as-
sume that the long-run incidence of social security payroll taxes is
1The following will heavily draw from Landis MacKellar’s excellent overview of the eco-
nomics of ageing [MacKellar, 2000].
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entirely on labour. Therefore, in a flexible labour market, high pay-
roll taxes will lead to lower net wages and unemployment and firms’
labour unit costs will be unaffected” [MacKellar, 2000, p.22].
In other words, employers can pass the tax on to workers in the form of lower
real wages. If the labour supply is highly elastic to changes in the real wage,
workers will withdraw their labour from the market. However, in countries with
well developed formal sectors, evidence suggests that the elasticity of labour
supply to the real wage is close to zero [MacKellar, 2000, p.22].2
What happens when labour markets are not flexible? If wages are sticky
downwards, theory tells us, employers will not be able offload the costs of pen-
sion contributions to workers. Consequently, employers reduce their demand for
labour as pensions contributions increase unit labour costs. High-skilled work-
ers in a strong bargaining position will benefit from higher wages, whereas low
skilled workers will become unemployed [MacKellar, 2000, p.22]. Much of the
political debate about socio-economic changes in Europe revolves around this
insight. The argument, usually couched in terms of international competitive-
ness, asserts that the combination of generous European social programmes and
inflexible labour markets has led to a “. . . witch’s brew of high costs, low price
competitiveness, and structural unemployment” [MacKellar, 2000, p.22].
Yet, in terms of economic theory, it is not pensions contributions per se that
affect labour demand. Rather, the question is whether pensions contributions in-
crease the real net wage. The answer to this question, again, is ambiguous: much
depends on the precise institutional nature of labour market inefficiencies, i.e. on
the socio-political constellations of the state, labour unions, and employer’s rep-
resentatives. Alesina and Perrotti find that pensions contributions only increase
unit labour costs when union power is at a medium level: when union power is
weak, employers meet little resistance when setting wages; when union power
is very strong, meaning that unions are equal social partners in the political
dialogue, payroll taxes lead to lower net real wages [Alesina and Perrotti, 1997].
Moreover, as MacKellar elegantly argues, the problems are inherent to labour
markets, not inherent to pension systems: existing labour market distortions
lead to reduced labour demand as a reaction to pay-roll taxes, it is not the
pay-roll taxes that produce labour market distortions.3
Labour Market Participation What influences the retirement decision?
Public Pay-As-You-Go systems that distort individual choice by inefficient and
unfair pay-offs to politically influential groups, shouts the World Bank. Wrong!
interjects the ILO. If workers want to retire early, they probably have good
reasons: it is the lack of democratic management and poor working conditions
that lead to early retirement. Be that as it may, the Commission surmises, but
taking a systemic view will reveal that fundamental, yet inappropriate, socio-
institutional and individual practises are responsible for early withdrawal from
the labour market.
In terms of the retirement decision, economic expertise provides reasonably
clear indications. If we assume workers are rational economic agents, what
2To be fair, the World Bank repeatedly points out that escape to the informal sector is a
marginal problem in affluent northern countries.
3This assumes that withdrawal to the informal sector is not an option, which, given the
structure of European labour markets, is a fairly plausible assumption.
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factors affect the retirement decision? In general terms, (rational) workers will
consider life expectancy, income, and the availability of pension and health
insurance, when thinking about retirement [MacKellar, 2000, p.4]. Whereas
increases in life-expectancy would motivate an individual to work longer, high
real incomes as well as the ready access to appropriate health and pension
insurance would suggest early retirement.
Why, then, do workers retire early? As we have seen, life expectancy is
on the rise: rational economic agents should prefer to work longer rather than
retire early. That leaves two alternative explanations: either people retire early
because, as real incomes rise, they prefer leisure to work or the structure of
pension systems has skewed the retirement decision in favour of early retirement.
If the former is the case, the OECD maintains, then policy can do very little
short of drastically cutting income for early retirement [MacKellar, 2000, p.42].
If the latter is the case, then policy can and, by implication, should affect the
retirement decision.
How does the structure of pensions systems (public or private) affect the
retirement decision? The OECD lists a number of potential influences on the
decision to exit the labour force [OECD, 1998]. First, standard, i.e. legal, eligi-
bility ages4 will probably have little influence on the actual retirement rate. The
OECD argues that raising the standard age of retirement (at 65 for males and
60 for females in most European countries) will not raise the actual retirement
age in the same way. There is, the OECD avers, “. . . a strong desire to take
advantage of any mechanism permitting early retirement, but not vice versa,
as shown by the fact that actual retirement ages have fallen during the period
when the standard age has remained stable” [OECD, 1998, p.44].
Second, minimal eligibility ages,5 however, are likely to have a strong impact.
Many pension systems, the OECD points out, have in-built mechanisms that
allow access to pension benefits after a certain amount of contributing years
or at a certain age (below the standard age). Although the precise modalities
vary,6 these arrangements provide for fairly generous benefits before the legal
retirement age. The European Commission points out that
“. . . there is a strong correspondence between the age at which retire-
ment benefits are available departure from the labour force. In many
cases, pension systems have provided generous retirement benefits
at relatively young ages” [Commission, 1999, p.36].
Third, the OECD contends, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, that benefit lev-
els will probably have little impact on the retirement decision. The rationale
here is essentially empirical. Although replacement rates have risen and retire-
ment ages fallen in the OECD as a whole, there are notable exceptions. One
such exception is France, where replacement rates have hardly increased yet
retirement ages have plummeted. The other is Japan, where replacement rates
has increased sharply, yet retirement rates have hardly decreased [OECD, 1998,
p.45].
4This is the legally mandated age at which workers can retire. Although there is some
variation, most countries set the standard retirement age at about 60 for females and 65 for
males.
5This differs from the standard retirement age. It is the minimal age at which a worker
becomes eligible for pension. Often, this relates to a minimal number of contribution years.
6Some countries, e.g. Germany, actuarially reduce benefits for each year of early retirement,
other have no such reductions.
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Fourth, rules governing pension accrual rates will, according to the OECD,
have a large impact on early retirement. The way in which an individual pen-
sion rights accumulate often acts as an disincentive to remain in the labour
force. In many systems, workers do not accrue any further pension rights after
a specified period of contribution. As MacKellar, points out (referring to oc-
cupational pensions), the result “. . . is to reduce the net wage to a fraction of
the nominal wage . . . Not surprisingly, many workers choose to leave the firm”
[MacKellar, 2000, p.5].
Additionally, structures and practises of both public social protection pro-
visions and private occupational pensions have encouraged early retirement. In
the public sector, the use of unemployment insurance and disability pensions as
labour market tools, that is as means to ease older workers out of the labour
market, accounts for a considerable part of European early retirement figures
[OECD, 1998, pp.47–49] [MacKellar, 2000, p.5]. In the private sector, occupa-
tional pensions may set retirement ages at or below the legal retirement age, with
reductions for early retirement that are not actuarially neutral [OECD, 1998,
p.49].
In sum, the institutional set up and rules that govern pension systems have
encouraged early retirement in Europe. The OECD concludes that “. . . employees
desire to retire earlier than the standard retirement age has to some extent been
transformed into reality at possibly high cost to society as a whole by develop-
ments that are in principle susceptible to policy” [OECD, 1998, p.43].
Note, however, that these features are common to both public sector and
private pension arrangements.
Savings The issue of savings, that is whether or not specific types of pensions
systems discourage savings, is particularly thorny and complicated.
Recall that the World Bank suggests that societies with an older age struc-
ture will save less. This effect is then exacerbated by public Pay-As-You-Go
systems that fail to accumulate capital reserves. Both the evidence and the
theory of this line of thinking are, however, questionable. In terms of empir-
ical evidence of whether pensions systems (particular public Pay-As-You-Go
systems) discourage savings, even the World Bank admits that the jury is still
out [James, 1994, p.125]. Some researchers argue that public Pay-As-You-Go
pension system enable the first generation of the scheme to consume without
saving. Others look at the empirical data and find no conclusive evidence ei-
ther way [Magnussen, 1994]. Understanding whether public Pay-As-You-Go
pension systems inversely affect the national savings rate is hobbled by two
fundamental uncertainties. First, it is difficult to establish, let alone research,
the counterfactual (i.e. what would have happened if there had been no Pay-
As-You-Go system) [James, 1994, p.126]. Second, even if the evidence were
conclusive, MacKellar argues, it “. . .may not tell us very much about the im-
pacts of moving from an existing PAYG-financed system to a CR-financed one”
[MacKellar, 2000, p.12].
Further, despite World Bank assertions, two circumstances militate against
the unambiguously positive effect of mandatory savings plans on national sav-
ings rates. First, given that most countries already operate large public Pay-As-
You-Go plans, any change to Credit-Reserve-financed schemes would require a
transition period: policy-makers need to find ways to finance pensioners’ claims
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under the old Pay-As-You-Go system while compelling workers to contribute
to the new system. None of the available options are attractive. Policy-makers
could simply let the young cohort finance two pensions: their own via manda-
tory savings schemes and those of the retired generation via Pay-As-You-Go
pension contributions. Alternatively, the state could finance the transition by
increased government debt: yet, deficit financing simply replaces the obligation
to serve interest payments with the obligation to support current pensioners
[OECD, 1998, MacKellar, 2000]. Financing the transition by increasing tax-
ation provides another option. Here, however, policy-makers would run into
evasive and distortionary patterns of behaviour. Last, states can cut public
spending to finance the transition and maintain an adequate level of savings
[OECD, 1998, p.5] [MacKellar, 2000, p.12]; recent political experience of bud-
get cuts in Europe, however, shows that containing government spending is as
least as difficult a process as pension reform itself.
Second, MacKellar is doubtful about the efficacy of both mandatory savings
plans and incentives to save (such as tax breaks). Disney argues that, if forced
to pay into a mandatory pension plan, households may find ways to dissave in
other areas of their budgets (i.e. by increasing borrowing) [Disney, 1996]. Again,
the empirical evidence is mixed [MacKellar, 2000, p.3]. Tax exemptions used to
encourage savings also pull in two directions. On the one hand, tax exemptions
produce substitution effects, meaning that current consumption becomes more
expensive leading to increased savings, and income effects, meaning that after
tax income increases and leads to higher consumption. The relative sizes of the
effects will determine whether households will save more or consume more.7 In
any case, the state will save less, since it loses the tax on capital gains. In order,
then, to make savings plans effective, policy-makers will have to
• establish mandatory savings schemes,
• prohibit borrowing against pension assets,
• tax capital gains on retirement savings [MacKellar, 2000, p.13].
But are savings necessarily so crucial to economic growth? MacKellar does
not seem to think so. A reduced level of savings will affect economic growth if
it leads to declining investments. While the change in the age structure may
have an impact on the composition of investment, it does not necessarily have to
depress the level investment. Slower labour force growth, MacKellar asserts, will
however inevitably lead to reduced investment demand. This, in turn, implies
that societies can support a given per capita path of output growth with less
investment. Since societies need to invest less to sustain the same rate of output
growth, ageing presents societies with a “golden opportunity” to maintain levels
of consumption with less savings [MacKellar, 2000, p.19].
In sum, there is little conclusive evidence that public pension systems reduce
national savings and, conversely, that mandatory or voluntary funded schemes
would promote savings. Evasive behaviour of rational individuals equally ap-
plies to mandatory savings plans as it does to public Pay-As-You-Go systems:8
7MacKellar points out that if there is a ceiling on tax-deductible retirement income, high
income households will definitely save less if the ceiling is below what these households would
have been saving anyway.
8The World Bank argument that workers will perceive contributions to mandatory savings
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if policy-makers cannot expect to elicit more savings from households, then, it
would seem, they will have to provide the savings, in the form of public expen-
diture cuts, themselves. What is clear is that an older society
“. . . will inevitably have lower savings than a younger one, because
the ratio of consumers to producers is higher. This will be equally
true whether the pension system is Pay-As-You-Go- or Credit-Reserve-
financed, whether it is defined-benefit or defined-contribution, whether
it is public or private” [MacKellar, 2000, p.15].
Fiscal Balance Economists largely agree that ageing will increase pressures
on the public purse [OECD, 1998, pp.28-35] [MacKellar, 2000, p.15]. Although
the OECD concedes that fiscal impacts of ageing are difficult to assess (due to
the fundamental uncertainties in forecasting demographic and economic trends
mentioned above), the accumulated pension entitlements of the baby-boom gen-
eration are likely to strain fiscal balances once this cohort retires [OECD, 1998,
p.30]. If policy-makers choose to finance public Pay-As-You-Go pension deficits
by budgetary means, the OECD, like the World Bank, fears that
“. . . such a policy could seriously compromise economic efficiency
and dynamism if cuts were to be concentrated in areas such as edu-
cation, research and development, and infrastructure” [James, 1994,
p.34].
Add to this expected steep increases in health care costs [OECD, 1998, p.13]
and we are left with the picture of a dire fiscal squeeze beginning about 2010.
Yet, MacKellar reminds us that the point about what he calls “doom-and-
gloom” fiscal predictions is that “they will never come to pass” [MacKellar, 2000,
p.9]. In the past, he continues, policy-makers have broken pension promises:
there is no reason to believe they will do otherwise in the future. This means
that states will act (by reforming pensions systems, reforming health sectors,
cutting public spending, etc. ) before it comes to “fiscal melt-down”.9
In sum, “expert” opinion, like the policy stories themselves, is divided on
both the basic variables and the economic impacts of ageing. However, there
is general agreement that, modo grosso, ageing will burden public finances and
that current pension arrangements (both public and private) have probably en-
couraged early retirement. The precise shape and form of these effects, however,
is unclear. In terms of labour market distortions and savings, neither economic
theory nor empirical evidence unambiguously points one way or the other: the
size and direction of the impacts will depend on the precise set-up of the econ-
omy. What is more, while economists seem to agree that an ageing society will
save less, they disagree about how much the decline in savings will be, what can
be done about the problem, or, indeed, whether it is a problem at all.
schemes as a price (for which they purchase a good) rather than a tax (that disappears into
thin air) is rather thin. What is more, it presupposes that rational economic agents share the
same enthusiasm for and trust in private sector firms, a dubious assumption at best.
9MacKellar is rather scathing about the argument, that fiscal doom-and gloom predictions
serve a political function in that they create an awareness (albeit an exaggerated one) of the
shape and size of the issue. In particular, he claims that this argument “. . . is precisely how
the Club of Rome modellers defended their silly simulations. The excuse was thin then, and
it’s still thin” [MacKellar, 2000, p.9]. My suspicion, however, is that it is precisely this types




Assertive deliberation is about pushing through policy proposals regardless of
any type of opposition within or beyond the particular policy subsystem. Here,
debate is highly competitive and manipulative. Policy actors use debate to
discredit both the policy goals (deep core) and proposed policy means (pol-
icy core and secondary elements) of rival policy positions with all rhetorical
and discursive means available. Interaction is heated but superficial, polarised
and simplified. In short, policy actors are not inclined to listen to criticism
and hence, no learning, innovation or change takes place; in fact, policy actors
doing the asserting will often view policy-oriented learning with disdain. Com-
mentators often characterise British policy-making under the Thatcher govern-
ments, particularly reforms of the public sector, in terms of assertive deliberation
[Hennessy, 1989].
Strategic deliberation enables policy-makers to tap into reservoirs of knowl-
edge and expertise on selected and controlled policy issues. Based on the belief
that it is profitable to separate policy goals from the means of pursuing them,
strategic deliberation hopes to elicit objective knowledge to guide the efficient
pursuit of predetermined policy objectives. Here, policy actors listen to criticism
and suggestions on means of policy-making (policy core and secondary elements)
without, however, discussing policy objectives and policy goals. Strategic de-
liberation works best (in the sense that it enables policy actors to adapt and
deal with problems) when actors agree on the nature of policy issues and when
these policy issues tend to change very little. Strategic deliberation does less
well in rapidly fluctuating policy domains where policy actors disagree about
the nature of policy problems. In situations calling for responsiveness, strategic
deliberation provides increasing technical sophistication in the delivery of the
same basic policy outputs. As soon as policy debate thematises fundamental
goals and values, strategic deliberation jams and degenerates into an intractable
policy controversy in which policy actors try to resolve normative issues on the
basis of objective facts. Thus, strategic deliberation promotes single-loop learn-
ing in terms of narrowly defined technical knowledge.
Last, reflexive deliberation does not impose any limitations on policy debate.
Reflexive deliberation promotes the critical scrutiny of both the means as well
as the ends of policy. In fact, policy actors engaged in a process of responsive
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deliberation no longer perceive the differentiation between means and ends of
policy-making as being meaningful. Instead, actors know that means are never
value-free and that effective policy-making involves understanding and balancing
contending values. Reflexive deliberation presupposes a predisposition to accept
criticism. This need not be rooted in the psychological make-up of individual
actors but rather in the organisational and cultural structures of the policy




A Guide to the Regions of
Pluralist Democracy
The two dimensions of pluralist democracy, accessibility and responsiveness,
outline a socio-institutional space with nine different regions. Policy subsystems
in the regions emerge from different combinations of accessibility and respon-
siveness. Although we can group the nine region into three distinct provinces,
each region differs in terms of institutional characteristics, vulnerabilities and
mechanisms of adaptation.
The Lowland Regions
Closed Hegemonies: monocentric policy space featuring as-
sertive deliberation
Characteristics: Policy networks in region of the socio-institutional topography
correspond to what Dahl called “closed hegemonies” [Dahl, 1971]. This
policy subsystem features a single social solidarity that dominates policy-
making to the detriment of all other policy actors. The dominant social
solidarity excludes policy actors from rival social solidarities by using the
full spectrum of power resources. The basis for absolute rule is some
form of privileged access to knowledge imbued only to a particular social
solidarity: in closed hegemonies, policy-makers either think they know
what is good for citizens or they do not care about the common good. In
either case, policy-makers feel it is unnecessary to seek advice in any aspect
of policy. In this context, policy debate and deliberation, even given the
narrow range of potential policy conflict, serves to reaffirm policy decisions
taken by the leaders in the policy subsystem.
Vulnerabilities: Since limited accessibility restricts the pool of potential pol-
icy solutions and strategies closed hegemonies are particularly exposed to
conceptual blindness. This is compounded by a mode of political commu-
nication disinclined to even permitting, let alone listening to, criticism.
The resulting errors of judgement and policy failures throw into stark re-
lief the claim that the dominant policy actors know best. What is more,
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displacement of policy conflict further erodes the shaky foundations of
democratic legitimacy as excluded actors look for round-the-corner ways
into the policy subsystem.
Change and Adaptation: Change and internal reform is very difficult in these
types of policy subsystems. Isolated from alternative policy strategies,
closed hegemonies sooner or later come up against policy problems created
by their conceptual blindness which they are no position to solve. Since
closed hegemonies have few mechanisms for strategy switching, change is
always traumatic and absolute. Often forces in the wider political envi-
ronment impose change on closed policy subsystems.
Examples: In Europe, closed hegemonies have, fortunately, become rare at
the national or sectoral levels. However, at regional and communal level,
many policy subsystems and issue areas are run like personal the fiefdoms
of a communal or regional official.
Rational Management: monocentric policy space featuring
strategic deliberation
Characteristics: Rational Management regions consist of a single social solidar-
ity which reserves for itself the exclusive right to define policy issues, set
the agenda, and implement policy. Dominant policy actors in subsystems
geared toward rational management also claim to know what is in the best
interest of its citizens. Unlike closed hegemonies, however, rational pol-
icy managers base their claim to rule on a ’rational’ process of knowledge
management: less confident in their omnipotence, rational managers seek
expert advice on how best to pursue policy objectives. These, however,
remain beyond the scope of deliberation. What is more, members of the
dominant social solidarity define what is to count as expertise and relevant
Vulnerabilities: The major vulnerability of rational management is that the
rational managers may not recognise good advice. In fact, monocentric
rational management defines ’good advice’ as knowledge that accords with
their fundamental policy goals. As a result, policy-makers in rational man-
agement subsystems take a dim view of advice and expertise that questions
the feasibility of predetermined policy goals. Often, policy-makers will
simply ignore or suppress this type of knowledge. This, in turn, exposes
rational management subsystems to highly visible errors and mistakes
(see [Collingridge, 1992]). Displaced policy conflict caused by exclusion
potentially embarrasses policy-makers as frustrated experts find ways of
informing the public of ignored expertise.
Change and Adaptation: Like all monocentric subsystems, the well of policy
solutions and strategies from which rational managers can draw is rather
shallow. At the same time, strategic deliberation prevents policy debate
from thematising fundamental policy issues. The upshot is that while
strategic deliberation may alert rational managers to transformations and
changes in the wider environment, the highly curtailed repertoire of pol-
icy solutions available provides no suitable means of responding to these
changes.
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Examples: Rational management has characterised policy fields concerned
with the development and regulation of large-scale and inflexible tech-
nologies such as nuclear power (fission and fusion) or space exploration.
Collingridge shows how monocentric decision-making for these technolog-
ical systems led to massive disasters (such as the Chernobyl nuclear power
plant accident or the fatal crash of the space shuttle)[Collingridge, 1992].
Continental European pension policy networks prior to the 1990s – par-
ticularly in Germany – also provide an example of monocentric rational
management structures.
Vacillating Dyad: bi-polar policy space featuring assertive
deliberation
Characteristics: Vacillating Dyads consist of policy spaces featuring policy
actors from two dominant social solidarities. Here, the concentration of
power in the subsystem enables one of the two advocacy coalitions to dom-
inate policy-making for a limited time (say, due to the electoral cycle) but
only permits the exclusion of one social solidarity. Assertive deliberation
implies that neither of the social solidarities in the dyad is inclined to
listen to the other when in the driving seat: this leads to considerable
displacement behaviour which acts as a pressure cooker for an already
heated and polarised policy debate.
Vulnerabilities: Assertive deliberation in a bi-polar policy space results in more
aggressive interaction with and ever-decreasing willingness to listen. As
members of social solidarities currently in charge forge ahead with inher-
ently flawed policy solutions, members of the competing social solidarity
can do nothing but shout louder to point to errors and misjudgements.
Policy debate in Vacillating Dyads, then, is at great risk of deteriorating
into a “dialogue of the deaf”.
Adaptation and Change: Since assertive deliberation prevents learning but
the bi-polar policy space provides some choice in policy strategies, policy
bounces back and forth between the two extreme positions in the Vac-
illating Dyad. In each cycle, one social solidarity will implement their
preferred, but inherently flawed, policy solutions ignoring criticism. In-
evitably, when this policy hits the buffers, the contending social solidarity
will take over, make an about turn, and charge in the opposite policy
direction oblivious to any criticism and restraint. While the policy sub-
system vacillated between the two poles, fundamental policy problems
remain unresolved.
Examples: Policy domains featuring highly emotive and explicitly moral policy
issues, such as gay marriage, tend to get defined in these binary terms.
Here, policy initiatives of one social solidarity are undone by the rival
social solidarity in the following policy cycle.
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The Midland Regions
Issue Networks: triangular policy space featuring assertive
deliberation
Characteristics: This region of pluralist democracy corresponds to what Hugh
Heclo called an issue network [Heclo, 1978]. In this socio-institutional
location, we find policy subsystems that provide access to all social sol-
idarities without, however, providing an effective say in policy-making.
Although a high degree of accessibility generates a large pool of poten-
tial policy solutions, the assertive and competitive nature of deliberation
undermines any attempt to realise this potential. In issue networks, con-
tending policy actors spend their time and energy outmanoeuvring their
rivals.
Vulnerabilities: Issue networks are prone to collapsing into a cacophony of
contending and competing voices. Since assertive deliberation undermines
coordination and cooperation, issue networks are prone to disjointed and
poorly coordinated policy formulation and delivery. The ultimate out-
come is poor quality and badly managed public services featuring patchy
coverage in some areas and oversupply in others. Moreover, since issue
networks provide no institutional means for initiating and sustaining co-
operation, policy actors are vulnerable to being divided and conquered by
policy entrepreneurs within or outside the policy subsystem.
Change and Adaptation: The issue network provides policy-makers with no
means of purposely adapting to change in the wider policy environment.
Since poor communication structures and absent norms of reciprocity
disable any coordinated response to perceived challenges, responses to
changes are of an anarchic nature: each social solidarity will respond to
threats it is able to perceive but cannot profit from the ’policy feelers’ of
contending social solidarities. Since no learning takes place, surprise is
prevalent but equally distributed among policy actors.
Examples: In many continental European countries, the political representa-
tion of older peoples’ interests resembles disjointed issue networks. Here,
different types of organisations for and of older people (health related,
political interests, socio-cultural, care, etc. ) compete for policy-makers’
attention. Cooperation is unusual and is not encouraged on part of the
policy-makers. The upshot is that senior citizenship issues and active
ageing concerns languish in the margins of continental European political
life.
The Ivory Tower: monocentric policy spaces featuring re-
flexive deliberation
Characteristics: This region of the socio-institutional space describes gover-
nance dominated by a single social solidarity engaged in reflexive deliber-
ation. Including both aspects of deliberation means that this top left-hand
region of the socio-institutional space describes regimes that attempt to
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implement the ideal of ’benign despotism’ often invoked by economic the-
ory. This, then, is the region of the ’Ivory Tower’. Policy-makers in the
Ivory Tower justify exclusion in terms of expertise in the relevant issue area
much the same way that way physicians exclude other health care profes-
sionals from policy-making. Unlike policy actors in other monocentric
regions, policy actors in the Ivory Tower are explicitly committed to pro-
viding some form of public good in a rational manner: just as physicians
are committed by the Hippocratic oath or university professors (denizens
of the archetypal Ivory Tower) are committed to the pursuit of truth, pol-
icy actors in Ivory Tower policy subsystems are institutionally bound to a
public interest mission. However, while monopoly over the relevant expert
knowledge justifies exclusion of other social solidarities, the commitment
to public service gives rise to reflexive policy debate over the precise nature
of the public good and how best to provide it.
Vulnerabilities: Like issue networks, the imbalance between accessibility and
responsiveness makes Ivory Tower vulnerable to policy inertia and circu-
larity. Monocentric policy-making will lead to policy failure sooner rather
than later. Norms and practises of reflexive deliberation mean that policy-
makers in Ivory Tower will thematise and intensely debate this policy fail-
ure. Without, however, the contending social solidarities and their respec-
tive policy strategies, debate will only produce the same policy responses
that, at best, are toothless and, at worst, exacerbate the problem.
Change and Adaptation: Like all monocentric policy spaces, policy actors in
the Ivory Tower are unable to appreciate the unintended consequences of
their preferred policy or the policy challenges generated by change outside
the policy subsystem. Surprise and policy failure, then, occur frequently.
Yet, while reflexive deliberation provides policy actors with the norms and
practises for double-loop policy learning, the narrow scope of policy con-
flict provides little material for societal learning processes. Debate, while
extensive and prolonged, brings about little in the way of institutional
innovation and effective policy response.
Examples: The surprise of Austrian and German education policy actors about
the results of the PISA study in both 2001 and 2004 suggest that the policy
community is both isolated and self-absorbed. What is more, the inability
to formulate policy responses to perceived weaknesses, despite lengthy and
in-depth debate, point to a reflexive policy debate within a narrow pool
of policy solutions.
Colluding Dyad: bi-polar policy space featuring strategic
deliberation
Characteristics: This region of pluralist democracy probably best describes
most policy domains in Europe. The Colluding Dyad consists of a pol-
icy space in which considerable interorganisational resource dependencies
bind two competing social solidarities into a cooperative set-up. The ba-
sis for this cooperation is an explicit or tacit agreement on policy goals:
this agreement will provide incentives for both social solidarities to co-
operate and exclude the missing social solidarity. Within the boundaries
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of this negotiated policy concord, Colluding Dyads encourageconflict and
deliberation on issues that do not touch fundamental policy issue.
Vulnerabilities: Like other midland regions, the Colluding Dyad tends to get
bogged down and becomes inflexible. The weakness of the Colluding Dyad
emerges from the inherent difficulties of sustaining strategic deliberation
with only two social solidarities. Strategic deliberation is predicated on
limiting policy debate to technical aspects of the policy in hand. However,
since bi-polar systems exclude an active social solidarity from the policy
subsystem, these actors will displace policy conflict to question fundamen-
tal policy objectives. Faced with this external pressure, Colluding Dyads
gives rise to two equally unstable reactions. First, the coalition can co-
coon itself into the alleged policy consensus by limiting the scope of policy
debate and policy-making to ever tightly circumscribed technical details.
As a result, policy debate fails to address what the excluded social soli-
darity is trumpeting as the major policy challenges: policy becomes the
incremental, glacial and largely irrelevant ’politics of the piddling’. This,
in turn, leaves policy-makers open to (predicted and much advertised)
surprises and public management failures. Second, the Colluding Dyad
can react by thematising fundamental policy objectives. This, however,
will give rise to principled policy conflict that strategic deliberation is
incapable of resolving. In a bi-polar policy subsystem with strategic de-
liberation, principled policy conflict quickly degenerates into a ’dialogue
of the deaf’. On the one hand, the absence of the third social solidarity
means that there are no alternative policy strategies available to resolve
potential policy deadlock. On the other hand, strategic deliberation im-
plies that the principal is incapable or unwilling to listen to fundamental
criticism of the agent: this, in turn, only makes the agent shout louder and
refuse to cooperate. This, then, leads to the congestion of policy-making
that commentators refer to as Reformstau.
Change and Adaptation: Of all the regions in the Midlands of pluralist democ-
racy, Colluding Dyads offer policy-makers institutional mechanisms, norms
and practises to adapt to policy challenges. However, both the potential
and the willingness for institutional strategy switching are limited by con-
straints to accessibility and responsiveness. This means that Colluding
Dyads can adapt and respond to a range of policy challenges within the
limits outlined by the policy agreement. If forced to face policy problems
beyond the scope of strategic deliberation, the Colluding Dyad falls apart
and/ or is replaced by another Dyad [Schwarz and Thompson, 1990].
Examples: In Europe, colluding dyads are common in the top-down neo-
corporatist systems of continental Europe. For example, labour market
regulation in Austria emerges from a collusion of individualist and hier-
archical actors. The basis for their cooperation is a broad and flexible
definition of full-employment as well as a tacit agreement about the role
of social partners in structuring the policy subsystem [Ney, 2004a].
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The Highland Regions:
Learning Dyad: bi-polar policy space featuring responsive
deliberation
Characteristics: In this region of the highlands we find a type of policy subsys-
tem featuring a coalition of two social solidarities with strong interorgan-
isational dependencies. Reflexive deliberation characteristic of this region
means that policy outputs and policy outcomes reflect the framings and
policy solutions of both participating social solidarities. In the Learning
Dyad, policy actors from the two social solidarities critically scrutinise
both the means and the fundamental ends of policy-making. Thus, in
the long-run, contending policy actors adapt and develop their policy sto-
ries in the light of criticism and contestation. This, then, corresponds
to what Paul Sabatier and Hank-Jenkins-Smith refer to a “mature policy-
subsystem” that enables “policy-oriented learning” (see Chapter ??). Yet,
the Learning Dyad fails to include the third active social solidarity.
Vulnerabilities: Compared to the Colluding Dyad, the Learning Dyad produces
less internal pressures for change and, as a result, is a relatively stable
policy network. However, like any policy subsystem that restricts access,
the Learning Dyad encourages displacement behaviour and is vulnerable
to surprises caused by conceptual blindness.
Change and Adaptation: Given the responsive nature of policy deliberation in
Learning Dyad, the policy network inherently leans towards extending the
scope of policy conflict by including the third active social solidarity. In
short, the internal dynamic of the Learning Dyad nudges policy networks
towards Clumsy Institutions.
Examples: In Europe, Learning Dyads are most common in the bottom-up
corporatist systems of the Nordic countries [Ervik, 2001, Piekkola, 2004].
For example, active ageing programmes for older Finnish workers represent
a Learning Dyad between individualists (firms) and hierarchy (the state
and the unions): here, close interaction at all levels as well as uninhibited
deliberation have produced comprehensive policies safeguarding the occu-
pational health and work-ability of older Finnish workers. However, while
exemplary in Europe, these active ageing programmes are limited to the
labour market and do not extend social citizenship (as egalitarians would
demand) to all older people.
Strategic Pluralism: triangular policy space featuring strate-
gic deliberation
Characteristics: This region houses policy subsystems in which all three ac-
tive social solidarities are engaged in strategic cooperation. Like other
regions featuring strategic deliberation, social solidarities interact only if
they believe they can capitalise from collaboration. While in the short-
run, two social solidarities can form a coalition for a particular project,
power is sufficiently diffuse to discourage the permanent exclusion of any
social solidarity.
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Vulnerabilities: Although strategic pluralist policy subsystems can draw on the
full scope of policy conflict, strategic deliberation limits policy debate to
common strategic interests. In these types of policy subsystems, displace-
ment of conflict about fundamental issues and policy goals takes the form
of defining and negotiating common interests. This detracts resources from
formulating and implementing policy responses to the challenges at hand.
Unlike Colluding Dyads, however, there is less danger of policy deadlock
since the wider pool of policy strategies offers policy-makers real choices.
This and the fact that agreements on policy goals are more difficult to
sustain in triangular policy spaces makes Strategic Pluralist systems in-
herently more dynamic and fluid.
Change and Adaptation: The active participation of all three social solidari-
ties in policy-making, albeit limited to strategic interaction, enables policy
actors to react to internal and external change. However, the dynamic na-
ture of complete accessibility, in combination with strategic deliberation,
means that strategic pluralist subsystems rapidly reach the boundaries of
’permitted’ debate. Unlike Colluding Dyads, triangular policy spaces pro-
vide only weak incentives to suppress debate on fundamental policy issues.
Strategic pluralism, then, is a volatile region in which debate can rapidly
degenerate to an issue network but can equally develop into Clumsy In-
stitution.
Examples: The OECD’s vision of modern governance and citizen participa-
tion falls squarely into this category. Here, the OECD argues in favour
of wide access to decision-making and policy deliberation for citizens
[OECD PUMA, 2001]. However, this vision conceptualises citizens pri-
marily in terms of reservoirs of knowledge and expertise to be mined by
policy-makers. Citizen participation, then, is designed to produce knowl-
edge to improve and refine specific policies and measures (this may include
scrapping policies and measures). The broad policy framework and policy
orientation, however, remains outside the remit of citizen participation.
Clumsy Institutions: triangular policy space featuring re-
sponsive deliberation
Characteristics: The upper right-hand region of the socio-institutional ter-
rain is the ultimate destination for any process of democratisation. Here,
all three social solidarities have full access to the policy subsystem and
responsive deliberation provides each social solidarity with an effective
say in policy-making. In short, this region corresponds to Dahl’s idea
of polyarchy. For Cultural Theorists, policy subsystems featuring all ac-
tive social solidarities engaged in a critical but constructive policy debate
constitute clumsy institutions. (see section ??)
Vulnerabilities: Clumsy institutions minimise the twin pressures on policy-
making. Since clumsy institutions include all the active social solidarities,
they vastly reduce the risks of displaced policy conflict. Moreover, the re-
sponsive and critical engagement of all active social solidarities minimises
the risk of conceptual blindness thereby increasing the robustness of policy
outputs.
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Change and Adaptation: Unlike other regimes, clumsy institutions do not
attempt to inhibit the dynamic effects of policy conflict: change, reform
and strategy switching, then, are inherent to clumsy institutions.
Examples: Policy spaces in this province of the socio-institutional landscape
are as rare as landscapes at the other end of the map. Urban transport
planning in Munich, Frank Hendriks contends, has emerged from a clumsy
policy process featuring constructive policy interaction between all active
social solidarities [Hendriks, 1994]. As a result, Munich now boasts a
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[Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004] Koppenjan, J. and Klijn, E.-H., editors (2004).
Managing Uncertainties in Networks. Routledge, London.
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[Schmähl, 1999] Schmähl, W. (1999). Pension Reforms in Germany: Major
Topics, Decisions and Developments. In Transformation of Social Security:
Pensions in Central-Eastern Europe. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg.
[Schmidt, 2000] Schmidt, V. (2000). Values and discourse in the politics of
adjustment. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
[Schmidt, 2002] Schmidt, V. (2002). The Futures of European Capitalism. Ox-
ford University Press, New York, NY.
[Schmidt and Radelli, 2004] Schmidt, V. and Radelli, C. M. (2004). Policy
change and discourse in europe: Conceptual and methodological issues. West
European Politics, 27(2):183–210.
[Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979] Schmitter, P. and Lehmbruch, G., editors
(1979). Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation. Sage Publications, Bev-
erley Hills, California.
[Schmutzer, 1994] Schmutzer, M. E. A. (1994). Ingenium und Individuum: eine
sozialwissenschaftliche Theorie der Technik und Wissenschaft. Springer Ver-
lag, Wien.
377
[Schmutzer and Bandler, 1980] Schmutzer, M. E. A. and Bandler, W. (1980).
Hi and Low — In and Out: Approaches to Social Status. Journal of Cyber-
netics, 10:283–299.
[Schofield, 1993] Schofield, N. (1993). The Role of Government. In Transport,
the Environment and Sustainable Development, pages 117–124. E&FN Spon,
London.
[Schwarz and Thompson, 1990] Schwarz, M. and Thompson, M. (1990). Di-
vided We Stand: Redefining Politics, Technology and Social Choice. Harvester
Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.
[Shaw, 1997] Shaw, B. (1997). Environmental security. In Joint IIASA/LOS
Conference on Security, Laxenburg, Austria.
[Sikkink et al., 2002] Sikkink, K., Khagram, S., and Riker, J. (2002). Re-
structuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and
Norms. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
[Simon, 1945] Simon, H. (1945). Administrative Behaviour. Free Press, New
York.
[Sjoberg, 1998] Sjoberg, L. (1998). World views, political attitudes and risk
perceptions. Risk: Health, Safety and Environment, 137:137–153.
[Skocpol, 1995] Skocpol, T. (1995). Social Policy in the United States: Future
Possibilities in Historical Perspective. Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey.
[Smith, 1993] Smith, M. J. (1993). Pressure, Power and Policy: State Au-
tonomy and Policy Networks in Britain and the United States. Harvester
Wheatsheaf, London.
[Steinmo et al., 1992] Steinmo, S., Thielen, K., and Longstreth, F., editors
(1992). Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Anal-
ysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[Stone, 1988] Stone, D. (1988). Policy Paradox and Political Reason. Scott
Foresman, Glenview, Illinois.
[Stone, 1997] Stone, D. (1997). Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision
Making. W.W. Norton & Company, London.
[Strategic Policy-Making Team, 1999] Strategic Policy-Making Team (1999).
Professional Policy-Making for the Twenty-First Century. Policy document,
The Cabinet Office, London.
[Strohmeier, 2003] Strohmeier, G. A. (2003). Zwischen Gewaltenteilung und
Reformstau: Wie viele Vetospieler braucht das Land. Aus Politik und Zeit-
geschichte, 51:17–22.
[Synder, 1999] Synder, F. (1999). Globalisation and europeanisation as friends
and rivals: European union law in global economic networks. EUI Working
Paper LAW no.99/8, European University Institute, Florence.
378
[Tálos and Kittel, 2001] Tálos, E. and Kittel, B. (2001). Gesetzgebung in
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